Living
Ontologists (a list of authors with an interest in ontology, with
synthetic bibliographies)
INTRODUCTION
"In two important senses, Englebretsen is not the inventor of the logic of which he writes, though he no doubt deserves the title of the most dedicated and meticulous expositor of it today. In the first place the logic in question is none other than the so-called 'term logic' usually said to have been invented by Aristotle, taught throughout the middle ages, toyed with by Leibniz, forgotten in the enlightenment and surpassed at last by the great developments
in mathematical logic associated with
names like Boole, Frege, Russell, Quine. So at least runs the textbook history that the average student of logic would learn today. Term logic figures in the contemporary mind as one of the discarded fashions of science, much like the Ptolemaic system in astronomy. Englebretsen does not claim to invent but only to rehabilitate this logic. And such an effort obviously requires a reassessment of its history, of which the present work provides an outline.
But the logic is not Englebretsen's own in a second way. The book is a sustained and systematic exposition of the life work of Prof. Sommers of Brandeis University, whose efforts have revealed the continuity of term logic from Aristotle to Leibniz and also its character an uncompleted project, with unlimited promise in its application to logic of natural language. Sommers' work comes at a crucial moment, just as the problems in applying formal mathematical structures
to ordinary language are coming to be recognized.
Sommers' unconventional approach, however, has seemed to many to be moving quickly in the wrong direction, toward the 'errors' of the past and he has thus acquired a reputation as the Ishmael of modern logic.
Professor Englebretsen's work is a systematic exposition and defense of Sommers' far-reaching contributions to logic, placing them in the context of a rectified history of the subject. Term logic is a project abandoned prematurely by logicians deceived by the appearance of security which the prestige of mathematics conferred upon mathematical logic. Recent logicians concluded too quickly that term logic was unformalizable, inadequate to reflect many of the actual inference
structures of ordinary language,
etc. The work of Sommers has demonstrated these claims to be false in the most appropriate way possible, by constructing a term logic of which they do not hold. Moreover Englebretsen has shown that Sommers' reply on behalf of term logic is not a mere riposte; it is a 'programme' of logic in the fullest sense. It contains a rigorously presented theory not just of the syntax, semantics and rules of inference for a term logic, but also a modal logic, a theory of predication, identity, singular terms, categories
and ontology. In the reading of this book it is impossible not to get the idea that here is a vital programme for logic which is deserving of careful consideration and which is bound to lead to a re-evaluation of the traditional dogmas of mathematical logic."
From: Graeme Hunter - Foreword to: George Englebretsen - Essays on the philosophy of Fred Sommers. In logical terms - Lewiston, The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990, pp. I-II.
COMPLETE BIBLIOGRAPHY
For the bibliography of Fred Sommers see the page dedicated to him.
"Knowledge, negation and incompatibility," Journal of Philosophy
66: 581-585 (1969).
"Epistemologists and logicians have long ignored an important fact about the
logic of knowledge statements. The fact is that there are three uniquely
different kinds of negation operable upon such statements. The statement
itself can be negated (it is not the case that a knows that p). The
predicate can be negated (a doesn't know that p). And the propositional
object can be negated (a knows that it is not the case that p). This paper
is an attempt to reinforce the distinctions between these kinds of negations
and to illustrate the logical relations which hold among knowledge
statements differing only in the ways in which various combinations of these
kinds of negation are present."
"On the nature of Sommers's rule," Mind 80: 608-611 (1971).
"I argue here that recent discussions of Fred Sommers' "rule for enforcing
ambiguity" have been mistaken on one of two grounds. Either they
misrepresent the sense of the rule or they misunderstand its intent. the
rule is neither a sense rule nor a categorial rule, but a 'translation' rule
relating senses of terms to categories of individuals. Rather than a test
for term ambiguity the rule is a test for theory coherence. finally, I show
that there are many possible ways of applying the rule."
"Elgood on Sommers's rules of sense," Philosophical Quarterly 21:
71-73 (1971).
"I argue here that Elgood, like many of Sommers's critics, has misunderstood
Sommers's rules of sense, particularly the "rule for enforcing ambiguity".
While he confuses terms and things in his discussion of the rule, his
primary error is his failure to recognize the difficult though important
distinction between the spanning and predicability relations between terms
and things. A typical counter-example by Elgood to the rule is considered
and shown to be harmless once the spanning-predicability distinction is
seen."
"Sommers' theory and the paradox of confirmation," Philosophy of
Science 38: 438-441 (1971).
"It is shown here how Fred Sommers' theory of predicability can be used to
discern the 'natural' subject of any statement. If any two logically
equivalent statements are confirmed in exactly the same way, and if the
consideration of the set determined by its natural subject is necessary for
the confirmation of any statement, then it can be shown that the two
statements of the onfirmation paradox share a common natural (though not
grammatical) subject."
"J. O. Nelson on logical notation," Ratio 13: 88-89 (1971).
"The paradoxical nature of the confirmations of 'all ravens are black' and
its contrapositive is not due to the logical identity of the two sentences.
It results from the belief that universal categoricals are confirmed by
picking-out items satisfying their subject terms. But, since 'non-blacks' is
not a genuine sortal term, items satisfying it cannot possibly be
picked-out. thus, what it would be necessary to pick-out for the
confirmation of a sentence need not be what satisfies its subject term."
"The incompatibility of God' existence and omnipotence," Sophia
10: 28-31 (1971).
"The Paradox of the Stone is a formally valid argument which purports to
prove that God is not omnipotent. It is argued here that if the paradox is
unsound, it must be because the first premise is false. By using some
logical notions developed by Fred Sommers, it is shown that if this premise
is false it is because its subject term ("God") fails to refer (God does not
exist). thus, since the paradox is either sound or unsound, God is either
omnipotent or exists but not both."
"Armstrong on disembodied minds," Dialogue 11: 576-579 (1972).
"For D. M. Armstrong the existence of a disembodied mind is required in
order to guarantee the contingency of mind-body identity. However,
Armstrong's explication of disembodied minds in terms of mental states is at
best confusing. While admitting the force of F. Sommers' attack on
Strawson's theory of persons, which is equally effective against Armstrong,
Strawson's theory, without disembodied minds, is defended as an alternative
to Armstrong pseudo-materialism."
"True sentences and true propositions," Mind 81: 451-452 (1972).
"Susan Haack has held that the predicates 'true' and 'false' are univocally
predicable of both sentence tokens and propositions. Using a theory of
predication devised by F. Sommers I attempt to show that such predicates
must be ambiguous over sentence tokens and propositions or, if Sommers'
theory is correct, the Haacks' theory of sentences and propositions is
incoherent."
"Vacuosity," Mind 81: 273-275 (1972).
"It is argued here that F. Sommers' notion of vacuousity must be expanded to
allow for statements presupposing false statements which may not be
existential. the result of this is the enforcement of a distinction between
vacuousity and category mistakenness, and, more importantly, a distinction
between the spanning and predicability relations which hold between terms
and things."
"Sommers on empty domains and existence," Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic 13: 350-358 (1972).
"After examining the customary ways in which quantificationalists have
handled the problem of preserving theorem-hood in the empty domain (the ways
used by Quine, Lejewski, Cohen, etc.), I introduce the attempt by Fred
Sommers to eliminate quantification theory all together. Sommers' denial of
quantification is based on his rejection of the 'Fregean dogma' (the belief
that all predications must be to a singular subject). By eliminating
quantification in the way suggested by Sommers I am able to show that none
of the normal quantificational theorems are in any danger from the empty
domain. The notion of an empty domain, of course, is no longer given in
terms of a range of variable values. Finally, on the basis of his theory I
give a proof, which Sommers has attempted unsatisfactorily, to the effect
that necessarily something exists."
"A revised category mistake argument," Philosophical Studies 23:
421-423 (1972).
"E. Erwin has shown that T. Szasz's rejection of the disease model of
psychopathology is mistaken in that it is based upon the category mistake
argument (there are no heterotypical predications by univocal predicates).
It is argued here, however, that S. Sommers' 'rule for enforcing ambiguity'
can provide Szasz with a revised category mistake argument which is immune
to Erwin's attack."
"On van Straaten modification of Sommers' rule," Philosophical
Studies 23: 216-219 (1972).
"I argue here that R. van Straaten's four modifications of F. Sommers' 'rule
for enforcing ambiguity' are based upon a misunderstanding of the basis of
the rule and a failure to see the spanning/predicability distinction. The
effect is that none of van Straaten's several counterexamples are telling
against the rule. In place of van Straaten's modifications I offer the
following simple but important changes in the rule: the restriction of
things to individuals and the reading of 'makes sense to predicate' and
similar phrases in terms of the spanning relation."
"Persons and predicates," Philosophical Studies 23: 393-399
(1972).
"F. Sommers' 'rule for enforcing ambiguity' is a theory-critical tool. It
can be applied to incoherent theories to render them coherent. In
particular, it can be applied to Strawson's theory of persons. The result is
an attributive theory which, unlike Strawson's, is coherent and has
important advantages over idealistic, dualistic, and identity theories of
persons. H. Chandler's attack on Sommers's rule and D. M. Armstrong's
defense of an identity theory are given special consideration."
"Suggested truth-tables for a three-valued sentential logic,"
International Logic Review 8: 255-259 (1973).
"Truth-tables for the normal sentential connectives are constructed on the
basis of the concept of 'partial values'. On this view, every statement has
a truth-value which is a function of an ordered pair of partial values. The
first member is either T or non-T and the second is either F or non-F. The
four combinations of partial values result in three possible truth-values:
true, false, and empty."
"Locke's language of proper names," Locke Newsletter 4: 25-30
(1973).
"It is argued here that recent discussions concerning the compatibility of
Locke's theory of nominal essences with Geach's thesis (that each use of a
proper name must presuppose the ability to use some corresponding general
term) fail to appreciate the important difference between the generation of
Lockean general ideas (from ideas of individuals) and the generation of
Lockean general terms (not from proper names)."
"Epistemic logic and mere belief," Logique et Analyse 63-64:
374-378 (1973).
"Drawing on results obtained in a previous paper, axioms for an epistemic
calculus are laid down. It is then shown that the necessary conditions for
mere belief (which, unlike belief, is incompatible with knowledge) can be
formulated in this system."
"Meinong on existence," Man and World 6: 80-82 (1973).
"I argue here that on one plausible
reading Meinong's theory of objects, far from being mistaken in the way
Russell thought it was, shows considerable insight into the notion of
existence. In particular, Meinong can be seen as making an important
distinction between what can be significantly referred to and what
exists. This distinction is very close to one made recently by Fred
Sommers."
"For several years I was told, and
believed, that while Russell's theory of descriptions might he flawed
(viz. in the way Strawson showed), his rejection of Meinong's theory of
objects, which led to the theory of descriptions, was undoubtedly
correct. Now I doubt very much if this is so.
The "official" view is
that Meinong had made the mistake of multiplying the senses of "exists"
unnecessarily. According to this view, Meinong, since he held that the
descriptive components of any meaningful sentence must refer to
something, was forced to provide a special kind of existence,
subsistence, for entities which are nonexistent but referred to
meaningfully. Russell avoided this position by claiming that statements
referring to nonexistent entities are meaningful but false (since they
logically entail the existence of the entity referred to). I think the
official view underestimates Meinong's philosophical abilities. Indeed,
I think, rather than engaging in the philosophically dangerous task of
multiplying kinds of existence, Meinong was expressing a keen insight
into the nature of existential commitment." p. 80
"Presupposition, truth and existence," Philosophical Papers 2:
39-40 (1973).
"The Strawsonian concept of presupposition challenges the logician's
insistence upon truth-functionality and bivalence. Nevertheless, these
logical features can be retained by defining presupposition in terms of
material implication and logical contrariety, which is not logical negation.
Given this notion of presupposition, it can be seen that not all presupposed
statements are existential, nor do all statements presuppose the existence
of their subjects."
"Persons, predicates and death," Second Order 2: 67-70 (1973).
"The logic of negative theology," The New Scholasticism 67:
226-232 (1973).
"Essentiality," Journal of Critical Analysis 5: 112-117 (1974).
"Behaviorism and perception," Man and World 7: 149-157 (1974).
"After distinguishing the ontological question concerning persons (what is
the concept of a person?) from the epistemological question (on what grounds
does my knowledge of persons rest?) three kinds of behaviorism are cited as
responses to the Cartesian answer to the epistemological question. Unlike
physicalism and dispositionism, restricted behaviorism denies that knowledge
applies at all to myself and goes on to distinguish behavior from bodily
activity. On this theory behavior is taken to be interpreted bodily activity
-- bodily activity seen as personal behavior."
"A note on contrariety," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 15:
613-614 (1974).
"It is shown here that S. McCall's proposal, that in addition to the normal
sentential operation of negation there is another, more traditional,
sentential operation of contrariety ("Contrariety," Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic, 8, 1967) is misguided. There is indeed a contrariety operator.
But, it is a predicate operator rather than a sentential operator. The
ability to explicate contrariety is just one of the advantages which an
Aristotelian logic of terms has over modern sentential logic."
"More on disembodied minds," Philosophical Papers 3: 48-49
(1974).
"Although the concept of a disembodied mind is essential to an identity
theory such as D. M. Armstrong's, it is based upon a faulty view concerning
the contingency of certain identity statements."
"Brody on Sommers," Philosophical Studies 26: 149-150 (1974).
"Sommers on the predicate 'exists'," Philosophical Studies 26:
419-423 (1974).
"In a series of recent journal articles F. Sommers has developed a logic of
terms which differs greatly from the usual logic now taught in the schools.
However, Sommers has commited himself to a thesis proper to that logic but
not to his: everything exists. It is shown here that such a thesis cannot
follow from Sommers' previous work. Using his logic proofs that something
exists and that something does not exist are given."
"Erwin on the category mistake argument," Second Order 3: 47-53
(1974).
"Durrant on 'God'," The New Scholasticism 48: 251-252 (1974).
"In The logical status of 'God' (Macmillan, 1973) Michael Durrant augues
that 'God' cannot be a proper name since there is no substantival term which
could be used in making an identifying reference to God. However, this view,
when coupled with Durrant's thesis that a thing exists only if it can be
identifyingly referred to by use of a substantival, entails that God does
not exist. If Durrant is to retain his belief in God he must abandon either
his view of proper names or (better) his criterion for existence."
Speaking of persons. Halifax: Dalhousie University Press 1975.
"This monograph is an attempt to defend an attributist theory of the concept
of a person. It is held that our ordinary concept of a person is the concept
of a noncomposite (contra dualism), material (contra idealism) object, to
which both Strawsonian p- and m-predicates apply. Personal identity is
accounted for in terms of bodily continuity "and" sortal continuity.
Finally, with the aid of F. Sommers' theory of linguistic-ontological
ismorphism, it is argued that an ontological theory compatible with our
theory, must reject any sort of spirit, including God."
"Sommers' theory and natural theology," International Journal for
Philosophy of Religion: 111-116 (1975).
"Rescher on E!," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 16: 536-538
(1975).
"In "Definitions of 'existence'," Philosophical Studies, vol. 7
(1957), pp. 65-69, N. Rescher rejected the definition of 'E!' given by H. S.
Leonard in "The Logic of existence", Philosophical Studies, vol. 7
(1956) pp. 49-64. (...)
In this note I will first briefly show that Reseller's reason for rejecting
(L) is unsatisfactory. Then I will show that (R2) must be rejected. Finally,
I will make some remarks about the general attempt to formalize a definition
of existence."
"Sommers' proof that something exists," Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic 16: 298-300 (1975).
"It is argued here that F. Sommers' proof to the effect that necessarily
something exists is wrong in principle and that when it is reformulated
correctly it turns out to be formally invalid.
What is called for is an entirely new kind of proof, which the present
author has supplied in a previous paper."
"Trivalence and absurdity," Philosophical Papers 4: 221-227
(1975).
"The Square of Opposition," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
17: 531-541 (1976).
"The traditional Aristotelian square of opposition is examined here. Various
restrictions on the square are considered. Finally, it is argued that while
applicability of the square relations is not influenced by considerations of
existence, analyticity, etc., it is restricted by considerations of category
correctness. The work of F. Sommers is useful in showing this."
"Sommers' Tree Theory and possible things," Philosophical Studies
(Ireland) 24: 131-139 (1976).
"A key thesis in F. Sommers' "tree theory" is that language and ontology are
structurally isomorphic. In the process of building that theory Sommers
outlined a notion of "levels of rectitude" for linguistic rules. According
to this rules (sense rules, logical rules, grammar rules) are applied to a
sequence of words in a strict order. In this essay we attempt to show that,
given the isomorphism thesis, the notion of levels of rectitude can be
extended to the ontology. The result is a strict ordering of several senses
of "possible" as applied to things in the ontology."
"Aristotle on the subject of predication," Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic 19: 614-616 (1978).
Reprinted in: A. Menne and G. Offenberger (eds.) - Zur Modernen Deutung
der Aristotelischen Logik - vol. II, Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1985 pp. 128-130.
"Aristotle's thesis that universals must always inhere in a primary
substance, a particular, has been used recently as evidence that he, like
many contemporary logicians, rejected the predication of terms to universal,
i.e., nonsingular, subjects. Yet this would force Aristotle to treat
quantifiers as ranging over bare, unsorted, particulars. But Aristotle took
the notion of an unsorted particular as nonsense. His thesis about the
status of universals can no more serve as evidence that he took all subjects
as particulars than can his thesis that every particular satisfies some
universal serve as evidence that he took no subjects as particular."
"Notes on the new syllogistic," Logique et Analyse 85-86: 111-120
(1979).
"Recently F. Sommers has developed a new syllogistic. While it inherits the
naturalness and ease of the old one it also inherits the usual critiques as
well. A new syllogistic must be able to answer all the charges usually
placed against the old: inability to deal with relationals, negative terms,
singular terms, etc. The doctrine of distribution and the notion of
existential import for universals are frequently cited here. I argue that a
proper understanding of the syllogistic law of identity illuminates both
these areas. Syllogistic inferences claimed to be invalid by critics are
shown to be enthymemes. In each case the missing premise is derived from the
law of identity."
"The powers and capacities of God," Sophia 18: 29-31 (1979).
"It seems possible to argue that since either God can limit his power or he
cannot, he is not omnipotent. Critics of such arguments claim that the
important distinction between God's capacities (to do what is logically
possible) and powers (to do what is in his capacity) is ignored. They would
argue that though God cannot limit his power this is merely an incapacity --
not a failure of potency. However, God is incapable only with respect to
what is logically impossible, which is so either because its description is
formally false or definitionally false. 'God can limit his power' is not
formally false. But that it is false by definition merely begs the
question."
"Bryant on Sommers," Critica 7: 87-92 (1980).
"A recent attempt to make use of Fred Sommers' denial-negation distinction
is shown to be misguided. The failure here generates other errors involving
such important distinctions as spanning/predicability, vacuous/category
mistaken, and essence/accident."
"Chandler on change," Critica 7: 81-85 (1980).
"Common sense, as Aristotle saw, demands an account of the world which
admits both accidental and substantial change. In the first an object ceases
to be how-it-is; in the second it ceases to be what-it-is. H. S. Chandler's
recent critique of M. Loux's "Substance and attribute" suffers from a
misunderstanding of this distinction. Chandler mistakenly concludes from the
Aristotle-Loux theory that because an object is necessarily what-it-is, then
it is eternally what-it-is."
"A note on predication," Dialogue 19: 627-628 (1980).
Repy to: Nicholas Griffin - Do we need predication? - Dialogue, 16,
1977, pp. 653-663.
"Noncategorical syllogisms in the Analytics," Notre Dame
Journal of Formal Logic 21: 602-608 (1980).
"On propositional form," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 21:
101-120 (1980).
Reprinted in: A. Menne and G. Offenberger (eds.) - Zur Modernen Deutung
der Aristotelischen Logik - vol. II, Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1985 pp.131-140.
"There is a vast difference between the Aristotelian and contemporary
accounts of the logical form of subject-predicate sentences. While
contemporary logicians take both subjects and predicates to be syntactically
simple (and build up sentences from them by adding quantifiers and
sentential connectives), Aristotle took subjects to be syntactically complex
(term plus quantifier) and predicates as well (term plus qualifier). Recent
work by F. Sommers shows the advantages of the old view over the new one."
"Denotation and reference," Philosophical Studies (Ireland) 27:
229-236 (1980).
"The new syllogistic recently developed by F. Sommers requires a distinction
between terms, on the one hand, and subjects and predicates, on the other. a
subject is a quantified term; a predicate is a qualified term. so terms and
subjects are logically distinct, with distinct sentential roles.
Terms denote; subjects refer. the reference of a subject is determined by
both the denotation of its constituent term and its quantity. these notions
have important consequences for the idea of quantified singulars and for
distribution theory."
"Singular terms and the syllogistic," The New Scholasticism 54:
68-74 (1980).
"It is generally held that singular terms have no place in Aristotle's
syllogistic. A variety of reasons have been given for holding this view.
Nevertheless, Aristotle did offer examples of syllogisms containing singular
terms. It is suggested here that the reasons for denying singulars a place
in syllogistic are unacceptable. Thus, singular terms are on a logical par
with general terms.
They can be subject terms (thus be quantified) and they can be predicate
terms as well (thus be affirmed or denied of subjects). A proper
understanding of how this is so comes only from a clear understanding of
Aristotle's theory of logical syntax. Recently F. Sommers has provided a
syllogistic logic ("the calculus of terms") which shows, among other things,
how singulars can be treated syllogistically."
Logical negation. Assen: Van Gorcum 1981.
Introduction 1; Some historical remarks 3; Negation in mathematical logic
19; Sommers' term logic 28; The symbolism for a term logic 38; Negation and
falsity 47; Concluding remarks on the nature of formal logic 56; Index
61-62.
"This monograph examines the notions of negation found in classical, Stoic,
and contemporary mathematical logics and argues that for philosophical
purposes, and consonant with ordinary discourse, the notions of predicate
denial and term negation (Aristotle's) are to be preferred over the
sentential negation now favored. Arguments supporting this atavism are drawn
from or based upon the work of F. Sommers. A final result of this
investigation is new light on falsity."
Three logicians. Aristotle, Leibniz, and Sommers and the syllogistic.
Assen: Van Gorcum 1981.
Preface VII; Introduction 1; Three logicians; Aristotle 9; Leibniz
28; Sommers 42; The syllogistic; Contemporary mathematical logic 67;
Syllogistic logic 77; Concluding remarks 109; Bibliography 113; Index
116-118.
"In his Introduction to Logical Theory (London, 1952) P.F. Strawson
attempted to show that traditional syllogistic logic was more reflective of
various features of ordinary language than was modern mathematical logic. P.
Geach, the best modern critic of traditional logic, responded to Strawson in
"Mr. Strawson on Symbolic and Traditional Logic", Mind, 72 (1963).
His brief remarks there show that Strawson's defense of the old logic is, at
best, naive. Geach clearly believes that there just can be no sound defense
of traditional logic. He even suggests that those who would persist in their
allegiance to the old logic are either irrational or lazy. He says:
Many readers will vaguely think Strawson has proved that the
traditional system with all its faults is philosophically less misleading
than the new-fangled one. Those Colleges of Unreason where the
pseudo-Aristotelian logic is presented as the only genuine logic, and those
lecturers who would like to teach the philosophy of logic without having to
learn any modern logic, may well thus have been supplied with a pretext for
supine ignorance.
We believe that syllogistic logic is philosophically defensible. What Geach
sees as its faults are either not faults at all or can be remedied. The
result of applying such remedies is a new syllogistic - a logic which is
broader and stronger than Aristotle's original. It is a logic competitive
with the "new fangled" logic of today. This new syllogistic was invisaged,
but not built, by Leibniz. The hope for such a logic lay dormant during the
period when mathematical logic was being born and nurtured through its rapid
maturity. But recently that hope has been revitalized, and virtually
fulfilled, in the work of F. Sommers. The best general answer to Geach's
overall charge is simply a presentation of this new syllogistic.
While the primary motive in presenting this essay is the defense of
syllogistic against its modern detractors, we also believe that it is time
for a concise introduction to Sommers' logical work. This work is scattered
throughout a wide variety of journals and anthologies; and there is now no
available account of it. Given the great originality of Sommers' ideas, and
the importance of the issues he has chosen to deal with in logic, this void
must be filled. Part of this essay is intended as a modest start at that
task." From the Preface.
"A note on identity, reference and logical form," Critica 8:
75-81 (1981).
"Predicates, predicables and names," Critica 8: 105-108 (1981).
"It is a canon of modern predicate logic that general terms are predicates
and subjects are singular. Traditional logic, by contrast, took all terms to
be fit for either the subject or predicate roles. The thesis, recently
defended by T. Burge, that names are predicates amounts (once the prejudices
of modern logic are abandoned) to the much weaker claim that names can be
used as general terms."
"A journey to Eden: Geach on Aristotle," Grazer Philosophische
Studien 14: 133-141 (1981).
"Peter Geach has charged Aristotle with the sin of corrupting logic by
initiating a process which led to the view that a sentence consists
logically of just two names. This charge can only result from a clearly
mistaken view of Aristotle's theory of logical syntax. Aristotle, unlike
Geach, was careful to distinguish subjects from subject-terms and predicates
from predicate-terms.
He took both subjects and predicates as syntactical complexes. Geach,
following Frege, holds a very different theory of logical syntax which takes
predicates, but not subjects, as syntactically complex."
"A further note on a proof by Sommers," Logique et Analyse 94:
271-272 (1981).
"In a previous essay I pointed to a flaw in F. Sommers' proof (contra
Łukasiewicz) that 'some a is a' is not a logical truth. Yet the failure of
Sommers' proof is no reason to reject his view of 'some a is a'. Here I
offer a revision of his proof to the effect that 'some a is a' is not a
logical truth."
"On the terms of truth," Philosophical Papers 10: 89-92 (1981).
"Correspondence theories of truth require a special relation between
sentences and the world.
Relying on suggestions first made by Leibniz, and later expanded by Sommers,
it can be shown that the relation called for is simply that of denotation.
Since denotation is primarily a relation between a term and things,
sentences must be construed as terms. The things denoted by sentences are
(pace Sommers) states of affairs."
"Natural syntax, logical syntax, and translation," Australian Logic
Teachers Journal 6: 8-14 (1982).
"Predication old and new," Critica 14: 117-120 (1982).
"Do we need relative identity?," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
23: 91-93 (1982).
"F. Sommers has shown how statements of absolute identity can be viewed as
having an underlying categorical logical form once singular terms are taken
to be syntactically similar to general terms. This means that singulars can
be quantified and can be predicted. The result is a logic which, unlike the
predicate calculus, does not need a special 'identity theory' appendage. It
is shown here that relative identities can be categoricalized as well. while
'a is b', 'a is the same x as b' is treated as 'some x which is a is b'."
"What in the world is the truth about logical space?," Philosophical
Inquiry 4: 52-61 (1982).
"Aristotle on the Oblique," Philosophical Studies 29: 89-101
(1982).
"Leibniz on logical syntax," Studia Leibnitiana 14: 119-126
(1982).
"Aristotle and Quine on the basic combination," The New Scholasticism
56: 244-249 (1982).
"Quine's 'basic combination' is a sentence joining a singular to a general
term. The position as the singular is referential -- that of the general is
predicational. Singulars and generals are unfit for each other's position.
This contrasts with Aristotle's view, which takes such sentences to join a
subject and a predicate. A subject is a quantified term -- a predicate is a
qualified term. Yet the terms themselves are syntactically homogeneous --
fit for each other's position. One motive behind the Quinean view is the
belief that: (i) subjects refer, (ii) singular refer to individuals, (iii)
universals cannot be referred to. So, since generals cannot refer without
referring to universals, generals are unfit for subjects. the Aristotelian
account of logical syntax also avoids Platonic consequences, but not at the
cost of an unsupported singular/general distinction."
"Reference, anaphora and singular quantity," Dialogos 41: 67-72
(1983).
"Several ideas from Sommers are added to those from Donnellan, Vendler,
Leibniz and Scholastic logic to provide a syntactic account of the
attributive/referential distinction."
"Presumptions of reference," Philosophical Papers 12: 9-11
(1983).
"Presupposition and existence," Philosophical Papers 12: 1-8
(1983).
"It is argued that sentences with subjects which are names or descriptions
neither materially imply nor presuppose existence. Following a suggestion by
F. Sommers it is claimed that in most, but not all, contexts 'a is b' is
accompanied by the presupposition 'every b exists'. from these two, 'a
exists' follows syllogistically. This thesis is then extended to account for
the apparent implications of sentences containing extensional verbs such as
'knows'."
"Feldman and Sommers on Leibniz's Law," Dialogos 43: 91-96
(1984).
34. "Following suggestions made recently by F. Sommers it can be shown that
Leibniz's law is in fact a principle of term substitutability. Terms are the
same if and only if they are intersubstitutable for one another. More
importantly for Leibniz's general program for syllogistic is the fact that
this principle is but a special case of the dictum de omni."
"Logical form and natural syntax," Indian Philosophical Quarterly
11: 229-254 (1984).
"Fred Sommers' recent work on logic has succeeded in the construction of a
'new syllogistic', comparable in expressive and inference powers to the
standard predicate calculus. Modern logicians committed to the standard
system have begun to counsel grammarians concerning the logical syntax of
natural language. A quite different view of this syntax, one requiring far
fewer concessions from grammarians, is provided by a phrase structure
grammar based on Sommers' logic."
"Freeman on induction/deduction," Informal Logic 6: 26-27 (1984).
"It has recently been claimed that logicians make the deduction/induction
distinction on the basis of explicit or implicit illation signs supplemented
by recourse to traditionally assigned forms. A view of logic which takes all
arguments initially as deductive according to some standard theory (e.g.,
syllogistic, first-order predicate calculus, etc.) allows invalid arguments
to be judged according to a supplementary theory of induction."
"Logical structure and natural syntax," Journal of Social and
Biological Structures 7: 219-234 (1984).
"Opposition," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 25: 79-85
(1984).
"Using ideas first presented by F. Sommers it can be shown that there are
certain laws which are confused with the law of excluded middle but which,
unlike the law, fail to apply universally.
Distinguishing among the various types of logical opposition involved in
these laws permits a richer account of opposition in general, including
opposition for singular sentences. Also, such distinctions allow for a more
sophisticated account of vacuousity."
"Quadratum Auctum," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 107:
309-325 (1984).
Reprinted in: George Englebretsen (ed.) - Essays on the philosophy of
Fred Sommers - Lewiston, Edwin Mellen Press, 1990, pp. 133-147.
"Drawing on ideas presented recently by F. Sommers a variety of distinctions
are made between different kinds of logical opposition. The principles
governing these logical distinctions can be used to augment those governing
a traditional square of opposition. The result is an augmented square of
opposition useful for the analysis of not only normal categorical sentences,
but vacuous sentences, singular sentences, and even compound sentences."
"Anselm's Second Argument," Sophia 23: 34-37 (1984).
Zur philosophischen Interpretation der Logik: ein weiter aristotelischen
Dialog. In Zur Modernen Deutung der Aristotelischen Logik. Vol. II.
Edited by Menne Albert and Öffenberger Niels. Hildesheim: Georg Olms 1985.
pp. 112-127
"Quine on Aristotle on identity," Critica 17: 65-68 (1985).
"Defending distribution," Dialogos 45: 157-159 (1985).
"At least one recent defender of the doctrine of distribution has conceded
too much to the opposition. Friends of distribution must recognize the
crucial distinction between denotation, a semantic feature of all terms, and
reference, a semantic feature of quantified expressions. They must also be
prepared to apply their doctrine to every kind of term -- including
relationals."
"Logical primitives," Indian Philosophical Quarterly 12: 371-380
(1985).
"Recent work on a logic of terms by F. Sommers shows that there are a small
number of natural language formatives which are sufficient for the
generation of all logical formatives. The logically primitive formatives are
the particular quantifier, term negation, sentence negation and sentence
conjunction. Cases where less primitive formatives cannot be defined shed
light on a variety of apparent logical paradoxes."
"On the proper treatment of negative terms," Journal of Critical
Analysis 8: 109-115 (1985).
"Negative names," Philosophia 15: 133-136 (1985).
"E. M. Zemach's otherwise superb defense of the formal symmetry of names and
general terms includes a mistaken view about the nature of negated names.
While agreeing with his symmetry thesis I argue that he fails to appreciate
(1) that the referents of negated names are not logically impossible, and
(2) that the negation of a name is not a name."
"Semantic considerations for Sommers' logic," Philosophy Research
Archives 11: 281-318 (1985).
"During the last twenty-five years Fred Sommers has developed a series of
inter-related theories of language structure, ontological structure, logical
syntax, and truth. Each theory has naturally contained valuable suggestions
concerning semantic issues. But Sommers has not yet offered a specifically
semantic theory. I attempt here to fill that gap by sketching a theory of
semantics based upon his logical theses. The theory holds that terms, as
used in statement making sentences, have both denotation and signification.
Terms denote objects and signify properties. Terms, when quantified, refer
to some or all of their denotations, and, when quantified, characterize the
subjects to which they are predicated as having or lacking the properties
they signify. The semantic, syntactic, and ontological theses presented in
this theory are contrasted with those found in classical, Scholastic,
Leibnizian, Fregean, and Quinean theories."
"Geach on logical syntax," The New Scholasticism 59: 177-184
(1985).
"A note on truth and existence in Leibniz," Manuscrito.Revista
Internacional de Filosofia 9: 7-9 (1986).
"Leibniz was able to connect the notion of truth for a sentence with the
idea of existence for individuals. Words and sentences are taken to both
denote individuals and signify concepts. iI a true sentence two conditions
must hold. The concept signified by the subject and the word denoted by the
sentence must be the actual word."
"Czezowski on wild quantity," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
27: 62-65 (1986).
"It is well known that if singular sentences are to be fully incorporated
into a syllogistic logic, singular subjects must be quantified. Leibniz
argued that such subjects are both universal and particular. Similar (but
not identical) views have been advanced in this century by Copi, Sommers and
Czezowski. but the latter has argued that singular quantity is unique,
distinct from the two classical quantities. it is shown here that this is an
illusion."
"Singular / General," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27:
104-107 (1986).
"Modern logic takes the difference between singular and general terms very
seriously. It insists that sentences with general subjects have a much more
complex logical syntax than sentences with singular subjects.
This is partly because modern logic always treats general terms as
predicates and never treats singular terms as anything but subjects. The
insistence that the logic of singulars is different from the logic of
general propositions is also partly due to modern logic's demand that the
logical form of any sentence be a reflection of its truth conditions.
'Socrates is wise' is true just in case Socrates is wise. But 'Some
philosopher is wise' is true just in case there is at least one thing which
is such that it is a philosopher and it is wise. So the modern logician
requires a great deal of semantic information to be reflected in syntax. But
how does a logician decide how much semantic information should be so
reflected? Surely not all. There's just too much. Just that which determines
truth? 'John is a bachelor' has as one of its (necessary) truth conditions
that John is a male. Yet the modern logician does not require this bit of
semantic information to be revealed syntactically."
"On some alleged semantic correlations," The New Scholasticism
60: 490-500 (1986).
"The Fregean replacement of the subject/predicate distinction with the
argument/function distinction led to an emphasis on the singular/general
distinction for logic. Only singulars could be subjects; only general terms
could be predicates. Singulars refer; predicates are true of Ultimately the
Fregean syntactic distinction is semantic. The old subject/predicate is not.
A semantic theory based on the old logic of subjects and predicates can
allow the semantic, syntactic and ontological distinctions their proper
places."
Logical polarity. In The new syllogistic. Edited by Englebretsen
George. New York: Peter Lang 1987. pp. 305-311
"Both statements and terms can be negated. They come in
positively/negatively charged pairs. This polarity is reversible for terms
(for any negative term a semantically equivalent positive can be defined)
but not for statements. An account of why this is so is offered here."
Natural syntax and Sommers' theory of logical form. In The new
syllogistic. Edited by Englebretsen George. New York: Peter Lang 1987.
pp. 245-272
"F. Sommers has challenged the Fregean theory of logical syntax. In
particular, he has denied the idea that natural language has no logic. It is
possible to articulate a theory of logical syntax for natural language. it
construes sentences as concatenations of subjects and predicates. A subject
is a quantifier plus a term; a predicate is a qualifier plus a term.
Surprisingly, such an analysis accounts not only for categoricals but
singulars, identities, rationals and truth-functions."
The new syllogistic. Edited by Englebretsen George. New York:
Peter Lang 1987.
Preface IX; Introduction 1; 1. The calculus of terms by Fred Sommers p. 11
(reprinted from Mind, 89, (1970); 2. De Morgan and Sommers by Peter
Swiggart p. 57; 3. Back to Leibniz or on from Frege? by B. H. Slater p. 87;
4. Review: The logic of natural language by Peter Frederick Strawson
p. 99 (reprinted from The Journal of Philosophy, 79, (1982); 5. On
the semantics of Sommers' 'Some S' p. 105 by Richard M. Martin p. 105
(reprinted from Mind, modality, meaning and method (1983); 6. Sommers
and modern logic by John Bacon p. 121; 7. Proofs and pronouns: extending the
system by Michael Lockwood p. 161; 8. Algebraic rules for syllogisms and
antilogisms by W. H. Friedman p. 213; 9. The two term theory of predication
by Aris Noah p. 223; 10. Natural syntax and Sommers' theory of logical form
by George Englebretsen p. 245; 11. Some practical and theoretical features
of Sommers' cancellation method by Richard Purtill p. 273; 12. Some problems
with TFL [Traditional Formal Logic] by Charles Sayward p. 283; 13. Truth and
existence by Fred Sommers p. 299; 14. Logical polarity by George
Englebretsen p. 305; Notes on the contributors p. 313; Bibliography p.
315-322.
"This anthology brings together essays by F. Sommers, his defenders and
critics concerning his new system of logic based on a traditional logical
syntax (the "new syllogistic"). The essays include presentations of the
logic, explorations of some of its historical antecedents, examinations of
the symbolic algorithm which accompanies it, and discussions of such key
topics as pronominalization, truth, syllogistic inference, existence and
term-negation."
Truth and existence. In The new syllogistic. Edited by
Englebretsen George. New York: Peter Lang 1987. pp. 299-304
"Morris on identity," Analysis 47: 92-93 (1987).
"T. V. Morris's recent account of how non-trivial identity statements can be
informative fails. It generates the kind of infinite regress he himself has
cautioned against."
"Subjects," Studia Leibnitiana 19: 85-90 (1987).
"La théorie des catégories de Sommers: une nouvelle introduction,"
Dialogue 27: 451-473 (1988).
"Fred Sommers is best known now for his work on term logic. But this work
can ultimately be traced back to his tree theory, which he developed in the
Fifties and Sixties. That theory centers on the thesis that (1) ordinary
language has a specifiable structure, (2) there is an ontological structure
determined by the categories of things, and (3) the two are isomorphic. This
essay is an attempt to recover the main ideas of the tree theory -- ideas
whose potency has yet to be fully exploited."
"Preliminary notes on a new modal syllogistic," Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic 29: 381-395 (1988).
"The new syllogistic developed recently by F. Sommers is given a modal
extension. In such a modal syllogistic modal expressions are allowed to
modify both terms and sentences. Models for such modalities are in terms of
domains of discourse (totalities relative to which a sentence is used). Some
preliminary discussion of rules for proof and some sample syllogistic proofs
are provided."
"A note on Leibniz's wild quantity thesis," Studia Leibnitiana
20: 87-89 (1988).
"Formatives," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 30: 382-389
(1989).
"An answer to the question of 'sentential unity' (What makes a sentence a
single linguistic unit rather than just a string of words?) is one of the
goals of any theory of logical syntax. A 'Fregean' theory claims that a
sentence is a function (unsaturated expression, containing gaps) whose gaps
are filled with either arguments (saturated, gap-less) or other functions
which have already been saturated. A 'Leibnizian' theory construes a
sentence as a syntactically complex subject (quantified term) plus a
syntactically complex predicate (qualified term). Subjects and predicates
just naturally fit one another to form sentences. An 'Aristotelian' theory
takes a sentence to consist of a pair of terms connected by a binary
formative expression (functor), whose only role is to connect terms to form
more complex expressions (e.g., sentences). After an examination of the
formal nature of such functors, it is argued that this third sort of theory
not only answers better the question of sentential unity, but it also
provides a better account of the nature of logical constants in general."
Essays on the philosophy of Fred Sommers. In logical terms.
Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press 1990.
Contents;
Foreword by Graeme Hunter I; Introduction III; I. A reintroduction to
Sommers' tree theory 1; II. Sommers on the subject of a sentence 33; III. On
the philosophical interpretation of logic: another Aristotelian dialogue 43;
IV. A introduction to (a Sommers-like) logic 63; V. Remarks on the semantics
of terms and sentences 109; VI. Qadratum auctum 133; VII. On the logic of
phrasal conjunctions 151; VIII. Compound terms 159; IX. Preliminary notes on
a new modal syllogistic 169; X. Existing things 189; XI. A brief note on
psychologism 197; Bibliography 205; Index of names 229; Index of terms 233.
"The myth of modern logic," Cogito 4: 150-158 (1990).
"A note on copula and qualifiers," Linguistic Analysis 20: 82-86
(1990).
"Cartesian syntax," Philosophical Inquiry 12: 59-64 (1990).
"The "Cartesian" theory of logical syntax was most fully formulated by the
Port-Royal logicians. A brief survey of their work, especially the Logique,
shows that they took a statement to have a deep structure analyzable as a
predication. It is a joining or separating of two terms by a positive or
negative copula. Complex terms were also viewed as (implicit) predication.
The logical syntax of predication requires no recourse to semantic
distinctions among terms, nor does it distinguish atomic from molecular
statements."
"An algebra for logic," Canadian Journal of Rethorical Studies 2:
104-140 (1992).
"Plus and Minus," Critica 24: 73-116 (1992).
"Laying the cards on the table: negation theory and contradiction,"
Linguistic Analysis 22: 96-99 (1992).
"Linear diagrams for syllogisms (with relationals)," Notre Dame
Journal of Formal Logic 33: 37-69 (1992).
"A system for diagramming syllogisms is developed here. Unlike Venn, and
other planar diagrams, these diagrams are linear. This allows one to diagram
inferences which exceed the virtual four term limit onnonlinear systems. It
also can be extended (by the use of vectors) to inferences involving all
kinds of relational expressions."
"L'utilisation de modèles lineares dans l'enseignement des entiers
relatifs," Instantanés Mathématiques 30: 16-18 (1994).
with G. Boulet and M. Francavilla.
"A propos of nothing," Linguistic Analysis 24: 32-38 (1994).
Something to reckon with: the logic of terms. Ottawa: Ottawa
University Press 1996.
With a foreword by Fred Sommers; Preface; Introduction 1; 1. The good old
days of the bad old logic (or, Adam's Fall); Aristotle's syllogistic 9;
Scholastic additions 16; Cartesian interlude 23; Leibnizian insights 30;
Nineteenth-century algebraists 41; 2. A modern success Story (or, Frege to
the rescue); Frege 53; Bradley and Ramsey raise some doubts 64; Russell and
Wittgenstein 69; Strawson, Geach, and Quine 78; 3. Coming to terms with
Sommers 99; The Calculus of Terms 99; The logic of natural language 122; The
truth 135; The laws of thought 142; 4. It all adds up 149; Plus/Minus 149;
Truth and what 'there' is 185; A new system of diagrams 188; Conclusion 239;
Bibliography 243; Index of names 269-274.
"The unifying copula," Logique et Analyse 159: 255-259 (1997).
"Bradley's 'Paradox' can be avoided by paying the price of Frege's
'Paradox'. Recently R. Gaskin has tried to avoid both by introducing a kind
of "Fregean copula," which would be at once a saturated sentential element
and a sentential unifier. Yet Gaskin's solution turns out to concede too
much to Bradley, generating its own infinite regress. The best way here is
simply to reintroduce Aristotle's logical copula."
"Religious discourse and Sommers' theory of truth: a response to Hans H.
Penner," Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 9: 249-258
(1997).
Line diagrams for logic: drawing conclusions. Lewiston: Edwin
Mellen Press 1998.
Preface; Introduction 1; I. Reasoning with diagrams 7; II. Syntax and
diagrams 13; III. A word about truth 17; IV. Diagramming categoricals and
singulars 19; V. Compound terms and negative names 29; VI. Compound names
37; VII. Syllogistic inference 41; VIII. Relationals 47; IX. Reflexive and
personal pronouns; 57; X. The dictum de omni 63; XI. Statement logic as a
special part of term logic 67; XII. Diagramming unanalyzed statements 77;
XIII. Final remarks 85; Appendix 87; References 99-105
An invitation to formal reasoning. The logic of terms. Aldershot:
Ashgate 2000.
Co-author: Fred Sommers.
Preface X; 1. Reasoning 1; 2. Picturing propositions 25; 3. The language of
logic (I) 49; 4. The language of logic (II) 77; 5. Syllogistic 109; 6.
Relational syllogistic 139; 7. Statement logic 163; 8. Modern predicate
logic 213; Rules, laws and principles 253; A note on further reading
259-260.
The book "introduces the discipline of formal logic by means of a powerful
new system formulated by Fred Sommers.
This system, term logic, is different in a number of ways from the standard
system employed in modern logic; most striking is, its greater simplicity
and naturalness. Based on a radically different theory of logical syntax
than the one Frege used when initiating modern mathematical logic in the
19th Century, term logic borrows insights from Aristotle's syllogistic,
Scholastic logicians, Leibniz, and the 19th century British algebraists.
Term logic takes its syntax directly from natural language, construing
statements as combinations of pairs of terms, where complex terms are taken
to have the same syntax as statements. Whereas standard logic requires
extensive 'translation' from natural language to symbolic language, term
logic requires only 'transcription' into the symbolic language. Its
naturalness is the result of its ability to stay close to the forms of
sentences usually found in every day discourse. Written by the founders of
the term logic approach, An Invitation to Formal Reasoning is a unique
introduction and exploration of this new system, offering numerous exercises
and examples throughout the text. Summarising the standard system of
mathematical logic to set term logic in context, and showing how the two
systems compare, this book presents an alternative approach to standard
modern logic for those studying formal logic, philosophy of language or
computer theory."
Preliminaries for a term-functor logic. In Variable-free semantics.
Edited by Böttner M. and Thümmel W. Osnabrück: Secolo-Verlag 2000. pp. 90-99
Two important logical insights by Lewis Carroll. In Reflections on
Lewis Carroll. Edited by Soto Fernando J. Shelburne: The Lewis Carroll
Society of Canada 2000. pp.
Postmodernism is irrational. In Postmodernism. Edited by Maus
Derek. San Diego: Greenhaven Press 2001. pp. 152-155
"Postmodernism is a philosophy that significantly diminishes the role of
supposedly universal truths like rational thought and logic. The result of
this is a society in which "willful stupidity'' to the realities of modern
life is an acceptable side effect of a more tolerant attitude toward all
ideas."
"On the concept of mental health," APA Newsletter in Philosophy and
Medicine: 162-164 (2001).
"The "business" of mental health is a growth industry. It ultimately rests
on a number of key concepts. In particular, it depends on the concept of
mental health (or, correspondingly, mental disease). Getting clear about
concepts is a philosophical -- not psychiatric --t ask. Using the
conceptual-category theory developed by F. Sommers, it can be shown that the
key concepts are confused. Mental illness, as T. Szasz says, is a myth.
Fashionable postmodern views on mental health are also examined and found
wanting."
"Protagoras and Humanism," Humanist in Canada 138: 14-15 (2001).
"Syllogistic: old wine in new bottles," History and Philosophy of
Logic 23: 31-35 (2002).
"In the late nineteenth century there were two very active lines of research
in the field of formal logic. First, logicians (mostly in English-speaking
countries) were engaged in formulating a generally traditional logic as an
algebra, a part of mathematics; second, logicians (mostly on the Continent)
were busy building a non-traditional logic that could serve, not as a part
of, but as the foundation of, mathematics. By the end of the First World War
the former line had been pretty well abandoned while the second continued to
expand. However, that old abandoned line, stretching from Aristotle, through
the Scholastics and then Leibniz to the nineteenth century algebraists, had
not been completely forgotten. One of those logicians who has recently
worked on the restoration (and, importantly, the extension) of that line is
Fred Sommers. His Term Logic preserves a number of traditional insights
(especially involving the theory of logical syntax), while also enjoying a
power to account for formal inference at least comparable to that of the
standard logic now in place."
Trees, terms, and truth: the philosophy of Fred Sommers. In The old
new logic. Essays on the philosophy of Fred Sommers. Edited by Oderberg
David S. Cambridge: The MIT Press 2005. pp. 25-48
"During the past fifty years Fred Sommers has developed bold and original
ideas concerning the sense structure of natural language and how it reveals
ontological structure, a powerful and fully expressive version of term
logic, and a revitalized theory of truth by correspondence. This essay shows
how all these ideas are mutually related to one another. Together they
amount to a unified, coherent theory of mind, language and the world.
Sommers's work in these areas has influenced research in philosophy of
language, logic, and cognitive psychology."
Bare facts and naked truths. A new correspondence theory of truth.
Aldershot: Ashgate 2006.
Contents: Preface IX. Part One: Introduction; 1. À la recherche du temps
perdu 9; 2. The big MAC attack 37; Part Two: 3. Terminism 79; 4. Facing the
facts 1070; 5. Giving the world Its due 141; 6. A nice derangement 153;
Conclusion 167; Bibliography 171; Index 189.
"The aim of the present essay is to outline a theory about truth. Since a
number of concepts are involved in the concept of truth this means that I
shall has to offer clarification, of one sort or another, of a large number
of concepts and conceptual clusters. Some of these involve what there is,
existence, reality, and the like (so my project is partly metaphysical);
some involve knowledge, belief, perception, and so forth (so my project is
partly epistemological); others involve sentences, terms, propositions,
statements, saying, and so on (so part of my project is in the philosophy of
language -- semantics). To illustrate briefly what I've been saying,
consider some of the semantic concepts with which we shall be dealing. The
terms of art needed to talk about such things as sentences, statements,
facts, stating, saying, and what is stated are all plagued by ambiguity (and
much else besides). To disambiguate them, trace out their different senses,
is to analyze the multiple concepts they can express. Thus a sentence might
be either a sentence-type or a sentence-token; a statement might be either a
sentence or what is expressed by a sentence; a fact might be either a true
sentence, a true statement, a truth expressed by a sentence (or by a
statement), or what makes something (a sentence, statement, and so on) true;
to state might be to utter, to express, to signify, or to do something else;
to say might be to utter or to state; what is stated might be a sentence, a
fact, or something else. So here we have just a portion of a large cluster
of concepts that is implicated in any account of truth and is in serious
need of clarification, analysis, disentanglement -- and I have yet to focus
on the concept of a concept. An appropriate way to make progress here is to
try to formulate a detailed, specific theory of truth. Along the way, the
clarification of various concepts will help push along the development of
the theory. Reciprocally, the theory, as it gets formulated, will help shed
light on various key concepts and at least show the way to the clarification
of others."
EXCERPTS FROM HIS PUBLICATIONS (in preparation)
PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE ON LINE
Project Euclid - 15 papers and 1 review by George Englebretsen published in the Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (PDF format)
(click on the image to see the PDF file)