STUDIES ON BERNARD BOLZANO'S LOGIC AND ONTOLOGY (H - Z)
Hafner Johannes, "Bolzano's criticism of indirect proofs," Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 52 (3-4): 385-399 (2000).
Haller Rudolf, "Remarques sur la tradition sémantique," Archives de Philosophie 50: 359-369 (1987).
Haller Rudolf. Bolzano and Austrian philosophy. In Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre 1837-1987. International Workshop. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki 1992. pp. 191-206
Haller Rudolf. Bemerkungen über Bolzano und die österreichische Philosophie. In Bernard Bolzano und die Politik. Staat, Nation und Religion als Herausforderung für die Philosophie im Kontext von Spätaufklärung, Frühnationalismus und Restauration. Edited by Rumpler Helmut. Wien: Böhlau 2000. pp. 353-369
Jaray Kimberly, "Reinach and Bolzano: towards a theory of pure logic," Symposium.Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 10: 473-491 (2006).
"The work of Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) on states of affairs, judgment, and speech acts bears striking similarities to Bernard Bolzano's work in the area of general logic. It is my belief that these similarities suggest that Reinach used Bolzano's logical work to assist with his own. Three considerations support this view. First, Bolzano's work in Die Wissenschaftslehre (Theory of Science) was considered by Husserl to be the necessary foundation for any work in logic. Second, Bolzano's logic was a suitable alternative to Immanuel Kant's in that he formulated his essential relations as inexistent yet real, not Platonic or belonging to a transcendental realm. Third, Reinach did not openly criticize Bolzano in the manner he did the Austrians of the Brentano school, suggesting that Bolzano's logic was more complementary with his own. Due to his untimely death in 1917, Reinach's work on states of affairs and logic remains incomplete, some of it even lost or destroyed. I shall here offer a few brief remarks about Husserl as he was Reinach's mentor and friend, but an in depth discussion of the differences between Reinach and Husserl will not be offered in this paper. Secondary literature tells us that Reinach admired Husserl's Logical Investigations, in which phenomenology was said to concern itself with "primarily the discovery of the terra firma of pure logic, of the Sachen (things) in the sense of objective entities in general and of general essences in particular," and further "this phenomenology must bring to pure expression, must describe in terms of their essential concepts and their governing formulae of essence, the essences which directly make themselves known in intuition, and the connections which have their roots purely in such essences." These acts of discovering and describing essences or things themselves became the foundation of Reinach's realist ontology: things themselves surround us in the world and our access to them does not require a transcendental turn. It was precisely this realist foundation that allowed Reinach to develop and extend his phenomenological work to logic, legal philosophy, and speech acts as well. This conception of the nature and goal of phenomenology allowed Reinach and other phenomenologists a manner in which to analyze experience with its essential connections without either falling prey to psychologism or resorting to Platonism: phenomenology for them was truly a realist alternative."
Kasabova Anita, "Is logic a theoretical or practical discipline? Kant and/or Bolzano," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 84: 319-333 (2002).
Kasabova Anita, "Colour sensations and colour qualities: Bolzano between modern and contemporary views," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12: 247-276 (2004).
Kluge Eike Henner, "Bolzano and Frege: some conceptual paralles," Grazer Philosophische Studien 10: 21-41 (1980).
"Bolzano's position on logic and his theory of sentences-in-themselves and their analysis, as well as his position on existence statements and subjective representations show a striking and profound similarity to Frege's theory of thoughts, his analysis of propositions, representations and judgement, as well as his position on the nature of logic in general. Bolzano's theories on these points, therefore, may well have been seminal to the development of Frege's position."
Krause Andrej, "Are Bolzano's substances simple?," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 80: 543-562 (2006).
"This article analyzes one aspect of Bolzano's metaphysics. It discusses the question of whether, according to Bolzano, substances are simple or not. In the opinion of some commentators, he accepts composed substances, that is, substances having substances as proper parts. However, it is easily possible to misinterpret his position. This paper first tries to reconstruct Bolzano's definitions of the concept of substance and suggests that he should be able to agree with the following final definition: x is a substance if and only ifx is real and not a property. After this, it is shown that, according to Bolzano, every substance is simple in a fourfold sense: No substance has (1) adherences as parts, (2) substances as proper parts, (3) spatially extended parts, and (4) temporal parts."
Krickel Frank. Teil und Inbegriff: Bernard Bolzanos Mereologie. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 1995.
Künne Wolfgang. "Die Ernte wird erscheinen ..." Die Geschichte der Bolzano-Rezeption (1848-1939). In Bolzano und die österreichische Geistesgeschichte. Edited by Ganthaler Heinrich von and Neumaier Otto. Sank Augustin: Academia Verlag 1997. pp. 9-82
Künne Wolfgang, "Propositions in Bolzano and Frege," Grazer Philosophische Studien (53): 203-240 (1997).
Reprinted in W. Künne - Versuche über Bolzano / Essays on Bolzano - pp. 157-195.
"Bolzano's Sätze an sich and Frege's Gedanken are obviously close relatives. The paper underlines both similarities and dissimilarities between the psychological and semantical roles assigned to structured truth-evaluable contents in Bolzano's and Frege's theories. In particular, their different accounts of propositional identity are compared, and it is argued that Dummett's recent criticism of Frege's account is grist to Bolzano's mill."
Künne Wolfgang, "Substanzen und Adhärenzen. Zur Ontologie in Bolzanos Athanasia," Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 1: 233-250 (1998).
"According to Bolzano, the actual (that which is capable of acting upon something) is either a substance or an adherence (an individual accident). In this paper I shall point out the source of inspiration for this ontological distinction in the Leibniz-Wolff school as well as its counterparts in the analytical metaphysics of our century, and attempt a systematic reconstruction. I shall then examine Bolzano's arguments for the following two ontological theses: (I) If there is any actual entity at all, then there is at least one substance, and (II) substances neither come into existence, not do they cease to exist. Bolzano's decisive argument in favor of (II) proves to be indefensible (as can be shown with the help of his Wissenschaftslehre. The argument for (I), however, is of remaining interest."
Künne Wolfgang. Über Lug und Trug. In Bernard Bolzanos geistige Erbe für das 21. Jahrhundert. Edited by Morscher Edgar. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 1999. pp. 29-58
Künne Wolfgang. Die Geschichte der philosophischen Bolzano-Rezeption bis 1939. In Bernard Bolzano und die Politik. Staat, Nation und Religion als Herausforderung für die Philosophie im Kontext von Spätaufklärung, Frühnationalismus und Restauration. Edited by Rumpler Helmut. Wien: Böhlau 2000. pp. 311-352
Beiträge des Bolzano-Symposions der Österreichischen Forschungsgemeinschaft und der Internationalen Bolzano-Gesellschaft 17./18. Dezember 1999, Wien.
Künne Wolfgang. Constituents of concepts: Bolzano vs. Frege. In Building on Frege. New essays on sense, content, and concept. Edited by Newen Albert, Nortmann Ulrich, and Stuhlmann-Laeisz Rainer. Stanford: CLSI Publications 2001. pp. 267-285
Reprinted in W. Künne - Versuche über Bolzano / Essays on Bolzano - pp. 211-232
Künne Wolfgang, "Are questions propositions?," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 57: 157-168 (2003).
Reprinted in W. Künne - Versuche über Bolzano / Essays on Bolzano - pp. 197-210
Künne Wolfgang. Bernard Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre' and Polish analytical philosophy between 1894 and 1935. In Philosophy and logic. In search of the Polish tradition. Essays in honour of Jan Wolenski on the occasion of his 60th birthday. Edited by Kijania-Placek Katarzyna. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2003. pp. 179-192
Künne Wolfgang. Analiticity and logical truth: from Bolzano to Quine. In The Austrian contribution to analytic philosophy. Edited by Textor Mark. New York: Routledge 2006. pp. 184-249
Reprinted in W. Künne - Versuche über Bolzano / Essays on Bolzano - pp. 233-303
Künne Wolfgang. Versuche über Bolzano / Essays on Bolzano. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2008.
Inhalt: Geleitwort von Edgar Morscher 7; Vorwort 11; Bolzanos frühe Jahre 13; Die theologischen Gutachten in den Verfahren gegen den Professor and Priester Bolzano 67; Bolzanos oberstes Sittengesetz 103; Über Lug and Tug 121; Propositions in Bolzano and Frege 157; Are Questions Propositions? 197; Constituents of Concepts 211; Analyticity and Logical Truth: From Bolzano to Quine 233; "Die Ernte wird erscheinen..." Die Geschichte der Bolzano-Rezeption (1848-1939) 305: Literaturverzeichnis 405; Quellennachweis 449: Personenregister 451
Lapointe Sandra, "Analyticité, universalité et quantification chez Bernard Bolzano," Études Philosophiques 4: 455-470 (2000).
"Jusqu'à maintenant, il semble qu'on n'ait pas établi de lien entre le rejet par Bolzano de la notation quantificationnelle des propositions universelles de la logique traditionnelle et l'articulation inédite de sa notion de validité universelle. C'est ce que je veux faire ici. En particulier, dans la mesure où l'analyticité est un cas spécial de la validité universelle, j'ai l'intention de défendre l'idée qui veut que la notion bolzanienne d'analyticité cherche à résoudre des problèmes qui sont intrinsèquement liés à la théorie traditionnelle de la quantification universelle tels qu'ils surviennent, notamment avec le traitement kantien de l'analyticité."
Lapointe Sandra. Bolzano's hidden theory of universal quantification. In Logica Yearbook 2001. Edited by Childer Timothy and Ondrej Majer. Prague: Filosofia. Publihing House of Prague Institut of Philosophy 2002. pp. 37-48
Lapointe Sandra. Bolzano et la réception de Kant en Autriche. In Années 1781-1801. Kant. Critique de la raison pure. Vingt ans de réception. Edited by Piché Claude. Paris: Vrin 2002. pp. 263-271
Lapointe Sandra. Principe de priorité et principe du contexte chez Bolzano et Husserl. In Aux origines de la phénoménologie. Husserl et le contexte des Recherches logiques. Edited by Fisette Denis. Paris: Vrin 2003. pp. 93-110
Lapointe Sandra. Why Frege never read Bolzano. In Logica Yearbook 2003. Edited by Behounek Libor. Prague: Filosofia. Publishing House of Prague Institute of Philosophy 2004. pp. 183-194
Lapointe Sandra. Bolzano on grounding or why is logic synthetic. In The Logica Yearbook 2005. Prague: Filosofia 2006. pp. 113-126
Lapointe Sandra. Bolzano's semantics and his criticism of the decompositional conception of analysis. In The Analytic Turn. Edited by Beaney Michael. London: Routledge 2007. pp. 219-234
Laz Jacques. Bolzano critique de Kant. Suivi de Bernard Bolzano Sur la doctrine kantienne de la construction des concepts pa les intuitions. Paris: Vrin 1993.
Majolino Claudio, "Variation(s) I. Bolzano et l'équivocité de la variation," Études Philosophiques 4: 471-488 (2000).
"À partir d'une lecture comparée de certains extraits de l' Einleitung zur Grössenlehre et de la Wissenschaftslehre, cet article se propose de reformuler l'ensemble de la réflexion bolzanienne sur le rapport entre objets effectifs et idéaux par le biais de la notion de "Veränderung". Plutôt que d'envisager la variation bolzanienne depuis la théorie des fonctions, elle doit être abordée d'abord par une réflexion sur le rapport entre variation et signe, puis entre substitution et mise en série de représentations, et enfin comme corrélat d'un acte de visée de multiplicités. Une telle reformulation impliquera la prise en compte d'une notion de devenir propre aux objets idéaux."
Mancosu Paul, "Bolzano and Cournot on mathematical explanation," Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 52 (3-4): 429-456 (1999).
Mangiagalli Maurizio, "Bernard Bolzano e l'idea di una logica pura," Sapienza 59: 459-466 (2006).
Mates Benson. Bolzano and ancient Pyrrhonism. In Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre 1837-1987. International Workshop. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki 1992. pp. 121-139
Melandri Enzo. I paradossi dell'infinito nell'orizzonte fenomenologico. In Omaggio a Husserl. Edited by Paci Enzo. Milano: Il Saggiatore 1960. pp. 83-120
Menne Albert. Extension und comprehension bei Peirce und Bolzano. In Proceedings of the C. S. Peirce bicentennial International Congress. Edited by Ketner Kenneth L. Lubbock: Texas Tech Press 1981. pp. 359-361
Morscher Edgar, "Zwei Typen von Systemen der traditionellen Logik," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 50: 275-281 (1968).
"In this paper two different kinds of existential presuppositions in traditional logic are discussed. In the Aristotelian logic (1) the propositional function "some a is a" is always true (i.e. true for all substitutions of "a") and (2) the inference from "all a is b" to "some a is b" is valid. Modern logic does not contain either (1) or (2). In the logic of Bernard Bolzano (2), but not (1) is held. Therefore the existential presupposition in Bolzano's logic is weaker than that in Aristotelian and stronger than that in modern logic. (The reason for that difference between Aristotelian and Bolzano's logic lies in the different range of values for the variable "a": in the Aristotelian syllogistic the empty set is not a possible value of "a", however in Bolzano's logic the null set (or a "Gegenstandlose vorstellung an sich") is a possible value of "a". The reason for the difference between Bolzano's and modern logic lies in the different interpretation of "all a is b")."
Morscher Edgar. 'Philosophische Logik' bei Bernard Bolzano. In Bolzano-Symposion 'Bolzano als Logiker', am 17. und 18. Dezember 1973. Wien: Verlag der Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften 1972. pp. 77-105
Morscher Edgar. Von Bolzano zu Meinong: zur Geschichte des logischen Realismus. In Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Beiträge zur Meinong-Forschung. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck - und Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 69-102
Morscher Edgar. Das logische An-sich bei Bernard Bolzano. Salzburg, München: Verlag Anton Pustet 1973.
Morscher Edgar, "Ist Existenz ein Prädikat? Historische Bemerkungen zu einer philosophischen Frage," Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 28: 120-132 (1974).
Morscher Edgar, "Bolzanos Wissenschaftslehre," Sitzungsberichte.Philosophisch-historische Klasse / Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften 38: 99-126 (1981).
Morscher Edgar, "Was existence ever a predicate?," Grazer Philosophische Studien 25/26: 269-284 (1986).
"The question "Was 'existence' ever a predicate?" in a way already suggests its own answer, that this is really the wrong question to ask, because 'existence' has always been a predicate. Even those, such as Kant, who supposedly opposed this view, in fact held it. They merely denied that 'existence' is a "normal" first-order predicate. Not only Kant, but also Bolzano, Frege and Russell claimed that it is a second-order predicate. There is substantive disagreement between Kant and Bolzano on the one hand and Frege and Russell on the other over two issues: the former claim that this second-order predicate applies to no concept analytically and that it can be properly ascribed to a singular concept, whereas the latter deny both of these claims."
Morscher Edgar, ""Hintertürln" für Paradoxien in Bolzanos Logik," Philosophia Naturalis 24: 414-422 (1987).
Morscher Edgar, "Bolzanos Syllogistik," Philosophia Naturalis 24 (4): 447-451 (1987).
Morscher Edgar. Propositions and all that: ontological and epistemological reflections. In Logos and pragma. Essays on the philosophy of language in honour of Professor Gabriël Nuchelmans. Edited by De Rijk Lambertus Marie and Braakhuis Henk A.G. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1987. pp. 241-257
Morscher Edgar, "Bolzano's method of variation: three puzzles," Grazer Philosophische Studien 53: 139-165 (1997).
"Bernard Bolzano's most fruitful invention was his method of variation. He used it in defining such fundamental logical concepts as logical consequence, analyticity and probability. The following three puzzles concerning this method of variation seem particularly worth considering. (i) How can we define the range of variation of an idea or the categorial conformity of two ideas without already using the concept of variation? This question was raised by Mark Siebel in his M.A. thesis. (ii) Why must we define analyticity by means of (simultaneous or successive) variation of several ideas rather than by means of replacing a single idea? This problem is suggested by an example due to W.V.O. Quine, John R. Myhi II and Benson Mates. (iii) Must every 'there is ...' sentence be synthetic for Bolzano, as his pupil Franz Prihonsky claims in his booklet Neuer Anti-Kant, or can a `there is...' sentence be logically analytic?"
Morscher Edgar. Robert Zimmermann -- der Vermittler von Bolzanos Gedankengut? Zerstörung einer Legende. In Bolzano und die österreichische Geistesgeschichte. Edited by Ganthaler Heinrich von and Neumaier Otto. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 1997. pp.
Morscher Edgar. Logische Allgemeingültigkeit. In Bernard Bolzanos geistige Erbe für das 21. Jahrhundert. Edited by Morscher Edgar. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 1999. pp. 179-206
Morscher Edgar, "La définition bolzanienne de l'analyticité logique," Philosophiques 30: 149-169 (2003).
"A proposition is logically analytic according to Bolzano if and only if it is either logically valid or logically non-valid. And a proposition is sometimes said to be logically valid according to
Bolzano if and only if it is true and remains true under all simultaneous and uniform variations of all of its nonlogical parts.
Basically, the same definition is provided by Quine in his paper "Carnap and Logical Truth" where he attributes to Carnap (and in a footnote also to Bolzano) the view that a logically true sentence is a true sentence which involves only logical words essentially. But, what about true propositions and sentences which are composed exclusively of logical parts? Due to the definition mentioned above, all of them will trivially turn out as logically valid or logically true. A proposition like "There is something", however, is clearly not logically valid according to Bolzano. The common definition of logical validity must be modified in order to match Bolzano's intuitions. In this paper, such a modification is presented."
Morscher Edgar. Sind alle wahren logischen Sätze logisch wahr? In Bernard Bolzanos Leistungen in Logik, Mathematik und Physik. Edited by Morscher Edgar. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2003. pp. 57-82
Morscher Edgar. Studien zur Logik Bernard Bolzanos. Sankt Augustin: Akademia Verlag 2007.
Morscher Edgar. Bernard Bolzano's life and work. Sank Augustin: Academia Verlag 2008.
Table of contents: Preface 9; Introduction13; 1. Bolzano's life and scientific career 17; 2. Bolzano's removal from Office and the "Bolzano Trial" 23; 3. A short survey of Bolzano's work 29;
4. Logic33; 5. Epistemology and philosophy of science 75; 6. Ethics 89; 7. Aesthetics 107; 8. Political and social philosophy 113; 9. Philosophy of religion and theology 125; 10. Metaphysics 135; 11. Philosophy of nature and of physics 139; 12. Philosophy of mathematics 141; 13. Metaphilosophy and history of philosophy 149; 14. The so-called Bolzano Circle and Bolzano's influence on the development of the sciences and on intellectual history 151; Appendix: A formal reconstruction of Bolzano's method of idea-variation and of his definitions of logical truth
and of logical consequence 159; Bibliography 169; Index of names 207.
"Despite the enormous increase of interest in Bolzano's philosophy during the last decades, an up-to-date monograph on Bolzano's philosophy is still a desideratum. The last book that might be called a monograph on Bolzano's philosophy dates from almost 100 years ago; it is Shmuel Hugo Bergmann's Das philosophische Werk Bernard Bolzanos (Halle/S. 1909), written in the spirit of the Brentano school, in particular of Bergmann's teacher Anton Marty.
When I was invited by the Editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy to contribute the entry on Bernard Bolzano, I took it as a challenge for starting my long-standing plan to write a monograph on Bolzano's philosophy. The present book is, to be clear, merely the first step toward this end. In this respect I can benefit from the generous copyright regulations of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy which allow the entries to appear also in print. The author welcomes any kind of comments and criticism to the present printed version of the Internet article in order to take them into consideration in his projected monograph on Bolzano's philosophy.
(...)
I dedicate this book to the greatest and most meritorious Bolzano scholar ever, Jan Berg, without whom Bernard Bolzano would not be seen as the outstanding philosopher as we now know him to be." (From the Preface)
Mourany Antoun-Hamid. Logik und Wahrheit an Sich bei Bolzano. Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang 1978.
Mugnai Massimo. Leibniz and Bolzano on the "Realm of Truths". In Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre 1837-1987. International Workshop. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki 1992. pp. 207-220
Neeman Ursula, "Analytic and synthetic propositions in Kant and Bolzano," Ratio 12: 1-25 (1970).
"Whereas Kant regards the structure of being and knowing as identical, Bolzano interprets the Kantian true synthetic propositions as true propositions, in which the predicate is a characteristic of the subject and not a component of the notion of the subject (characteristic =df. a property of the object, which falls under the concept; component =df. ingredient of the concept). These propositions are analytic in a wider sense, because they render possible an analysis of an object, whereas the logico-analytic propositions render possible only an analysis of their concept. Therefore Bolzano also distinguishes between deductibility (ordo cognoscendi) and ground-consequence relation (ordo essendi) and grounds the latter on the principle of simplicity. A discovery of an objective connection in mathematics is only possible by a strict determination of the basic concepts and by axiomatization, because in opposition to Kant, Bolzano thinks mathematical laws to be discoveries and not creations of the human mind."
Neeman Ursula. Bernard Bolzanos Lehre von Anschauung und Begriff in ihrer Bedeutung für erkenntnistheoretische und pädagogische Probleme. München: F. Schöningh 1972.
Neeman Ursula, "Der begriff der Möglichkeit bei Bernard Bolzano," Philosophia Naturalis 17: 70-89 (1978).
Neeman Ursula, "Zeichen in Sprache und Denken nach Ockham, Lambert und Bolzano," Zeitschrift für Semiotik (23) (2001).
"According to B. Bolzano, signs are real objects or processes which are grasped not as something in themselves but in reference to other objects. The meanings of verbal signs are shared by the users of a language as their uniform semantical basis. It is a realm of ideas and sentences, in other words, what is known as the intension of verbal signs. Extension, the reference to extra-mental objects, is possible only on the basis of intensions. These considerations are used to clarify Bolzano's use of the expressions "meaning" and "reference". The emphasis on the intensional aspect leads to epistemological problems which are discussed with reference to the theories of signs suggested by W. of Ockham, J. H. Lambert, and G. W. Leibniz. Central in this discussion is the question whether what is signified by verbal signs is a copy of the extra-mental world of objects or whether the sign's function consists in a reference to the extra-mental world without being similar to it."
Palágyi Melchior. Kant und Bolzano. Eine kritische Parallele. Halle: Verlag von Max Niemeyer 1902.
Italian translation: Kant e Bolzano. Un confronto critico - Edited by Luca Guidetti - Ferrara, Spazio Libri Editori 1993
Preti Giulio, "I fondamenti della logica formale pura nella "Wissenschaftslehre" di B. Bolzano e nelle "Logische Unturschungen" di E. Husserl," Sophia II-IV: 187-194-361-376 (1935).
Reprinted in: Giuli Preti - Saggi filosofici - Vol. I - Firenze, La Nuova Italia 1976 p. 11-31
Prihonsky Franz. Neuer Anti-Kant und Atomenlehre des seligen Bolzano. Edited by Morscher Edgar and Thiel Christian. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2003.
New edtion of two works originally published in 1850 (Neuer Anti-Kant) and 1857 (Atomenlehre).
Prihonsky Franz. Bolzano contre Kant. Le nouvel anti-Kant. Paris: Vrin 2006.
Introduit, traduit et annoté par Sandra Lapointe.
Proust Joëlle, "Bolzano's analytic revisited," Monist.An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry: 214-230 (1981).
"This article offers a new interpretation of what Bolzano had in mind with the concept of 'analytic proposition'. In Bolzano's terms, an analytic proposition is a proposition in which there is at least one constituent that can be arbitrarily changed without altering the truth value of the original proposition. The author shows that a proper understanding of this criterion cannot be reached if one ignores the text in which a full account of the extensional properties of the variable constituent is provided by Bolzano. The completed criterion fits more sharply the Bolzanian epistemology, and is free from the inconsistencies inherent to the so-called 'Quinean' interpretation of Bolzano's analytic."
Proust Joëlle. Questions of form. Logic and the analytic proposition from Kant to Carnap. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1989.
Translated by Anastasios Albert Brenner from the original French: Questions de forme. Logique et proposition analytique de Kant à Carnap - Paris, Fayard, 1986.
See the Third Chapter: Bolzano's renovation of analiticity - pp. 49-108.
Proust Joëlle, "Bolzano's theory of representation," Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 52 (3-4): 363-383 (1999).
"Bolzano's theory of representation is one of the most radically intensionalist approaches to representation. It is based on the following three claims A. A representation is essentially independent of thought and of linguistic expression ; B. A representation is structured ; C. Such a structure is independent of the objects represented. These claims are both tools and constraints relative to Bolzano's substantive goals. Bolzano ultimately aimed to carry out a deep transformation of mathematical and scientific practice, thanks to a more accurate conception of logic and of the role of logic in scientific exposition. I examine tome of the consequences of Bolzano's claims in regard to his conception of mathematical treatises."
Raspa Venanzio, "Su ciò che non esiste. Da Bolzano a Meinong: un excursus nella filosofia austriaca," Studi Urbinati B 67: 115-201 (1995).
Roberts Mark, "The bearer of truth and falsity," Southwest Philosophy Review 10: 59-67 (1994).
"Until Bolzano nearly all philosophers believed that truth and falsity are predicated of judgments of beliefs. Bolzano and other philosophers after him argue that propositions are the bearers of truth and falsity and that propositions have a timeless ideal existence: a position which seems to discredit completely their view that propositions are the bearers of truth and falsity. Yet, several arguments can be offered which show that propositions are the bearers of truth and falsity without introducing as a premise the timeless existence of propositions."
Rojszczak Artur. From the act of judging to the sentence: the problem of truth bearers from Bolzano to Tarski. Dordrecht: Springer 2005.
Edited by Jan Wolenski
Rollinger Robin. Austrian theories of judgment: Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl. In Phenomenology and analysis. Essays on Central European philosophy. Edited by Chrudzimski Arkadiusz and Huemer Wolfgang. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2004. pp. 257-284
Rusnock Paul, "A critical introduction to Bolzano's philosophy", University of Waterloo (Canada), 1996.
Available at UMI Dissertation Express. Order number: NN15340
"Received accounts of nineteenth-century thought make little or no room for the substantial contributions of the Bohemian philosopher Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848). This thesis constitutes a sustained attempt to show that this omission is a serious mistake, that Bolzano is more rightly treated as one of the major figures of western philosophy. To his contemporaries, Bolzano was known primarily as a teacher, religious leader, and social reformer. Outside of central Europe, though, he became known primarily through his logical and mathematical writings. The thesis focusses primarily on the latter, showing in detail how Bolzano's methodological work advanced revolutionary changes in both mathematics and logic, with effects which would be felt throughout philosophy."
Rusnock Paul, "Bolzano and the traditions of analysis," Grazer Philosophische Studien 53: 61-85 (1997).
"Russell, in his History of Western Philosophy, wrote that modern analytical philosophy had its origins in the construction of modern functional analysis by Weierstrass and others. As it turns out, Bolzano, in the first four decades of the nineteenth century, had already made important contributions 'to the creation of "Weierstrassian" analysis, some of which were well known to Weierstrass and his circle. In addition, his mathematical research was guided by a methodology which articulated many of the central principles of modern philosophical analysis. That Russell was able to discover philosophical content within mathematical analysis was thus not surprising, for it had been carefully put there in the first place. Bolzano can and should, accordingly, be viewed as a founder of modern analytical philosophy, and not necessarily as an uninfluential one. This paper considers his work in mathematical and philosophical analysis against some of the relevant historical background."
Rusnock Paul, "Philosophy of mathematics: Bolzano's responses to Kant and Lagrange," Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 52 (3-4): 399-428 (1999).
Rusnock Paul. Bolzano's philosophy and the emergence of modern mathematics. Amsterdam: Rodopi 2000.
Rusnock Paul. La théorie des intuitions chez Bolzano. In Aux origines de la phénoménologie. Husserl et le contexte des Recherches logiques. Edited by Fisette Denis and Lapointe Sandra. Paris: Vrin 2003. pp. 111-123
Rusnock Paul, "Qu'est-ce que la représentation? Bolzano et la philosophie autrichienne," Philosophiques 30: 67-81 (2003).
"Largely ignored in Germany during the nineteenth century, Bolzano was certainly better known in Austria, in particular among Brentano's students, who enthusiastically studied his Theory of Science. In this respect it makes sense to speak of Bolzano as belonging to a tradition of Austrian philosophy. Yet an examination of the reception of Bolzano's ideas among Brentano's students indicates that he was not always well understood. This article discusses a particular case, Twardowski's reaction to Bolzano's theory of representation."
Rusnock Paul and George Rolf. Bolzano as logician. In The rise of modern logic: from Leibniz to Frege. Edited by Gabbay Dov and Woods John. Amsterdam: North-Holland 2004. pp. 177-205
Volume 3 of the Handbook of the history of logic.
Schmit Roger, "Über Bolzanos Begriff der Auslegung," Grazer Philosophische Studien 47: 1-29 (1994).
Schnieder Benjamin. Substanz und Adhärenz. Bolzanos Ontologie des Wirklichen. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2002.
Schnieder Benjamin, "Bolzano sur la structure des propositions et le rôle sémantique des propriétés," Philosophiques 30: 83-103 (2003).
Bernard Bolzano developed a highly elaborate and comprising account of propositions as structured entities composed of concepts. One of his main contentions was that all propositions share a common structure: "A - has - (the property) b". The main part of my paper is a discussion of the role which properties play for this thesis and thus in Bolzano's semantics.
Where properties feature as semantic values in standard semantic theories they are (at least in general) conceived of as shareable entities, in other words, as universals. I show that (contrary to a commonly agreed doctrine in the literature) it is particularised properties which Bolzano thought to be the entities standing under the predicate-ideas of propositions. With this idea, a rather
uncommon semantic arises : a proposition of the form [A - has - (the property) b] will be true iff one of the particularised properties standing under the predicate-idea [b] inheres in the subject of the proposition, i.e. in the entity denoted by the subject-idea."
Schnieder Benjamin, "Mere possibilities: a Bolzanian approach to non-actual objects," Journal of the History of Philosophy 45: 525-550 (2007).
"The paper is a detailed reconstruction of Bernard Bolzano's account of merely possible objects, which is a part of his ontology that has been widely ignored in the literature so far. According to Bolzano, there are some objects which are merely possible. While they are neither denizens of space and time nor members of the causal order, they could have been so. Thus, on Bolzano's view there are, for example, merely possible persons, i.e., objects which are neither actual nor persons but which could have been both. In course of the development of Bolzano's views, they are contrasted with the better known theory of his compatriot Alexius Meinong, and it is shown that they have a modern counterpart in the accounts of merely possible objects that were developed by Bernard Linsky and Ed Zalta, and by Timothy Williamson."
Schnieder Benjamin, "Bolzanos zwei Substanzbegriffe. Anmerkungen zu Krauses Bolzano-Interpretation," Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 62: 97-108 (2008).
Scholz Heinrich, "Die Wissenschaftslehre Bolzano's. Eine Jahrhundert-Betrachtung," Abhandlungen der Fries'schen Schule 6: 399-472 (1937).
Reprinted in: H. Scholz - Mathesis universalis. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie als strenger Wissenschaft (eds. H. Hermes, F. Kambartel & J. Ritter) - Basel 1961
Schubring Gert, "Bernard Bolzano. Not as unknown to his contemporaries as is commonly believed?," Historia Mathematica: 45-53 (1993).
Schuffenhauer Werner. Bernard Bolzano 1781-1848. Studien und Quellen. Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1981.
Sebestik Jan, "Bolzano et Brentano. Deux sources autrichiennes du Cercle de Vienne," Fundamenta Scientiae 5: 219-235 (1984).
Sebestik Jan, "Premiers paradoxes bolzaniens de l'infini avec un texte inèdit de B. Bolzano," Archives de Philosophie 50: 403-411 (1987).
"This paper presents an unpublished note by Bolzano, which surveys the various difficulties linked to the notion of infinity. This note, written in 1813-1814, is an excerpt from his mathematical diaries, "Miscellanea mathematica". Raising the question whether one may deduce the equivalence of two sets from the existence of a bijective correlation between them ends in a blind alley: from every possible answer, absurd consequences follow."
Sebestik Jan. Logique et sémantique chez Bernard Bolzano. Paris: Vrin 1992.
With an extended bibliography: pp. 481-504
Sebestik Jan. The construction of Bolzano's logical system. In Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre 1837-1987. International Workshop. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki 1992. pp. 163-177
Sebestik Jan, "Twardowski entre Bolzano et Husserl: la théorie de la représentation," Cahiers de la Philosophie Ancienne et du Langage de l'Université de Paris XII 1: 61-85 (1994).
Sebestik Jan, "Etudes bolzaniennes," Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale (3): 437-448 (1996).
Sebestik Jan, "Bolzano, Exner and the origins of analytical philosophy," Grazer Philosophische Studien 53: 33-59 (1997).
"Analytical philosophy begins with the first mathematical and philosophical works of Bolzano published between 1804 and 1817. There, Bolzano set out a project for the global reform of mathematics by means of the axiomatic method. Having completed the Wissenschaftslehre, Bolzano wrote a summary of his logic for the Grossenlehre, which he sent to Exner in 1833. The correspondence between Bolzano and Exner covered some of the main subjects treated by analytical philosophy: the status of abstract objects (propositions and objective ideas), intuitions, objectless ideas, the concept of object and many others. While Bolzano argued in favor of abstract entities independent of mind and of language, Exner considered them as abstractions obtained from the subjective judgments and representations. During the XIXth century, Bolzano's philosophy spread over Bohemia and Austria through manuscripts and through the first edition of Zimmermann's textbook of philosophy. The most important Brenta-n ians, Kerry, Twardowski, Meinong and Husserl, discussed his doctrines which may also have influenced Wittgenstein and the Polish school."
Sebestik Jan. Bolzanos Paradoxien des Unendlichen. In Bernard Bolzanos geistige Erbe für das 21. Jahrhundert. Edited by Morscher Edgar. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 1999. pp. 231-256
Sebestik Jan, "Forme, variation et déductibilité dans la logique de Bolzano," Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 52: 479-505 (1999).
"Bolzano's main innovations in logic result from his introduction and systematic use of the method of variation, which corresponds to the substitutional method in contemporary logic. The application of this method yields the fundamental logical concepts of validity, analyticity and deducibility. I also put forward a tentative list of Bolzano's logical concepts. I compare deducibility with Tarski's notion of logical consequence. This comparison allows specific features of Bolzano's logic to be brought out -- above all, his ontology of logic. Although Bolzano also worked with propositional forms, the true objects of his logic were propositions-in-themselves and ideas-in-themselves."
Sebestik Jan. Husserl reader of Bolzano. In Husserl's Logical investigations reconsidered. Edited by Fisette Denis. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2003. pp.
"Some of Husserl's most important logical innovations stem from Bolzano. Logic, extended to theory of science, takes leave of psychology and is connected to mathematics. Following Bolzano, Husserl conceives logical objects as ideal meanings and considers three aspects of ideas: expression, meaning and object. Husserl's division of analytics into apophantic (formal logic) and formal ontology corresponds to Bolzanian division between logic and universal mathematics, i.e., theory of collections and sets. Husserl fully recognized his debt to Bolzano, stressing at the same time the naivetés of Bolzano's epistemology and the absence of any prospect for phenomenology."
Sebestik Jan, "La dispute de Bolzano avec Kant. Fragment d'un dialogue sur la connaissance mathématique," Philosophiques 30: 47-66 (2003).
"In this dialogue, two opposed conceptions, which dominate the philosophy of mathematics till today, are confronted. Kant's account of mathematics is based upon the activity of constructing mathematical objects in pure intuition (time and space). In yielding objects for mathematics, our intuition contributes in an essential way to the formulation of mathematical truths. Against Kant, Bolzano argues that intuition has place neither in arithmetic nor in geometry and that mathematical existence consists in the possibility of the defined objects, i.e., in non-contradiction. For Bolzano, the central idea of mathematics is that of rigorous proof."
Segura Luis Felipe. La prehistoria del logicismo. México: Plaza y Valdés 2001.
Seron Denis, "La controverse sur la négation de Bolzano à Windelband," Philosophie 90: 58-78 (2006).
"L'auteur s'attache au problème de la négation, qui a traversé la philosophie germanique du XIXème et de la première moitié du XXème siècle, et se définit par un ensemble de questions fondamentales: l'affirmation et la négation sont-elles co-originaires, ou l'une se laisse-t-elle dériver de l'autre? la négation est-elle assimilable à l'acte de nier ou appartient-elle au contenu sémantique idéal visé par cet acte? si la négation est un acte de rejet, que rejette-t-elle? s'identifie-t-elle à une diairesis, et implique-t-elle une synthesis entre contenus de représentation? L'auteur retrace l'histoire de ce problème qui, ancrée dans la Logique de Lotze et la Doctrine de la science de Bolzano, conduit à Husserl et Frege."
Siebel Mark. Der Begriff der Ableitbarkeit bei Bolzano. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 1996.
"In his Wissenschaftslehre (1837, § 155), Bolzano defined a consequence relation, titled "Ableitbarkeit": a proposition P is derivable from a proposition Q with respect to certain variable ideas iff varying these ideas leads to a true variant of P, whenever the corresponding variant of Q is true. In the first part, I introduce the relevant fundamental concepts, the method of variation and the characteristics of derivability. In the second part, I examine how far Bolzano anticipated Russell's propositional functions, Tarski's definition of logical consequence and relevance logic. The result is that there are many more differences than unusually claimed."
Siebel Mark. Bolzanos Ableitbarkeit und Tarskis Logische Folgerung. In Analyomen 2. Proceedings of the Second Conference "Perspectives in analytical philosophy". Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1997. pp. 148-156
Vol. I: Logic, epistemology, philosophy of science.
"It is a commonplace that Bolzano ("Wissenschaftslehre", 1837, § 155) anticipated Tarski's definition of logical consequence. This is true only in a limited sense: one can extract a definition from Bolzano's "Wissenschaftslehre" resembling Tarski's insofar as the corresponding relation is neither symmetrical nor asymmetrical, but transitive and defined by recourse to variation of nonlogical elements. But there remain important differences concerning inconsistent premises and logically true conclusions. Moreover, unlike Tarski, Bolzano treats synonymous expressions alike, with the result that "All "drakes" are birds" is a logical consequence of "All Male Ducks" are ducks" and "All ducks are birds"."
Siebel Mark, "Variation, derivability and necessity," Grazer Philosophische Studien 53: 117-137 (1997).
"In Bolzano's view, a proposition is necessarily true iff it is derivable from true propositions that include no intuition (Anschauung). This analysis is historically important because it displays close similarities to Quine's and Kripke's ideas. Its systematic significance, however, is reduced by the fact that derivability is defined with recourse to the method of variation, which we are allowed to apply even to propositions containing none of the respective variables. This liberality leads to the result that, according to Bolzano's analysis, every truth is necessarily true. Even by introducing his condition of relevance (shared variables), Bolzano cannot avoid that some propositions come out as necessarily true which are merely contingently true."
Siebel Mark. Bolzano über Ableitbakeit. In Bernard Bolzanos geistige Erbe für das 21. Jahrhundert. Edited by Morscher Edgar. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 1999. pp. 147-178
Siebel Mark. Bolzano über Erkenntnistheorie. In Bernard Bolzanos geistige Erbe für das 21. Jahrhundert. Edited by Morscher Edgar. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 1999. pp. 59-96
Siebel Mark, "Bolzano's concept of consequence," Monist.An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry 85: 580-599 (2002).
"According to Bolzano (1837), the 'sentences in themselves' Q follow from the 'sentences in themselves' P with respect to the 'ideas in themselves' I iff every substitution of I which leads to true variants of P leads to true variants of Q. The article presents the main characteristics of this account and relates it to modern ideas. The common claim that Bolzano anticipated Tarski's definition of logical consequence, as well as the claim that he is a forerunner of relevance logic, should be taken with a big pinch of salt."
Siebel Mark, "La notion bolzanienne de déductibilité," Philosophiques 30: 171-189 (2003).
"The article: (i) presents the concept of deducibility which Bolzano introduced in his Wissenschaftslehre, (ii) points out some of the characteristic features in virtue of which it differs from many modern conceptions of consequence, and (iii) examines the claims that it displays a strong similarity to Tarski's account and relevance."
Siebel Mark, "Bolzanos Urteilslehre," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 86: 56-87 (2004).
"The article introduces Bolzano's theory of judgment, that is, his notions of a judgment, its content and its degree of confidence, the differentiation between mediate and immediate judgments and his account of inferences as judgments caused by judgments. A larger part is devoted to a passage in which Bolzano seems to claim that all of our inferences are valid. It is argued that what he says there is correct and does not rule out fallacies."
Simons Peter, "Bolzano, Tarski, and the limits of logic," Philosophia Naturalis: 378-405 (1987).
Reprinted in: Peter Simons - Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected essays - Dordrecht, Kluwer 1992 pp. 13-40.
"Both Bolzano and Tarski doubted whether logic has a sharp boundary. This paper uses Bolzano's procedure of concept variation, together with Tarski's suggestion that those objects are logical which are invariant under all permutations of the domain, to define what it is to be a logical constant in a typed extensional language, and provide an answer to their doubts."
Simons Peter, "Bolzano on collections," Grazer Philosophische Studien 53: 87-108 (1997).
"Bolzano's theory of collections (Inbegriffe) has usually been taken as a rudimentary set theory. More recently, Frank Krickel has claimed it is a mereology. I find both interpretations wanting. Bolzano's theory is, as I show, extremely broad in scope; it is in fact a general theory of collective entities, including the concrete wholes of mereology, classes-as-many, and many empirical collections. By extending Bolzano's ideas to embrace the three factors of kind, components and mode of combination, one may develop a coherent general account of collections. But it is most difficult to take Bolzano's view to fit modern set theory. So while Krickel's positive thesis is rejected, his negative thesis is confirmed."
Simons Peter. Bolzano über Wahrheit. In Bernard Bolzanos geistige Erbe für das 21. Jahrhundert. Edited by Morscher Edgar. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 1999. pp. 13-28
Simons Peter. Bolzano, Brentano and Meinong: three Austrian realists. In German philosophy since Kant. Edited by O'Hear Anthony. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999. pp. 109-136
"Austrian philosophy, though carried out in German, took different paths than German philosophy. Three of the main Austrians are briefly presented, with biographical and bibliographical background and a precis of each one's salient views. The idea is to encourage the reader to go and read the originals. Of the three, Bolzano emerges as an -- perhaps the -- outstanding nineteenth century philosopher."
Simons Peter, "Bolzano sur les nombres," Philosophiques 30: 127-135 (2003).
"In this article, the author exposes Bolzano's theory of numbers. He shows, on the basis of a comparison with Frege, that Bolzano's conception not only meets all the requisites of such a theory but also exhibits original features, such as for instance the fact that it is grounded in a theory of "collections" (Inbegriffe), which impart it with undeniable philosophical interest. After indicating one problem relating to the Bolzanian notion of a Reihe, the author presents Bolzano's conception of natural numbers, reconstructs his theory of abstract numbers and expounds the connection between the latter and their application to concrete sets of things."
Sinaceur Hourya, "Bolzano est-il le précurseur de Frege?," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 57: 286-303 (1975).
Sinaceur Hourya, "Réalisme mathématique, réalisme logique chez Bolzano," Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 52 (3-4): 457-478 (1999).
"The majority of Bolzano's scholars present his theory of propositions and representations in themselves -- a theory of objective sense -- as a paradigm example of his philosophical realism. Goal of this article is to show the difficulties encountered by too monolithic an interpretation of this realism. Bolzano's logical theory is in fact more nuanced than is generally appreciated. Surely, the propositions in themselves constitute an universe of objective significations with their own reality. But the propositions in themselves are not, strictly speaking, logical objects; they are matter, not object, of thought. As for Bolzano's mathematical realism, it is affected by a certain empirism, which is evident especially in his account of the natural numbers."
Smart Harold R., "Bolzano's logic," Philosophical Review 53: 513-533 (1944).
Spalt Detlef D. Bolzano's Zahlbegriffe. Bislang Ubersehene Marksteine Feudal-absolutischer Mathematik. In Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre 1837-1987. International Workshop. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki 1992. pp. 27-54
Stachel Peter. Die Bedeutung von Bolzanos Wissenschaftslehre für die österreichische Philosophiegeschichte. Ein Baustein zu einer Geschichte der pluralistischen Tradition österreichischer Philosophie. In Bolzano und die österreichische Geistesgeschichte. Edited by Ganthaler Heinrich von and Neumaier Otto. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 1997. pp.
Stachel Peter. Der logische Realismus Bernard Bolzanos. In Geschichte der Österreichischen Humanwissenschaften. Vol 6.1: Philosophie und Religion: Erleben, Wissen, Erkennen. Edited by Acham Karl. Wien: Passagen Verlag 2004. pp. 53-63
Stelzner Werner, "Compatibility and relevance: Bolzano and Orlov," Logic and Logical Philosophy 10: 137-171 (2002).
Sundholm Göran, "MacColl on Judgement and Inference," Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (1): 119-132 (1998).
Sundholm Göran. When, and why, did Frege read Bolzano? In Logica Yearbook 1999. Praga: Filosofia Publishers 1999. pp. 164-174
Süssbauer Alfons, "Propositionen und Sachverhalte in der Österreichischen Philosophie von Bolzano bis Popper," Philosophia Naturalis 24: 476-498 (1987).
"On the basis of a conceptual framework the theories on propositions and/or Sachverhalte of Bolzano, Husserl, Meinong, Wittgenstein, and Popper are discussed. But to commit oneself to propositions and/or Sachverhalte is not the whole show. So the attention is directed to the examination of different strategies of justifying the ontological commitment to propositions and/or Sachverhalte. As a result, normative and pragmatic aspects become important as to the problem of propositions and/or Sachverhalte. Finally some rudimentary requirements for a future theory of propositions and/or Sachverhalte are established."
Tatzel Armin, "Bolzano's theory of ground and consequence," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43: 1-25 (2002).
"The aim of the paper is to present and evaluate Bolzano's theory of grounding, that is, his theory of the concept expressed and the relation brought into play by 'because'. In the first part of the paper (Sections 1-4) the concept of grounding is distinguished from and related to three other concepts: the concept of an epistemic reason}, the concept of causality, and the concept of deducibility (i.e., logical consequence). In its second part (Sections 5-7) Bolzano's positive account of grounding is reconstructed in axiomatic form and critically discussed."
Tatzel Armin, "La théorie bolzanienne du fondement et de la conséquence," Philosophiques 30: 191-217 (2003).
"The aim of the paper is to present and evaluate Bernard Bolzano's theory of grounding, i.e., his theory of the concept expressed and the relation brought into play by 'because'. In the first part the concept of grounding is distinguished from and related to three other concepts: the concept of an epistemic reason, the concept of causality and the concept of deducibility (i.e., logical consequence). In its second part Bolzano's positive account of grounding is reconstructed in axiomatic form and critically discussed."
Textor Mark. Bolzanos Propositionalismus. Belin, New York: W. De Gruyter 1996.
Textor Mark, "Bolzano's sententialism," Grazer Philosophische Studien 53: 181-202 (1997).
"Bolzano holds that every sentence can be paraphrased into a sentence of the form "A has b". Bolzano's arguments for this claim are reconstructed and discussed. Since they crucially rely on Bolzano's notion of paraphrase, this notion is investigated in detail. Bolzano has usually been taken to require that in a correct paraphrase the sentence to be paraphrased and the paraphrasing sentence express the same proposition. In view of Bolzano's texts and systematical considerations this interpretation is rejected: Bolzano only holds that the sentence to be paraphrased and the paraphrasing sentence must be equipollent ("gleichgeltend"). It is shown that even this modest view of paraphrase does not help Bolzano in sustaining his claim that all sentences have the form "A has b"."
Textor Mark, "Bolzano et Husserl sur l'analyticité," Études Philosophiques: 435-454 (2000).
"L'auteur expose la tentative faite par Bolzano de définir le concept de proposition en soi analytique à l'aide du concept de variation de représentation. Puis, il discute les difficultés qui résultent de ce modèle quant à la définition bolzanienne du concept étroit de vérité logiquement analytique ou de vérité logique. En conclusion, il compare la définition bolzanienne du concept de proposition en soi analytique et la définition husserlienne : celle-ci se découvre être une application de l'idée fondamentale de Bolzano - employer la variation de représentation pour définir les concepts logiques fondamentaux."
Textor Mark, "Logically analytic propositions "a posteriori"?," History of Philosophy Quarterly 18: 91-113 (2001).
Textor Mark, "Caius-at-noon or Bolzano on tense and persistence," History of Philosophy Quarterly 20: 81-102 (2003).
Translated in French as: Bolzano sur letemps et la persistence - Philsophiques, 30, 2003, pp. 105-125.
"How can we can truly say that a is tired in the morning, and not tired at noon? Bolzano holds that every proposition about a contingent thing contains an idea representing a time in its subject-part. In this paper I reconstruct and assess Bolzano's arguments for his view of propositions about contingent things, comparing them to those of his main opponent, the view according to which every proposition about a contingent thing contains a copula combined with an idea hat represents a time at which the object represented by the subject-part of the proposition has the property represented by the predicate-part (copula-modification view)."
Thompson Paul B., "Bolzano's deducibility and Tarski's logical consequence," History and Philosophy of Logic 2: 11-20 (1981).
Van der Schaar Maria. Bolzano on judgement and error. In The Logica Yearbook 2006. Edited by Tomala O. and Honzik R. Prague: Filosofia 2007. pp. 211-221
van Rootselaar Bob. Axiomatics in Bolzanos logico-mathematical research. In Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre 1837-1987. International Workshop. Florence: Leo S. Olschki 1992. pp. 221-230
Voltaggio Franco. Bernard Bolzano e la dottrina della scienza. Milano: Edizioni di Comunità 1974.
Winter Eduard. Bernard Bolzano. Ein Lebensbild. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog 1969.
First volume of the Gesamtausgabe
Winter Eduard. Ausgewahlte Schriften aus dem Nachlass. Edited by Morscher Edgar. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 1993.
"The volume contains essays selected from the posthumous works of Eduard Winter, especially concerning Bernard Bolzano and Franz Brentano. It includes a previously unpublished report by Johann Heinrich Loewe on Robert Zimmermann's "Philosophische Propaedeutik", one of the first textbooks in philosophy used in Austrian schools in the second half of the nineteenth century (first edition published in 1853). The volume is introduced by a short biography of Eduard Winter and a report on the Salzburg Bolzano- Winter- Archiv, both by Edgar Morscher."
Wolenski Jan. Bolzano über verneinende Existezaussagen. In Bernard Bolzanos geistige Erbe für das 21. Jahrhundert. Edited by Morscher Edgar. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 1999. pp. 207-216
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