Theory and History of Ontology

by Raul Corazzon - e-mail: raul.corazzon[at]formalontology.it

For an overview see the Index of the Pages, the SITE MAP or the Alphabetical Index of the Philosophers: A-F - G-O - P-Z; You can also download this page as

Table of Contemporary Ontologists (click on the image to see the PDF file)

Bibliography of E. J. Ashworth on the History of Logic

Earline Jennifer Ashworth (born 1939) studied at Cambridge University and at Bryn Mawr College, where she was awarded a Ph. D. in 1964.

She is Distinguished Professor Emerita at the University of Waterloo, Ontario (retired July, 1st 2005) and her main interests are Late Mediaeval and Renaissance logic and  philosophy of language; she is Renaissance subject Editor for the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

I wish to thank Professor Ashworth for helping me to complete this bibliography.

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

1.  "The Logica Hamburgensis of Joachim Jungius", Bryn Mawr College, 1964.
   Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation

    

2.  "Joachim Jungius (1587-1657) and the logic of relations," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 49: 72-85 (1967).
   "In conclusion one may say that although the Logica Hamburgensis shares in all the faults of its age, the superficiality, the lack of metalogical perceptiveness, it also has merits which are peculiarly its own. The body of truth-functional logic contained in it would alone be sufficient to distinguish Jungius from his contemporaries, and still more impressive, given the background, is his use of relational inferences. It is true that the argument a divisis ad composita is both unoriginal and unremarkable, despite Scholz's praise; it is true that the inversion of relations is found in other contemporary logicians; while discussion of the oblique syllogism was quite usual; but the argument a rectis ad obliqua was both original and clearly presented. Moreover, Jungius seems to have been fully conscious that relational inferences were inferences in their own right, to be treated as such and not to be hidden away among the categories. Without this realization, any amount of originality in the discovery of actual inferences could have gone for nought. Hence, while the verdict of Heinrich Scholz needs modification, his praise of Jungius is basically justified, for it was he who brought the logic of relations to the attention of his successors, especially Leibniz." p. 85

    

3.  "Propositional logic in the Sixteenth and early Seventeenth centuries," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 9: 179-192 (1968).
   "Until recently, historians of logic have regarded the early modern period with unremitting gloom. Father Boehner, for instance, claimed that at the end of the fifteenth century logic entered upon a period of unchecked regression, during which it became an insignificant preparatory study, diluted with extra-logical elements, and the insights of men like Burleigh into the crucial importance of propositional logic as a foundation for logic as a whole were lost.(1) Nor is this attitude entirely unwarranted, for the new humanism in all its aspects was hostile to such medieval developments
   as the logic of terms and the logic of consequences. Those who were devoted to a classical style condemned medieval works as unpolished and arid, and tended to subordinate logic to rhetoric; while those who advocated a return to the original works of Aristotle, freed from medieval accretions, naturally discounted any additions to the subject matter of the Organon.
   But it would be a mistake to dismiss the logical work of the period too readily. In the first place, the writings of the medieval logicians were frequently published and widely read. To cite only a few cases, the Summulae Logicales of Petrus Hispanus received no fewer than 166 printed editions;(2) Ockham's Summa Totius Logicae was well known; the 1639 edition of Duns Scotus included both the Grammaticae Speculativae attributed to Thomas of Erfurt and the very interesting In Universam Logicam Quaestiones of Pseudo-Scotus; (3) the Logica of Paulus Venetus was very
   popular; and a number of tracts by lesser known men like Magister Martinus and Paulus Pergulensis were printed. Moreover, since logic still played such a preeminent role in education, contemporary scholars were not backward in producing their own textbooks; and numerous rival schools of logic flourished.(4) The purpose of this paper is to make a preliminary survey of some of the wealth of material available from the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries, in order to ascertain how much of the medieval propositional logic had in fact been retained.(5) It will become clear that the situation was better than has been thought." p. 179
   
   (1) See P. Boehner, ''Bemerkungen zur Geschichte der De Morgannsche Gesetze in der Scholastik," Archivâr Philosophie, 4 (1951), p. 145.
   (2) See J. P. Mullally, The Summulae Logicales of Peter of Spain (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1945), p. LXXVIII.
   (3) In Joannes Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia, edited by L. Wadding (Lugduni, 1639), Vol. I.
   (4) For a comprehensive account of the various schools of logic, see Dr. Wilhelm Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit. I. Band 1500-1640, (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1964).
   (5) I have limited myself to material in the British Museum and the Cambridge University Library for the purposes of this introductory survey.

    

4.  "Petrus Fonseca and material implication," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 9: 227-228 (1968).
   "I intend to show that the sixteenth century Jesuit, Petrus Fonseca, whose Institutionurn Dialecticarum libri octo (1564) was one of the most popular textbooks of the period, was well acquainted with [material implication].
   Fonseca introduces the subject in his discussion of the appropriateness of the name hypothetical' as applied to compound propositions."

    

5.  "The doctrine of supposition in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 51: 260-285 (1969).
   "It is often assumed that the logic of terms, including supposition theory, was despised and ignored by the logicians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in spite of the sophistication with which it had been developed during the later middle ages.
   (...)
   It is perhaps not surprising that when I looked at some eighty textbooks written during the period in question, I discovered that as many as twenty authors not only referred to the doctrine of supposition sympathetically, but usually went on to offer a detailed analysis which is neither a slavish nor an inept echo of what the mediaeval logicians had said." pp. 260-271

    

6.  "Some notes on syllogistic in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 11: 17-33 (1970).
   "Although a number of different schools of logic flourished in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they seem to have shared a lack of interest in formal logic which expressed itself in a greater concern for the soundness than for the validity of arguments. An example of this tendency is the emphasis placed upon the Topics, or the ways of dealing with and classifying precisely those arguments which were not thought to be susceptible of formal treatment, since they depended for their effectiveness upon the meaning of the terms involved. It is true, of course, that the Humanists and, later, the Ramists, devoted considerably more space to the Topics and to the "invention" of arguments than did the scholastics, the Aristotelians, the Philippists or followers of Melancthon, or even the eclectics; but this was balanced by the greater devotion of the other schools to the categories, the predicables, the pre-, post-, and even extra-predicaments.
   However, there was one subject which was both formal in inspiration and common to all text-books, namely, the syllogism; and as a result it provides a very good test of how much interest and competence in purely formal matters was retained during these centuries of logical decline." p. 17
   
   (Notes omitted.)

    

7.  Descartes' theory of clear and distinct ideas. In Cartesian studies. Edited by Butler R.J. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1972. pp. 89-105

    

8.  "The treatment of semantic paradoxes from 1400 to 1700," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 13: 34-52 (1972).
   "During the middle ages, semantic paradoxes, particularly in the form of "Socrates speaks falsely", where this is taken to be his sole utterance, were discussed extensively under the heading of insolubilia. Some attention has been paid to the solutions offered by Ockham, Buridan, and Paul of Venice, but otherwise little work seems to have been done in this area.
   My own particular interest is with the generally neglected period of logic between the death of Paul of Venice in 1429 and the end of the seventeenth century; and the purpose of this paper is to last some light both upon the new writings on paradoxes and upon the marked change in emphasis which took place during the sixteenth century. Although the traditional writings on insolubilia were available throughout the period, the detailed discussions of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries were soon entirely replaced by briefer comments whose inspiration seems wholly classical. Even the mediaeval word insolubile was replaced by the Ciceronian inexplicabile. In this area at least there is strong evidence for the usual claim that the insights of scholastic logic were swamped by the new interests and studies of Renaissance humanism." p. 34

    

9.  "Strict and material implication in the early Sixteenth century," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 13: 556-560 (1972).
   "One of the favorite games played by historians of logic is that of searching their sources for signs of the Lewis-Langford distinction between strict and material implication. There are three ways of going about this, but the first two are often reminiscent of the conjurer searching for his rabbit, and only the third has real merit, for it alone involves the study of what was said about the conditional as such. I shall look at each way in turn, in relation to writers of the early sixteenth century."

    

10.  "Existential assumptions in late medieval logic," American Philosophical Quarterly 10: 141-147 (1973).
    "I discuss attempts made by late medieval logicians to deal with non-denoting terms within their systems, and to draw explicit distinctions between those inferences whose validity involves existential assumptions, and those whose validity does not involve existential assumptions. It was commonly assumed that affirmative sentences with non-denoting terms were false, and that negative sentences with non-denoting terms were true. Thus "all unicorns are white" is false, just as "some unicorns are white" is false, and the second can be validly inferred from the first without an extra premiss. Other inferences were seen to require an extra premiss, to the effect that members of a certain class existed."

     

11.  "Are there really two logics?," Dialogue 12: 100-109 (1973).
    "In this article I examine critically some of the things which people have to say about the relationship between mathematical logic and some other kind of logic which is variously described as 'intentional' and 'traditional'. In particular, I look at the theory of meaning held by John of St. Thomas, and other Sixteenth and Seventeenth century logicians, and I show how some kinds of proposition were given an unequivocally extensionalist interpretation. I argue that just as there is not one logic in modern times, so there was not one logic in the Seventeenth century."

     

12.  "Priority of analysis and merely confused supposition," Franciscan Studies 33: 38-41 (1973).
    "In this paper I criticize the argument put forward by Swiniarski that Ockham should have adopted the priority of analysis rule whereby the subject is analyzed before the predicate, and that had he adopted such a rule, merely confused supposition would have become unnecessary. I point out that in later medieval logic explicit priority of analysis rules were adopted, whereby terms with determinate supposition were analyzed first, whether they were subject or predicate. I also discuss the use made of merely confused supposition, particularly in the analysis of the relationship between "all a is b" and "only b is a"."

     

13.  "Andreas Kesler and the later theory of Consequence," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 14: 205-214 (1973).
    "In another paper I examined the theory of consequence presented by a number of later fifteenth and early sixteenth century writers, ending with Javellus, an Italian who died in 1538. (1) For this earlier period, there was an abundance of material, containing much sophisticated discussion of semantical issues; but the next hundred years do not offer more than a few sources, and these are of limited value. The only really outstanding figure, so far as I can see, is that of Andreas Kesler. He was a Protestant theologian who was born at Coburg in 1595, educated at Jena and Wittenberg, and died in 1643 after a long career in education. In 1623 he published a book entitled De Consequentia Tractatus Logicae which is unique, both for its own time, and as compared to the products of this earlier period, in that it explicitly subsumes the whole of formal logic under the theory of consequence. The laws of opposition and conversion, the categorical and hypothetical syllogism, were all seen as different types of consequence. Moreover, no extraneous material was included. Instead of starting with the categories, like the Aristotelians, or with the invention of arguments, like the Ramists, he devoted his first chapter to the definition of consequence. Topics, informal fallacies and other such subjects found no place, whereas some rarely discussed matters like exclusive and reduplicative propositions and the modal syllogism did appear. Thus he stands out for his contents as well as for his organization."
    
    (1) See my paper "The Theory of Consequence in the Late Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Centuries,".

     

14.  "The theory of consequences in the late Fifteenth and early Sixteenth centuries," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 14: 289-315 (1973).
    "In this paper I intend to examine the treatment accorded to consequences by a group of writers from the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, although I shall make some reference to earlier periods. The subject of consequences (or valid inference) is of central importance to the historian of logic because those who discussed it covered such a wide range of logical issues, including criteria for validity, problems of self-reference, the status of the so-called paradoxes of strict implication, and the systematization of valid inference forms. Indeed, a large part of semantics and the whole of formal logic could be subsumed under this general heading. Whether the authors themselves fully appreciated that this was so is unfortunately not such an easy question to answer, for those I am concerned with frequently leave the reader in doubt as to their view of the relation of consequences to the rest of logic." p. 289

     

15.  "The doctrine of Exponibilia in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth centuries," Vivarium 11: 137-167 (1973).
    Reprinted as chapter IX in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
    
    "The doctrine of 'exponibilia' deals with sentences which need analysis because of the presence of such terms as 'only', 'begins', and 'ends'. In this paper I concentrate on three cases: exceptives, containing 'except' exclusives, containing 'only', and reduplicatives, containing 'in so far as'. I explain how they were analyzed by means of logically equivalent sentences; and I also show that the accounts offered by logicians of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries were more sophisticated than those offered both by later logicians and by such earlier logicians as Paul of Venice."

     

16.  Classification schemes and the history of logic. In Conceptual basis of the classification of knowledge. Proceedings of the Ottawa Conference on the conceptual basis of the classification of knowledge, October 1st to 5th, 1971. Edited by Wojciechowski J.A. Pullach bei München: Verlag Dokumentation 1974. pp. 275-283

     

17.  Language and logic in the Post-Medieval period. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company 1974.
    This book is the first attempt to provide a general introduction to the type of logical inquiry pursued in Europe after 1429 by means of a systematic presentation of the doctrines which were actually written about and taught. It radically alters traditional views of the period by demonstrating that not only were medieval doctrines still of overriding importance at the beginning of the sixteenth century, but that they continued to be discussed in many European universities at least until the mid-seventeenth century.
    
    TABLE OF CONTENTS; PREFACE IX; NOTE ABOUT ABBREVIATIONS XIII; ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS XV; CHAPTER I - HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 1; l. The Publication of Medieval Works 2; 2. Scholasticism in Italy and Germany 4; 3. Scholasticism in France and Spain 5; 4.Humanism 8; 5. Rudolph Agricola and His Influence 10; 6. Petrus Ramus and His Influence 15; 7. Seventeenth Century Logic: Eclecticism 17; 8. Humanism and Late Scholasticism in Spain 19; 9. Other Schools of Logic 20; 10. A Note on Terminology 22; CHAPTER II / MEANING AND REFERENCE 26; I. The Nature of Logic 26; 1. The Contents of Logical Text-books 26; 2. The Definition of Logic 29; 3. The Object of Logic 32; II. Problems of Language 37; 1. Terms: Their Definition and Their Main Divisions 38; 2. The Relationship between Mental, Spoken and Written Terms 42; 3. Other Divisions of Terms 45; 4. Sense and Reference 47; 5. Propositions and their Parts 49; 6. Sentence-Types and Sentence-Tokens 52; 7. Complex Signifiables and Truth 55; 8. Other Approaches to Truth 62; 9. Possibility and Necessity 66; III. SUPPOSITION THEORY 77; 1. Supposition, Acceptance and Verification 78; 2. Proper, Improper, Relative and Absolute Supposition 82; 3. Material Supposition 83; 4. Simple Supposition 84; 5. Natural Personal Supposition 88; 6. Ampliation 89; 7. Appellation 92; IV. SEMANTIC PARADOXES 101; 1. Problems Arising from Self-Reference 101; 2. Solution One: Self-Reference Is Illegitimate 104; 3. Solution Two: All Propositions Imply Their Own Truth 106; 4. Solution Three: Insolubles Assert Their Own Falsity 108; 5. Solution Four: Two Kinds of Meaning 110; 6. Solution Five: Two Truth-Conditions 112; 7. Later Writing on Insolubles 114; CHAPTER III / FORMAL LOGIC. PART ONE: UNANALYZED PROPOSITIONS 118; I. THE THEORY OF CONSEQUENCE 120; 1. The Definition of Consequence 120; 2. The Definition of Valid Consequence 121; 3.Formal and Material Consequence 128; 4. 'Ut Nunc' Consequence 130; 5. The Paradoxes of Strict Implication 133; 6. Rules of Valid Consequence 136; II. PROPOSITIONAL CONNECTIVES 147; 1. Compound Propositions in General 147; 2. Conditional Propositions 149; 3A. Rules for Illative Conditionals 154; 3B. Rules for Promissory Conditionals 156; 4. Biconditionals 156; 5. Conjunctions 157; 6. Disjunctions 161; 7. De Morgan's Laws 166; 8. Other Propositional Connectives 177; III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE RULES FOUND IN SOME INDIVIDUAL AUTHORS 171; 1. Paris in the Early Sixteenth Century 171; 2. Oxford in the Early Sixteenth Century 181; 3. Germany in the Early Sixteenth Century 183; 4. Spain in the Third Decade of the Sixteenth Century 184; 5. Spain in the Second Part of the Sixteenth Century 184; 6. Germany in the Early Seventeenth Century 185; CHAPTER IV / FORMAL LOGIC. PART TWO: THE LOGIC OF ANALYZED PROPOSITIONS 187; I. The Relationships Between Propositions 189; 1. The Quality and Quantity of Propositions 189; 2. Opposition 192; 3. Equipollence 194; 4. Simple and Accidental Conversion 195; 5. Conversion by Contraposition 199; II. Supposition Theory and Quantification 207; 1. The Divisions of Personal Supposition 207; 2. Descent and Ascent 213; III. Categorical Syllogisms 223; 1. Figures and Modes 224; 2. How to Test the Validity of a Syllogism 230; 3. Proof by Reduction 239; 4. Syllogisms with Singular Terms 247; APPENDIX / LATIN TEXTS 253; BIBLIOGRAPHY 282; 1. Primary Sources 282; 2. Secondary Sources on the History of Logic 1400-1650 291; INDEX OF NAMES 297.

     

18.  "Some additions to Risse's Bibliographia Logica," Journal of the History of Philosophy 12: 361-365 (1974).
    "One of the greatest contributions to the history of logic in recent years was the publication in 1965 of Wilhelm Risse's Bibliographia Logica, Vol. I, which covers the years from 1472 to 1800. However, despite the fact that Risse's monumental work lists an estimated 8,000 logical works, it is still far from comprehensive, as Mr. Hickman pointed out in an earlier article in this journal. Why this should be the ease immediately becomes apparent when one starts to work in a library such as the Bodleian at Oxford with its handwritten catalogue of books printed before 1920 and its lack of any specialized bibliographies such as the British Museum has provided for early printed books. Even in well catalogued libraries such as the University Library at Cambridge it can be difficult to locate texts, and one often stumbles across a new logical work through the accident of its being bound in the same volume as better known works. As a result of my researches over the last few years, I have put together a list of works which do not appear in Risse in the hope that other historians of logic may benefit from my discoveries. I cannot, however, claim that I have exhausted the resources of the libraries which I have visited. Doubtless there are still not only new editions but new authors left to be discovered.
    (...)
    This paper concerns logic texts published between 1472 and 1800. I list 20 items whose authors do not appear in Risse, 12 items whose authors appear in Risse in connection with another title or other titles, and 58 items which appear in Risse in another edition or in other editions. I indicate the libraries in which all these items are to be found, and I also list some useful bibliographical works."

     

19.  "For riding is required a horse: a problem of meaning and reference in late Fifteenth and early Sixteenth century logic," Vivarium 12: 146-172 (1974).
    Reprinted as chapter I in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
    
    "If one assumes that 'horse' always refers to individual horses, then sentences such as the one quoted raise various problems. In this paper I first describe how the problems were stated by a group of logicians at the university of Paris, and what solutions they offered. I then present three typical Latin texts, with a detailed analysis of the arguments found in each."

     

20.  "Descartes' theory of objective reality," New Scholasticism 49: 331-340 (1975).
    "In this paper I examine Descartes' attempt to prove the existence of god by means of arguments about the objective reality of ideas. I argue that, even if we allow Descartes all of his controversial premisses, the proof begins to fall apart when we reach the claim that ideas exhibit different grades of objective reality. One problem is that although Descartes starts by considering ideas not with respect to their content but with respect to their status as entities, he is forced to revert to a consideration of their content. Another problem is that the only way Descartes can sensibly draw a line between those ideas which have enough reality to warrant the inference that objects exist, and those ideas which do not, involves the introduction of the ontological argument, which is illicit at this stage in the "Meditations"."

     

21.  "Will Socrates cross the bridge? A problem in medieval logic," Franciscan Studies 14: 75-84 (1976).
    Reprinted as chapter XII in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
    
    "The problem discussed here is the truth-value of the sentence "Socrates will not cross the bridge" when uttered by Socrates in conjunction with the two premises "all those who say what is false will not cross the bridge" and "all those who say what is true will cross the bridge." Paul of Venice treated the sentence as a genuine semantic paradox, and offered two different solutions. Other authors, such as Peter of Ailly, presented arguments to show that the sentence is not a semantic paradox. I argue that Paul of Venice was wrong."

     

22.  "Agostino Nifo's reinterpretation of medieval logic," Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia 31: 353-374 (1976).

     

23.  "I promise you a horse: a second problem of meaning and reference in Late Fifteenth and early Sixteenth century logic (first part)," Vivarium 14: 62-79 (1976).
    Reprinted as chapter II (first part) in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
    
    "If one assumes that 'horse' always refers to individual horses, then sentences such as the one quoted raise various problems. In this paper I first describe how the problems were stated by a group of logicians at the university of Paris, and what solutions they offered. I then present four typical Latin texts, with a detailed analysis of the arguments found in each."

     

24.  "I promise you a horse: a second problem of meaning and reference in Late Fifteenth and early Sixteenth century logic (second part)," Vivarium 14: 139-155 (1976).
    Reprinted as chapter II (second-part) in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
    
    "This is the second part of the article in question, and it contains transcriptions of four early sixteenth century texts, together with an English analysis of the arguments contained in them."

     

25.  "Thomas Bricot (d. 1516) and the Liar Paradox," Journal of the History of Philosophy 15: 267-280 (1977).
    Reprinted as chapter XI in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
    
    "Bricot discussed at length three solutions to the liar paradox: Ockham's, Peter of Ailly's, and his own. His solution takes its starting point from the solution of Roger Swyneshed, but it is both original and highly plausible. In my paper I examine Bricot's discussion critically, with particular emphasis on his remarks about synonymy. I argue that his work is important both because it was influential in his own time and because it demonstrates the often unsuspected originality of late fifteenth and early sixteenth century logicians. I also show that his solution, like so many others, falls foul of the strengthened liar paradox."

     

26.  "An early Fifteenth century discussion of infinite sets," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 18: 232-234 (1977).
    "In the opening years of the fifteenth century, or perhaps a little earlier, John Dorp wrote a commentary on Buridan's Compendium Totius Logicae and it is here that one finds a discussion of infinite sets which is not only quite unexpected3 but which suggests that other thinkers of that period were interested in the same topic.
    The question of infinite sets arose in the context of the theory of reference.
    Medieval logicians assumed that affirmative sentences were true only if the subject and object terms had reference, but this assumption conflicted with their intuitions about such sentences as "I imagine a chimera" and "The word 'chimera' refers to a chimera". These sentences seem to be true, but "chimera" cannot refer to actual or possible chimeras, since a chimera is an impossible object, just as a round square is an impossible object. The question then arose of how such sentences were to be treated, and one obvious answer was to postulate a class of imaginary objects which included impossible objects and to which reference could be made in intentional contexts.4 In his discussion of this answer, Dorp presented several arguments against the claim that one could refer to impossible objects."
    
    Notes omitted.

     

27.  "Chimeras and imaginary objects: a study in the post-medieval theory of signification," Vivarium 15: 57-79 (1977).
    Reprinted as chapter III in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.

     

28.  The tradition of medieval logic and speculative grammar from Anselm to the end of the Seventeenth century: a bibliography from 1836 onwards. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1978.
    Contents: Preface VII; Part One. Anselm to Paul of Venice (items 1-632) 1; Part Two. After Paul of Venice (items 633-879) 73; Index of Names 101; Index of Texts 105; Index of Translations 107; Index of Subjects 109.
    
    There is a continuation volume: Fabienne Pironet - The tradition of medieval logic and speculative grammar. A bibliography (1977-1994) - Turnhout, Brepols 1997.

     

29.  "Theories of the proposition: some early Sixteenth century discussions," Franciscan Studies 38: 81-121 (1978).
    Reprinted as chapter IV in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
    
    "I examine the discussions of propositional sense and reference found in the works of a group of authors connected with the university of Paris in the last decade of the Fifteenth century and the first three decades of the Sixteenth century. I pay particular attention to the rejection of "complexe significabilia" or eternal objects which serve as the referent of utterances, and to the doctrine that utterances signify not "aliquid" (some thing) but "aliqualiter" (in some way)."

     

30.  "A note on Paul of Venice and the Oxford Logica of 1483," Medioevo 4: 93-99 (1978).

     

31.  "Multiple quantification and the use of special quantifiers in early Sixteenth century logic," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 19: 599-613 (1978).
    Reprinted as chapter X in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
    "I have three reasons for writing this paper. In the first place, I want to explain the early sixteenth century practice of using the letters 'a', 'b', 'c', and 'd' as special signs governing the interpretation of terms within sentences. In the second place, I want to investigate the analysis which logicians in the medieval tradition gave of such sentences as "There is somebody all of whose donkeys are running", "Everybody has at least one donkey which is running", and "At least one of the donkeys which everybody owns is running".(2) In the third place, I want to show that, despite what
    Geach has suggested, (3) logicians in the medieval tradition were capable of offering good reasons for rejecting such inferences as "Every boy loves some girl, therefore there is some girl that every boy loves". My discussion will be based mainly on the work of a group of logicians who were at the University of Paris in the first two decades of the sixteenth century, in particular Fernando de Enzinas, Antonio Coronel, and Domingo de Soto." p. 599
    
    (2) Cf. P. T. Geach, Reference and Generality, Ithaca, New York (1962), p. 15 ff.
    (3) P. T. Geach, "History of a fallacy" in Logic Matters, Oxford (1972), pp. 1-13.

     

32.  "A note on an early printed logic text in Edinburgh University Library," Innes Review 30: 77-79 (1979).

     

33.  "The Libelli Sophistarum and the use of medieval logic texts at Oxford and Cambridge in the early Sixteenth century," Vivarium 17: 134-158 (1979).
    "The two most frequently printed logic texts in early sixteenth century England were the Oxford and Cambridge versions of the "Libellus sophistarum". I analyze the contents of each version, showing their similarities and differences; and I demonstrate that both works were merely unadorned reprints of early fifteenth century manuscript collections."

     

34.  The Scholastic background to Locke's theory of language. In Progress in linguistic historiography. Papers from the International Conference on the History of the Language Sciences, Ottawa, 28-31 August 1978. Edited by Köerner Konrad. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins 1980. pp. 59-68

     

35.  "Can I speak more clearly than I understand? A problem of religious language in Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus and Ockham," Historiographia Linguistica 7: 29-38 (1980).

     

36.  "Descartes and human reason," Queen's Quarterly 86: 653-656 (1980).

     

37.  Two early Sixteenth century discussions of Complexe Significabilia. In Sprache un Erkenntnis im Mittelalter (vol. I). Akten des VI Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l'étude de la philosophie médiévale, 29 August - 3 September 1977 im Bonn. Berlin, New York: W. de Gruyter 1981. pp. 511-516

     

38.  "Mental language and the unity of propositions: a semantic problem discussed by early Sixteenth century logicians," Franciscan Studies 41: 61-96 (1981).
    Reprinted as chapter VI in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
    
    "In the 14th century Gregory of Rimini argued that (1) there is a mental language separate from spoken language and (2) mental propositions are unified wholes with no discernible parts. This article examines the reactions of later logicians, showing that they accepted the doctrine of mental language; but argued that mental propositions must have a discernible structure, which involves parts."

     

39.  ""Do words signify ideas or things?" The Scholastic sources of Locke's theory of language," Journal of the History of Philosophy 19: 299-326 (1981).
    Reprinted as chapter VII in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
    
    "I consider recent attempts by Kretzmann and Landesman to give an account of Locke's theory of language. I show that a more plausible account can be given if we place Locke's remarks within the context of the scholastic debate on the signification of words, particularly as this debate is presented by such authors as Martin Smiglecius who were read in Seventeenth century Oxford."

     

40.  "The problems of relevance and order in Obligational disputations: some late Fourteenth century views," Medioevo 7: 175-193 (1981).

     

41.  The eclipse of medieval logic. In The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. Edited by Kretzmann Nicolas, Kenny Anthony, and Pinborg Jan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982. pp. 787-796

     

42.  "The structure of mental language: some problems discussed by early Sixteenth century logicians," Vivarium 20: 59-83 (1982).
    Reprinted as chapter V in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
    
    "Given their belief in mental language, late medieval logicians felt the need to give some account of its structure. I explore their different views on the part played by syncategorematic terms, impersonal and other verbs, demonstratives, pronouns, case, number and gender. I show that Ockham's views were not universally followed; and I argue that mental language was not necessarily thought of as an ideal logical language."

     

43.  English Obligationes texts after Roger Swyneshed. The Tracts beginning Obligatio est quaedam ars. In The rise of British Logic. Acts of the Sixth European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Balliol College, Oxford, 19-24 June 1983. Edited by Lewry Osmund P. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval studies 1983. pp. 309-333

     

44.  "Inconsistency and paradox in Medieval disputations: a development of some hints in Ockham," Franciscan Studies 44: 129-139 (1984).
    "Fourteenth-century logicians discussed a special kind of disputation, called an obligational disputation, which normally had a logically possible but false proposition as its starting point. The problem then arose of how to handle various kinds of pragmatic paradox, including 'I do not exist'. I explore some solutions given by Ockham, John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, and William Buser."

     

45.  "Locke on language," Journal of Philosophy 14: 45-73 (1984).
    Reprinted as chapter VIII in: Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
    Reprinted also in: Vere Chappell (editor) John Locke, theory of knowledge - New York, London; Garland Publishing 1992 and in: Vere Chappell (editor) - Locke - Oxford, New York; Oxford University Press 1998 pp. 175-194.
    
    ""Locke's main semantic thesis is that words stand for, or signify, ideas. He says this over and over again, though the phraseology he employs varies. In Book III chapter 2 alone we find the following statements of the thesis: (1) '... Words ... come to be made use of by Men, as the Signs of their Ideas' [111.2.1; 405:10-11] (*); (2) 'The use then of Words, is to be sensible Marks of Ideas; and the Ideas they stand for, are their proper and immediate Signification' [III. 2.1 ; 405:15-17]; (3) Words in their primary or immediate Signification, stand for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them' [111.2.2; 405:21-2]; (4) 'That then which Words are the Marks of, are the Ideas of the Speaker' [111.2.2; 405:27-8]; (5) Words, as they are used by Men, can properly and immediately signify nothing but the Ideas, that are in the Mind of the Speaker' [111.2.4; 406:29-31]. Locke offers no explanation of the terms he uses in these remarks, and I am going to take it that the phrases 'stand for; 'being a mark of,' and 'being a sign of are all roughly synonymous with the term 'signify.' The purpose of this paper is to explore what Locke intended to convey when he said that words signify ideas. I shall attempt to defend him against some, though not all, standard objections; and part of my defense will rest on the claim that Locke was using 'signify' in the same way that his scholastic predecessors used the Latin term 'significare'. My paper falls into three parts. First, I shall give a general description of Locke's account of language; second, I shall look more closely at the scholastic theories of mental language and of signification, and their relation to Locke's theory; third, I shall return to Locke's text to examine what he has to say about the signification of general terms, and how it is that our ideas conform both to the ideas of other men and to external objects."
    
    (*) Page and lines reference are to John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited with a foreword by Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).

     

46.  An annotated bibliography of Medieval and Renaissance logic. In The history of mathematics from Antiquity to the Present. A selective bibliography. Edited by Dauben J. New-York, London: Garland Publishing Co. 1985. pp. 290-292

     

47.  Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics. London: Variorum Reprints 1985.
    Reprint of 12 essays already published.
    
    CONTENTS: Preface;
    REFERENCE IN INTENSIONAL CONTEXTS; I 'For Riding is Required a Horse": A Problem of Meaning and Reference in Late fifteenth and Early sixteenth Century Logic - Vivarium XII. 1974; II I Promise you a Horse": A Second Problem of Meaning and Reference in Late fifteenth and Early sixteenth Century Logic (Parts 1 & 2) - Vivarium XIV. 1976; III Chimeras and Imaginary Objects: A Study in the Post-Medieval Theory of Signification - Vivarium XV. 1977;
    PROPOSITIONS AND MENTAL LANGUAGE
    IV Theories of the Proposition: Some Early sixteenth Century Discussions - Franciscan Studies 38. 1978 (1981); V The Structure of Mental Language: Some Problems Discussed by Early Sixteenth Century Logicians - Vivarium XX. 1982; VI Mental Language and the Unity of Propositions: A Semantic Problem Discussed by Early Sixteenth Century Logicians - Franciscan Studies 41. 1981 (1984);
    SCHOLASTIC INFLUENCES ON JOHN LOCKE
    VII "Do Words Signify Ideas or Things?" The Scholastic Sources of Locke's Theory of Language - Journal of the History of Philosophy XIX. 1981; VIII Locke on Language - Canadian Journal of Philosophy XIV/1. 1984;
    LOGICAL ANALYSIS
    IX The Doctrine of Exponibilia in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries - Vivarium XI. 1973; X Multiple Quantification and the Use of Special Quantifiers in Early Sixteenth Century Logic - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic XIX. 1978;
    SEMANTIC PARADOXES
    XI Thomas Bricot (d. 1516) and the Liar Paradox - Journal of the History of Philosophy XV. 1977; XII Will Socrates Cross the Bridge? A Problem in Medieval Logic - Franciscan Studies 46. 1976 (1977);
    Addenda et Corrigenda; Index

     

48. Sanderson Robert. Logicae artis compendium. Bologna: Editrice CLUEB 1985.
    Reprint of the second edition (1618, first anonymous edition 1615), edited with an introduction by E. J. Ashworth.
    Contents: Editor's Introduction IX-LV; I. Robert Sanderson: Life and worksXI; II. The history of logic in the Sixteenth centuryXVI; III. Logic in EnglandXXIII; IV. The Oxford curriculum XXXII; V. An analysis of the Logicae Artis Compendium XXXV-LV.
    Logicae artis compendium. Pars prima 11; Pars secunda 81; Pars tertia 129; Appendix prima 243; Appendix posterior 331; Indices; Index of pre-twentieth century authors and works 371; Index of twentieth-century authors 375; Index of names used in examples 377; Index of Latin terms 379-382.
    
    "V. An Analysis of the Logicae Artis Compendium
    In this section I intend to relate Sanderson to his background by focussing on four specific aspects of the Logicae artis compendium. I shall discuss (i) the nature of logic; (ii) the medieval heritage; (iii) changes in syllogistic; (iv) method and the art of discourse.
    (i) The Nature of Logic
    I shall begin by analyzing Sanderson's first chapter, which in a brief compass touches on a range of classificatory issues that were the subject of lively debate during the sixteenth century. The first of these issues concerns the very use of the word 'logica' as opposed to 'dialectica'. It was a medieval commonplace that the word 'dialectica' could be used in two senses, a broad sense which equated dialectic with logic, and a narrow sense, whereby dialectic was that kind of probable argumentation discussed in the Topics. (94) Which word was used for the study of all kinds of argumentation was a matter of taste. Peter of Spain had used 'dialectica'; John Buridan and others preferred logica'. However, in the sixteenth century greater doctrinal significance became attached to the word 'dialectica'. Ramus argued at some length that Aristotle's 'Organon' did not as was commonly thought discuss three special kinds of logic, i.e. apodictic or demonstrative, dealing with necessary material; dialectic, dealing with probable material; and sophistic, dealing with fallacious material. Instead, there was one general doctrine, which included a general doctrine of invention. (95) Hence, there was no specialized use of the term 'dialectic' and it both could and should properly be applied to logic as a whole. In response Zabarella, for instance, argued that 'dialectic' did name a distinct part of logic, and should be used as the name of that part only. (96) Sanderson allows the wider use; but his remark that logica' is `Synecdochiche Dialectica' is significant, given that synecdoche is the figure of speech whereby a part is put for the whole.
    Sanderson next classifies logic as an 'ars instrumentalis'. Once more, his choice of words has to be understood in the light of sixteenth century polemic. There were four ways in which logic could be classified. (97) Peter of Spain had called it both an art and a science; scholastics tended to call it a science; humanists tended to call it an art;" and Zabarella called it neither an art nor a science but an instrumental habit. Giulio Pace in turn argued that an instrumental habit was in fact an art;" and it seems to be this usage that Sanderson has adopted. Moreover, Sanderson was fully conscious of the implications of his choice, for in Appendix 1, chapter 2, pp. 31-37, he gives a sample speech on the genus of logic. He cites Zabarella (as well as Keckermann) and he concludes that logic is properly speaking an art. In this he is departing from some of his English predecessors, especially Seton, who had classified logic as a science. (100)
    The final part of Sanderson's initial characterization of logic is the phrase "dirigens mentem nostram in cognitionem omnium intelligibilium." This definition is very similar to one found in Keckermann, who may well have influenced Sanderson here. Keckermann wrote "[Logica] Est ars humani intellectus operationes sive Hominis cogitationes ordinandi & dirigendi in rerum cognitione.,,(101) According to the Conimbricenses, the view that logic directed the operations of the mind was found in Fonseca and Suarez, and it is not found explicitly in the antiquiores. (102) In order to understand the full significance of Sanderson's definition, it is necessary to relate his remark about directing the mind to his subsequent discussion of the divisions of logic, and it is also necessary to explore his reference to the knowledge of intelligible things in relation to his subsequent classification of the objects and subjects of logic." pp. XXXV-XXXVIII
    
    (94) See, e.g., the commentary by John Dorp in Perutile compendium totius logice Joannes Buridani (Venice 1499, facsimile edition Frankfurt am Main, 1965), sig.a 2ra. For discussion see Pierre Michaud-Quantin, "L'emploi des termes logica et dialectica au moyen age" in Arts libéraux et philosophie au moyen age (Montreal, Institut d'études médiévales, Paris, J. Vrin, 1965), pp. 855-862. See also Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis in universam dialecticam Aristotelis (Cologne, 1607: facsimile edition Hildesheim, New York, 1976) col. 25.
    (95) Petrus Ramus, Scholarum dialecticarum seu animadversionum in Organum Aristotelis, in Scholae in tres primas liberales antes (Francofurti 1581, facsimile edition, Frankfurt am Main 1965), pp. 40-43. He suggested (p. 40) that sophistic was not properly a part of the art of logic, just as 'barbarismorum doctrina' is not properly a part of the art of grammar. Virtue is homogeneous but vices are heterogeneous, he remarked.
    (96) Jacobus Zabarella, De natura logicae in Opera Logica (Cologne 1597, facsimile edition Hildesheim 1966), col. 20. Cf. the discussion by Pedro da Fonseca, Instituiçoes Dialécticas / Institutionum dialecticarum libri octo, edited by J. Ferreira Gomes (Universidade de Coimbra, 1964), p. 22. Fonseca remarked that the definition of dialectic as dealing with the probable could not apply to dialectic in the wide sense.
    (97) For discussions of these alternatives (and a fifth alternative, that logic is a faculty) see Conimbricensis, cols. 33-37; Zabarella, De natura logicae, cols. 5-24.
    (98) One favourite phrase of those in the humanist tradition was "ars disserendi". Agricola wrote, for instance, "Erit ergo nobis hoc pacto definita dialectice, ars probabiliter de qualibet re proposita disserendi": Rodolphus Agricola, De inventione dialectica (Cologne 1523, facsimile edition Frankfurt am Main, 1967), p. 193. For discussion and further references see Ong, Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue, pp. 178-179; and Conimbricensis, cols. 25-27.
    (99) Julius Pacius, In Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Organum Commentarius Analyticus (Frankfurt 1597, facsimile edition, Hildesheim 1966), p. 2a: "Ergo logica est habitus instrumentalis, id est ars."
    (100) Seton (sig. A 59 wrote: "Dialectica est scientia, probabiliter de quovis themate disserendi." Cf. John Sanderson, Institutionum dialecticarum (Oxoniae 1602) p. 3 and Samuel Smith, Aditus ad logicam (Oxonii, 1684, editio nona) p. I, for similar definitions.
    (101) Bartholomaeus Keckermann, Praecognitorum logicorum tractatus tres in Operum omnium quae extant tomus Primus (Genevae, 1614), col. 90-91.
    (102) Conimbricensis, col. 42.

     

49. Bricot Thomas. Tractatus Insolubilium. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1986.
    Critical edition of the treatise by Thomas Bricot with an introduction, notes, appendices and indices by E.J. Ashworth.

     

50.  "Renaissance man as logician: Josse Clichtove (1472-1543) on disputations," History and Philosophy of Logic 7: 15-29 (1986).
    "Josse Clichtove represents a turning point in the history of disputation, for he combines one of the earliest accounts of the doctrinal disputation with one of the latest accounts of the obligational disputation. This paper describes the nature and significance of the theories that he offered. Particular attention is paid to the doctrines of truth, necessity and possibility which lie behind his doctrines; and also to the light which his work throws on the aims and nature of an obligational disputation."

     

51.  Jacobus Naveros (fl. ca. 1533) on the question: "Do spoken words signify concepts or things?". In Logos and Pragma. Essays on the philosophy of language in honor of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans. Edited by Rijk Lambertus Maria de and Braakhuis Henk A.G. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1987. pp. 189-214
    "In a volume dedicated to the celebration of Gabriel Nuchelmans' achievements, it seems appropriate to pick up one of the themes that he himself has discussed. In his seminal work on post-medieval philosophies of language, Late Scholastic and Humanist Theories of the Proposition, Nuchelmans devoted a section to the relation between written, spoken and mental propositions. In it he made reference to a few writers from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, such as George of Brussels and Petrus Tartaretus, and he spoke of their reactions to arguments put forward by Aquinas, Ockham and Buridan. In this paper I intend to explore in more detail the question of whether words signify concepts or things, as it was discussed by Jacobus Naveros, a Spaniard who studied and taught at Alcalá, and whose lengthy and interesting commentary on the Perihermenias was first published in 1533. I shall also discuss the 1530 commentary of Alphonsus Prado, who taught at Alcalá until 1534, when he moved to Coimbra. Both men were influenced by the strong school of logic at Paris, and I shall make particular reference to the Parisian authors Johannes Raulin (1443-1514), Petrus Crockaert de Bruxellis (1465/70-1514), and Johannes Dullaert (ca. 1470-1513). A number of other authors who discussed the question in some detail will be mentioned in passing, particularly in the footnotes. I shall thus use my examination of Naveros to add to the material given by Nuchelmans, and to explore further the impact of Aquinas, Ockham and Buridan on later writers.
    The debate about whether words signified concepts or things was not, of course, a new one. It was already raging in the late thirteenth century, when Roger Bacon said that there was "not a moderate strife among famous men". A little later, Duns Scotus wrote of "a great altercation". Nearly everyone who wrote a commentary on the Perihermenias had something to say on the issue, and it was also discussed in Sentence commentaries and in Buridan's Sophismata. The debate had been triggered by the words of Aristotle, who had opened his Perihermenias (16a3) by saying that spoken words were signs of affections in the mind. As translated by Boethius the passage reads: "Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae, et ea quae scribuntur eorum quae sunt in voce". What Aristotle himself had intended to assert can be ignored here, for the later debate began not just from Boethius' Latin, but from a particular interpretation of it. Notae were taken to be signa, passiones were taken to be concepts; and ea quae sunt in voce were taken to be primarily such substantive nouns as 'human being' and 'animal'. Those words which themselves stand for signs were excluded for the obvious reason that, at least in the case of mental signs, the referents must be concepts. In his analysis of the passage in question, Naveros argued that because nothing is called a sign of something unless it is representative or significative of it, Aristotle intended to assert that spoken words do signify concepts. Moreover, because Aristotle went on to state that spoken words were not the same for all men, Aristotle had meant to assert that this signification was ad placitum, i.e. conventional. Naveros strengthened the claim by adding the word proprie: the signification is not merely conventional, but conventional in the strictest sense. On the face of it, Naveros came down very strongly on one side of the debate. However, as we shall shortly see, this did not involve him in any denial that words also signified things. Indeed, the very theory of signification committed him to the assertion of a word-thing relationship." pp. 189-190 (Notes omitted).

     

52. Pauli Veneti. Logica Magna. Secunda pars. Tractatus de Obligationibus. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1988.
    Critical edition of the treatise by Paul of Venice (Pauli Veneti), edited with and English translation and notes by E. J. Ashworth.

     

53.  Traditional logic. In The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy. Edited by Schmitt Charles B. and Skinner Quentin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988. pp. 143-172
    "I outline the developments and changes in logic and logic teaching between 1350 and 1600, paying attention to the survival of medieval doctrines and to the renewed Aristotelianism of the sixteenth century. I also discuss the philosophy of language in the same period, paying attention to speculative grammar, to the doctrines of signs and signification, and to the clash between medieval doctrines of conventional signification and the new renaissance interest in the idea of a naturally significant spoken language."

     

54.  Changes in logic textbooks from 1500 to 1650: the new Aristotelianism. In Aristotelismus und Renaissance. In memoriam Charles B. Schmitt. Edited by Kessler Eckhard, Lohr Charles, and Sparn Walter. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrossowitz 1988. pp. 75-87

     

55.  Oxford. In Ueberweg, Friedrich, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Vollig neubearbeitete Ausgabe. Die Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts. Band 3.1. England. Edited by Schobinger Jean-Pierre. Basel: Schwabe & Co. 1988. pp. 6-9-26-27

     

56.  "The historical origins of John Poinsot's Treatise on signs," Semiotica 69: 129-147 (1988).

     

57.  "La sémantique du XIV siècle vue à travers cinq traités Oxoniens sur le Obligationes," Cahiers d'Épistémologie (1989).

     

58.  "Boethius on topics, conditionals and argument-forms," History and Philosophy of Logic 10: 213-225 (1989).

     

59.  Paul of Venice on Obligations. The sources for both the Logica Magna and the Logica Parva versions. In Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy (vol. II). Edited by Knuuttila Siimo, Työrinoja R., and Ebbesen Sten. Helsinki: Yliopistopaino 1990. pp. 407-415
    Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy, Helsinki, 24-29 August 1987

     

60.  The doctrine of signs in some early Sixteenth-Century Spanish logicians. In Estudios de Historia de la Lógica. Actas del II Simposio de Historia de la Lógica, Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, 25-27 de Mayo de 1987. Edited by Angelelli Ignacio and D'Ors Angel. Pamplona: Ediciones Eunate 1990. pp. 13-38
    "In this paper I intend to discuss the doctrine of signs as it was presented by six Spanish logicians from the first half of the sixteenth century, all of whom except Naveros studied or taught at the University of Paris. I shall consider the Termini of Gaspar Lax, whose second edition appeared in 1512; the Termini of Juan Dolz, which appeared about 1510; the Dialecticae introductiones of Juan de Celaya, published as early as 1511; the Summulae of Domingo de Soto, which appeared in 1529 and were heavily revised for their second edition in 1539; the posthumous Termini perutiles of Fernando de Enzinas, published in 1533; and the Praeparatio dialectica of Jacobo de Naveros, published in 1542. I shall, of course, be mentioning various other authors, particularly from Paris, both to set the stage for the work of the Spanish logicians, and in order to trace subsequent developments.
    There are three reasons why I have chosen to focus on the doctrine of signs. First, there is the link with the doctrine of signification. For the early sixteenth-century logician, at least for those writing in the medieval tradition, to signify was to be a sign; and unless we understand how the notion of sign was handled we will be unable to understand such crucial debates as that concerning the question whether words signify concepts or things (1). In particular, we will be likely to fall into the modern trap of translating the word 'significatio' by the word 'meaning', and thereby misreading large portions of medieval and post-medieval logic and philosophy of language (2). Second, it is in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries that logicians broke away from the medieval trend of discussing signification only in relation to voces or utterances (3), and attempted to present the linguistic sign in a much wider framework. Third, recent attention has been focussed on the sign-theory of later authors, particularly the seventeenth-century John of St. Thomas, and I think it is important to reveal the true pioneers in this field (4).
    
    (1) See E. J. Ashworth, "Jacobus Naveros (fl.ca.1533) on the Question: 'Do Spoken Words Signify Concepts or Things?", in Logos and Pragma. Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans, edited by L. M. de Rijk and H. A. G. Braakhuis, pp. 189-214 (Artistarium, Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers, 1987); and E. J. Ashworth, "'Do Words Signify Ideas or Things?' The Scholastic Sources of Locke's Theory of Language", Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (1981), pp. 299-326, reprinted as Study VII in E. J. Ashworth, Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985).
    (2) For examples of such misreading, see E. J. Ashworth, "Locke on Language", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1984), pp. 45-73, reprinted as Study VIII in Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
    3. Two medieval exceptions to this trend were Robert Kilwardby and Roger Bacon. For references, see below notes 31 and 32.
    4. See John N. Deely, translator and editor, with Ralph Austin Powell, Tractatus de Signis. The Semiotic of John Poinsot (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). See also E. J. Ashworth, "The Historical Origins of John Poinsot's 'Treatise on Signs', Semiotica 69 (1988), 129-147.

     

61.  Domingo de Soto (1494-1560) and the doctrine of signs. In De ortu grammaticae. Studies in medieval Grammar and Linguistics Theory in Memory of Jan Pinborg. Edited by Bursill-Hall Geoffrey L., Ebbesen Sten, and Koerner Konrad. Amsterdam-Philadelphia: J. Benjamins Publishing Co. 1990. pp. 35-48

     

62.  Equivocation and analogy in Fourteenth-Century logic: Ockham, Burley and Buridan. In Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Festschrift für Kurt Flasch zu seinem 60. Geburtstag. (vol. I). Edited by Mojsisch Burkhard and Pluta Olaf. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: B. R. Grüner 1991. pp. 23-43
    "In this paper I shall explore the notions of equivocation and analogy as they were handled by William of Ockham in his logical writings; (1) and I shall compare his position with those adopted by Walter Burley and John Buridan.(2) I realize that Ockham's views on these issues have already been discussed in print, (3) and I shall not be able to point to hitherto unnoticed material in his works. My main intention is to place his views in perspective, by locating them in their historical context. This project is one which has been touched on only indirectly by scholars, (4) yet it is crucial to the proper understanding both of Ockham himself and of later developments in the theory of analogy.
    My study of Ockham is part of a series in which I intend to explore the notions of equivocation and analogy as they were handled by logicians from the mid-thirteenth to the end of the sixteenth century. (5) I became interested in this issue when I noticed that virtually the only logician ever referred to in discussions of Aquinas's theory of analogy is Cajetan, despite the fact that he wrote over two centuries later, and had a rather different philosophical agenda. In fact, there are a number of striking dissimilarities between logicians contemporary with Aquinas and such sixteenth-century logicians as Domingo de Soto. Some of these are of minor importance. For instance, sixteenth-century logicians had access to more of the Greek commentators on Aristotle's Categories, and they tended to discuss analogy in the context of commentary on the Categories rather than in the context of commentary on the Sophistici Elenchi. Others affect the general approach: here I have in mind the different theories of signification which were predominant in the two periods, and the more-or-less complete abandonment of the grammatical doctrines of modi significandi. Yet others are crucial to the details. In the thirteenth century, the analogy of attribution was the important kind, and the analogy of proportionality was barely mentioned. The reverse is true after Cajetan. In the thirteenth century, the key notion was that of signification per prius et posterius, and the implications of this were spelled out partly in terms of concepts (whether one or more), but especially in terms of common natures. In the sixteenth century the focus was on concepts, whether one imprecise concept matched with more than one precise concept, or one formal concept matched with more than one objective concept. In addition, sixteenth-century logicians worried about the differences between intrinsic and extrinsic denomination, not an issue which had concerned late thirteenth-century logicians.
    The fourteenth century had two big contributions to make to the changes in doctrine that I have just outlined. First, John Duns Scotus's arguments about the univocity of being seem to have persuaded logicians that it makes sense to postulate just one concept of being, even if one goes on to reject the claim that <ens> is a univocal term. Second, Ockham and his followers diverted attention from common natures, which they rejected, to words and concepts. Sixteenth-century discussions of analogy have to be understood in terms of a reaction to these fourteenth-century developments, and not just in terms of a reaction to the writings of Thomas Aquinas. I shall leave the elucidation of Scotus and his influence to others; but it must be remembered that in concentrating on Ockham and the logicians I am telling only part of the story." pp. 23-25
    
    (1) William of Ockham, Summa Logicae, edited by P.Boehner, G.Gál, S.Brown, Opera Philosophica I (St.Bonaventure, N.Y.: St.Bonaventure University, 1974); Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis, edited by G. Gal in Opera Philosophica II (St.Bonaventure, N.Y.: St.Bonaventure University, 1978); Expositio super libros Elenchorum, edited by F. del Punta, Opera Philosophica III (St.Bonaventure, N.Y.: St.Bonaventure University, 1979). I shall also refer to the following theological writings: Scriptum in librum Primum Sententiarum Ordinatio. Distinctiones II-III, edited by S. Brown with G.Gál, Opera Theologica II (St.Bonaventure, N.Y.: St.Bonaventure University, 1970); Quaestiones in librum Tertium Sententiarum (Reportatio), edited by F.E. Kelley and G.I. Etzkorn, Opera Theologica VI (St.Bonaventure, N.Y.: St. Bonaventure University, 1982); Quodlibeta Septem, edited by J.C. Wey, Opera Theologica IX (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: St.Bonaventure University, 1980).
    (2) Much research remains to be done on both Burley and Buridan. I shall draw most of my material relating to Burley from his 1337 commentary on the Categories in Burlei super artem veterem Porphirii et Aristotelis (Venetiis, 1497). For Buridan I have used Iohannes Buridanus. Quaestiones in Praedicamenta, edited by J. Schneider (Munchen: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1983) and extracts from his Summulae in S. Ebbesen, The Summulae. Tractatus VII. De Fallaciis in The Logic of John Buridan, edited by Jan Pinborg (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum, 1976), pp.139-160.
    (3) The most recent and best discussion is found in M.McCord Adams, William Ockham (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), Vol.II, pp.903-960, especially pp.952-960. See also G. Leff, William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975) pp.149-164 for a detailed but very confused discussion. A much earlier work, containing some useful material, is M.C. Menges, The Concept of Univocity Regarding the Predication of God and Creature According to William Ockham (St.Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, Louvain: E.Nauwelaerts, 1952).
    (4) For a bibliography of works on fallacies, which of course include equivocation, and some discussion. see S.Ebbesen, The way fallacies were treated in scholastic, Cahiers de l'institut du moyen-age grec et latin 55 (1987), 107-134.
    (5) See E.J. Ashworth, Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A New Approach to Aquinas. I am currently writing a paper on equivocation and analogy in sixteenth-century logicians. Full documentation of my claims about thirteenth and sixteenth-century logic will be found in these papers.

     

63.  Nulla propositio est distinguenda: la notion d' equivocatio chez Albert de Saxe. In Itinéraires d'Albert de Saxe. Paris-Vienne au XIV siècle. Actes du Colloque organisé les 19-22 juin 1990 dans le cadre des activités de l'URA 1085 du CNRS à l'occasion du 600 anniversaire de la mort d'Albert de Saxe. Edited by Biard Joël. Paris: Vrin 1991. pp. 149-160

     

64.  "A Thirteenth-century interpretation of Aristotle on equivocation and analogy," Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary volume 17: 85-101 (1991).
    "This paper is a case study of how a few short lines in two of Aristotle's logical works were read in the thirteenth century.(1) I shall begin with a quick look at Aristotle's own remarks about equivocation in the Categories and the Sophistical Refutations, as they were transmitted to the West by Boethius's translations.(2) I shall continue with an analysis el the divisions of equivocation and analogy to be found in an anonymous commentary on the Sophistical Refutations written in Paris between 1270 and 1280.(3) I have chosen this author's work to focus on, because it offers a remarkably full account which brings together the elements found in many other logical works from the second half of the thirteenth century. In the course of my analysis I shall attempt to show the part played by four different sources: (1) the Greek commentators of late antiquity; (2) the new translations of Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics; (3) the reception of Arabic works, particularly the commentaries of Averroes; and (4) new grammatical doctrines, notably that of modi significandi. At the same time, I hope to throw some light on the development of the doctrine of analogy as it was understood by late thirteenth-century logicians." pp. 85-86
    
    (1) For full bibliographies and more information on the matters touched on here, see E.J. Ashworth, 'Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy,' Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991) 39-67; E.J. Ashworth, 'Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context,' Mediaeval Studies (forthcoming); E.J. Ashworth, 'Equivocation and Analogy in Fourteenth Century Logic: Ockham, Burley and Buridan,' Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien Zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, B. Mojsisch and 0. Pluta, eds. (Amsterdam: B.R. Gruner forthcoming).
    (2) Aristotelis Latinus I 1-5. Categoriae vel Praedicamenta. L. Minio-Paluello. Leiden: E.J. Brill 1961 and Aristotelis Latinus VI 1-3. De Sophisticis Elenchis. B.G. Dod. Leiden: E.J. Brill, Brussels: Desclée de Brouwer 1975.
    (3) Incerti Auctores, Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos, S. Ebbesen, ed. Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi VII. Copenhagen: Gad 1977. Of the two sets of questions edited by Ebbesen I shall use only the first (the SF commentary).
    (4) Aristotelis Latinus I 1-5. Categoriae vel Praedicamenta. Categories 1a1-6 in Aristotelis Latinus I 1-5. Categoriae vel Praedicamenta, 5. (Latin citation omitted)

     

65.  "Analogy and equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic. Aquinas in context," Mediaeval Studies 54: 94-135 (1991).
    "I suggest how mistaken it is to read Aquinas through the eyes of Cajetan, who wrote over two centuries later, by examining how analogy was handled by logicians, including the young Duns Scotus, between ca 1230 and ca 1300. I show how analogy entered the logic texts in the context of equivocation; and I argue that the emphasis on analogy "per attributionem", the absence of the analogy of proportionality, and the development of a threefold classification of analogy all throw considerable light on Aquinas' own discussion, particularly in the passage from his "Sentences" commentary which was used by Cajetan."

     

66.  "Signification and modes of signifying in Thirteenth-century logic: a preface to Aquinas on analogy," Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1: 39-67 (1991).
    "My study of Aquinas in the context of thirteenth-century logic has two parts. In the first part, which constitutes the present essay, I shall explore the general theory of language that lies behind theories of equivocation and analogy. I shall explain such key concepts as imposition, signification, and res significata, and I shall pay particular attention to the notion of modi significandi. In the second part, to be published separately, (*) I shall survey thirteenth-century accounts of equivocation from Peter of Spain to John Duns Scotus. I shall show how the discussion of analogy came to be subsumed under discussions of equivocation and how logicians developed a threefold classification of analogy that has a close relation to Aquinas's own classification in his Sentences-commentary."
    (*) See: Analogy and equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic. Aquinas in context

     

67.  "Logic in late Sixteenth-Century England: Humanist dialectic and the New Aristotelianism," Studies in Philology 88: 224-236 (1991).
    "In this paper I intend to look at the kind of logic that was taught at Oxford and Cambridge in 1590, and that was central to the undergraduate curriculum. I shall begin with a survey of the authors who were studied during the sixteenth century; then I shall consider the contents of their texts, with particular emphasis on the interplay between logic, dialectic and Aristotelianism. My main purpose is to explain what humanist dialectic might have been, and what it actually became in the hands of the textbook writers." p. 224

     

68.  Logic in late Medieval Oxford. In The history of the University of Oxford - vol. II - Late Medieval Oxford. Edited by Catto Jeremy C. and Evans Ralph. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992. pp. 35-64
    Co-author Paul Vincent Spade

     

69.  "Analogical concepts. The Fourteenth-Century background to Cajetan," Dialogue 31: 399-413 (1992).
    "Cajetan attacked three views of the concept of being: that it is a disjunction of concepts; that it is an ordered group of concepts; and that it is a single, separate concept which is unequally participated by substances and accidents. I discuss these views as they were presented by the 14th-century philosopher Peter Aureol, Hervaeus Natalis, and John of Jandun. I thereby shed light on medieval theories of analogy, of signification, and of the so-called objective concept."

     

70.  "New light on medieval philosophy: the Sophismata of Richard Kilvington," Dialogue 31: 517-521 (1992).
    "In this review-article of a recent edition and translation of the sophismata of the 14th-century English philosopher and theologian, Richard Kilvington, I place sophismata (i.e., puzzle-sentences) in their literary, institutional, and philosophical context. Kilvington's sophismata are particularly characterized by their use of the mathematical language of proportion and the analysis of continuous magnitudes and processes, as well as by their focus on the syntactico-semantic properties of terms. They have important implications for theories of reference."

     

71.  "The Obligationes of John Tarteys: edition and introduction," Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 3: 653-703 (1992).

     

72.  Ralph Strode on inconsistency in Obligational disputations. In Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns. Edited by Jacoby Klaus. Leiden, New York, Köln: E. J. Brill 1993. pp. 363-386
    "Treatises on obligations represent one of the interesting new developments of medieval logic.(1) They set out the rules which were to govern a certain kind of disputation, the obligational disputation. Truth was not at issue in such disputations, since their starting point was normally a false proposition;(2) nor was any particular subject-matter explored. Instead, according to Strode, their purpose was both to provide exercise for beginning students in handling logical inferences; and to prepare them to reason from truths in real-life situations.(3) He compared these disputations to the military exercises which young soldiers had to undergo before they could participate in real battles.(4)
    Obviously both the acceptance of falsehoods and the application of rules in isolation from a given subject-matter have their dangers; and one of the features of obligations treatises is the way they explore the different kinds of inconsistency which can arise in a disputational setting. In this paper I intend to discuss Ralph Strode's reaction to earlier attempts to amend the rules so as to avoid some of these kinds of inconsistency. So far as Strode's predecessors are concerned, my main focus will be on Roger Swyneshed (5) and on an anonymous author whose treatise on obligations was preserved in a Merton College manuscript, (6) though I shall also pay some attention to Richard Kilvington. (7)
    
    (1) For bibliography and discussion, see Paul of Venice, Logica Magna. Part II Fascicle 8. [Tractatus de Obligationibus] ed./trad. E. J. Ashworth, published for the British Academy by the Oxford University Press, 1988. Two papers which are particularly relevant to the theme of this paper are: P. V. Spade, ' Three Theories of Obligationes: Burley, Kilvington and Swyneshed on Counterfactual Reasoning", History and Philosophy of Logic 3, 1982, 1-32; and E. J. Ashworth, "Inconsistency and Paradox in Medieval Disputations: A Development of Some Hints in Ockham", Franciscan Studies 44, 1984, 129-139.
    (2) Some authors, including Strode, explicitly allowed the possibility of a true positum: see Paul of Venice, op. cit., p. 33; Ralph Strode, Obligationes, Oxford Bodleian Library MS Canon. misc. 219, fol. 37"; Spade, op. cit., p. 12 (for a discussion of Burley on this point).
    (3) Strode, ibid., fol. 37', fol. 37va. The second point is made even more clearly by the anonymous Merton author who refers to jurists and moral philosophers in this context: see N. Kretzmann and E. Stump,' The Anonymous De Arte Obligatoria in Merton College MS. 306", in Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Studies dedicated to L.M. de Rik, ed. E. P. Bos, Nijmegen: Ingenium, 1985, pp. 243 sq., § VI. (Short title: Anon. Merton). It should be noted that I use the phrase 'anonymous Merton author' for convenience, and not because we know that he was actually a Mertonian. In Paul of Venice, op. cit., I referred to him as Pseudo-Dumbleton.
    (4) Strode, op. cit., fol. 37ra.
    (5) Swyneshed's treatise was probably written between 1330 and 1335. For discussion and an edition of the text, sec P.V. Spade, "Roger Swyneshed's Obligationes: Edition and Comments", Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age 44, 1977, 243-285. (Short title: Swyneshed).
    (6) See note 3 above. This treatise was probably written during the period 1335-1349: see Anon. Merton., p. 239.
    (7) Since I wrote this paper, The Sophismata of Richard Kilvington, edited and translated by Norman Kretzmann and Barbara Ensign Kretzmann, has appeared in two volumes: translation, introduction and commentary, Cambridge: University Press, 1990; edition, Oxford: University Press for the British Academy, 1990. However, I have drawn my material from Spade, op. cit., pp. 19-28, and from E. Stump, "Roger Swyneshed's Theory of Obligations", Medioevo 7, 1981, 143-153.

     

73.  Les manuels de logique à l'université d'Oxford aux XIV et XV siècles. In Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d'enseignement dans les universités médiévales. Edited by Hamesse Jacqueline. Louvain-la-Neuve: Université Catholique de Louvain, Publications de l'Institut d'Etudes Médiévales 1994. pp. 351-370

     

74.  "Obligationes treatises: a catalogue of manuscripts, editions and studies," Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 36: 118-147 (1994).

     

75.  La doctrine de l'analogie selon quelques logiciens jésuites. In Les jésuites à la Renaissance. Système éducatif et production du savoir. Edited by Giard Luce. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1995. pp. 107-126

     

76.  "Suarez on the analogy of Being. Some historical background," Vivarium 33: 50-75 (1995).
    "I argue that Suarez is best read as part of a tradition which predates Cajetan with respect to the classification of types of analogy, and which to some extent predates Scotus in its insistence on a concept of being which is both one and analogical. I draw on three Fifteenth century philosophers and theologians, Capreolus, Dominic of Flanders, and Soncinas, and one Sixteenth century writer, Domingo de Soto."

     

77.  "Late Scholastic Philosophy. Introduction," Vivarium: 1-8 (1995).
    "Late scholastic philosophy coexisted with Humanism, Renaissance philosophy, and early modern philosophy from the late fifteenth to the late seventeenth century. It was characterized by its relation to institutions of higher learning, its method of presentation, its focus on Aristotle, and its explicit concern with problems stemming from the work of medieval philosophers."

     

78.  Analogy, univocation, and equivocation in some early Fourteenth-Century authors. In Aristotle in Britain during the Middle Ages. Proceedings of the International conference at Cambridge 8-11 April 1994 organized by the Société Internationale pour l'Etude de la Philosophie Médiévale. Edited by Marenbon John. Turnhout: Brepols 1996. pp. 233-247

     

79.  Domingo de Soto (1494-1560) on analogy and equivocation. In Studies on the History of Logic. Proceedings of the Third Symposium on the History of Logic. Edited by Angelelli Ignacio and Cerezo Maria. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter 1996. pp. 117-132
    "In 1543 the Spanish logician, Domingo de Soto, published a commentary on Aristotle's Categories. As one might expect, Soto offers a detailed discussion of the opening lines in which Aristotle presents a definition of equivocal terms, but his discussion also includes an analysis of analogical terms, together with an account of the conceptual correlates of such terms. The purpose of this paper is to show how Soto's analysis fits into a long tradition of commentary on the Categories. In particular, I wish to show that although Soto betrays the influence of Thomas de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan, whose short book, On the Analogy of Names, was published in 1498, it is a great mistake to suppose that the history of analogy from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century should be read through the eyes of Cajetan. At the same time, I hope to throw some light on the background to Suarez, for it seems to me that there is a close relationship between the doctrines found in Soto and those developed by Suarez.
    My paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, I shall look at the notion of equivocation and how it came to be related to analogy. In the second part, I shall describe Soto's divisions of analogy and how they are related to those of Cajetan. In the third part, I shall discuss what Soto had to say about the imposition of analogical terms and about their relationship to concepts and natures." p. 117

     

80.  "Autour des Obligationes de Roger Swineshed: la Nova responsio," Etudes Philosophiques (3): 341-360 (1996).
    "I examine a number of sources according to which Swyneshed (despite the claims made by Angel D'Ors in his recent articles) does give a nova responsio partly in the form of the rule 'One can deny a conjunction whose conjuncts have already been granted.' I show that this nova responsio is linked to a rejection of the rule 'Every proposition following from a set of propositions which have already been granted must be granted', and I attribute this rejection to a theory whereby an inference is based on the logical relations between just two propositions."

     

81.  Petrus Fonseca on objective concepts and the analogy of Being. In Logic and the workings of the mind: the logic of ideas and faculty psychology in early modern philosophy. Edited by Easton Patricia A. Atascadero: Ridgeview 1997. pp. 47-63
    "Petrus Fonseca was a Portuguese Jesuit who lived from 1528 to 1599. He was one of those responsible for drawing up the Jesuit Ratio Studiorum which set the curriculum for Jesuit schools across Europe, and he was also responsible for initiating the production of the Coimbra commentaries on Aristotle, or Conimbricenses, which served as texts for many schools and universities in the seventeenth century. He was himself the author of two popular texts, an introduction to logic, and a commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics. His logic text was one of two alternatives prescribed by the Ratio Studiorum of 1599, and may have been used at La Flèche; his Metaphysics commentary was used at many Jesuit schools, and may also have been used at La Flèche.
    In short, Fonseca was a leading figure in the Scholastic Aristotelian tradition of the late sixteenth century, a tradition which lies behind many of the developments in early modem philosophy, and which in many ways is more important than the humanist tradition represented by Petrus Ramus.
    I have chosen to discuss Fonseca on objective concepts and the analogy of being both because an examination of these issues will help us to understand how logic came to be bound up with the philosophy of mind and because the history of how these issues were treated helps solve a small problem about Descartes's sources. My paper has four parts. I shall begin by giving a historical outline of treatments of analogy and their relevance to Descartes. Secondly, I shall discuss late medieval theories of signification, particularly as they appear in Fonseca, in order to show how logicians turned away from spoken language to inner, mental language. Thirdly, I shall explain how it was that analogy, as a theory of one kind of language use, was particularly bound up with the discussion of concepts. Finally, I shall look at the distinctions Fonseca made while discussing the concepts associated with analogical terms." p. 47 (notes omitted)

     

82.  L'analogie de l'être et les homonymes. Categories, 1 dans la "Guide de l'étudiant". In L'enseignement de la philosophie au XIII siècle. Autour du "Guide de l'étudiant" du ms. Ripoll 109. Actes du Colloque International. Edited by Lafleur Claude and Carrier Joanne. Turnhout: Brepols 1997. pp. 281-295
    "Mon étude se divise en trois parties. En premier lieu, comme introduction à mon thème principal, je donnerai un bref aperçu de l'analogie dans les manuels de logique et dans les commentaires sur Aristote. Ensuite, je traiterai du sujet de la logique aristotélicienne en général et du sujet des Catégories en particulier. Mon but ici est de montrer l'importance de l'être, surtout dans le contexte de deux questions : y a-t-il une science unique des catégories, et quels sont les rapports entre la logique et la métaphysique? Pour terminer, j'aborderai les rapports entre homonymes, synonymes et paronymes, interprétés comme des réalités et non pas comme des mots, dans le contexte de la question : pourquoi Aristote a-t-il placé les homonymes avant les synonymes et les paronymes?" p. 283

     

83.  Analogy and equivocation in Thomas Sutton O.P. In Vestigia, Imagines, Verba. Semiotics and logic in medieval theological texts (XIIth-XIVth century). Acts of the XIth Symposium on Medieval logic and semantics. San Marino, 24-28 May 1994. Edited by Marmo Costantino. Turnhout: Brepols 1998. pp. 289-303

     

84.  Aquinas on significant utterance: interjection, blasphemy, prayer. In Aquinas's moral theory: essays in honor of Norman Kretzmann. Edited by MacDonald Scott and Stump Eleonore. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1998. pp. 207-234
    "Aquinas's interest in the moral significance of speech led him to modify the prevalent intellectualist approach which saw language as primarily a rational system intended to express truths and not modifiable either by the context or by a speaker's intentions and emotional states. First I lay out the standard thirteenth-century view adopted by Aquinas in his commentary on De interpretatione; then I consider the relation between animal noises and language, the role of the imagination, the effects of passion, slips of the tongue, and linguistic incontinence, and the place of appropriated language."

     

85.  Antonius Rubius on Objective Being and Analogy: one of the routes from early Fourteenth-Century discussions to Descartes's Third Meditation. In Meetings of the Minds. The relation between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy. Edited by Brown Stephen F. Turnhout: Brepols 1998. pp. 43-62
    "In this paper I shall use Rubius's tract on analogy to show how a rich medieval tradition survived into the seventeenth century and to shed some light on the problem of Descartes's sources for the notion of an idea's objective reality. I shall proceed as follows. First, I shall state the problem as it has been set out in recent secondary literature. Second, I shall trace the distinction between formal and objective concepts from the early fourteenth century to the early seventeenth century in the context of the discussion of analogical terms. Third, I shall examine the analogical use of terms as it was presented by Rubius. Fourth, I shall explain why a theory of language use and a theory of concepts carne to be linked together. Finally, I shall discuss what Rubius had to say about formal and objective concepts, and I shall suggest a relationship between this account and Descartes's own attitude towards mental contents and simple natures."

     

86.  Text-books: a case study - logic. In The Cambridge History of the Book in Britain (vol. 3). Edited by Trapp J.B. and Hellinga Lotte. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999. pp. 380-386
    "This book covers the years 1400 to 1557. In such a long period, we would expect great changes in the logic text-books used at Oxford and Cambridge. Indeed, there were great changes, but their timing is some what unexpected. If one considers just books written by Englishmen and copied or printed in England, then there is hardly any change at all between 1400 and 1530, the year in which the last surviving edition of the compilation text-book known as Libellus Sophistarum was printed. A period of fifteen years follows in which no surviving logic text was either written or printed, and then suddenly in 1545 we are confronted with the Dialectica of John Seton, a work which was to go through fourteen editions by the end of the sixteenth century, and which represents a completely different type of logic.(1) In what follows, I shall focus on the fortuna of just one type of logic text in use between 1400 and 1530, namely the treatises devoted to obligationes, or the rules prescribing what one was obliged to accept and reject in a certain kind of logical disputation.
    It is necessary first to consider the place of logic in the curriculum and the type of instruction which was offered, then to say something about fourteenth-century logicians and the obligationes texts used in the fifteenth century, and finally to examine the Libelli Sophistarum and other early printed texts in relation to fifteenth-century manuscript collections."
    
    (1) A useful chronological list of logic books printed in England before 1620 is in Schmitt 1983b [John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England, Kingston and Montreal] pp. 225-9. For English logic during the sixteenth century: Ashworth 1985b [Introduction to Robert Sanderson. Logicae artis compendium, Bologna], especially pp. XXIII-XXXIII; 1991; Giard 1985 [La production logique de l'Angleterre au 16e siècle, Les Études philosophiques, 3, 303-324]; Jardine 1974 [The place of dialectic teaching in sixteenth century Cambridge, Studies in the Renaissance, 21, .31-62]. No attention should be paid to Howell 1956 [Logic and rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, Princeton] whose account of developments in logic, particularly during the medieval period, is wildly inaccurate, and this vitiates his judgements about the texts described.

     

87.  Domingo de Soto on Obligationes: His use of Dubie positio. In Medieval and Renaissance Logic in Spain. Acts of the 12th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics. Edited by Angelelli Ignacio and Perez-Ilzarbe. Hildesheim: Georg Olms 2000. pp. 291-307
    "Soto's Opusculum obligationum was published in 1529 as the last treatise in his Summulae. (1) I have chosen to discuss it in this paper both because it is one of the very last serious discussions of the medieval doctrine of obligationes, and because it sheds some light on the history of dubie positio as a type of obligational dispute. This is important, beeause dubie positio is one of the areas pertinent to medieval epistemie logic, and the material found in obligationes treatises has not yet been the subject of much investigation. (2) In what follows, I shall first discuss the nature of dubie positio and its relation to other types of obligational disputation. I shall then describe the rules which were used. Third, I shall take up a particular problem concerning apparently indubitable propositions, such as 'I exist'. Finally, I shall discuss a sophisma in which the response 'I am in doubt about it' seemed to cause problems for one of the standard obligational rules.
    
    (1) Domingo de Soto, Opusculum obligationum in Summulae (Burgos, 1529), ff. cl ra-cliii vb; Domingo de Soto, De obligationibus in Summulae (Salamanca 1554-1555: reprinted Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms, 1980), ff 156 ra-159 vb. The latter is a reproduction of the third edition which, as Dr. Angel d'Ors has shown, modifies the second edition in certain respects: see Angel d'Ors, "Las "Summulae" de Domingo de Soto", Anuario Filosôfico (Universidad de Navarra) 16 (1983), p. 212. All my references are to the 1529 edition unless otherwise specified.
    
    (2) For a good discussion of some other sources, see Ivan Boh, Epistemic Logic in the Later Middle Ages, (London and New York: Routledge, 1993). See also William Heytesbury, 'The Compounded and Divided Senses' (pp. 413-434), and "The Verbs 'Know' and 'Doubt" [chapter 2 of the Regulae] (pp. 435-479) in Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, trans., Logic and the Philosophy of Language, vol. 1 of The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)."

     

88.  L'equivocité, l'univocité et les noms propres. In La tradition médiévale des catégories (XIIe-XVe siècles). Actes du XIII Symposium européen de logique et de sémantique mdiévales (Avignon, 6-10 juin 2000). Edited by Biard Joël and Rosier-Catach Irène. Louvain: Peeters Publishers 2003. pp. 127-140

     

89.  Language and logic. In Cambridge companion to Medieval philosophy. Edited by McGrade Arthur Stephen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003. pp. 73-96
    "I survey the texts used and the developments from Augustine onwards, and discuss views of the purpose and nature of language and logic, emphasizing their cognitive orientation. I examine the basic semantic notion of signification, the distinction between conventional and natural language, and the notion of mental language. I discuss extended uses of language, especially paronymy and analogy, and theories of reference, especially supposition theory. Finally, I consider various types of paradox: "There is no truth" in proofs for the existence of God, the Liar paradox, and the paradoxes of strict implication as treated in theories of inference."

     

90.  Singular terms and singular concepts: from Buridan to the early Sixteenth century. In John Buridan and beyond. Topics in the Language Sciences 1300-1700. Edited by Ebbesen Sten and Friedman Russell. Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel 2004. pp. 121-151
    "This article considers medieval treatments of proper names and demonstrative phrases in relation to the question of when and how we are able to form singular concepts. The logical and grammatical background provided by the authoritative texts of Porphyry and Priscian is examined, but the main focus is on John Buridan and his successors at Paris, from John Dorp to Domingo de Soto. Buridan is linked to contemporary philosophers of language through his suggestion that, although the name 'Aristotle' is a genuine proper name only for those who have the appropriate singular concept caused by acquaintance with Aristotle, it can be properly treated as a singular tem by subsequent users because of their beliefs about the original imposition of the name."

     

91.  Singular terms and predication in some late Fifteenth and Sixteenth century Thomistic logicians. In Medieval theories on assertive and non-assertive language. Edited by Maierù Alfonso and Valente Luisa. Florence: Leo S. Olschki 2004. pp. 517-536
    Acts of the 14th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics. Rome, June 11-15, 2002.

     

92.  "Ockham et la distinction entre les termes abstraits et concrets," Philosophiques 32: 427-434 (2005).
    "Quand j'ai lu l'ouvrage magistral de Claude Panaccio, je me suis rendu compte que j'aurais de la difficulté à en discuter, parce que je suis d'accord avec tout ce dit l'auteur, surtout en ce qui concerne les problèmes du langage. Je trouve en particulier décisif les arguments qu'il présente contre les thèses de Paul Spade. Ce dernier a argumenté, en se basant sur trois prémisses, qu'il n'y a pas de terme connotatif simple dans le langage mental. Premièrement, chaque terme connotatif a une définition nominale qui, en principe, ne contient que des termes absolus. Deuxièmement, un terme connotatif est synonyme de sa définition.
    Troisièmement, il n'y a pas de synonymie dans le langage mental. Il s'ensuit que, dans le langage mental, un terme connotatif sera remplacé par une séquence de termes absolus qui, selon Ockham, réfèrent aux substances et qualités individuelles d'une manière directe. En opposition à Spade, Panaccio a montré qu'il est impossible d'éliminer les concepts connotatifs simples du
    langage mental et que les termes connotatifs simples ne sont pas synonymes de leurs définitions nominales. Il est vrai que par ses analyses du langage Ockham voulait montrer que l'on pouvait parler du monde sans multiplier les entités, mais on peut atteindre cet objectif tout en admettant une certaine complexité au niveau des concepts simples. En outre, Panaccio a établi deux
    thèses importantes. D'abord, Ockham ne s'intéresse pas à la construction d'un langage mental idéal mais plutôt au fonctionnement idéal de notre esprit. En deuxième lieu, l'étude de ce fonctionnement idéal ne nous donne pas toutes les solutions aux problèmes de signification parce que, pour comprendre l'acception des termes, il faut connaître les intentions des impositeurs, ceux qui ont donné leur signification primordiale aux termes oraux. Selon Panaccio, Ockham présente une théorie externaliste de la signification du langage." p. 427

     

93.  Logic teaching at the University of Prague around 1400 A. D. In History of Universities. Vol. 21 (I). Edited by Feingold Mordechai. New York: Oxford University Press 2006. pp. 211-221
    Review of: Logica modernorum in Prague about 1400. The Sophistria disputation 'Quoniam quatuor' (MS Cracow, Jagiellonian Library 686, ff. 1ra-79rb), with a partial reconstruction of Thomas of Cleves' Logica - Edition with an Introduction and Appendices by Egbert P. Bos, Leiden, Brill, 2004.
    "This book is largefy (45-432) an edition of a Sophistria text that represents logic teaching at the University of Prague around 1400 A.D. While the anonymous author shows few signs of intelfectuaf distinction, both the topics chosen for discussion and the large number of direct references to other logicians make the work a valuable source for those interested in the undergraduate curriculum of the late middle ages. The editor, E.P. Bos, has done an excellent job of presenting the Latin text in as perspicuous a fashion as possible, and has provided the reader with an analysis (8-10) of the somewhat haphazard way in which the Prague master presented his sequences of arguments. However, in order to understand the text, or to glean from it anything about university teaching, one needs a good deal more than that. While Bos does provide some basic information about the logicians referred to (11-21), he tells the reader very little about Prague or its curriculum, and his brief list (28-32) of some of the views expressed in the text sheds little light. On page 28 he writes, 'I shaff discuss these views in more detail later in the introduction', but unfortunately the promised amplification is never provided. Nor is it clear why some of the views were listed. For instance, the division of singular terms into three types (29-30), including the vague individual (individuum vagum), such as 'this human being'. is merely the standard interpretation, found in Albert the Great and many later commentators, of a remark by Porphyry in his lsagoge. In what follows, I shall provide some context for the Sophistria text, before attempting to resolve the issue of its nature and purpose."

     

94.  "Metaphor and the logicians from Aristotle to Cajetan," Vivarium 45: 311-327 (2007).
    "I examine the treatment of metaphor by medieval logicians and how it stemmed from their reception of classical texts in logic, grammar, and rhetoric. I consider the relation of the word 'metaphor' to the notions of translatio and transumptio, and show that it is not always synonymous with these. I also show that in the context of commentaries on the Sophistical Refutations metaphor was subsumed under equivocation. In turn, it was linked with the notion of analogy not so much in the Greek sense of a similarity between two proportions or relations as in the new medieval sense of being said secundum prius et posterius. Whether or not analogy could be reduced to metaphor, or the reverse, depended on the controversial issue of the number of acts of imposition needed to produce an equivocal term. A spectrum of views is canvassed, including those found in the logic commentaries of John Duns Scotus."

     

95.  Developments in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic. Edited by Gabbay Dov and Woods John. Amsterdam: Elsevier 2008. pp. 609-644
    Handbook of the history of logic: Vol. 2.
    
    "To understand the significance of these developments for the logician, we have to consider three questions. First, how much of the medieval logic described in the previous chapters survived? Second, insofar as medieval logic survived, were there any interesting new development in tit? Third, does humanist logic offer an interesting alternative to medieval logic?
    In Part One of this chapter I shall consider the first two questions in the context of a historical overview in which I trace developments in logic from the later middle ages thorough to 1606, the year in which the Jesuits of Coimbra published their great commentary on Aristotle's logical works, the Commentarii Conimbricenses in Dialecticam Aristotelis. I shall begin by considering the Aristotelian logical corpus, the six books of the Organon, and the production of commentaries on this work. I shall the examine the fate of the specifically medieval contributions to logic. Finally, I shall discuss the textbook tradition, and the ways in which textbooks changes and developed during the sixteenth century. I shall argue that the medieval tradition in logic co-existed for some time with the new humanism, that sixteenth century is dominated by Aristotelianism, and that what emerged at the end of the sixteenth century was not so much a humanist logic as a simplified Aristotelian logic.
    In Part Two of this chapter, I shall ask whether the claims made about humanist logic and its novel contributions to probabilistic and informal logic have nay foundation. I shall argue that insofar as there is any principled discussion of such matters, it is to be found among writers in the Aristotelian tradition." p. 610

     

96.  Les théories de l'analogie du XIIe au XVIe siècle. Paris: Vrin 2008.
    Conférences Pierre Abélard, Université de Paris-IV Sorbonne (2004).
    "Afin de donner au lecteur une idée plus précise du plan de mon exposé, je dirai que dans les trois premiers chapitres, j'essaierai d'expliquer le trajet qui mène des Catégories et des Réfutations sophistiques d'Aristote à la tripartition de l'analogie telle que Burley la présente. Dans le premier chapitre, je donnerai un bref historique de la réception des textes et de I 'apparition de l'analogie d'attribution au mn e siècle. Je parlerai aussi des antécédents de la notion dans les textes des théologiens de la fin du XII e siècle et du début du XIII e siècle. Dans le chapitre il, je commençerai par un bref aperçu de la pensée de Thomas d'Aquin au sujet de l'analogie en général, avant d'examiner l'analogie de proportionnalité plus en détail. Dans le chapitre in, nous serons de nouveau avec Gauthier Burley et sa doctrine des concepts analogiques. Pour terminer, je consacrerai le dernier chapitre à deux problèmes concernant le langage parlé ou écrit : quand faut- il désambiguïser les propositions en faisant des distinctions, et quel est le rôle de la métaphore dans les discussions des théologiens et logiciens du Moyen Âge ?
    Prenons comme point de départ la question de savoir pourquoi les auteurs du Moyen Âge ont cru nécessaire de développer une théorie de l'analogie sémantique. Afin de trouver une réponse, nous devrons répondre à trois questions préliminaires : 1) Quelles sont les théories métaphysiques et théologiques qui ont produit l'analogie métaphysique? 2) Quelle est la théorie du langage qui prédominait? (3) Quels sont les textes canoniques qui donnaient les instruments que l'on pouvait utiliser pour résoudre le problème des rapports entre réalité et langage? Dans ce qui suit, j'esquisserai une réponse aux trois questions, avant de parler plus en détail des textes logiques. Ensuite je retournerai aux théologiens afin de parler d'une solution au problème des noms divins qui semble contenir les racines d'une théorie de l'analogie. Pour terminer ce chapitre, j'expliquerai comment l'arrivée des nouvelles traductions d' Aristote et des écrits arabes a mené à la théorie de l'analogie telle qu'on la retrouve chez Thomas d'Aquin. Évidemment je ne serai pas en mesure de donner les réponses avec toute la complexité qui s'impose, surtout à la première question, mais ces quelques remarques, même superficielles, pourront déjà nous indiquer la direction à suivre." pp. 15-16.

     

"Medieval Theories of Analogy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

"Medieval Theories of Singular Terms", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

Two articles in Handbook of Ontology and Metaphysics edited by H. Burkhardt and B. Smith (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1991):

• Joachim Jungius,

   

• Post-Medieval Logic.

   

Seven articles in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, edited by Robert Audi (Cambridge University Press, 1995), Second edition, 1999:

• Giordano Bruno,

   

• Tommaso Campanella,

   

• Marsilio Ficino,

   

• Pedro da Fonseca,

   

• Jean Gerson,

   

• Paracelsus,

   

• Giovanni Pico della Mirandola.

   

Nine articles in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (edited by Edward Craig) London & New York: Routledge 1998:

• Giordano Bruno,

   

• Language,

   

• Renaissance Philosophy of,

   

• Lipsius, Justus (1547-1606),

   

• Logic, Medieval,

   

• Logic, Renaissance,

   

• Paracelsus (Philippus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim) (1493-1541),

   

• Patrizi da Cherso, Francesco (1529-1597),

   

• Paul of Venice (1369/72-1429),

   

• Renaissance Philosophy.

   

PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE IN LINE

Nine articles published in the Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (PDF format) available at Project Euclid:

• Propositional logic in the Sixteenth and early Seventeenth centuries (1968)

   

• Petrus Fonseca and material implication (1968)

   

• Some notes on syllogistic in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries (1970)

   

• The treatment of semantic paradoxes from 1400 to 1700 (1972)

   

• Strict and material implication in the early Sixteenth century (1972)

   

• Andreas Kesler and the later theory of Consequence (1973)

   

• The theory of consequences in the late Fifteenth and early Sixteenth centuries (1973)

   

• An early Fifteenth century discussion of infinite sets (1977)

   

• Multiple quantification and the use of special quantifiers in early Sixteenth century logic (1978)

LINKS

On early-modern Scholastics see the excellent site SCHOLASTICON by Jacob Schmutz (in French).

RELATED PAGES

Medieval Theories of Supposition (Reference) and Mental Language (with an annotated bibliography on the medieval theory of supposition)

Ontology and History of Logic: an annotated bibliography

The Development of Renaissance and Modern Logic from 1400 to Boole

Birth of a New Science: the History of Ontology from Suarez to Kant

Last modified: Tuesday, March 09, 2010