Garver Newton. Notes for a linguistic reading of the Categories. In Ancient logic and its modern interpretations. Proceedings
of the Buffalo Symposium on Modernist Interpretations of Ancient Logic, 21 and 22 April, 1972. Edited by Corcoran John. Dordrecht: Reidel 1974. pp. 27-32
Gercke Alfred, "Ursprung der aristotelischen Kategorien," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 4: 424-441 (1891).
Gillespie Charles Melville, "The Aristotelian Categories," Classical Quarterly 19: 79-84 (1925).
Reprinted in: J. Barnes, M. Schofield, R. Sorabji (eds.) - Articles on Aristotle - Vol. 3 - Metaphysics - London, Duckworth, 1979, pp. 1-12
Graeser Andreas, "Probleme der Kategorienlehre des Aristoteles," Studia Philosophica.Jahrbuch der Schweizerischen Philosophischen
Gesellschaft 37: 59-81 (1977).
Graeser Andreas. Aspekte der Ontologie in der Kategorienschrift. In Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum. Studien zu einigen Dubia.
Akten des 9. Symposium Aristotelicum, Berlin, 7-16 September 1981. Edited by Moraux Paul and Wiesner Jürgen. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1983. pp. 30-56
Graham Daniel W. Aristotle's two systems. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1987.
Hacking Ian, "Aristotelian categories and cognitive domains," Synthese 126: 473-515 (2001).
"This paper puts together an ancient and a recent approach to classificatory language, thought, and ontology.It includes on the one hand an interpretation of
Aristotle's ten categories, with remarks on his first category, called (or translated as) substance in the Categories or What a thing is in
the Topics. On the other hand is the idea of domain-specific cognitive abilities urged in contemporary developmental psychology. Each family of ideas
can be used to understand the other. Neither the metaphysical nor the psychological approach is intrinsically more fundamental; they complement each other. The
paper incidentally clarifies distinct uses of the word 'category' in different disciplines, and also attempts to make explicit several notions of 'domain'. It
also examines Aristotle's most exotic and least discussed categories, being-in-a-position (e.g., sitting) and having-(on) (e.g., armour).
Finally the paper suggests a tentative connection between Fred Sommers' theory of types and Aristotle's first category."
Hamlyn David W., "Aristotle on predication," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 6: 110-126 (1961).
Hamlyn David W., "Focal meaning," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78: 1-18 (1978).
"The Aristotelian doctrine of focal meaning or "pros hen" homonymy involves a doctrine of primary and secondary meanings, as distinct from primary and
secondary cases, such that the secondary meaning is derivative from the primary. Aristotle seems to want to use this idea to establish an "ontological"
dependence of the secondary on the primary. Since he holds a realist theory of meaning there is circularity in this. Aristotle's use of 'cosmological' types of
argument is discussed, together with the question how far this kind of argument can be supported by considerations about meaning. The general limitations on
the use of the notion of focal meaning are set out."
Heimsoeth Heinz. Zum Geschichte der Kategorienlehre. In Nicolai Hartmann, der Denker und sein Werk. Fünfzehn Abhandlungen mit einer
Bibliographie. Edited by Heimsoeth Heinz and Heiss Robert. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1952. pp. 144-172
Heinaman Robert, "Non-substantial individuals in the Categories," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 26 (295): 307
(1981).
"There is a dispute as to what sort of entity non-substantial individuals are in Aristotle's Categories. The traditional interpretation holds that
non-substantial individuals are individual qualities, quantities, etc. For example, Socrates' white is an individual quality belonging to him alone,
numerically distinct from (though possibly specifically identical with) other individual colors. I will refer to these sorts of entities as 'individual
instances.'
The new interpretation (1) suggests instead that non-substantial individuals are atomic species such as a specific shade of white that is indivisible into more
specific shades. On this view, non-substantial individuals are what we would call universals (2) which can be present in different individual substances, but
are labelled 'individuals' by Aristotle because, like individual substances, there is nothing they are said of. (3)
In this paper I will defend the traditional account by attempting to show that it is supported by the slender textual evidence that is available. I will begin
by stating three serious objections to the traditional interpretation. Next I will show that in works later than the Categories Aristotle accepted
individual instances of properties of the sort found in the Categories by the traditional interpretation. Finally, I will set out the evidence that
supports the traditional interpretation and answer the three objections."
(1) G. E. L. Owen, "Inherence," Phronesis (1965), pp. 97-105; Michael Frede, "Individuen bei Aristoteles," Antike and Abendland (1978), pp. 16-31. In fact, it
is not clear to me what Professor Frede considers non-substantial individuals to be. While he refers approvingly to Owen, Owen's account collapses the
distinction between eidei en and arithmo en in the case of non-substances whereas it appears that Frede wishes to retain this distinction (pp. 23-24). Since he
does not explain what individual non-substances which are numerically different but specifically identical are supposed to be or in virtue of what they are
numerically different, by the "new interpretation" I will mean solely that explained in the text.
(2) This is not, as Allen, Matthews and Cohen think, an objection to the new interpretation (R. E. Allen, "Individual Properties in Aristotle's Categories,"
Phronesis (1969), p. 37; Gary Matthews and S. Marc Cohen, "The One and the Many," Review of Metaphysics (1968), pp. 640-41). There is no justification for the
presupposition that Aristotle must have used the terms 'individual' and 'universal' in the Categories in the same way as in later works or as they are used
today. (Of course, the word ' katholou' does not appear in the Categories).
(3) That is, for any individual x there is no y such that the name and definition of x are predicable of y (2a19-27).
Hetherington Stephen, "A note on inherence," Ancient Philosophy: 218-223 (1984).
"Aristotle's Categories quarters the world via the interaction of two relations -- the said-of relation and the inherence relation.
Aristotle's definition of the latter is unperspicuous, and many scholars have attempted its clarification. The matter's still unresolved; for instance, Owen's
important account is vague. I construct an Aristotelian account of conceptual inherence; I then make Owen's account precise. Plausibly, the result is that
Aristotle's view of the world's structure is a little clearer."
Hintikka Jaakko, "Aristotle and the ambiguity of ambiguity," Inquiry 2: 137-151 (1959).
Reprinted as Chapter 1 in: J. Hintikka - Time and necessity. Studies in Aristotle's theory of modality - Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1973 pp.
1-26.
Hintikka Jaakko, "Different kinds of equivocation in Aristotle," Journal of the History of Philosophy 9: 368-371 (1971).
Hintikka Jaakko, "Semantical games, the alleged ambiguity of 'is' and Aristotelian categories," Synthese 54: 443-468 (1983).
Reprinted in: J. Hintikka - Analysis of Aristotle - Selected Papers - Vol. 6, Dordrecht, Springer, 2004 , pp. 23-44.
Hintikka Jaakko. The varieties of Being in Aristotle. In The logic of Being: historical studies. Edited by Knuuttila Simo and
Hintikka Jaakko. Dodrecht: Kluwer 1986. pp. 81-114
Hirschberger Johannes, "Paronymie und Analogie bei Aristoteles," Philosophisches Jahrbuch 68: 191-203 (1960).
Hood Pamela M. Aristotle on the category of Relation. Washington: University Press of America 2004.
"Preface.
Many philosophers believe that Aristotle does not have, and indeed could not have, a theory of relation, even one that accounts for relations involving two
terms, i.e., dyadic relations. Aristotle's logical, metaphysical and ontological views, especially his substance-accident ontology, are seen as restricting
Aristotle to only one-place or monadic relations, and prohibiting the logical space for a separate entity, relation, to exist. Hence, Aristotle's conception of
relation is perceived to be so divergent from our own that it does not count as a theory of relation at all. I aim to show that the critics are wrong to speak
so poorly of Aristotle's account of relation.
I argue that Aristotle's theory has some of the basic features that a theory of relation must have. I begin in Part One by sketching out the critics' charges.
I then outline the main features of Aristotle's philosophy that inform his treatment of the category of relation, and briefly survey Aristotle's discussion of
relational issues scattered throughout the corpus. Next, I present an exegesis of Aristotle's two central texts on relation, Categories 7 and
Metaphysics V 15, and discuss the various accounts of relational entities or relatives therein. In Part Two, I examine two problems. First, I address
the problem of how best to interpret Aristotle's relatives. Second, I explore the epistemological difficulties stemming from Aristotle's view in the Categories
that relation involves two relative items or terms and that if one relative item is known definitely the other item must also be known definitely.
I conclude that Aristotle's treatment of relatives reveals his commitment to the view that there be a dyad, i.e., at least two items, involved in a relation.
Furthermore, I show that Aristotle includes in his theory something that accounts for the relation itself, i.e., something approaching a logical relational
predicate. I do not suggest that Aristotle attempts to construct a relational theory comparable to our own. But I do suggest that given Aristotle's grasp of
the dyadic nature of relation, we have good reason to believe Aristotle's theory of relation is more robust than many suspect."
Husik Isaac, "On the Categories of Aristotle," Philosophical Review 13: 514-528 (1904).
Reprinted (conjointed with Husik 1939) in: I. Husik - Philosophical essays, ancient, mediaeval, and modern - Edited by Milton C. Nahm and Leo Strauss,
Oxford, Blackwell, 1952, pp. 96-112.
Husik Isaac, "The authenticity of Aristotle's Categories," Journal of Philosophy 36: 427-433 (1939).
Reprinted (conjointed with Husik 1904) in: I. Husik - Philosophical essays, ancient, mediaeval, and modern - Edited by Milton C. Nahm and Leo Strauss,
Oxford, Blackwell, 1952, pp. 96-112.
Irwin Terence H., "Homonymy in Aristotle," Review of Metaphysics 34: 523-544 (1981).
"In the works of Aristotle, homonymy and multivocity are often the same, and neither is intended to mark different senses of words. Aristotle searched for
homonymy not to encourage skepticism, but to forestall skepticism which might result from rejection of Plato's belief that every name had one essence."
Irwin Terence H. Aristotle's concept of signification. In Language and Logos. Studies in ancient Greek philosophy presented to G. E. L.
Owen. Edited by Schofield Malcolm and Nussbaum Martha. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982. pp. 241-266
Jacobs William, "Aristotle and nonreferring subjects," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 24: 282-300 (1979).
"It is a widely accepted view amongst scholars that Aristotle believed that the subject of an assertion might fail to refer. Two texts, De
interpretatione XI 21 a 25-28 and Categories X 13 b 12-35, are generally cited as evidence for this belief. In this paper I argue that both
passages have previously been misunderstood and that Aristotle did not accept the possible referential failure of the subject of an assertion. In section I,
after first discussing the standard interpretations of both texts, I note the difficulties which result from these accounts. In section II I offer a brief
general argument showing that Aristotle's own account of what an assertion is implies that it is impossible for the subject of an assertion to fail to refer.
In section III I present my own analysis of each passage and show that when properly understood neither is in any way concerned with the problem of referential
failure."
Janko Richard, "A fragment of Aristotle's Poetics from Porphyry, concerning synonymy," Classical Quarterly 32: 323-326
(1982).
Jones Barrington, "Individuals in Aristotle's Categories," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy: 107-123
(1972).
"It is argued that the notion of an individual, whether substantial or non-substantial, in Aristotle's Categories can be satisfactorily explicated by
taking seriously their characterization as things that are 'one in number'. This is interpreted as 'what can be a unit in an enumeration'. 'A particular white'
will then be 'some particular substance's white'. On the basis of this account the notions of homonymy, synonymy and paronymy are explicated in such a way that
the three are on a par one with each of the others and that there is a clear connection between the introduction of these notions and the remainder of the
Categories."
Jones Barrington, "An introduction to the first five chapters of Aristotle's Categories," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient
Philosophy 20: 146-172 (1975).
Kahn Charles H. Questions and Categories. Aristotle's doctrine of categories in the light of modern research. In Questions. Edited
by Hiz Henry. Dordrecht: Reidel 1978. pp. 227-278
"The categories of Aristotle do not represent a complete logical inventory, a classification of all terms or concepts represented in language. They do attempt
to classify all the terms of a basic object language, where these terms are specified by the questions that can be asked or answered concerning an individual
subject. Hence the number of categories will be determined by the number of fundamentally distinct questions that can be raised concerning such a subject. As
has often been pointed out, the full list of ten given in the Categories and in Topics 1.9 suggests that Aristotle must have taken a human being as his
specimen subject, for only in this case would the two minor categories, Posture and Having (or Clothing) be natural topics of inquiry.
There is, then, a factual connection between Aristotle's list of categories and the linguistic forms of question or inquiry. But what is the philosophical
significance of this connection? Reflection on this matter may proceed along two quite distinct lines of thought, each of which could provide material for a
study devoted to questions and categories. On the one hand, we might consider Aristotle's doctrine simply as an early example of the genre, and widen the
concept of category to include modern theories of logical, conceptual, and grammatical categories. Our topic would then become: the connection between
interrogative forms and categorial distinctions in general. On the other hand, we may keep our attention fixed on Aristotle's doctrine but generalize the
remark about interrogative forms to include other grammatical or linguistic considerations. Our topic will then be: the significance of the connections between
Aristotle's scheme of categories and certain facts of grammar, including the grammar of questions in Greek. It is this second topic that I propose to study
here: I will discuss Aristotle's theory, not category theories in general." pp. 227-228 (notes omitted)
Kapp Ernst. Greek foundations of traditional logic. New York: Columbia University Press 1942.
Contents: I. The origin of logic as a science 3; II. Concepts, terms, definitions, ideas, categories 20; III. Judgments, subject and predicate 43; IV.
Syllogisms 60; V. Induction; ancient and modern logic 75; Books cited 89; Index 91-95.
Kapp Ernst. Die Kategorienlehre in der aristotelischen Topik. In Ausgewählte Schriften. Edited by Diller Hans and Diller Inez.
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1968. pp. 215-253
Wirtten in 1920, but first published in 1968.
Kenny Anthony John Patrick. A stylometric comparison between five disputed works and the remainder of the Aristotelian corpus. In
Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum. Studien zu einigen Dubia. Akten des 9. Symposium Aristotelicum, Berlin, 7-16 September 1981. Edited by Moraux
Paul and Wiesner Jürgen. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1983. pp. 345-366
Kosman Louis Aryeh, "Aristotle's first predicament," Review of Metaphysics 20: 483-506 (1967).
Reprinted in: Mary L. O'Hara (ed.) - Substances and things. Aristotle's doctrine of physical substance in recent essays - Washington, University Press
of America, 1982.
Kwan Tze-Wan. The doctrine of categories and the topology of concern. In The logic of the living present. Edited by Tymieniecka
Anna-Teresa. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2008. pp. 243-301
Analectas Husserliana - Vol. 46
Lallot Jean, "Origines et développement de la théorie des parties du discours en Grèce," Langages 92: 11-23 (1988).
Lewis Frank. Substance and predication in Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991.
Lugarini Leo, "Il problema delle categorie in Aristotele," Acme.Annali della Facolta di Filosofia e Lettere dell'Universita di
Milano 8: 3-107 (1955).
Reprinted as volume, Milano, Nuvoletti, 1955.
Maier Heinrich. Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles. Tübingen: H. Laupp 1896.
Vol. 1. Die logische Theorie des Urteils bei Aristoteles. Berichtigte Neuausgabe mit einem Anhang: Die Echtheit der aristotelischen Hermeneutik (1896); Vol. 2.
Die logische Theorie des Syllogismus und die Entstehung der aristotelischen Logik: 1. Formenlehre und Technik des Syllogismus (1897); 2. Die Entstehung der
aristotelischen Logik (1900).
Reprint: Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1969-1970.
Majolino Claudio. De la grammaire à l'ontologie et retour. Le rapport entre catégories de l'être et grammaire philosophique selon
Trendelenburg et Marty. In Aristote au XIX siècle. Edited by Thouard Denis. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Unversitaires du Septentrion 2004. pp.
Malcolm John, "On the generation and corruption of the Categories," Review of Metaphysics 33: 662-681 (1981).
Mann Wolfgang-Rainer. The discovery of things. Aristotle's Categories and their context. Princeton: Princeton University Press
2000.
Mansion Suzanne. La doctrine aristotélicienne de la substance et le traité des Catégories. In Proceedings of the Tenth
International Congress of Philosophy. Amsterdam (11-18th August, 1949). Edited by Beth Evert Willem, Pos H.J., and Kollak J.H.A. Amsterdam: North-Holland
1949. pp. 1097-1100
Vol. I, fasc. 2.
Mansion Suzanne. Notes sur la doctrine des catégories dans les Topiques. In Aristotle on dialectic: the Topics. Proceedings of
the Third Symposium Aristotelicum (Oxford, 1963). Edited by Owen Gwilym Ellis Lane. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1968. pp. 189-201
Reprinted in: S. Mansion - Études aristoteliciennes. Recueil d'articles - Louvain-la-Neuve, Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1984, pp.
169-182.
Matthen Mohan, "The Categories and Aristotle's ontology," Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical Review 17: 228-243 (1978).
"What where Aristotle's aims in the Categories? We can probably all agree that he wanted to say something about different uses of the verb 'to be' --
something relevant to ontology. The conventional interpretation goes further: it has Books Gamma and Zeta of the Metaphysics superseding theories put
forward in the Categories. We should expect then that the Categories and these books of the Metaphysics try to do the same sort of thing.
Most exegetes do indeed ascribe to the earlier work fairly elaborate ontologies, though they are in disagreement as to what theory Aristotle held while writing
it. I shall argue in this paper that the whole enterprise of reconstructing the ontology of the Categories from its small stock of clues is misguided;
that the business of the Categories is to set out data for which the Metaphysics tries to account. This view is not without consequence
relevant to some widely held theses. I shall claim that the difference between the Categories and the Metaphysics cannot uncritically be used
to trace the development of Aristotle's ontology, that the differences between the two doctrines has been greatly exaggerated."
Matthews Gareth B. and Cohen S.Marc, "The one and the many," Review of Metaphysics 21: 630-655 (1968).
"We discuss Aristotle's Categories as an answer to Plato's one-over-many argument. For Plato, F-ness is something "over against" particular F things;
to predicate "F" of these things is to assert that they all stand in a certain relation to F-ness. Aristotle answers that predication is classification; and
there being a classification of a certain sort is a fact correlative with there being things classifiable in the way the classification in question would
classify them."
Matthews Gareth B., "The enigma of Categories 1a20ff and why it matters," Apeiron 22: 91-104 (1989).
"I discuss three interpretations of Aristotle's definition of 'in a subject' at Categories 1a24-5 -- one associated with Michael Frede, one with G. E.
L. Owen and one with John Ackrill. I consider whether Ammonius's commentary on the Categories -- particularly his treatment of the fragrance in the
apple that leaves the apple and comes to us -- should lead us to settle on one of the three interpretations. Finally, I sketch the 'metaphysics of containers'
presented in the Categories and try to explain why the definitional question is important for assessing that metaphysical doctrine."
Menn Stephen, "Metaphysics, dialectic and the Categories," Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 100: 311-337 (1995).
Mignucci Mario, "Aristotle's definitions of relatives in Categories chapter 7," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy
31: 101-127 (1986).
Minio-Paluello Lorenzo, "The text of the Categoriae: the Latin tradition," Classical Quarterly 39: 63-74 (1945).
Reprinted in: L. Minio-Paluello - Opuscola: the Latin Aristotle - Amsterdam, Adolf M. Hakkert, 1972, pp.28-39.
Morales Fabio, "Relational attributes in Aristotle," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 39: 255-274 (1994).
"Aristotle's theory of relations involves serious difficulties of interpretation. By attempting to solve some of the problems posed by J. L. Ackrill in his
famous commentary on the Categories (Ackrill, 1963), I hope to contribute to a better understanding of Aristotle's statements on the nature and status
of relational attributes. In general, my procedure has been to analyze the criteria by which entities are supposed to fall under the category of 'the
relative'. The following topics will be considered: i) Aristotle's two definitions of relatives in Categories 7, ii) the pseudo-relational character
of the parts of substances, and iii) the threefold classification of relatives in Metaphysics chapter 15. A corollary of these discussions will be
that relations may have played for Aristotle a far more conspicuous role in the 'definition' of substances and attributes than has been hitherto acknowledged."
Moravcsik Julius. Aristotle's theory of Categories. In Aristotle. A collection of critical essays. Edited by Moravcsik Julius. New
York: Doubleday & Co. Inc. 1967. pp. 125-145
Moravcsik Julius, "Aristotle on predication," Philosophical Review 76: 80-96 (1967).
"In the Topics, Categories, and De Interpretatione, Aristotle is struggling with a variety of problems that span the fields of metaphysics
and philosophy of language. Both the problems and the attempted solutions have much relevance to some of the main issues in contemporary British and American
philosophy. Thus it is unfortunate that though there is a large number of ancient commentaries on these texts, little has been written on these matters in
modern times that is of genuine philosophical significance. Professor Ackrill's new translation and notes' make a fine contribution toward remedying this
deficiency. (...)
It is impossible to write a complete review of Ackrill's book, for, not being able to assume familiarity with Aristotle's theories, the reviewer would have to
cover simultaneously Aristotle's views, the quality of the new translation, and the quality of Ackrill's notes. As an alternative, the reviewer hopes to
introduce the reader to this volume by selecting one of the key nest of problems that Aristotle discusses in these works and discussing Aristotle's views, the
translation, and Ackrill's views in this limited context. Unfortunately, even this limited task is too large for the size of a paper to be expected under these
circumstances. Nevertheless, this sketchy introduction might be of some value to those interested in the problems at hand."
Morison Benjamin. Les Catégories d'Aristote comme introduction à la logique. In Les Catégories et leur histoire. Edited by
Bruun Otto and Corti Lorenzo. Paris: Vrin 2005. pp. 103-119
Morrison Donald. The taxonomical interpretation of Aristotle's Categories: a criticism. In Aristotle's ontology. Edited by
Preus Anthony and Anton John Peter. Albany: State University of New York Press 1992. pp. 19-46
Narcy Michel, "L'homonymie entre Aristote et ses commentateurs néo-platoniciens," Études Philosophiques: 35-52 (1981).
Nowak Michael, "Toward understanding Aristotle's Categories," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26: 117-123 (1965).
"It is maintained that three positions must be assumed in order to interpret the first five chapters of Aristotle's Categories. This includes the
meaning and role of "present in a subject." These positions are: 1) a rejection of univocity, 2) a dual conception of accident, 3) the principle of
discrimination. There are some comments on Aristotle's attempts to work out a notion of science that would account, at the same time, for the flux of
individuals and the necessity and universality proper to science. It is concluded that within the individual or the concrete, particular present, is grasped
the necessity required for science. Also, from insight flows the concept or definition, which is the universalization of the insight."
O'Brien Denis, "Aristote et la catégorie de quantité. Divisions de la quantité," Études Philosophiques: 25-40 (1978).
O'Farrell Frank, "Aristotle's categories of Being," Gregorianum 63: 87-131 (1982).
Oehler Klaus. Peirce contra Aristotle. Two forms of the theory of categories. In Proceedings of the C. S. Peirce Bicentennial
international Congress. Edited by Ketner Kenneth Laine. Lubbock: Texas Tech Press 1976. pp. 335-342
Owen Gwilym Ellis Lane. Logic and metaphysics in some earlier works of Aristotle. In Aristotle and Plato in the mid-fourth century.
Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum held at Oxford in August, 1957. Edited by Düring Ingemar and Owen Gwilym Ellis Lane. Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri
Aktiebolag 1960. pp.
Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen - Logic, science and dialectic. Collected papers in Greek philosophy - Edited by Martha Nussbaum, Ithaca, Cornell
University Press, pp. 180-199.
Owen Gwilym Ellis Lane, "Inherence," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 10: 97-105 (1965).
Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen - Logic, science and dialectic. Collected papers in Greek philosophy - Edited by Martha Nussbaum, Ithaca, Cornell
University Press, pp. 252-258.
Owens Joseph. The doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. A study of the Greek background of mediaeval thought. Toronto:
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1951.
Third revised edition 1978
Owens Joseph, "Aristotle on categories," Review of Metaphysics 14: 73-90 (1960).
"The author argues that the Aristotelian doctrine of categories was based upon the natures of things, and not, as has been contended, upon the use of words.
Therefore, category definition or construction was not an arbitrary procedure. However, the natures of things exist both in reality and in cognition;
accordingly, logical as well as metaphysical features are involved in Aristotle's presentation of the categories. The author suggests in explanation that the
natures upon which the categories bear are common to both logic and metaphysics. He then analyzes three types of category mistake in terms of Aristotle's
treatment."
Palu Chiara, "Le definizioni dei relativi nelle Categorie di Aristotele: una risposta a David Sedley," Dianoia 5: 39-55
(2000).
"This paper analyzes the two definitions of relatives in chapter 7 of Aristotle's Categories starting from David Sedley's recent article on this
topic. In particular, using Simplicius's Commentary, I suggest some new arguments for Sedley's emendation at 8b18, which make it possible to read the
expression 'aute e kephale' in the sense of the head in itself (a substance) in opposition to the head as a part of the body ('per accidens'). The
consequence of this interpretation is that it changes the meaning of the second definition of relatives, making it able to distinguish between what is a
relative as such and what is a relative accidentally."
Patzig Günther. Bemerkungen zu den Kategorien des Aristoteles. In Einheit und Vielheit. Festschrift für Carl friedrich v.
Weizsachker zum 60. Geburstag. Edited by Scheibe Erhard and Süssmann Georg. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1973. pp. 60-76
Pelletier Yvan, "Le propos et le proème des Attributions (Catégories) d'Aristote," Laval Théologique et
Philosophique 43: 31-47 (1987).
"Le but de cet article est de manifester qu'Aristote, dans ses Attributions (Catégories), a pour propos de fournir le prémier principe systématique de
toute recherche de definition. Ce but est atteint en deux temps: 1) par l'exposé direct de la conception que s'en fait l'auteur de l'article; 2) par la
verification de cette conception à travers une lecture rigoureuse des quatre premiers chapitres formant le proème aux Attributions."
Ragnisco Pietro. Storia critica delle categorie, dai primordi della filosofia greca sino ad Hegel. Firenze: Cellini 1871.
Two volumes.
Reale Giovanni, "Filo conduttore grammaticale e filo conduttore ontologico nella deduzione delle categorie aristoteliche," Rivista di
Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 49: 423-458 (1957).
Revised edition with the title: Filo conduttore grammaticale, filo conduttore logico e filo conduttore ontologico nella deduzione delle categorie
aristoteliche e significati polivalenti di esse su fondamenti ontologici - in: Adolf Trendelenburg - La dottrina delle categorie in Aristotele -
Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1994, pp. 17-70.
Reisinger Klaus. Kategorien und Seinsbedeutung bei Aristoteles. In Sein und Geschichtlichkeit. Sein und Geschichtlichkeit. Karl-Heinz
Volkmann-Schluck z. 60 Geburtstag. Edited by Schüssler Ingeborg and Janke Wolfgang. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann 1974. pp. 37-41
Rohr M.D., "Aristotle on the transitivity of being said of," Journal of the History of Philosophy 16: 379-385
(1978).
"According to Aristotle, the relation "being said of" is transitive. Categ. VIII,11a 20-32 and Topics IV,4,124b 15-19 would be inconsistent with its
transitivity if categories were summa genera, but the idea that they are is not as well supported in Aristotle's writings as the idea that "being said of" is
transitive."
Ross William D., "The authenticity of Aristotle's Categories," Journal of Philosophy 36: 427-433 (1939).
Rutten Christian. Stylométrie des Catégories. In Aristotelica: mélanges offerts à Marcel de Corte. Edited by Motte André.
Bruxelles: Éditions Ousia 1985. pp. 315-336
Sainati Vittorio. Storia dell'Organon aristotelico. Firenze: Le Monnier 1968.
Vol.1: Dai Topici al De interpretatione (1968); vol. 2: L'analitica. La crisi epistemologica della Topica (1973)
Sanford Jonathan J. Categories and Metaphysics;: Aristotle's science of Being. In Categories: historical and
sistematic essays. Edited by Gorman Michael and Sanford Jonathan J. Washington: Catholic University of America Press 2004. pp. 3-20
Scaltsas Theodore, "Numerical versus qualitative identity of properties in Aristotle's Categories," Philosophia 10-11:
328-345 (1981).
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Monique and Pellegrin Pierre. Paris: Les Belles Lettres 2002. pp. 324-352
Originally published in Italian as: Relatività aristoteliche - Dianoia, 2, 1997 pp. 11-15 (first part) and 1998, 3, 11-23 (second part).
"This study of relativity in Aristotle and his successors, examines Aristotle's contrast in Categories chapter 7 between two rival criteria for
relativity. It is widely held that the first is a specifically linguistic criterion, the second an ontological one. Against this the paper argues that, while
the first permits the inclusion of things for which a relation to something else is no more than 'part' of what it is to be them, the latter restricts
relativity to things which consist in a relation 'and nothing more'.
The second half of the study starts from the conclusion in the previous part that the second kind of relativity distinguished at the end of Categories
chapter 7 marks off things which consist in a relation 'and nothing more'. It is argued that this notion of relativity originated in the early Academy, from
which it also passed to the Stoics.
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Shields Christopher. Order in multiplicity. Homonymy in the philosophy of Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1999.
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Pensiero Antico 6: 357-377 (1985).
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(1972).
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(1978).
Reprinted in: Leonardo Tarán - Collected Papers 1962-1999 - Leyden - Brill, 2001, pp. 421-454.
"The evidence about Speusippus's classification preserved by Simplicius can lead to no conclusion other than that Speusippus made an exhaustive classification
of names and that for him homonymy and synonymy are properties of linguistic terms, not of things. Probability is in favor of thinking that in this respect
Speusippus exercised some influence on Aristotle."
Thiel Rainer. Aristoteles' Kategorienschrift in ihrer antiken Kommentierung. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2004.
Thillet Pierre, "Remarques sur les Catégories d'Aristote," Mélanges de la Bibliothèque de la Sorbonne 8: 28-36 (1960).
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Thouard Denis. Une métacritique des catégories: l'usage critique d'Aristote chez Trendelenburg. In Aristote au XIX siècle. Edited
by Thouard Denis. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Unversitaires du Septentrion 2004. pp. 37-62
Touratier Christian, "Catégories de langue et catégories de pensée: (Benveniste lecteur d'Aristote)," Lalies.Actes des Sessions de
Linguistique et de Littérature 10: 367-376 (1992).
Trendelenburg Friedrich Adolf. Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, zwei Abhandlungen. Berlin: G. Bethge 1846.
I: Aristotle Kategorienlehre; II: Die Kategorienlehre in der Geschichte der Philosophie.
Reprinted Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1963 and 1979.
Italian translations:
A. Trendelenburg - La dottrina delle categorie in Aristotele - Con in appendice la prolusione accademica del 1833 De Aristotelis categoriis -
Prefazione e saggio introduttivo di Giovanni Reale. Traduzione e saggio integrativo di Vincenzo Cicero - Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1994.
F. A. Trendelenburg - La dottrina delle categorie nella storia della filosofia. Profilo e valutazione critica - A cura di Renato Pettoello - Monza,
Polimetrica, 2004.
Tugendhat Ernst. Ti kata tinos. Eine Untersuchung zu Struktur und Ursprung aristotelischer Grundbegriffe. Freiburg: Alber 1958.
Ushida Noriko, "Before the Topics?: Isaak Husik and Aristotle's Categories revisited," Ancient Philosophy 23:
113-134 (2003).
"I. Husik, in arguing for the authenticity of the Categories (in: Philosophical Review 13, 1904, pp. 514-528), substantially overstated the case for
the similarity of that treatise to the Topics. The two works differ greatly in their treatment of the theory of substance (Cat. 5, 3 B 10-21; SE 22,
178 B 38ff.)."
Vollrath Ernst. Studien zur Kategorienlehre des Aristoteles. Ratingen bei Dusseldorf : A. Henn 1969.
Vuillemin Jules. Le sistème des Catégories d'Aristote et sa signification logique et métaphysique . In De la logique à al
théologie. Cinq études sur Aristote. Paris: Flammarion 1967. pp. 44-125
Ward Julie. Aristotle on homonymy. Dialectic and science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007.
Contents: Acknowledgments VII; Abbreviations IX; Introduction 1; 1. Aristotle's theory of homonymy in Categories 1 and its precursors 9; 2. Homonymy
in the Topics 43; 3. Systematic homonymy 77; 4. The homonymy of Being 103; 5. Physis, Philia, and homonymy 137; 6. Homonymy and
science 168; Afterword 201; Bibliography 207; Index of passages 215; General index 219-220.
Wedin Michael, "Aristotle on the existential import of singular sentences," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 23: 179-196
(1978).
"Aristotle is sometimes held to the thesis [T1] that singular affirmative sentences imply the existence of a bearer for the grammatical subject of the
sentence. Thus the truth of 'Ssocrates is sick' requires that something exist which is identical with Socrates. attribution of T1 to Aristotle can be justified
by appeal to Categories 13 b 27-33 which seems to contain a straightforward statement of the thesis. Unfortunately, T1's status becomes problematic in light of
"On interpretation" 21 a 24-28, for here Aristotle seems to deny T1 explicitly. This, at least, is the consensus among his commentators. We are thus faced with
a serious inconsistency in Aristotle's account of singular sentences, an inconsistency most interpreters are content merely to mention, if they notice it at
all. The first part of this paper advances some suggestions for reconciling the troublesome passages. In the second part I draw out certain related features of
Aristotle's theory of singular sentences."
Wedin Michael, "Said of and predicated of in the Categories," Philosophical Research Archives 5: 23-34
(1979).
Wedin Michael, "Nonsubstantial individuals," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 38: 137-165 (1993).
"Wedin addresses the debate over whether nonsubstantial individuals, that inhere in a subject but are not said of a subject, i.e. accidents, such as the pallor
of Socrates, are nonrecurring particulars or a kind of determinate universal. Wedin examines the secondary literature on this topic and divides it into two
schools of thought, determined by the contributions of J.L. Ackrill and G.E.L. Owen. According to Ackrill, individuals in non-substance categories are
particular to the substance they are in; Owen critiques Ackrill's view, and proposes that these items can recur in more than one subject and hence are a sort
of universal. Wedin finds Owen's thesis unsatisfactory, even after supplementing it with an improved version due to Michael Frede; instead, Wedin argues for a
revised version of Ackrill's interpretation of nonsubstantial individuals as nonrecurrent particulars. According to Wedin, Aristotle is committed to
individuals only -- e.g. to Socrates and to the particular bit of pallor in him: this conclusion has an important bearing on the ontological status of
individuals and on the primacy of substance to nonsubstantial items."
Wedin Michael, "The strategy of Aristotle's Categories," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 79: 1-26 (1997).
"This provides a systematic account of the framework of Aristotle's Categories, showing how the early chapters (including chapter one) provide
essential features of a precise and deliberately worked-out theory."
Wedin Michael. Aristotle's theory of substance. The Categories and Metaphysics Zeta. New York: Oxford University Press 2000.
Wehrle Walter E. The myth of Aristotle's development and the betrayal of Metaphysics. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield 2000.
Weil Eric, "La place de la logique dans la pensée Aristotelicienne," Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 56: 283-315 (1951).
Reprinted in: E. Weil - Essais et Conférences - Paris, Vrin, 1991, vol. I, Philosophie, pp. 43-80.
Wesoly Marian, "Verso un' interpretazione semantica delle categorie di Aristotele," Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico
5: 103-140 (1984).
Wheeler Mark Richard, "Kategoria in the Topics and the Categories," Journal of Neoplatonic Studies 8:
37-60 (2001).
"The term kategoria in Aristotle's Topics and Categories denotes predicates. Hence the categories are best understood as classifying
predicates and not predications. The equivocal use of the term in Top. 1, 9 is related to its use in signifying either linguistic or non-linguistic entities,
and not because it can be used to mean predication."
Zaslawski D., "Termes, propositions, contrariété et contradiction," L'Âge de la Science 2: 21-54 (1969).
Zingano Marco, "L'homonymie de l'être et le projet métaphysique d'Aristote," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 201: 333-356
(1997).
RELATED PAGES
From the Index of the Section: "Ontology and History of Logic"
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