Living Ontologists (a list of authors with an interest in ontology, with synthetic bibliographies)
BEING
"One of Frege's main semantic principles, is however, missing in Dummett's book, [Frege: philosophy of language] and it is has been
ignored by most Frege scholars. That principle is the thesis concerning the ambiguity of the word 'is'. Angelelli come close to attending to it when he makes
some remarks on identity and predication, and Matthias Schirn puts special emphasis on the role of the thesis in Frege's work. However, the great majority of
Frege scholars have neglected the ambiguity doctrine, even when they have commented on each of the allegedly different meanings of 'is' separately. This is
strange in view of the fact that it was Frege and Russell who proposed the thesis and established it as one of the basic ingredients of modern logic. They have
in fact been followed by most philosophers. For instance, in the Tractatus Ludwig Wittgenstein emphasizes the ambiguity of the verb 'to be' and
stresses the importance of constructing a language which prevents confusions between the different meanings of 'is'. Wittgenstein also remarks that Frege's and
Russell's conceptual notation: is such a language although it does not succeed in excluding all mistakes (Tractatus, 3.323 - 3.325). This work sets
out to show that a large part of Frege's philosophy is an attempt to make us realize the importance of keeping the different meanings of 'is' apart and to
catch the philosophical mistakes brought about our failure to see the ambiguity.
But how is the verb 'is' ambiguous in Fregean logic? Frege distinguishes between the following meaning of 'is':
(1) the 'is' of identity (e.g., Phosphorus is Hesperus; a=b),
(2) the 'is' of predication, i.e., the copula (e.g., 'Plato is blond'; P(a)),
(3) the 'is' of existence,
(i) expressed by means of the existential quantifier and the symbol for identity (e.g., 'God is'; (∃ x) (G=x)),
or
(ii) expressed by means of the existential quantifier and the symbol for predication (e.g., 'There are human beings' / 'There is at least one
human being'; (∃ x) H (x)),
and
(4) the 'is' of class-inclusion, i.e., generic implication (e.g., 'A horse is a four-legged animal'; (x) (P(x) → Q(x)))."
From: Leila Haaparanta - Frege's doctrine of Being - Helsinki, Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 39, 1985 pp. 13-14.
EXISTENCE
"If you want to assign a content to the verb 'to be', so that the sentence 'A is' is not pleonastic and self-evident, you will have to allow
circumstances which the negation of 'A is' is possible; that is to say, that there are subjects of which being must be denied. But in that case the concept
'being' will no longer be suitable for providing a general explanation of 'there are' under which 'there are B's' means the same as 'something that has being
falls under the concept B'; for if we apply this explanation to 'There are subjects of which being must be denied', then we get 'Something that has being falls
under the concept of not-being' or 'Something that has being is not'. There is no way of getting over this once a content of some kind -- it doesn't matter
what it is -- is agreed to the concept of being. If the explanation of 'there are Bs' as meaning the same as 'Something that has being is B' is to work, we
just have to understand by being something that goes entirely without saying.
For this reason the contradiction still remains if we say 'A exists' means 'The idea of the A has been caused by something affecting the
ego'. (...)
We can say that the meanings of the word 'exist' in the sentences 'Leo Sachse exists' and 'Some men exist' display no more difference than
does the meanings of 'is a German' in the sentences 'Leo Sachse is a German' and 'Some men are Germans'. But then the sentence 'Some men exist' or 'Something
existing is a man' only means the same as 'There are men' if the concept 'existing thing' is superordinate to the concept man. So if such forms of expression
are to have the same meaning in general, the concept 'existing thing' must be superordinate to every concept. This is only possible if the word 'exist' means
something that goes entirely without saying, and if therefore nothing at all is predicated in the sentence 'Leo Sachse exists', and if in the sentence 'Some
men exist' the content of what is predicated does not lie in the word 'exist'. The existence expressed by 'there is' is not contained in the word 'exist' but
in the form of the particular judgement. 'Some men are Germans' is just as good an existential judgement as 'Some men exist'. But once the word 'exist' is
given a content, which is predicated of an individual thing, this content can be made into the characteristic mark of a concept-a concept under which there
falls the individual thing of which existence is being predicated. E.g. if one divides everything into two classes
1. What is in my mind, ideas, feelings etc.
and
2. What is outside myself, and says of the latter that it exists, then one can construe existence as a characteristic mark of the concept
'centaur', although there are no centaurs. I would not acknowledge anything as a centaur that was not outside my mind; this means that I shall not call mere
ideas or feelings centaurs.
The existence expressed by 'there is' cannot be a characteristic mark of a concept whose property it is, just because it is a property of it.
In the sentence 'There are men' we seem to be speaking of individuals that fall under the concept 'man', whereas it is only the concept 'man' we are talking
about. The content of the word 'exist' cannot well be taken as the characteristic mark of a concept, because 'exists', as it is used in the sentence 'Men
exist', ,has no content.
We can see from all this how easily we can be led by language to see 'things in the wrong perspective, and what value it must therefore have
for philosophy to free ourselves from the dominion of language. If one makes the attempt to construct a system of signs on quite other foundations and 'with
quite other means, as I have tried to do in creating my concept-script, ,we shall have, so to speak, our very noses rubbed into the false analogies in
language."
From: Gottlob Frege - Dialogue with Punjer on Existence (written before 1884) - in: Posthumous Writings - Edited by
Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel, Friedrich Kaulbach - Chicago, The University of Chicago Press 1979 pp. 65-67.
TRUTH
"When entering upon the study of a science, we need to have some idea, if only a provisional one, of its nature. We want to have in sight a
goal to strive towards; we want some point to aim at that will guide our steps in the right direction. The word 'true' can be used to indicate such a goal for
logic, just as can 'good' for ethics and 'beautiful' for aesthetics. Of course all the sciences have truth as their goal, but logic is concerned with the
predicate 'true' in a quite special way, namely in a way analogous to that in which physics has to do with the predicates 'heavy' and 'warm' or chemistry with
the predicates 'acid' and 'alkaline'. There is, however, the difference that these sciences have to take into account other properties besides these we have
mentioned, and that there is no one property by which their nature is so completely characterized as logic is by the word 'true'. (...) Now it would be futile
to employ a definition in order to make it clearer what is to be understood by 'true'. If, for example, we wished to say 'an idea is true if it agrees with
reality' nothing would have been achieved, since in order to apply this definition we should have to decide whether some idea or other did agree with reality.
Thus we should have to presuppose the very thing that is being defined. The same would hold of any definition of the form 'A is true if and only if it has
such-and-such properties or stands in such-and-such a relation to such-and-such a thing'. In each case in hand it would always come back to the question
whether it is true that A has such-and-such properties, or stands in such-and-such a relation to such-and-such a thing. Truth is obviously something so
primitive and simple that it is not possible to reduce it to anything still simpler. Consequently we have no alternative but to bring out the peculiarity of
our predicate by comparing it with others. What, in the first place, distinguishes it from all other predicates is that predicating it is always included in
predicating anything whatever."
From: Gottlob Frege - Logic (1897) - in: Posthumous Writings - Edited by Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel, Friedrich
Kaulbach - Chicago, The University of Chicago Press 1979 pp. 128-129.
"7. What true is, I hold to be indefinable.
8. The expression in language for a thought is a sentence. We also speak in an extended sense of the truth of a sentence. 12. Logic
only becomes possible with the conviction that there is a difference between truth and untruth.
13. We justify a judgement either by going back to truths that have been recognized already or without having recourse to other judgements.
Only the first case, inference, is the concern of Logic.
14. The theory of concepts and of judgement is only preparatory to the theory of inference.
15. The task of logic is to set up laws according to which a judgement is justified by others, irrespective of whether these are themselves
true.
16. Following the laws of logic can guarantee the truth of a judgement only insofar as our original grounds for making it, reside in
judgements that are true.
17. No psychological investigation can justify the laws of logic."
From: Gottlob Frege - [17 Key sentences on Logic] (1906 or earlier) - in: Posthumous Writings - Edited by Hans Hermes,
Friedrich Kambartel, Friedrich Kaulbach - Chicago, The University of Chicago Press 1979 pp. 174-175.
A SELECTION OF CRITICAL JUDGMENTS (in preparation)
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Essays on Frege. Edited by Klemke Elmer D. Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1968.
From the Preface: "As Frege's writings became more widely read, a number of articles were written about various aspects of Frege's work-his ontology,
semantics, logic. Many of these papers are of great value for the study of Frege, and it was thought desirable to assemble some of them in a single volume. I
have divided these essays into three main categories: (1) Frege's ontology, (2) his semantics, and (3) his logic and philosophy of mathematics. To some extent,
these labels are not quite accurate. Thus a paper included in the section on semantics may have something to say regarding Frege's ontology as well. The
categorization is a matter of emphasis; if a paper is chiefly about, say, Frege's ontology, then it appears in that section.
Two of the papers that are included in the volume have not been previously published. These are "Frege, Concepts, and Ontology," by Prof. Moltke S. Gram of
Northwestern University (who so generously offered to write it for its appearance here), and my essay, "Frege's Ontology: Realism."
I have included as appendices three important essays by Frege, none of which were included in the excellent collection of translations by Geach and Black, but
which are valuable for the study of Frege's thought."
Contents: Part 1. Frege's ontology 1;
1. Rulon S. Wells: Frege's ontology 3; 2. Gustav Bergmann: Frege's hidden nominalism 42; 3. E. D. Klemke: Professor Bergmann and Frege's "hidden nominalism"
68; 4. Howard Jackson: Frege's ontology 77; 5. Reinhardt Grossmann: Frege's ontology 79; 6. Charles E. Caton: An apparent difficulty in Frege's ontology 99; 7.
Gustav Bergmann: Ontological alternatives 113; 8. E. D. Klemke: Frege's ontology: Realism 157; 9. M. S. Gram: Forge, concepts, and ontology 178;
Part 2. Frege's semantics 201;
10. Paul D. Wienpahl: Frege's Sinn und Bedeutung 203; 11. Richard Rudner: On Sinn as a combination of physical properties 219; 12. Max Black:
Frege on functions 223; 13. William Marshall: Frege's theory of functions and objects 249; 14. Michael Dummett: Frege on functions: a reply 268; 15. Peter T.
Geach Class and concept 284; 16. Michael Dummett: Note: Frege on functions 295; 17. Willliam Marshall: Sense and reference: a reply 298; 18. Michael Dummett:
Nominalism 321; 19. John R. Searle: Russell's objections to Frege theory of sense and reference 337; 20. G. E. M. Anscombe: The Fregean Annahme 346;
21. Peter T. Geach: Naming and predicating 349; 22. Howard Jackson: Frege on sense-functions 376; 23. Milton Fisk: A paradox in Frege's semantics 382; 24.
Rulon S. Wells: Is Frege concept of a function valid? 381; 25. James Bartlett: On questioning the validity of Frege's concept of function 407;
Part 3. Frege's logic and philosophy of mathematics 409;
26. Bertrand Russell: The logical and arithmetical doctrines of Frege 411; 27. H. R. Smart: Frege's logic 448; 28. Peter T. Geach: Frege's Grundlagen
467; 29. Peter T. Geach: Quine on classes and properties 479; 30. W. V. Quine: On Frege's way out 485; 31. Peter T. Geach: On Frege's way out 502;
Appendices. Three essays by Gottlob Frege 505;
A. The thought: a logical inquiry. Translated by A. M. and M. Quinton 507;
B. Compound thoughts. Translated by R. H. Stoothoff 537;
C. On the foundations of geometry. Translated by M. E. Szabo 559
Selected bibliography 577; Index 583-586.
Studien zu Frege I. Logik und Philosophie der Mathematik / Studies on Frege I. Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics. Edited by
Schirn Matthias. Stuttgart: Fromman-Holzboog 1976.
"The present collection of articles, mainly consisting of new publications, is a critical appreciation of the work of the logician, mathematician and
philosopher Gottlob Frege.
Volume I opens the collection with a programmatic contribution determining critically the historical position of Frege's philosophy. The main part of the
volume contains papers on logic and philosophy of mathematics. Among other things it is argued that Frege's introduction of the universal quantifier in the
Begriffsschrift enabled an integration of the statement- and predicate- calculus, going far beyond Boole's logic. Besides textual analyses of special
problems concerning Frege's logical system and an elucidation of the 'logistic thesis' in the context of modern investigations in the foundations of
mathematics, Frege's discussion of Hilbert's axiomatic method is subjected to critical analysis. One point made is that, contrary to a prejudice in the recent
history of mathematics, Frege's understanding of the axiomatic method is tenable."
Contents: Vorwort 11; Einleitung des Herausgebers. Einige Bemerkungen zum Zusammenhang von Logik, Mathematik und Sprachphilosophie bei Frege 13; Zur
historisch-kritischen Standortbestimmung der Philosophie Freges; 1. Hans D. Sluga. Frege as a Rationalist 27; Zum wissenschaftlichen Nachlass Freges; 2. Albert
Veraart. Geschichte des wissenschaftlichen Nachlasses Gottolob Frege und seiner Edition. Mit einem Katalog des ursprünglichen Bestands der nachgelassenen
Schriften Freges 49; Logik und Philosophie der Mathematik. 3. Victor H. Dudman. From Boole to Frege 109; 4. Robert Sternfeld. The logistic thesis 139; 5. W. D.
Hart. Imagination, necessity and abstract objects 161; 6. Michael D. Resnik. Die Frege-Hilbert Kontroverse 193; 7. Friedrich Kambartel. Frege und die
axiomatische Methode. Zur Kritik mathematik-historischer Legitimationsversuche der formalistichen Ideologie 215; 8. Michael Dummett. Frege on the consistency
of mathematical theories 229; 9. Christian Thiel. Gottlob Frege: Die Abstraktion 243; 10. Charles Parsons. Some remarks on Frege's conception of extension 265;
11. Terrell Ward Bynum. The evolution of Frege's Logicism 279; 12. Christian Thiel. Wahreitswert und Wertverlauf. Zu Freges Argumentation im § 10 de
'Grundlagen der Arithmetik' 287; 13. Franz Kutschera. Freges Begründung der Analysis 301; Abkürzungsverzeichnis 313; Mitarbeiter dieses Bandes 315.
Studien zu Frege II. Logik und Sprachphilosophie / Studies on Frege II. Logic and Philosophy of Language. Edited by Schirn
Matthias. Stuttgart: Fromman-Holzboog 1976.
"The first papers of volume II deal, in a critical way, with Frege's theory of functions and his concept of logic. An account showing the development of his
doctrine of judgment, is followed by two papers on the theory of quantification. The first discusses Frege's change from a substitutional to an objectual
definition of quantification, while the second compares Frege's approach with corresponding reflections of Russell and Quine. Finally, several articles discuss
problems of identity in Frege under comparative and analytical aspects."
Contents: 14. Reinhardt Grossmann. Structures, functions and forms 11; 15. Wolfgang Carl. Freges Unterscheidung von Gegenstand und Begriff 33; 16. Eike-Henner
W. Kluge. Freges Begriff des Logischeinfachen 51; 17. Gottfried Gabriel. Einige Eiseitigkeiten des Fregeschen Logiksbegriffs 67; 18. Hans-Ulrich Hoche. Vom
'Inhaltsstrich' zum 'Waagerechten'. Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklung der Fregeschen Uteilslehre 87;19. Leslie Stevenson. Frege zwei Definitionen der Quantifikation
103; 20. Robert Sternfeld. The mathematization of logic: quantified sentences 125; 21. Ignacio Angelellli. Friends and opponents of the substitutivity of
Identical in the history of logic 141; 22. Charles E. Caton. 'The idea of sameness challenges reflection' 167; 23. Matthias Schirn. Identität und
Identitätsaussage bei Frege 181; 24. Bertram Kienzle. Notiz zu Freges Theorien der Identität 217; 25. David Wiggins. Frege's problem of the Morning Star and
the Evening Star 221; 26. Ronald Suter. Frege und Russell über das 'Paradox der Identität' 257; 27. Haig Khatchadourian. Kripke and Frege on identity
statements 271; Abkürzungsverzeichnis 299; Mitarbeiter dieses Bandes 301.
Studien zu Frege III. Logik und Semantik / Studies on Frege III. Logic and Semantics. Edited by Schirn Matthias. Stuttgart:
Fromman-Holzboog 1976.
"Volume III chiefly contains studies on Frege's theory of sense and reference, generally regarded as the beginning of modern extensional and intensional
semantics. Included is an attempt to provide a uniform explanation of the concept 'Bedeutung' and to delimit the scope of the context principle in
Frege's philosophy. Further articles deal with special problems of the theory of sense and reference. A fully comprehensive bibliography is appended to the
collection."
28. Fred Sommers. Frege or Leibniz? 11; 29. Michael D. Resnik. Frege's Context Principle revisiterd 35; 30. Ernst Tugendhat. Die Bedeutung des Ausdrucks
'Bedeutung' bei Frege. Postskirpt 1975 51; 31. Victor H. Dudman. Bedeutung for predicates 71; 32. David S. Shwayder. On the determination of reference
by sense 85; 33. Leonard Linsky. Frege and Russell on vacuous singular terms 97; 34. Howard Jackson / Malcolm Acock. Sense and sense data 117; 35. Richard M.
Martin. Some comments of Frege's pragmatic concerms 139; 36. Anhang. Peter Janich. Trägheitsgesetz und Inertialsystem. Zur Kritik G. Freges and der
Definition L. Langes 146; Bibliographie 157; Abkürzungsverzeichnis 198; Mitarbeiter dieses Bandes 200.
Frege: tradition and influence. Edited by Wright Crispin. Oxford: Blackwell 1984.
Frege synthesized. Essays on the philosophical and foundational work of Gottlob Frege. Edited by Haaparanta Leila and Hintikka
Jaakko. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1986.
From the General Introduction: "In recent literature [about Frege], one can also find a wealth of new and sometimes controversial viewpoints. For instance,
Jean van Heijenoort has called our attention to an important but neglected aspect of Frege's attitude to logic and language that he calls 'logic as language'.
Hans Slugs has challenged on a large scale the received view of Frege as a lonely figure in nineteenth-century philosophy whose ancestry goes to medieval
objectivists rather than his German predecessors. Sluga wants to place Frege firmly in the middle of the German philosophical tradition of his day. It is
indeed unmistakable that there are, for instance, Kantian elements in his thinking that had earlier been overlooked. Indeed, the idea of logic as language is
likely to be one of them. Another one is the sharp contrast between the realm of thinking and understanding and the realm of sense and intuition. Sluga's
influence is illustrated amply in several papers in this volume. In an attempt to reverse the traditional priorities, Jaakko Hintikka has suggested, relying
partly on van Heijenoort's interpretation, that the crucial part of Frege's work in semantics lies in his ideas about the semantics of the familiar elementary
logic (truth-functions and quantification) rather than in Frege's theory of sense and reference, which is merely intensional frosting on a more important
extensional cake, even though it is typically given the pride of place in expositions in Frege's semantics. As a part of this attempted reversal of emphasis,
Jaakko Hintikka has also called attention to the role Frege played in convincing almost everyone that verbs for being had to be treated as multiply ambiguous
between the 'is' of identity, the 'is' of predication, the 'is' of existence, and the 'is' of class-inclusion -- a view that had been embraced by few major
figures (if any) before Frege, with the exception of John Stuart Mill and Augustus De Morgan. Hintikka has gone on to challenge this ambiguity thesis. At the
same time, Frege's role in the genesis of another major twentieth-century philosophical movement, the phenomenological one, has become an important issue. Even
the translation of Frege's key term 'Bedeutung' as 'reference' has become controversial.
The interpretation of Frege is thus thrown largely back in the melting pot. In editing this volume, we have not tried to publish the last word on Frege. Even
though we may harbor such ambitions ourselves, they are not what has led to the present editorial enterprise. What we have tried to do is to bring together
some of the best ongoing work on Frege. Even though the ultimate judgment on our success lies with out readers, we want to register our satisfaction with all
the contributions."
Contents: Part I. Introduction
Leila Haaparanta and Jaakko Hintikka: General introduction 3; Joan Weiner: Putting Frege in perspective 9;
Part II. Semantics and epistemology
Jean van Heijenoort: Frege and vagueness 31; Hans Sluga: Semantic content and cognitive sense 47; Thomas G. Ricketts: Objectivity and Objecthood: Frege's
metaphysics of judgment 65; Tyler Burge: Frege on truth 97; Leila Haaparanta: Frege on existence 155;
Part III. Logical theory
Michael D. Resnik: Frege's proof of referentiality 177; Nino B. Cocchiarella: Frege, Russell and Logicism: a logical reconstruction 197; Robert B. Brandom:
Frege's technical concepts: some recent developments 253;
Part IV. Philosophy of mathematics
Philip Kitcher: Frege, Dedekind, and the philosophy of mathematics 299; Gregory Currie: Continuity and change in Frege's philosophy of mathematics 345; A. W.
Moore and Andrew Rein: Grundgesetze, Section 10 375; Index of names 385; Index of subjects 388-390.
General assessments and historical accounts of Frege's philosophy. Edited by Sluga Hans. New York: Garland Publishing Co.
1993.
"The philosophy of Frege" - A collection of essay in four volumes - Vol. 1
Logic and foundations of mathematics in Frege's philosophy. Edited by Sluga Hans. New York: Garland Publishing Co. 1993.
"The philosophy of Frege" - A collection of essay in four volumes - Vol. 2
Meaning and ontology in Frege's philosophy. Edited by Sluga Hans. New York: Garland Publishing Co. 1993.
"The philosophy of Frege" - A collection of essay in four volumes - Vol. 3
Sense and reference in Frege's philosophy. Edited by Sluga Hans. New York: Garland Publishing Co. 1993.
"The philosophy of Frege" - A collection of essay in four volumes - Vol. 4
Philosophie und Logik. Frege-Kolloquien Jena 1989/1991. Edited by Stelzner Werner. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1993.
Mind, meaning, and mathematics. Essays on the philosophical views of Husserl and Frege. Edited by Haaparanta Leila. Dordrecht:
Kluwer 1994.
Frege: sense and reference one hundred years later. Edited by Kotatko Peter and Biro John. Dordrecht: Kuwer Academic Publishers
1995.
Frege: importance and legacy. Edited by Schirn Matthias. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1996.
Gottlob Frege: Werk und Wirkung. Mit den unveröffentlichten Vorschlägen für ein Wahlgesetz von Gottlob Frege. Edited by Gabriel
Gottfried and Dathe Uwe. Paderborn: Mentis 2000.
Building on Frege: new essays on sense, content, and concept. Edited by Newen Albert, Nortmann Ulrich, and Stuhlmann-Laeisz Rainer.
Stanford: CSLI Publications 2001.
From Frege to Wittgenstein. Perspective in early analytic philosophy. Edited by Reck Erich H. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002.
Das Wahre und das Falsche. Edited by Greimann Dirk. Hildesheim: Georg Olms 2003.
Frege's philosophy in context. Edited by Beaney Michael and Reck Erich H. New York: Routledge 2005.
Gottlob Frege. Critical assessments of leading philosophers. Vol. I
Frege's philosophy of logic. Edited by Beaney Michael and Reck Erich H. New York: Routledge 2005.
Gottlob Frege. Critical assessments of leading philosophers. Vol. II
Frege's philosophy of mathematics. Edited by Beaney Michael and Reck Erich H. New York: Routledge 2005.
Gottlob Frege. Critical assessments of leading philosophers. Vol. III
Frege's philosophy of thought and language. Edited by Beaney Michael and Reck Erich H. New York: Routledge 2005.
Gottlob Frege. Critical assessments of leading philosophers. Vol. IV
Angelelli Ignacio. Studies in Gottlob Frege and traditional philosophy. Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1967.
Contents: 0. Introduction 1; 1. Ontology 9; 2. Semantics 37; 3. The so-called logical relations 92; 4. The traditional lack of distinction between UF [das
Fallen eines Einzelnen unter einen Begriff] and UO [the relation of subordination between two concepts] 107; 5. 'Merkmal-Eigenschaft' 138; 6. Function 150; 7.
The idea of levels ('Stufen') in the philosophical tradition 192; 8. 'Wertverlauf' 205; 9. Existence 224; 10. Number 231; 11. The main results of the present
investigation 252; Appendix 261; Bibliography 274; Index of names 287; Index of subjects 291.
From the Introduction: "The present work is not intended to be a presentation of or an introduction to Frege's doctrines (though it may be so in some
respects). It presupposes a general knowledge of Frege's main doctrines and terminology, as well as of the main recent discussions on Frege.
Fregean terminology or doctrines are explained only so far as is necessary for each single discussion. (For instance, from an explanatory point of view,
Frege's ideas on number should have been presented at the beginning, and not in the last chapter.)
As has been said, Frege's different aspects are distributed according to a hierarchy, in which his insight into number has the central place.
Nevertheless, in looking for an answer to our primary question, the method used has been analytical rather than synthetical; thereby, of course, the
deep unity of Frege's thought has continually been taken into account.
Some of the philosophically relevant aspects of Frege's philosophy have been, so to speak, isolated, and the general question of his significance in the
context of the philosophical tradition has been reiterated in reference to each single aspect. Thus the general question has split into a set of particular
investigations, which is reflected in the title of the present work.
(...)
Each one of these 'Studies on G. Frege and Traditional Philosophy' is intended to satisfy simultaneously, at least in some degree, the following three
conditions:
(1) that they be a critical discussion of some fragment of Frege's thought;
(2) that they be an application of Fregean doctrines to the philosophical past;
(3) that they be a study of some feature of the philosophical tradition which seems necessary for a better understanding of Frege's doctrines, and
this in two ways: (a) intrinsically (i.e., a Fregean doctrine is confusing or not easily intelligible unless it is situated in the whole context of Western
philosophy), (b) extrinsically (i.e., a Fregean doctrine, clear enough in itself, may be better appreciated in its full significance by comparing it with some
similar doctrine of the philosophical tradition)." pp. 2-4
Angelelli Ignacio, "On identity and interchangeability in Leibniz and Frege," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 8: 94-100 (1967).
Angelelli Ignacio. Friends and opponents of the substitutivity of identical in the history of logic. In Studien zu Frege / Studies on
Frege I - III. Edited by Schirn Matthias. Stuttgart: Fromman-Holzboog 1976. pp. 141-166
Vol. II
Angelelli Ignacio. Frege's notion of 'Bedeutung'. In Logic, methodology and philosophy of science Vol. VI. Proceedings of the Sixth
International Congress of logic, methodology and philosophy of science. Edited by Cohen Jonathan. Amsterdam: North-Holland 1982. pp. 735-754
Anscombe Gertrud Elisabeth, "Existence and truth," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88: 1-12 (1988).
Bar-Elli Gilead. The sense of reference. Intentionality in Frege. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1996.
Beaney Michael. Frege: making sense. London: Duckworth 1996.
Beaney Michael. The Frege reader. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1997.
Bell David. Frege's theory of judgement. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1979.
Bell David, "On the translation of Frege's "Bedeutung"," Analysis 60: 191-195 (1980).
Bell David, "Thoughts," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28: 36-50 (1987).
Burge Tyler, "Belief de re," The Journal of Philosophy 74: 338-362 (1977).
Burge Tyler, "Sinning against Frege," The Philosophical Review 88: 398-432 (1979).
Burge Tyler, "Frege on extensions of concepts, from 1884 to 1903," The Philosophical Review 93: 3-34 (1984).
Burge Tyler, "The concept of truth in Frege's program," Philosophia Naturalis 21: 507-512 (1984).
Burge Tyler. Frege on truth. In Frege Synthesized. Edited by Haaparanta Leila and Hintikka Jaakko. Dordrecht: Reidel 1986. pp.
97-154
From the General Introduction by Leila Haaparanta and Jaakko Hintikka: "In his paper, entitled 'Frege on Truth', Tyler Burge suggests that Frege's odd-sounding
conclusion about truth and falsity should be taken seriously. In the first section of his article he claims that too little attention has been paid to the
pragmatic basis of Frege's view that truth values are objects. According to Burge, Frege is committed to the doctrine that logic is primarily concerned with
the normative notion of truth. The second section of Burge's paper consists mainly of the criticism of Dummett's interpretation of Frege's theses on truth
values. In section III Burge purports to show how Frege's identification of the truth values with particular objects has its sources in 'some of his deepest
philosophical conceptions'. He holds the view that 'in particular, it proceeds from a theory about the nature of logical objects, from a thesis about the aim
and ordering of logic, and from his conceptions of assertion and truth.'" p. 6
Burge Tyler, "Frege on knowing the Third Realm," Mind 101: 633-650 (1992).
Carl Wolfgang. Frege's theory of sense and reference. Its origins and scope. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994.
Currie Gregory, "Frege on thoughts," Mind 89: 234-248 (1980).
Currie Gregory. Frege. An introduction to his philosophy. Sussex: The Harvester Press 1982.
Dejnozka Jan. The ontology of the analytic tradition and its origins. Realism and identity in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and
Quine. Lanham: Littlefield Adams Books 1996.
Paperback edition reprinted with corrections, 2002; reprinted with further corrections, 2003.
"While many books discuss the individual achievements of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine, few books consider how the thought of all four thinkers bears
on the fundamental questions of twentieth century philosophy. This book is about existence-identity connections in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine. The
thesis of the book is that there is a general form of ontology, modified realism, which these great analysts share not only with each other, but with most
great philosophers in the Western tradition. Modified realism is the view that in some sense there are both real identities and conceptual (or linguistic)
identities. In more familiar language, it is the view that there are both real distinctions and distinctions in reason (or in language). Thus in modified
realism, there are some real beings which can serve as a basis for accommodating possibly huge amounts of conceptual or linguistic relativity, or
objectual identities' 'shifting' as sortal concepts or sortal terms 'shift.' Therefore, on the fundamental level of ontology, the linguistic turn was not a
radical break from traditional substance theory. Dejnozka also holds that the conflict in all four analysts between private language arguments (which imply
various kinds of realism) and conceptual "shifting" (which suggests conceptual relativism) is best resolved by, and is in fact implicitly resolved by, their
respective kinds of modified realism. Frege and Russell, not Wittgenstein and Quine, emerge as the true analytic progenitors of 'no entity without identity,'
offering between them at least twenty-nine private language arguments and fifty-eight 'no entity without identity' theories."
Dejnozka Jan. Dummett's backward road to Frege and to Intuitionism. In The philosophy of Michael Dummett. Edited by Auxier Randall
E. La Salle: Open Court 2007. pp. 55-113
The Library of Living Philosophers.
Dummett Michael. Frege: philosophy of language. London: Duckworth 1973.
Second edition 1981
Dummett Michael, "Was Frege a philosopher of language?," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 33: 786-810 (1979).
Dummett Michael. The interpretation of Frege's philosophy. London: Duckworth 1981.
Dummett Michael. Frege: philosophy of mathematics. Harvard: Harvard University Press 1995.
Dummett Michael. Frege and other philosophers. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996.
Falkenberg Gabriel. Sinn, Bedeutung, Intensionalität: der Fregesche Weg. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1998.
Forgie William, "Kant and Frege: existence as a second level property," Kant Studien 91: 165-177 (2000).
Føllesdal Dagfinn. Husserl und Frege. Ein Beitrag zur Beleuchtung der Enstehung der phänomenologischen Philosophie. Oslo: Aschehoug
1958.
Translated in English as: Husserl and Frege: a contribution to elucidating the origins of phenomenological philosophy - in: Leila Haaparanta (ed.):
Mind, meaning, and mathematics. Essays on the philosophical views of Husserl and Frege - Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1994 pp. 3-50
Føllesdal Dagfinn. Bolzano, Frege and Husserl on reference and object. In Future pasts. The analytic tradition in twentieth century
philosophy. Edited by Floyd Juliet and Shieh Sanford. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001. pp. 67-80
Gabriel Gottfried, "Fregean connection: Bedeutung, value and truth-value," Philosophical Quarterly 34: 372-376 (1984).
Geach Peter Thomas and Anscombe Gertrud Elisabeth. Three philosophers. Oxford: Blackwell 1961.
Contents: Analytical Table of Contents VI-XX; G. E. M. Anscombe: Aristotle: the search for substance 1; P. T. Geach: Aquinas 65; P. T. Geach: Frege 127
Goldfard Warren. Frege's conception of logic. In Future pasts. The analytic tradition in twentieth century philosophy. Edited by
Floyd Juliet and Shieh Sanford. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001. pp. 25-42
Greimann Dirk. Freges Konzeption der Wahrheit. Hildesheim: Georg Olms 2003.
Grossmann Reinhardt, "Frege's ontology," The Philosophical Review 70: 23-40 (1961).
Grossmann Reinhardt. Reflections on Frege's philosophy. Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1969.
Guenthner Franz, "Comments on Hintikka's 'A Hundred years later'," Synthese 59: 51-58 (1984).
Haaparanta Leila. Frege's doctrine of Being. Helsinki: Acta Philosophica Fennica 1985.
Contents: Preface 3; A note on the textual references and the bibliography 5; I. Introduction 9; II. The interpretational framework 27; III. The origin of the
thesis concerning the ambiguity of the word 'Is' 47; IV. Identity and predication 59; V. Existence 128; VI. Concluding remarks 159; Bibliography 162; Index of
names 179.
"The purpose of this work is to clarify the philosophical basis of Frege's doctrine concerning the word 'is'. Frege's doctrine of being is partly considered in
its historical setting, formed mainly by Leibniz and Kant. Since the ambiguity thesis is one of the cornerstones of Frege's new logic, this work will, to some
extent, help to indicate how Frege arrived at his great logical innovation. I shall proceed by first presenting a short survey of the different approaches to
Frege's philosophy and thereafter outlining Frege's historical setting (Chapter II.1.). Then I shall present the main features of Frege's view of logic
(Chapter II.2.). After that, I shall say a few words of the history of the word 'being' in philosophical and philological literature and study Frege's texts
concerning the ambiguity doctrine (Chapter III). In Chapter IV there is a discussion on Frege's distinction between identity and predication with reference to
Leibniz's and Kant's thought and some remarks are also made on class-inclusion. In Chapter V there are comments on Frege's doctrine of existence with reference
to Kant's ideas. Finally, I shall make some concluding remarks on Frege in a wider historical context (Chapter VI). Chapter II will give the interpretational
framework for considering Frege's doctrine of being. Chapters IV and V are meant to show how this general hypothesis works in the textual material and thereby
to yield a detailed interpretation of Frege's view." pp. 16-17.
Haaparanta Leila. Frege on existence. In Frege Synthesized. Edited by Haaparanta Leila and Hintikka Jaakko. Dordrecht: Reidel 1986.
pp. 155-174
From the General Introduction by Leila Haaparanta and Jaakko Hintikka: "In her article 'Frege on Existence' Leila Haaparanta emphasizes that Frege's greatest
insight was the idea of first-order language, which, to a large extent, motivated the rest of his innovations. Haaparanta focuses her attention on Frege's
concept of existence, which receives special attention in Frege's thought in connection with the thesis concerning the ambiguity of such words for being as the
English 'is'. The ambiguity thesis was an important part of the Fregean paradigm of first-order logic. Haaparanta argues that Frege does not only assume the
word 'is' to be ambiguous but that he considers 'exists', or the 'is' of existence, to be an equivocal word. She suggests that the equivocity view has a
metaphysical and epistemological background in Frege's thought. Her paper thus pushes a great deal further the suggestions of Jaakko Hintikka mentioned earlier
in this Introduction." p. 6
Haaparanta Leila. On Frege's concept of Being. In The logic of Being. Historical studies. Edited by Hintikka Jaakko and Knuttila
Simo. Dodrecht: Reidel Publishing Company 1986. pp. 269-289
Haaparanta Leila, "Existence and propositional attitudes: a Fregean analysis," Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 4: 75-86
(2001).
Hale Bob, "Frege's platonism," The Philosophical Quarterly 34: 224-241 (1984).
Hill Claire Ortiz. Word and object in Husserl, Frege, and Russell. The roots of twentieth-century philosophy. Athens, Ohio: Ohio
University Press 1991.
Reprinted 2001.
From the Introduction: "As a book by the founder of phenomenology that examines Frege's ideas from Brentano's empirical standpoint, Husserl's Philosophy of
Arithmetic is both an early work of phenomenology and of logical empiricism. In it Husserl predicted the failure of Frege's attempt to logicize arithmetic
and to mathematize logic two years before the publication of the Basic Laws of Arithmetic in 1893. I hope to show that Husserl did so in terms that
would prefigure both the account Frege would give of his error after Russell encountered the paradoxes ten years later and the discussions of Principia
Mathematica. Moreover, in locating the source of Frege's difficulties in the ambiguous theory of identity, meaning, and denotation that forms the basis of
Frege's logical project and generates Russell's contradictions, Husserl's discussions indicate that these contradictions may have as serious consequences for
twentieth century philosophy of language as they have had for the philosophy of mathematics.
This book is about these Austro-German roots of twentieth century philosophy. It is mainly about the origins of analytic philosophy, about the transmission of
Frege's thought to the English speaking world, and about the relevance of Husserl's early criticism of Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic to some
contemporary issues in philosophy. It is more about Husserl the philosopher of logic and mathematics than it is about Husserl the phenomenologist, and it is
principally addressed to those members of the philosophical community who, via Russell, have been affected by Frege's logic.
This makes it very different from work on Husserl and Frege that has focused on the importance of Frege's criticism of Husserl's Philosophy of
Arithmetic and attendant issues. The goal of this book is quite the opposite. It studies the shortcomings in Frege's thought that Husserl flagged and
Russell endeavored to overcome. One possible sequel to this book would be a thorough study of Husserl's successes and failures in remedying the philosophical
ills he perceived all about him, but that goes beyond the scope of this work, which follows the issues discussed into the work of Russell and his successors."
(pp. 3-4)
Contents: Abbreviations IX; Preliminary terminological comments XI; Glossary XIII; Acknowledgments XIV; Introduction 1.
Part One: Logic, realism and the foundations of arithmetic
1. The argument that Frege influenced Husserl 7; 2. Husserl, Frege, and psychologism 13; 3. Sense, meaning, and noema; 4. Husserl's 1891 critique of Frege 43;
5. Frege's review and the development of Husserl's thought 57; Conclusion: analiticity 91.
Part Two: Conceptual clarity
Introduction 99; 6. Intensions and extensions 103; 7. Presentation and ideas 125; 8. Function and concept 137; 9. On denoting 147; Conclusion: The way
things are 163; Notes 175; Bibliography 191; Index 215.
Hill Claire Ortiz and Rosado Haddock Guillermo. Husserl or Frege?: meaning, objectivity, and mathematics. Chicago: Open Court 2000.
Hintikka Jaakko, "Frege's hidden semantics," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 33: 716-722 (1979).
Hintikka Jaakko. Semantics: a revolt against Frege. In Contemporary philosophy. Vol. I. Edited by Floistad Guttorm. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff 1981. pp. 57-82
Hintikka Jaakko, "A hundred years later: the rise and fall of Frege's influence in language theory," Synthese 59: 27-50 (1984).
Holenstein Elmar. The meaning of "Bedeutung" in Frege. A philological inquiry. In History of semiotics. Edited by Eschbach Achim
and Trabant Jürgen. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company 1983. pp. 311-321
Imbert Claude. Phénoménologies et langues formulaires. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1992.
Kemp Gary, "Truth in Frege's 'Law of Truth'," Synthese 105: 31-51 (1995).
Kenny Anthony. Frege. An introduction to the founder of modern analytic philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell 2000.
Kleemeier Ulrike. Gottlob Frege: Kontext-Prinzip und Ontologie. Freiburg: Verlag K. Alber 1997.
Klement Kevin. Frege and the logic of sense and reference. London: Routledge 2002.
Klemke Elmer D., "Frege's philosophy of logic," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 33: 666-693 (1979).
Kluge Eike-Henner W., "Frege, Leibniz et alii," Studia Leibnitiana 9: 266-274 (1977).
Kluge Eike-Henner W., "Bolzano and Frege: some conceptual parallels," Grazer Philosophische Studien 10: 21-42 (1980).
Kluge Eike-Henner W. The metaphysics of Gottlob Frege. An essay in ontological reconstruction. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 1980.
Kluge Eike-Henner W., "Frege, Leibniz and the notion of an ideal language," Studia Leibnitiana 12: 140-154 (1980).
Kremer Michael, "Judgment and truth in Frege," Journal of the History of Philosophy 38: 549-581 (2000).
Kutscher Franz von. Gottlob Frege: eine Einführung in sein Werk. Berlin : Walter de Gruyter 1989.
Largeault Jean. Logique et philosophie chez Frege. Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts 1970.
Levine James, "Logic and truth in Frege," Aristotelian Society.Supplementary volume 70: 141-175 (1996).
Long P. and White R., "On the translation of Frege's Bedeutung: a reply to Bell," Analysis 40: 196-202 (1980).
Makin Gideon. The metaphysicians of meaning: Russell and Frege on sense and denotation. London: Routledge 2000.
Mendelsohn Richard, "Frege's two senses of 'Is'," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28: 139-160 (1987).
Mendelsohn Richard. The philosophy of Gottlob Frege. New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Mohanty Jitendra Nath, "Husserl and Frege: a new look at their relationship," Research in Phenomenology 4: 51-62 (1974).
Reprinted in: J. N. Mohanty (ed.) - Readings on Husserl's Logical Investigations - The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1977 pp. 22-32.
Mohanty Jitendra Nath. Husserl and Frege. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1982.
Noonan Harold W. Frege: a critical introduction. Oxford: Blackwell 2001.
Parsons Terence. Fregean theories of truth and meaning. In Frege: importance and legacy. Edited by Schirn Matthias. Berlin: Walter
de Gruyter 1996. pp. 371-409
Picardi Eva. La chinica dei concetti. Linguaggio, logica, psicologia 1879-1927. Bologna: Il Mulino 1994.
Picardi Eva, "Sigwart, Husserl and Frege on truth and logic, or is psychologism still a threat?," Eureopean Journal of Philosophy
5: 162-182 (1997).
Resnik Michael, "The context-principle in Frege's philosophy," Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 27: 356-365 (1967).
Ricketts Thomas, "Logic and truth in Frege," Aristotelian Society.Supplementary volume 70: 121-140 (1996).
Rieger Adam, "Paradox without Basic Law V: a problem with Frege's ontology," Analysis 62: 327-330 (2002).
Rosado Haddock Guillermo and Piedras Rio, "Remarks on sense and reference in Frege and Husserl," Kant Studien 73: 425-439 (1982).
Rosado Haddock Guillermo, "On Frege's two notions of sense," History and Philosophy of Logic 7: 31-41 (1986).
"Frege had not one but two different notions of sense, namely, that of 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung' and one implicit in a letter to Husserl of 1906 and elsewhere.
This last one originates in Frege's notion of conceptual content. The distinction is used to clarify some obscurities in Frege's thought. In the last section a
sort of 'explicans' of Frege's notion of conceptual content is introduced and applied to the semantic analysis of mathematics."
Rosado Haddock Guillermo. A critical introduction to the philosophy of Gottlob Frege. Aldershot: Ashgate 2006.
Sainsbury Richard Mark. Departing from Frege: essays in the philosophy of language. London: Routledge 2002.
Salmon Nathan. Frege's Puzzle. Cambridge: MIT Press 1991.
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Sluga Hans, "Frege and the rise of analytic philosophy," Inquiry 18: 471-487 (1976).
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Sommers Fred. Frege or Leibniz? In Studies on Frege. Logic and semantics. Edited by Schirn Matthias. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt:
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Volume III
Stevenson Leslie, "Frege's two definitions of quantification," The Philosophical Quarterly 23: 207-223 (1973).
Thiel Christian. Sense and reference in Frege's logic. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company 1968.
Tichy Pavel. The foundations of Frege's logic. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1988.
Tugendhat Ernst, "The meaning of Bedeutung in Frege," Analysis 30: 177-189 (1970).
Van Heijenoort Jean, "Sense in Frege," Journal of Philosophical Logic 6: 93-102 (1977).
Reprinted in: J. Van Heijenoort - Selected essays - Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1985, pp. 55-63
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Weiner Joan. Frege in perspective. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1991.
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