Living
Ontologists (a list of authors with an interest in ontology, with
synthetic bibliographies)
INTRODUCTION
"An ontology may be described as consisting of three kinds of statements: those that set the problems; those that list the kinds of entities that exist; those that show how the existents solve the problems. Ontologies may thus differ in different ways. The most decisive way concerns the kinds of entities deemed to exist. With respect to this way, there are but two types of ontology. One is lavish, cluttered; the other, frugal, sparse. The ontologies of Plato, Meinong, and Frege are lavish; those of Hume,
Brentano, and Wittgenstein are frugal.
Gustav Bergmann has propounded both types of ontology in the course of his thirty years of philosophizing. The Bergmann of The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism (1954) and Meaning and Existence (1959) propounds a frugal ontology. The Bergmann of Logic and Reality (1964) and Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong (1967)propounds a lavish ontology. In a way of speaking that Bergmann himself has used, the world of the early Bergmann is a desert, the world of the later Bergmann a jungle. In a way of speaking
that is suggestive, speculative, had the early Bergmann written Realism, he would have dedicated it to Brentano rather than to Meinong, as did the later Bergmann.
The difference between the ontologies of the two Bergmanns is great, though it does not greatly strike one in reading Bergmann's essays. One is rather struck, on the one hand, by his unswerving commitment to the so called ideal language method of philosophizing and, on the other, by his persistent concern with the solutions to, and dialectical connections amongst a seemingly limited number of problems-individuation, universals, necessity, and intentionality. Bergmann's essays thus appear to be a set of variations
on several ontological themes. And at first glance the variations are slight enough to cause one to overlook the amazing difference between the ontologies struck by the early and later Bergmanns. Furthermore, Bergmann himself tends to minimize the difference. He does so, I suspect, first, because he naturally stresses how his later views evolve naturally from 'his earlier ones and, second, because he tries to mediate between the two Bergmanns, telling the early one that the later's ontology is less cluttered
than one might initially think. The later Bergmann seems somewhat uncomfortable in the jungle into which he has led himself. Be that as it may, in Bergmann's essays the difference between the two Bergmanns is muted, obscured, by Bergmann's constant and conspicuous use of the ideal language method, his persistent preoccupation with the same problems, and his reluctance to dwell on and dramatize his evolution from frugality to lavishness.
The emergence of the later Bergmann is ironic. The lavishness is the outgrowth of his method, the very method developed by the early Wittgenstein as a device for solving frugally the problems Frege solved lavishly. The emergence of the later Bergmann is also, and more significantly, inevitable. The ideal language method dictates a lavish ontology. Upon realizing that, Bergmann abandoned frugality and clung to the method. In contrast, Wittgenstein, upon realizing the same thing, abandoned the method and clung
to frugality."
From: Edwin B. Allaire - Bergmann's Ontologies in: The ontological turn: studies in the philosophy of Gustav Bergmann. Edited by Gram Moltke S. and Klemke Elmer D. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press 1974. pp. 38-39.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
A complete and updated bibliography of Gustav Bergmann (128 titles) and the studies about him (107 titles) is available in Rivista di Estetica, 25, 2004 pp. 113-126; I
give only the most relevant publications.
The metaphysics of Logical Positivism. New York: Longmans, Green
& Co. 1954.
Second edition: Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1967.
Contents: Preface V; Preface to the Second edition IX-X; 1. Logical
Positivism (1950) 1; 2. Semantics (1950) 17; 3. Logical Positivism,
language, and the reconstruction of metaphysics (1953) 30; 4. Two
cornerstones of Empiricism (1953) 78; 5. Two types of linguistic philosophy
(1952) 106; 6. Bodies, minds, and acts (1952) 132; 7. Remarks on Realism
(1946) 153; 8. Sense data, linguistic conventions, and existence (1947) 176;
9. Russell on particulars (1947) 197; 10. Professor Ayer's analysis of
knowing (1949) 215; 11. On nonperceptual intuition (1949) 228; 12.
Conditions for an extensional elementaristic language (1948) 232; 13. A note
on ontology (1950) 238; 14. Logical Atomism, elementarism, and the analysis
of value (1951) 243; 15. Comments on Professor Hempel's "The concept of
cognitive significance" (1951) 255; 16. The identity of indiscernibles and
the formalist definition of "identity (1953) 268; 17. The problem of
relations in classical psychology (1952) 277; 18. Ideology (1951) 300;
Author's note 326; Index 328-340.
From the Preface: "This is not a collection of my papers on first philosophy
but a selection from them. Nor is the order in which they are arranged
chronological. This requires some comment. The papers fall into three
groups. Taken together, the first six, of most recent origin, provide an
outline of the views I now hold. The second group consists of the next
three, which are the earliest included in this volume. Together with three
other still earlier ones which I have excluded, they form a unit centered
around the realism phenomenalism issue. The excluded papers are "Pure
Semantics, Sentences, and Propositions" (Mind, 53, 1944), "A
Positivistic Metaphysics of Consciousness" (Mind, 54, 1945),
"Undefined Descriptive Predicates" (Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 8, 1947). I omit them because for the most part they
merely say very badly what I have since said again, a little less badly, in
the six essays of the first group. I mention them because there I first
struck out on my own, trying to free myself from the influence of Carnapian
positivism though not yet, alas, from its apparatus. Having said that much,
as I believe I should, I wish to add, as I believe I also should, that this
by now radical dissent has not at all affected either my gratitude or my
admiration for Carnap. I still think of him as the outstanding figure in a
major phase of the positivistic movement. The third group consists of all
the remaining essays, some of them very short. These are in the main
elaborations of themes struck in the first nine pieces. The arrangement
within this last group represents a compromise between their subject matter
and the order in which I remember having written them. The concluding essay
differs from the rest. Quite nontechnical, it touches at least indirectly on
my philosophy in that broader sense in which everyone who is not himself an
analytical philosopher speaks of a man's philosophy. Thus it is, perhaps,
not out of place at the end of a volume that is otherwise rather technical.
Aside from a few editorial changes I have left the papers as they were
originally written."
From the Preface to the Second edition: "The logical positivists of the
Vienna Circle were my first teachers. Thus I was faced with an unpalatable
choice. Dialectically, metaphysical materialism always seemed and still
seems to me the greater evil. (Scientific materialism is but common sense.)
So I began my philosophical career as a reluctant phenomenalist in the style
of the Circle. Now I am, and have been for some time, a realist of the
phenomenological variety. The break occurred in the early fifties, when I
proposed an analysis of the act. This book, my first, a collection of essays
originally published in 1954, reflects the struggles which led to that
break. Much of it I now reject. Yet there are also many analyses, of issues
and of movements, including pragmatism, logical positivism, and the
so-called linguistic philosophy, which I still think are right.
Two of the essays introduce the act. Another, about semantics, mentions the
meaning nexus which has come to play so great a role in my thought. The
essay on the problem of relations in classical psychology first manifests
what has since become one of my major concerns. The concluding piece, on
ideology, has been well received by many social scientists.
By now logical positivism belongs to history. Yet it was a vigorous
movement; some of its members were brilliant; its contribution to the
philosophy of science remains most valuable. From the record of such a
movement much can be learned. This book, in its own peculiar way, is part of
the record. Thus, since it is still in demand although it has been out of
print for some time, a new edition seems justified."
Philosophy of science. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press
1957.
Meaning and existence. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press
1959.
Contents: Preface V-X; 1. Intentionality (1955) 3; 2. The revolt against
Logical Atomism (1958) 39; 3. Analiticity (1958) 73; 4. Particularity and
the new nominalism (1954) 91; 5. (with Herbert Hochberg) Concepts (1957)
106; 6. Elementarism (1957) 115; 7. Individuals (1958) 124; 8. Sameness,
meaning, and identity (1958) 132; 9. Professor Quine on analiticity (1955)
139; 10. Some remarks on the ontology of Ockham (1954) 144; 11. Russell's
examination of Leibniz examined (1956) 155; 12. Some remarks on the
philosophy of Malebranche (1956) 189; 13. Frege's hidden nominalism (1958)
205; 14. Some reflections on time (1958) 225; Author's note 265; Index
267-274.
From the Preface: "The main theme of this book is the analysis of mind. But
even the basic problems fall into each other's scopes. Thus other themes had
to be sounded, some of them rather fully. Foremost among these is the basic
problem of ontology, that is, the search for a complete inventory of the
several kinds of existent. An analysis which denies mind the status of an
existent, in the full ontological sense of 'existent', is patently
inadequate. That shows the connection. Yet, all attempts to place mind in
any of the less extravagant ontological schemes available led to
consequences which flaw the over-all pattern. That shows the difficulty. The
book propounds how I propose to conquer it.
The characteristic feature of minds is their intentionality. That makes
"Intentionality and Ontology" an accurate two-word title. "Meaning and
Existence" sounds less formidable. Ontology asks what exists. This justifies
the substitution of 'existence' for 'ontology'. That of 'meaning' for
'intentionality' will be justified in a moment.
What a philosopher takes a question to be as well as the sort of answer
(rather than, which specific answer) he considers a (possible) solution
depends on his conception of the philosophical enterprise. Or, what amounts
virtually to the same thing, it depends on his method. That is why
philosophers always were method conscious. At the beginning of this century
analytical philosophy took what has been called the linguistic turn. The
issue, and it still is an issue, is one of method. That is why our
generation is even more method conscious than some of its predecessors. My
work is in the linguistic stream. Inevitably, therefore, the basic theme of
method runs through the whole book. One essay develops it in considerable
detail.
The linguistic stream has several currents. I philosophize by means of one
of the schemes known as ideal languages. My being in this current in part
determines the content of the book. Analyticity, every one agrees, is a very
fundamental problem. For a practitioner of my method it is basic. (I am even
prepared to grant that the adequate explication of analyticity is the one
and only major task for which the method is indispensable.) Moreover, there
is a very close connection between the problem of analyticity and the
analysis of mind.
To whatever current a linguistic philosopher may belong, the analysis of
mind is for him virtually indistinguishable from that of the various
ontological and logical aspects of meaning. (This justifies the substitution
of 'meaning' for 'intentionality' in the two-word title.) If he belongs to
my current, then the core of the problem is to construct an ideal language
into which the relevant uses of 'to mean' can be adequately transcribed. I
propose such an ideal language. Not surprisingly , for anyone familiar with
the course of analytical philosophy in this century, it turns out that this
proposal requires radical re-examination and eventual modification of the
classical analysts' explicit or implicit notions of analyticity. The
connection of my main theme with this major subtheme is thus close indeed.
(...)
This is the second essay collection I publish. The Metaphysics of Logical
Positivism (1954) was the first. Since the public for anything of
this sort is rather limited, quite a few prospective readers of the second
will have either read or at least heard of the first. I shall therefore
answer a question which is likely to occur to such readers. What, if any, is
the connection between the two books? The central thesis of this book is the
proposed analysis of the act (I use the classical term). Its central idea is
clearly stated in the first book. However, there is an important difference
between a full statement and its central idea, just as there is such a
difference between even a full statement and the exploration of its
consequences. (Remember what was said about the scopes of philosophical
problems.) In the Preface to the first book I promised to apply myself to
the tasks I had thus set myself. This book fulfills that promise. In this
respect, and I believe also in some others, the first book stands to the
second as flower stands to fruit. Whether the fruit was worth gathering is
not for me to say."
Logic and reality. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1964.
Contents: Preface VII-VIII; 1. Acts (1960) 3; 2. Ineffability, ontology, and
method (1960) 45; 3. Generality and existence (1962) 64; 4. Meaning (1962)
85; 5. Duration and the specious present (1960) 98; 6. Physics and ontology
(1961) 108; 7. Ontological alternatives (1963) 124; 8. Inclusion,
exemplification, and inherence in G. E. Moore (1962) 158; 9. Strawson's
ontology (1960) 171 10. The ontology of Edmund Husserl (1960) 193; 11. The
glory and misery of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1961) 225; 12. Stenius on the
Tractatus (1963) 242; 13. Synthetic a priori (1963) 272; 14.
Realistic postscript 302; Author's note 341; Index 343-355.
From the Preface: "Some philosophers never change their minds. Those who do
are of two kinds. One kind vacillates, often abruptly, between two extremes
such as, say, phenomenalism and materialism. With the other kind the changes
are gradual and show a direction. I belong to the latter kind.
This is my third book in first philosophy. In The Metaphysics of Logical
Positivism (1954) the major concern is with epistemology; the
implicit ontology is a reluctant phenomenalism. Since the act is recognized,
the phenomenalism is atypical. Recognition, though, is not enough; it merely
opens the way. The task is to find a dialectically adequate ontological
assay of the act. If this decisive step has been made, then, structurally,
realism has been achieved. In Meaning and Existence (1960)
ontology has come to the fore; structurally, realism is achieved; much of
the phenomenalist debris is cleared away. In this book the realism is
explicit and fully articulated. In the concluding essay the last piece of
debris is buried. That leaves no doubt about the direction of the several
changes. They took me over twenty years. The reprieve, even if only
conditional, is welcome.
One who has struck out on his own, either ignoring or challenging the
fashions of the day, will not, if he is sober, be certain that everything he
has gradually come to believe is true. I am very sober. Yet there is one
belief I have come to hold very firmly. One cannot arrive at a dialectically
adequate realism without recognizing that the world's form exists. Logic is
but a reflection of the world's form. Hence, one cannot fully articulate
one's realism without ontologizing logic. That accounts for the title of
this book and, more importantly, for its thematic unity. The belief I so
firmly hold is the theme. The fourteen essays are fourteen variations on
it."
Realism. A critique of Brentano and Meinong. Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press 1967.
Contents: Preface VII-VIII;
Book One: Facts, things, ideas
Part I: General ontology
One: Facts and things 3; Two: Two fundamental ties 22; Three: Connections
42; Four: Parts 71; Five: Perfect particulars and universals 85; Six:
Substances
Part II: Representationalism
Seven: Introductory reflections 125; Eight: Cores and fringes 138; Nine:
Three schemata 155; Ten: Perception 180; Eleven: Three predicaments 195;
Book Two: Brentano and Meinong
Part III: Brentano
Twelve: Introduction 221; Thirteen: The truncated world 238; Fourteen: Minds
264; Fifteen: Double judgments 284; Sixteen: Existence, truth, evidence 302;
Seventeen: Places, moments, selves 320;
Part IV: Meinong
Eighteen: The truncated world 335; Nineteen: Minds 374; Twenty: Earlier
stages 399; Twenty-one: Flaws and gaps 399; Bibliographical note 445; Index
447-458.
From the Preface: "Freud said of The Interpretation of Dreams that it
was the sort of book a man writes only once in his life. This book is of
that sort. It is also very long. Such a book ought to speak for itself. So I
send it into the world without any introduction except for one remark about
the way it is written.
There are two kinds of philosophical criticism, and, perhaps, only two kinds
of writing in philosophy. The inductive critics try at the same time to make
the cross and nail their intended victim onto it. Those who write
deductively first make the cross and, while making it, affect, except for an
occasional glance, an almost studied unconcern for the victim. I am
virtually incapable of writing inductively. The best I can do, therefore, is
to do without disguise, pretext, or apology, the one thing which I may hope
not to do too badly. This book has four parts. The first is a short treatise
on general ontology. The second expounds the dialectics of
representationalism. The third deals critically with Brentano; the fourth,
with Meinong. The criticism in the last two parts requires a minimum of
exposition. But both criticism and exposition are highly selective."
New foundations of ontology. Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press 1992.
Edited by William Heald.
Contents: Foreword by Edwin B. Allaire IX-XII; Editor's Note XIII-XX;
Editor's introduction 3; 1. Simples and canons 43; 2. Facts and modes 61; 3.
Diversity and order 101; 4. Functions and analiticity 134; 5. Thought and
language 201; 6. Classes 239; 7. The Linguistic Turn contained 317; Glossary
357; Index 369-372.
From the Foreword: "During the last two decades of his life-from the
publication of Realism in 1967 until his death in 1987 - Gustav
Bergmann published only five essays. One, 'Diversity,' his presidential
address to the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association,
appeared in 1968; the other four, between 1977 and 1981.
In those decades Bergmann worked as hard and as steadily as he ever had; and
he was a hard worker indeed. In the twenty-five years prior to Realism,
Bergmann published over a hundred essays, many of which are contained in
four essay collections, and Philosophy of Science. In his presidential address Bergmann made known his dissatisfaction with
certain aspects of his ontology, in particular his assays of the facts
expressed by universal and existential statements. (See 'Generality and
Existence,' Theoria, 28, 1962.) He thus set about to rethink his
system. New Foundations of Ontology is the result.
The manuscript seems to have been begun sometime in 1974 and completed in
late 1975. Bergmann decided to delay its publication: he had reservations
about the penultimate chapter, which deals with classes and arithmetic. He
never returned to the manuscript per se. Instead, he led himself into the
depths of set theory, a subject he had once known well. (Bergmann earned a
PhD in mathematics and from 1928 to 1935 published eight papers in
mathematics proper.) "
Collected Works. Vol I. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos Verlag 2003.
Selected Papers I.
Edited and with an introduction by Erwin Tegtmeier
Contents: Introduction 9; Remarks on Realism 18; Sense data, linguistic
conventions, and existence 41; Russell on particulars 62; On nonperceptual
intuition 80; A note on ontology 84; Bodies, minds, and acts 89; Two types
of linguistic philosophy 110; The identity of indiscernibles ad the
Formalist definition of identity 136; Logical Positivism, language, and the
reconstruction of metaphysics 145; Particularity and the new Nominalism 193;
Some remarks on the ontology of Ockham 208; Professor Quine on analyticity
219; Intentionality 224; Russell's examination of Leibniz examined 258; The
revolt against Logical Atomism 292; Frege's hidden nominalism 324; Sameness,
meaning, and identity 344-350.
Collected Works. Vol II. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos Verlag 2003.
Selected Papers II.
Edited and with an introduction by Erwin Tegtmeier
Contents: Introduction 7; Acts 13; Ineffability, ontology, and method 55;
Ontological alternatives 75; Inclusion, exemplification, and inherence in G.
E. Moore 109; Strawson's ontology 121; The ontology of Edmund Husserl 145;
The glory and misery of Ludwig Wittgenstein 177; Stenius on the Tractatus
195; Synthetic a priori 225; Realistic postscript 255; Diversity (1968) 295;
Sketch of an ontological inventory (1978) 309; Notes on ontology (1981) 321;
Notes on the ontology of minds (1981) 345-370.
EXCERPTS FROM HIS PUBLICATIONS (in preparation)
STUDIES ABOUT HIS WORKS
The ontological turn: studies in the philosophy of Gustav Bergmann.
Edited by Gram Moltke S. and Klemke Elmer D. Iowa City: University of Iowa
Press 1974. Contents: Preface VII; I. Ontological alternatives The limits of ontological analysis by Panayot Butchvarov 3; Bergmann's
ontologies by Edwin Allaire 38; To Gustav Bergmann: a humble petition and
advice by Henry B. Veatch 65; II: Ontological problems Bergmann's ontology and the Principle of Acquaintance by Reinhardt Grossmann
89; Consciousness by Timothy L. Sprigge 114; Time, substance, and analysis
by Laird Addis 148; Intentions, facts, and propositions by Hebert Hochberg
168; III. Language, logic, and the philosophy of science Seeing, seeming, and sensing by Wilfrid Sellars 195; Belief and error by
Keith Lehrer 216; Bergmann on the analytic-synthetic distinction by Alan
Hausman 230; The problem of color incompatibility by Erik Stenius 245;
Perspicuous languages by Robert Ackermann 264; Why I am not aware of your
pain by Fred Wilson 276; Bibliography: Works by Gustav Bergmann 301 Index 311-314.
From the Preface: "The initial plans for this volume in honor of one of the
world's most distinguished philosophers were conceived four years ago. After
much labor, and with the patience and assistance of all who participated, we
are happy to have brought it at last to birth. It may seem premature to some, at this time, to publish a volume of essays
on Professor Bergmann's philosophy, since his recent work has
not yet
been published. But the widespread interest in many countries in his work,
and the growing number of philosophers-even those who disagree with him-who
have followed his philosophical pursuits and have written extensively about
them, makes it fitting to present a collection of critical studies now."
Il realismo ontologico di Gustav Bergmann. Rivista di Estetica 25, 3-126
2004.
A cura di Guido Bonino e GiulianoTorrengo. Indice: Premessa 3; Introduzione by Guido Bonino and Giuliano Torrengo 5; I
- Cose e fatti by Stefano Caputo and Francesco Martinello 15; II -
Universali e particolari by Luca Angelone, Fabio Minocchio, Andrea Pagliardi
49; III - La percezione by Carola Barbero and Giuliano Torrengo 75; IV -
Idee e universali by Guido Bonino and Antonio Capuano 97; Bibliografia by
Guido Bonino 113-126.
Bonino Guido, "Why there are no facts in Meinong's world (according to
Gustav Bergmann)," Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien 2: 239-275
(2007). "The paper deals with Gustav Bergmann's analysis of Meinong's ontology,
carried out in Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong (1967);
more specifically it aims at making it clear in what sense Meinong can be
regarded as a "reist". Reism is characterized by Bergmann as a position --
largely dominant in the philosophical tradition -- which (i) neglects the ontological category of facts; (ii) neglects or downplays nexus (and more in general subsistents); (iii) tends to consider all entities as things or thing-like. As a by-product, some light will be thrown on the sense of Bergmann's
ontological enterprise."
Hochberg Herbert. Introduction: ontological analysis and the Linguistic
Turn. In Logic. ontology, and language. Essays on truth and reality.
München-Wien: Philosophia Verlag 1984. pp. 11-47
Hochberg Herbert, "From Carnap's Vienna to Meinong's Graz: Gustav
Bergmann's ontological odyssey," Grazer Philosophischen Studien 48:
1-50 (1994). "The development of the systematic ontology of Bergmann's posthumous 1992
work New Foundations of Ontology from its roots in his early
criticisms of R. Carnap's work on semantics to his acceptance of fundamental
Meinongian ideas, is traced, critically examined and compared to views of
others, such as G.E. Moore, B. Russell, W.V. Quine, and J. Searle. The
discussion, focusing on main themes of his final metaphysical system, deals
with problems posed by universals and particulars, predication and the
Bradley "paradox", facts, truth, intentionality and non-existent objectives,
classes and the membership relation, logic and the analytic-synthetic
distinction, arithmetic and logicism, ontological categories and canons,
modalities, internal relations, and the question of the phenomenological
ground of ontological claims. Some of the critical analyses are developed
into alternative analyses."
Hochberg Herbert, "Truths and the ontology of Logical Realism,"
Grazer Philosophischen Studien 58-59: 23-92 (2000).
Hochberg Herbert. The Positivist and the Ontologist. Bergmann, Carnap
and Logical Realism. Amsterdam: Rodopi 2001. Contents: Preface V-VI; 1. From Positivism to metaphysics: Bergmann's
critique of Carnap's semantics 1; 2. Reism, ontological types and
Aufbau-type
ontological constructions 33; 3. Bergmann's Realism and the critique
of Bundle and Trope ontologies 57; 4. Carnapian consequences: Realism and
semantic refutation of Realism 105; 5. Bergmann's Reism: Brentano's and
Carnap's revenge 147; 6. Relational order, the Russell-Wittgenstein dispute
and Meinongian Realism 175; 7. Negation, quantification and intensional
isomorphism 217; 8. The phenomenology and ontology of logic, classes and
modality 233; 9. Dispositions and laws of nature: Hume, Husserl and the
New Causal Realism 289; 10. Avoiding absurdity: Physical Realism,
Phenomenalism and Mindless Materialism 319; 11. Extensions, intensions and
Carnap's critique of reference 349; 12. Reference reconsidered 371; 13.
Logical truth, logical paradoxes and Logical Realism 393-400.
Preface: "Gustav Bergmann's remarkable intellectual journey, beginning as
one of the youngest members of the Vienna Circle, and ending, in Hector
Castaneda's judgment, as 'the foremost ontologist of the decade' focused on
three metaphysical issues that he continuously discussed for thirty years:
the problems of individuation, of universals, and of intentionality.
Bergmann's turn to metaphysics began with his 1947 paper 'Russell on
Particulars,' though he had long insisted that his later concerns with the
metaphysics of intentionality, expressed in a 1955 paper on intentionality,
are already present in two criticisms of Carnap's semantics published in
1944 and 1945. But a careful reading of the earlier papers, which Carnap (in
a letter to Bergmann in the Bergmann archives at the University of Iowa
Library) found to be 'mostly Chinese,' show that Bergmann, in 1944 and 1945,
is writing as an extreme early Carnapian positivist. In fact he is
criticizing Carnap for moving away from positivism and towards a kind of
metaphysical realism, by introducing a designation relation between
linguistic items and non-linguistic reality. Irrespective of when his turn
to metaphysics took place, it was unique among the positivists that
emigrated to the United States and England. This book will trace lines in Bergmann's development from his early
philosophical writings, in the mid 1940s, to what I have called, in one
chapter, his 'middle phase,' epitomized in his long and complex book,
Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong of 1967, and finally to its
culmination in his last work in three final published papers and a book
manuscript, New Foundations of Ontology, that was posthumously
published in 1992 (and from which the final papers were obviously taken). It
will also relate them to various themes in Carnap's work in semantics of the
1940s. But, as I am mainly concerned with the basic philosophical issues
raised, the book is a study of various attempts to deal with questions posed
by the relation between thought and language, on the one hand, and the
objects of thought and the referents of linguistic items, on the other. Thus
I will be setting out critical assessments of the work of philosophers other
than Bergmann and Carnap, including a number of other major figures on the
contemporary scene, and of the recent past, in attempting to arrive at a
viable realistic ontology that I have called Logical Realism. The basic
themes set forth owe much to Bergmann, Carnap, Moore, Russell and the
'early' Wittgenstein. It will also be clear that the analyses set forth owe
much to what has come to be called the Austrian Tradition, and the "realism"
many of its members espoused, especially Meinong. It is no accident that the
early figures of the 'analytic' tradition, Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein,
were heavily influenced by the Brentano school -with Russell and Moore
reading the works of various members of that school at the turn of the
century. Russell, as is well known, wrote extensive critical, but
appreciative, studies of Meinong and other members of the Graz school and
was influenced by what he read, in spite of being mostly known in that
connection for his widely discussed criticisms of Meinong. Moore's
development of his philosophy of mind, with its focus on 'mental acts,'
clearly derived this theme from his reading of the Austrians, and he, in
turn, influenced Russell, who did not abandon mental acts until the years
1919-1921. One no longer needs to comment on Wittgenstein's connection to
Austrian thought of the period. Bergmann was a unique figure in being the only one of the positivists of the
Vienna Circle to recombine, in a most fruitful way, the metaphysical themes
set forth by Russell and Moore, in what Russell had termed the 'revolt
against idealism,' with fundamental ideas derived from the logical
positivism of the Vienna Circle, influenced by Wittgenstein and Russell, and
important ideas from the Brentano school - particularly Brentano's
philosophy of the act, Meinong's theory of objects, and Husserl's
phenomenology. In this he would be a remarkable contemporary philosopher
and, as Castaneda noted, play a distinctive role on the philosophical scene
from the early 1950s thru the 1970s."
Hochberg Herbert, "The radical hylomorphism of Bergmann's Aristotelian
metaphysics and the ontology of relations," The Modern Schoolman 78:
257-288 (2001).
Park Woosuk, "Scotus, Frege, and Bergmann,"
The Modern Schoolman
67: 259-273 (1990).
Tegtmeier Erwin, "Die Bedeutung Gustav Bergmanns,"
Metaphysica 0:
19-36 (1999).
Wolterstorff Nicholas, "Bergmann's constituent ontology,"
Nous 4:
109-134 (1970).
PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE ON LINE
Nino Cocchiarella - Gustav Bergmann on Ideal Languages - Unpublished lecture presented at
Indiana University at the Gustav Bergmann Memorial Conference (October 30-21, 1992)
The page about Gustav Bergmann at Hist-Analytic by Steve Bayne contains the following essays
by Bergmann:
Synthetic Apriori (1963)
Realistic Postscript (1964)
Logical Positivism, Language, and the Reconstruction of Metaphysics (1953)
Dispositional Properties and Dispositions (1955)
Quine's Letter to Bergmann on Dispositional Properties (1955)
(click on the image to see the PDF file)