The most complete bibliography is: ;Edmund Husserl. Bibliography - Compiled by Steven Spileers - Dordrecht - Kluwer 1999, VI + 450 pages.
From the General Introduction: "This bibliography contains the publications of Husserl and the main secondary literature on Husserl, from Husserl's earliest publication (1887) till today (1997), As the collection of material was concluded in June 1997, the list of publications for the year 1997 if of course incomplete.
In this bibliography publications in the following languages have been included: German, English, French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch - for both primary and secondary literature. Since this bibliography has been base primarily on the consultation of the included documents (and not restricted to copying already existing bibliographies), it was not possible to include publications in languages other than those mentioned."
TABLE OF CONTENTS: General Introduction 1; Bibliographies (in chronological order ) 9; Husserliana (Gesammelte Werke) 12; Husserliana-Dokumente III (Briefwechsel) 14; 1 Edited volumes [1-513] 15; 2 Works of Husserl; 2.1 German texts [514-707] 48; 2.2 English translations [708-786] 62; 2.3 French translations [787-872] 68; 2.4 Italian translations [873-923] 75; 2.5 Spanish translations [924-959] 78; 2.6 Portuguese translations [960-965] 81; 2.7 Dutch translations [966-967] 82; 2.8 Texts published by other authors
in the Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung [968-1005] 82; 3 Secondary literature; 3.1 Secondary literature in German [1006-2345] 84; 3.2 Secondary literature in English [2346-4668] 154; 3.3 Secondary literature in French [4669-5433] 266; 3.4 Secondary literature in Italian [5434-6341] 303; 3.5 Secondary literature in Spanish [6342-6959] 344; 3.6 Secondary literature in Portuguese [6960-7067] 374; 3.7 Secondary literature in Dutch [7068-7184] 379; Index of names 386; Index of
words 392; Index of keywords 396; Index of Husserl editors 409; Index of Husserl translators 410; Index of editors 412; Index of authors 418; Glossary (German-English) 445.
The phenomenology of Husserl. Selected critical readings. Edited
by Elveton Roy O. Chicago: Quadrangle Books 1970.
Second edition with a new introduction: Seattle, Noesis Press, 2000.
Husserl: expositions and appraisals. Edited by Elliston Frederick
A. and McCormick Peter. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1977.
Readings on Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations. Edited by
Mohanty Jitendra Nath. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1977.
Husserl, intentionality, and cognitive science. Edited by Dreyfus
Hubert L. Cambridge: The MIT Press 1982.
Parts and moments. Studies in logic and formal ontology. Edited
by Smith Barry. München: Philosophia Verlag 1982.
Husserl's phenomenology. A textbook. Edited by Mohanty Jitendra
Nath and McKenna William. Pittsburgh: University Press of America 1989.
Phenomenology and the formal sciences. Edited by Seebohm Thomas,
Föllesdall Dagfinn, and Mohanty Jitendra Nath. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers 1991.
Mind, meaning, and mathematics. Essays on the philosophical views of
Husserl and Frege. Edited by Haaparanta Leila. Dordrecht : Kluwer 1994.
The Cambridge Companion to Husserl. Edited by Smith Barry and
Smith David Woodruff. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Phénomenologie et logique. Edited by Courtine Jean-François.
Paris: Presses de l'Ecole normale supérieure 1996.
Husserl-Frege. Les ambiguïtés de l'antipsychologisme. Edited by
Brisart Robert. Paris: Vrin 2002.
"Chacune des études rasssemblées ici se propose de jeter sur les rapports de
Husserl et de Frege un regard neuf et surtout exempt des nombreux préjugés
qui, jusqu'ici, ont detérminé les diverses «lectures frégéennes de la
phénoménologie». En pointant les différences profondes qui, sous le couvert
de quelques similitudes de surface, ont en fait, et de très bonne heure,
orienté les deux philosophes sur des voies radicalement opposées, ce recueil
permet de se faire une idée plus claire de ce que fut en réalité
l'antipsychologisme de Husserl dans tout ce qui le sépare de la version
logiciste que lui a donné Frege. De cette manière, il concours également à
apporter quelques éclairages nouveaux sur la question des origines de la
philosophie contemporaine."
One hundred years of phenomenology: Husserl's Logical Investigations
revisited. Edited by Zahavi Dan and Stjernfelt Frederik. Dodrecht:
Kluwer 2002.
Aux origines de la phénoménologie. Husserl et le contexte des
Recherches Logiques. Edited by Fisette Denis and Lapointe Sandra. Paris:
Vrin 2003.
"Douze étude ont été réunies dans ce volume afin de souligner le centenaire
de la publication de l'ouvrage séminal de la phénoménologie. Fidèles à la
vocation que lui assigne le père de la phénoménologie d'être une œuvre de
percée, ces études ouvrent de nouvelles perspectives sur ce monumental
Grundwerk. Elles se penchent sur les différents aspects des
Recherches logiques en portant une attention particulière à son contexte
historique, à ses sources (bolzaniennes et brentaniennes) dans la
philosophie du XIXe siècle et à sa réception, du Cercle de Munich jusque
dans la philosophie britannique."
Husserl's Logical Investigations. Edited by Dahlstrom Daniel O.
Dodrecht: Kuwer Academic Publishers 2003.
Husserl. La représentation vide suivi de Les "Recherches logiques",
une oeuvre de percée. Edited by Benoist Jocelyn and Courtine
Jean-François. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2003.
Edmund Husserl. Critical assessments of leading philosophers.
Edited by Bernet Rudolf, Welton Donn, and Zavota Gina. New York: Routledge
2005.
Five volumes: 1. Circumspections: classic essays on Husserl's phenomenology;
2. The cutting edge: phenomenological method, philosophical logic, ontology,
and philosophy of science; 3. The nexus pf phenomena: intentionality,
perception, and temporality; 4. The web of meaning: language, noema, and
subjectivity and intersubjectivity; 5. Horizons: life-world, ethnics,
history, and metaphysics.
Husserl-Frege. Les ambiguïtés de l'antipsychologisme. Edited by
Brisart Robert. Paris: Vrin 2005.
"Chacune des études rasssemblées ici se propose de jeter sur les rapports de
Husserl et de Frege un regard neuf et surtout exempt des nombreux préjugés
qui, jusqu'ici, ont detérminé les diverses «lectures frégéennes de la
phénoménologie». En pointant les différences profondes qui, sous le couvert
de quelques similitudes de surface, ont en fait, et de très bonne heure,
orienté les deux philosophes sur des voies radicalement opposées, ce recueil
permet de se faire une idée plus claire de ce que fut en réalité
l'antipsychologisme de Husserl dans tout ce qui le sépare de la version
logiciste que lui a donné Frege. De cette manière, il concours également à
apporter quelques éclairages nouveaux sur la question des origines de la
philosophie contemporaine."
Albertazzi Liliana. Material and formal ontology. In Formal ontology.
Edited by Poli Roberto and Simons Peter. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1996. pp. 199-232
Ales Bello Angela. Le problème de l'être dans la phénomenologie de
Husserl. In The great chain of being and Italian phenomenology.
Edited by Ales Bello Angela. Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1981. pp. 41-50
Angelelli Ignacio, "Husserl-Frege: filosofia del numero," Analisis
Filosofico 9: 139-145 (1989).
"After pointing out some of the coincidence between Frege and Husserl about
the philosophy of numbers and paying less attention to the subject of
psychologism, in order to understand the differences between the authors,
the analysis that each one made on the nature of number are described,
showing the most evident divergencies. Immediately afterwards, three
objections are examined regarding Husserl's position and a crucial criticism
is formulated against Frege's method, related to the one discussed by
Husserl. Lastly, it is assumed that it is possible to offer a method of
analysis that gathers together the most important aspects of both authors
points of view and leaving out the most noticeable defects."
Aquila Richard, "Husserl and Frege on meaning," Journal of the
History of Philosophy 12: 377-383 (1974).
Bachelard Suzanne. A study of Husserl's "Formal and transcendental
logic". Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press 1968.
Translation by Lester E. Embree from the original French edition: La
logique de Husserl. Étude sur "Logique formelle et trascendentale" -
Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1957.
First paperback edition 1989.
Balaban Oded. Epoché: Meaning, object, and existence in
Husserl's phenomenology. In Phenomenology world-wide: foundations,
expanding dynamisms, life-engagements. A guide for research and study.
Edited by Tymieniecka Anna-Teresa. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002. pp. 103-114
Banchetti-Robino Marina, "Husserl's theory of language as Calculus
Ratiocinator," Synthese 112: 303-321 (1997).
Abstract: "This paper defends an interpretation of Husserl's theory of
language, specifically as it appears in the Logical Investigations, as an
example of a larger body of theories dubbed 'language as calculus'. Although
this particular interpretation has been previously defended by other
authors, such as Hintikka and Kusch, this paper proposes to contribute to
the discussion by arguing that what makes this interpretation plausible are
Husserl's distinction between the notions of meaning-intention and
meaning-fulfillment, his view that meaning is instantiated through
meaning-intending acts of transcendental consciousness, and his view that
the content of meaning-intending acts is ideal meaning simpliciter. As well,
the paper argues that the phenomenological method of reduction itself
presupposes the notion that reality as such can be reached by subtracting
the influence of the language of the natural attitude and its ontological
commitments and it, thus, presupposes the conception of language as a
reinterpretable calculus."
Bar-Hillel Yehoshua, "Husserl's conception of a purely logical grammar,"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 17: 362-369 (1956).
Reprinted in: Aspects of language. Essays and lectures on philosophy of
language, linguistic philosophy and methodology of linguistics - Jerusalem -
The Magnes Press - The Hebrew University, 1970 pp.89-97.
Reprinted also in: Jitendra Nath Mohanty - Readings on Husserl's Logical
Investigations - The Hague - Martinus Nijhoff 1977 pp. 128-137.
Bell David, "A Brentanian philosophy of arithmetics," Brentano
Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 2: 139-144
(1989).
The aim of this paper is to identify the main respects in which Husserl's
early philosophy, and in particular his early writings on the foundation of
arithmetic, were influenced by Brentano's thought. It is claimed that the
doctrinal, conceptual and methodological perspective within which Husserl's
Philosophy of Arithmetic is conceived and executed (but which remains
very largely suppressed in Husserl's texts) is that which he inherited, more
or less without modification, from Brentano in the period to which
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, The Origin of our Knowledge
of Right and Wrong, and the lectures on Descriptive Psychology
belong. That influence was extensive and profound enough to warrant calling
Husserl's philosophy of arithmetic 'Brentanian'."
Bell David. Husserl. New York: Routledge 1991.
Benoist Jocelyn, "La découverte de l'a priori synthétique matériel:
au-delà du "quelque chose", le tout et les parties (Recherches Logiques
III).," Recherches Husserliennes 3: 3-22 (1995).
Benoist Jocelyn. Les Recherches logiques de Husserl: Le
catégorial, entre grammaire et intuition. In Phénomenologie et logique.
Edited by Courtine Jean-François. Paris: Presses de l'École normale
supérieure 1996. pp. 33-63
Benoist Jocelyn, "De Kant à Bolzano: Husserl et l'analyticité," Revue
de Métaphysique et de Morale 100: 217-238 (1997).
"In his Logical Investigations, Husserl uses a concept of
"analyticity" that seems quite different from the Kantian one. Analyticity
is defined as formal and by the possibility of regular variations, so as in
mathematical equations which determine relations between variables. In that
matter, Husserl is influenced by Bolzano and is much deeply connected with
the Austrian tradition of logical studies than with the transcendental
tradition of the German Idealism. But he deals also with the problem that
Bolzano left unsolved: if analyticity in the "strict" sense means the
logical rule, what does "logical" mean?"
Benoist Jocelyn. Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie. Husserl et la
tradition logique autrichienne. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France
1997.
Benoist Jocelyn, "Y a-t-il une "logique de l'expérience"? Remarques sur
le contrat phénoménologique dans les Recherches logiques,"
Recherches Husserliennes 12: 47-76 (1999).
Benoist Jocelyn, "Husserl entre Brentano et Bolzano: jugement et
proposition," Manuscrito 23: 11-39 (2000).
Benoist Jocelyn. Intentionnalité et langage dans les "Recherches
logiques" de Husserl. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2001.
Benoist Jocelyn. Husserl and Bolzano. In Phenomenology world-wide:
foundations, expanding dynamisms, life-engagements. A guide for research and
study. Edited by Tymieniecka Anna-Teresa. Dodrecht: Kluwer 2002. pp.
98-100
Benoist Jocelyn. The question of grammar in Logical Investigations,
with special reference to Brentano, Marty, Bolzano and later developments in
logic. In Phenomenology world-wide. Foundations -- Expanding dynamics --
Life-engagements. Edited by Tymieniecka Anna-Teresa. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers 2002. pp. 94-98
Bergmann Gustav, "The ontology of Edmund Husserl," Methodos:
359-392 (1960).
Bernet Rudolf, "Logik und Phenomenologie in Husserls Lehre von der
Warheit," Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 43: 35-89 (1981).
Bernet Rudolf, "Husserl and Heidegger on intentionality and being,"
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 21: 136-152 (1990).
Bernet Rudolf, Kern Iso, and Marbach Eduard. An introduction to
Husserlian phenomenology.1993.
Original German edition: Edmund Husserl: Darstellung seines Denkens -
Hambyrg, Felix Meiner, 1989.
Bernet Rudolf. Different concepts of logic and their relation to
subjectivity. In One hundred years of phenomenology: Husserl's Logical
Investigations revisited. Edited by Zahavi Dan and Stjernfelt Frederik.
Dodrecht: Kluwer 2002. pp. 19-29
Beyer Christian. Von Bolzano zu Husserl: eine Untersuchung über den
Ursprung der phänomenologischen Bedeutungslehre. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1996.
Beyer Christian. Bolzano and Husserl on singular existential statements.
In Phenomenology and analysis. Essays on Central European philosophy.
Edited by Chrudzimski Arkadiusz and Huemer Wolfgang. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag
2004. pp. 69-88
Bégout Bruce. La généalogie de la logique. Husserl, l'antéprédicatif
et le catégorial. Paris: Vrin 2000.
"Si le concept husserlien de passivité a fasciné toute une génération de
philosophes (Merleau-Ponty, Landgrebe, Levinas, Henry), il a rarement fait
l'objet d'une étude qui adopte la perspective du fondateur de la
phénoménologie. Husserl considère que la passivité appartient sans reste à
la sphère de la constitution et qu'elle consolide par conséquent son
transcendantalisme. Loin d'être un domaine de sens irréductible à la
rationalité, elle représente même le fondement des opérations de la pensée
catégoriale. C'est en son sein que doivent être cherchées les "sources" des
formes supérieures de la logique. Toute passive et préconsciente qu'elle
soit, l'expérience antéprédicative appartient donc pour Husserl au sujet
transcendantal.
Ce travail s'attache ainsi à montrer que la genèse du catégorial à partir de
l'expérience passive entre dans le projet général de Husserl d'asseoir la
phénoménologie sur le socle originaire de l'expérience du monde."
Bégout Bruce, "La réverbération logique: la phénoménologie des
"Prolégomènes à la logique pure" de Husserl," Revue Philosophique de
Louvain 99: 564-592 (2001).
Blecksmith Richard and Null Gilbert T., "Matrix representation of
Husserl's part-whole-foundation theory," Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic 32: 87-111 (1990).
"This paper pursues two aims, a general one and a more specific one. The
general aim is to introduce and illustrate the use of Boolean matrices in
representing the logical properties of one- and (mainly) two-place
predicates over small finite universes, and hence of providing matrix
characterizations of finite models for sets of axioms containing such
predicates.
This method is treated only to the extent required to pursue the more
specific aim, which is to consider axiomatic systems involving the
part-whole relation together with a relation of foundation employed by
Husserl."
Bosio Franco. Fondazione della logica in Husserl. Milano:
Lampugnani Nigri 1966.
Brisart Robert, "Husserl et Bolzano: le lien sémantique," Recherches
Husserliennes 18: 3-29 (2002).
Brisart Robert, "La logique de Husserl en 1900 à l'épreuve marbourgeois:
la recension de Natorp," Phänomenologische Forschungen: 183-204
(2002).
Brown Charles S., "Problems with the Fregean interpretation of Husserl,"
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 22: 53-64 (1991).
Bucci Paolo. Husserl e Bolzano. Alle origini della fenomenologia.
Milano: Edizioni Unicopli 2000.
Buonazia Sabrina, "Per una formalizzazione della teoria husserliana
dell'intero e della parte," Rivista di Filosofia 87: 287-313 (1996).
Bussotti Paolo, "Alcune note sulla gnoseologia husserliana della
"Philosophie der Arithmetik", con particolare riferimento al concetto di
numero," Teoria 17: 119-133 (1997).
Cairns Dorion. Guide for translating Husserl. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff 1973.
Cairns Dorion. Conversations with Husserl and Fink. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff 1976.
Cairns Dorion, "The fundamental philosophical significance of Husserl's
Logische Untersuchungen," Husserl Studies 18: 41-49 (2002).
Caputo Anselmo, "Gli "Studi psicologici per una logica elementare" di
Husserl," Aquinas 43: 31-62 (2000).
Casadio Claudia, "Husserl e il pradigma mereologico," Lingua e Stile
25: 405-423 (1990).
Casari Ettore, "On Husserl's theory of wholes and parts," History and
Philosophy of Logic 21: 1-43 (2005).
"The strongly innovative theory of whole-parts relations outlined by Husserl
in his Third logical Investigation-to which he attributed a basic
value for his entire phenomenology-has recently attracted a renewed
interest. Although many important issues have been clarified (especially by
Kit Fine) the subject seems still worth being revisited. To this aim
Husserlian universes are introduced. These are lower bounded
distributive lattices endowed with a unary operation of defect and a
binary relation of isogeneity. Husserl"s contents are identified with
nonzero elements of a Husserlian universe and the dependence
relations among contents are defined and studied starting from the idea
that the defect of x is what x needs in order to "exist" i.e.,
in order to be "closed" with respect to the closure operation defined as the
sup of x and its defect. It turns out that there are (at least) eight
dependence relations which are worth to be considered. Many other questions
concerning the world of contents (among them the proofs of the famous
Husserl"s Satze) may now be discussed and clarified. Then the theory of
species and genera is developed. Ultimate species (for short: species)
are identified with equivalence classes of contents modulo isogeneity,
and species in general (for short: genera) are identified with
arbitrary unions of species. On the basis of the relation obtaining
among two contents when they are isogeneous to two contents the first of
which is a part of the second it becomes possible to develop a rather
satisfying interpretation of Husserl"s theory of the dependencies among
species and genera and of the material a priori laws. By strengthening
the notion of Husserlian universe into the notion of rigid Husserlian
universe, the theory of species and genera obtains a stronger version.
Three models of the theory are exhibited. The first one, suggested by
combinatorial-topological considerations, identifies contents with finite
non-empty sets of natural numbers ; the second one identifies contents with
non-empty sets of formulas of a formal language; the third one (not totally
"rigid") identifies contents with positive integers."
Cavallin Jens. Content and object. Husserl, Twardowski and
psychologism. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1997.
See in particular: Chapter 3. Husserl and Twardowski: a philosophical
encounter pp. 21-42
Appendix I: References to Twardowski in Husserl's published works 241
Appendix III: Kazimierz Twardowski's Nachlass 243-248.
Celis Raphael, "Le problème de la mathématisation du savoir dans
l'oeuvre tardive de Husserl," Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie
128: 1-24 (1996).
"The distinction established by Husserl in 1913 between formal and material
ontology constitutes the theoretical basis needed in phenomenology to
mathematize knowledge, and physics in particular. In "The Crisis of European
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology", this distinction appears as a
subwork in the sections concerned with Galileo and the birth of modern
physics. Through its reformulation. Husserl tried to imagine the
foundational range of an eidetic interpretation of nature as entrenched in
the "Lebenswelt"."
Cobb-Stevens Richard. Husserl and analytic philosophy. Dordrecht:
Kluwer 1990.
Cobb-Stevens Richard, "Two stages in Husserl's critique of Brentano's
theory of judgment," Études Phénomenologiques 14 (27-28): 193-212
(1998).
Cobb-Stevens Richard. "Aristotelian" themes in Husserl's Logical
Investigations. In One hundred years of phenomenology: Husserl's
Logical Investigations revisited. Edited by Zahavi Dan and Stjernfelt
Frederik. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002. pp. 79-92
Cortois Paul, "From apophantics to manifolds: the structure of Husserl's
formal logic," Philosophia Scientiae 1: 15-50 (1996).
"A global picture of Husserl's architectonic view of the structure of formal
science (including formal mathematics) is offered, as the view got its
fullest (yet elliptic) articulation in the first three chapters of
Formale und transzendentale Logik (1929). It is shown how Husserl's
understanding of the structure of formal science (abstracting from the
latter's subjective foundation) requires the independent consideration of at
least three dimensions with respect to the formal, in terms, respectively,
of 'approaches', epistemic 'interests', and 'successive layers'. First,
there is the dimension of apophantic versus ontological approaches; second,
the distinction of combinatorial (syntactic) versus truth (semantic)
interest; and third, the consideration of the three layers of pure grammar,
derivability relations, and systems or manifold theory. Moreover, it is
shown how, in Husserl's view, the virtual identity of apophantic and
ontological approaches on the top layer (deductive systems and/or manifolds)
is supposed to give a kind of technical (if not philosophical) warrant for
the unity of formal science."
Courtine Jean-François. L'objet de la logique. In Phénomenologie et
logique. Edited by Courtine Jean-François. Paris: Presses de l'Ecole
normale supérieure 1996. pp. 9-31
Crosson Frederick J., "Formal logic and formal ontology in Husserl's
phenomenology," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 3: 259-269 (1962).
Crosson Frederick James, "Formal logic and formal ontology in Husserl's
phenomenology," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 3: 259-269 (1962).
Cunningham Suzanne. Language and the phenomenological reductions of
Edmund Husserl. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1976.
Da Silva Jairo José, "Husserl conception of logic," Manuscrito
22: 367-397 (1999).
"This paper presents and discusses Husserl's conception of logic, formal
logic in particular. A special emphasis is giving to Husserl's idea of a
theory of manifolds as the closure of the thematic field of formal logic.
Husserl's own version of logicism in the philosophy of mathematics is also
presented and some aspects of his conception of formal logic are highlighted
and contrasted with Frege's."
Da Silva Jairo José, "Husserl's two notions of completeness. Husserl and
Hilbert on completeness and imaginary elements in mathematics," Synthese
125: 417-438 (2000).
"In this paper I discuss Husserl's solution of the problem of imaginary
elements in mathematics as presented in the drafts for two lectures he gave
in Gottingen in 1901 and other related texts of the same period, a problem
that had occupied Husserl since the beginning of 1890, when he was planning
a never published sequel to "Philosophie der Arithmetik" (1891).
In order to solve the problem of imaginary entities Husserl introduced,
independently of Hilbert, two notions of completeness (definiteness in
Husserl's terminology) for a formal axiomatic system. I present and discuss
these notions here, establishing also parallels between Husserl's and
Hilbert's notions of completeness."
De Oliveira Nythamar Fernandes, "Husserl's phenomenology of meaning in
the "Logical Investigations"," Veritas 45: 117-134 (2000).
"This article seeks to show that, although emerging out of a so-called
traditional, metaphysical view of language, Edmund Husserl's theory of
meaning qua ideal species in the "Logical Investigations" cannot be reduced
to the linguistic expression of an essentialist, representational
adequation, but rather emphasizes the role of intentionality, the ideality
of language, and the constitutive character of consciousness in the
fulfillment of "meaning" ("Bedeutung")."
Dermot Moran, "Husserl's critique of Brentano in the Logical
Investigations," Manuscrito 23: 163-205 (2000).
Dougherty Charles J., "The significance of Husserl's Logical
Investigations," Philosophy Today 23: 217-225 (1979).
"The purpose of this paper is to explore Husserl's critique of psychologism
and his positive theory of mind against both its historical background and
the developments that issued from it. The conclusion of the paper is the
claim that Husserl's rejection of psychologism led him to ground logic in a
realm of ideal relationships made available by way of a new method of
non-reductive analysis, phenomenology. Phenomenological analysis itself is
shown to be a methodological expression of a theory of mind as an active
participant in the constitution of reality."
Drummond John, "From intentionality to intensionality and back,"
Études Phénomenologiques 27-28: 89-126 (1998).
Drummond John. The Logical Investigations: Paving the way to a
transcendental logic. In One hundred years of phenomenology: Husserl's
Logical Investigations revisited. Edited by Zahavi Dan and Stjernfelt
Frederik. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002. pp. 31-40
Drummond John J. Willard and Husserl on logical form. In
Phenomenology and the formal sciences. Edited by Seebohm Thomas,
Föllesdall Dagfinn, and Mohanty Jitendra Nath. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers 1991. pp.
Ducat Philippe. Que veut la "grammaire purement logique" de Husserl? In
Phénomenologie et logique. Edited by Courtine Jean-François. Paris:
Presses de l'École normale supérieure 1996. pp. 65-81
Dupré Louis, "The concept of truth in Husserl's Logical
Investigations," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24:
345-354 (1964).
"It is stated that Husserl's theory of truth is ambiguous. when Husserl
attacked psychological interpretations of truth, a logicism seemed to be
predominant; later he inclined toward intuitionism, where truth is
constituted by the real presence of the object. Purely logical relations in
an eternal order of truth, independent of things, seems to conflict with the
idea of evidence, which is a psychological experience. It is concluded that
truth is the result of an intuition in which the thing itself is given.
Finally, parallels are drawn between Husserl's double truth and Leibniz's
truths of reason and truths of fact."
Edie James M. Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. A critical commentary.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1987.
Eley Lothar. Metatrik der formalen Logik. Sinnliche Gewissheit als
Horizont der Aussagenlogik und elementaren Prädikatenlogik. The Hague :
Martinus Nijhoff 1969.
English Jacques. Husserl et Hilbert: La phénoménologie est-elle
axiomatisable? In Phénomenologie et logique. Edited by Courtine
Jean-François. Paris: Presses de l'École normale supérieure 1996. pp. 83-107
English Jacques, "Pourquoi et comment Husserl en est venu à critiquer
Brentano," Études Phénomenologiques 14 (27-28): 51-88 (1998).
English Jacques. Le vocabulaire de Husserl. Paris: Ellipses 2002.
Farber Marvin. The foundations of phenomenology. Edmund Husserl and
the quest for a rigorous science of philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press 1943.
Reprinted with a new introduction, Albany, State University of New York
Press, 1968.
Reprint of the 1968 edition: Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2006.
Fine Kit. Part-Whole. In The Cambridge Companion to Husserl.
Edited by Smith Barry and Smith David Woodruff. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1995. pp. 463-485
Fisette Denis. Lecture frégéenne de la phénoménologie. Combas:
Éclat 1994.
Flores Luis. Husserl's concept of pure logical grammar. In
Phenomenology world-wide: foundations, expanding dynamisms,
life-engagements. A guide for research and study. Edited by Tymieniecka
Anna-Teresa. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002. pp. 100-103
Föllesdall Dagfinn. An introduction to phenomenology for analytic
philosophers. In Contemporary philosophy in Scandinavia. Edited by
Paul Anthony, Olson Raymond, and Wright Georg Henrik von. Baltimore, London:
The John Hopkins Press 1972. pp. 417-429
"Phenomenology is a science of noemata.
An object, for Husserl, is anything toward which an act can be directed. Not
all objects are material; there are also immaterial objects, for example,
numbers and the other ideal objects of mathematics.
Mathematics and all natural sciences, including psychology, are sciences
about the objects of our acts. But we have just noticed that in addition to
possibly having an object, every act also has a noema. And what Husserl
wanted to create with his phenomenology was a new science, a science of
noemata.
Noemata are objects, too. In an act of reflection the noema of one act can
be made the object of another act.
Mathematicians and scientists explore what we experience, the world of
nature around us. In the phenomenological reduction we disregard this
nature, this world of objects toward which our acts are directed. We do not
deny that it is there, as if we were sophists, nor do we doubt that it is
there, as if we were sceptics, but we, as it were, put it in brackets. We
perform an epoché, Husserl said, borrowing a word which the skeptics of
antiquity used to denote abstinence from any judgment.
The phenomenologist does not worry about what is or is not in the real world
around him. He is not disturbed by the fact that some of our acts have
objects, others not, but turns to the noemata of our acts. These are the
phenomena he considers. The real world is reduced to a correlative of our
acts, which constitute it, bring it forth. All that is transcendent is put
in brackets together with the other objects of our acts. What is left,
purified of all that is transcendent, Husserl called transcendental. The
phenomenological reduction hence leads us from the transcendent to the
transcendental.
Phenomenological analysis-
The phenomenologist analyzes the noemata of his acts in order to clarify how
the world is 'constituted' by his consciousness. He observes that he expects
a tree to have a back, to continue to be there if he turns away from it for
a moment, and so forth. He studies the structure of the noemata of his acts.
He elucidates how his expectations are arranged in patterns, how new sense
impressions can change his expectations and sometimes lead to an 'explosion'
of the noemata and make him reject his original supposition about the
direction of his act. According to Husserl, phenomenology thereby becomes an
analysis of something similar to what Kant called the a priori. If one were
to describe phenomenology in brief, it would therefore be this: an
investigation of the a priori, the necessary. Its aim is similar to that of
many other philosophies from antiquity onward. But its methods, and the
general framework of acts, noemata, and objects within which it tries to
make sense of this aim, are different.
It is also not difficult to see the close connection between analytic
philosophy and phenomenology here. For just as analytic philosophers,
especially those of the so-called linguistic variety, analyze meaning,
meanings of linguistic expressions, so the phenomenologist analyzes noemata,
or meanings of acts in general."
Föllesdall Dagfinn, "Husserl's notion of noema," Journal of
Philosophy 20: 680-687 (1976).
Reprinted in: Hunert Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (eds.) - Husserl.
Intentionality and cognitive science - Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1982,
pp. 73-80
Föllesdall Dagfinn. The justification of logic and mathematics in
Husserl's phenomenology. In Phenomenology and the formal sciences.
Edited by Seebohm Thomas, Föllesdall Dagfinn, and Mohanty Jitendra Nath.
Dordrecht: Kluwer 1991. pp.
Föllesdall Dagfinn. Husserl and Frege. A contribution to elucidating the
origins of phenomenological philosophy. In Mind, meaning, and
mathematics. Essays on the philosophical views of Husserl and Frege.
Edited by Haaparanta Leila. Kluwer: Dordrecht 1994. pp. 3-47
Translated from German by Claire Ortiz Hill.
Original edition: Husserl und Frege. Ein Beitrag zur Beleuchtung der
Entstehung der phänomenologischen Philosophie - Oslo, I kommisjon hos
Aschehoug, 1958.
Föllesdall Dagfinn. Gödel and Husserl. In From Dedekind to Gödel.
Edited by Hintikka Jaakko. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1995. pp. 427-446
Föllesdall Dagfinn. La notion d'objet intentionnel chez Husserl. In
Jaakko Hintikka: questions de logique et de phénoménologie. Edited by
Rigal Élisabeth. Paris: Vrin 1998. pp. 223-233
Föllesdall Dagfinn. Husserl and the categories. In Categories:
historical and systematic essays. Edited by Gorman Michael. Washington:
Catholic University. of America Press 2004. pp.
Føllesdal Dagfinn. Bolzano, Frege and Husserl on reference and object.
In Future pasts. The analytic tradition in twentieth century philosophy.
Edited by Floyd Juliet and Shieh Sanford. Oxford: Oxford University Press
2001. pp. 67-80
Gardies Jean-Louis. Rational grammar. München: Philosophia Verlag
1985.
Translated from the original French: Ésquisse d'une grammaire pure -
Paris, Vrin, 1975 by Kevin Mulligan.
"This enlarged version of a book which originally appeared in French in 1975
provides an introduction to the project of a rational grammar, as it was
sketched out by Husserl and partially developed by Ajdukiewicz. Besides
investigating the nature of grammaticality, the distinction between logic
and grammar and the relation of grammatical structure to the communicative
functions of language, the author analyzes a large number of grammatical
phenomena (names, verbs, conjunctions, adverbs, mood, tense, aspect, etc.)."
Ginev Dimitri, "Fundamental ontology and Regional ontology of
Humanities," Epistemologia 15: 87-100 (1992).
Gobber Giovanni, "Alle origini della grammatica categoriale. Husserl,
Lesniewski, Ajdukiewicz," Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 77:
258-295 (1985).
Haaparanta Leila, "Analysis as the method of logical discovery: some
remarks on Frege and Husserl," Synthese 77: 73-97 (1988).
"This paper attempts to study the methods which Frege and Husserl followed
in their logics. Frege regards the problem of discovering logical laws as a
psychological problem but takes the interest in the method of discovering
the logical language to belong to logic. Husserl does not intend to
construct a new language but he seeks for the epistemological justification
of Aristotelian logic. It is shown how Husserl proceeds in his studies of
the origins of logic. It is concluded that both Frege and Husserl rely on
the method of analysis but they use it for different purposes in their
logical studies."
Haaparanta Leila. L'analyse comme méthode de justification: quelques
remarques sur les études logiques de Husserl. In Jaakko Hintikka:
questions de logique et de phénoménologie. Paris: Vrin 1998. pp. 234-246
Haaparanta Leila. Husserl's argument against naturalism and his own
foundation of pure philosophy. In Foundations of the formal sciences IV.
The history of the concept of the formal sciences. Edited by Löwe
Benedikt, Peckhaus Volker, and Räsch Thomas. London: College Publications
2006. pp. 69-79
Hamacher Hermes Adelheid, "Debate between Husserl and Voigt concerning
the logic of content and extensional logic," Analecta Husserliana 34
(1992).
Hanna Robert, "The relation of form and stuff in Husserl's grammar of
pure logic," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44: 323-342
(1984).
Hanna Robert, "Logical cognition: Husserl's "Prolegomena" and the truth
in psychologism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53:
251-275 (1993).
"Frege's devastating attack on logical psychologism leaves philosophers of
logic in a quandary: If logical propositions exist altogether independently
of human acts of thinking, then "how" can they be grasped by thinkers?
Husserl's "Prolegomena to Pure Logic" contains a thorough critique of
psychologism, but manages to avoid Frege's problem by developing a plausible
theory of logical cognition. Husserl's account entails that a) logical
propositions are essentially knowable by finite rational minds, but also b)
those propositions are irreducible to individual human minds. Hence Husserl
shows that there can be a weak form of psychologism that is perfectly
consistent with anti-psychologism."
Hart James G., "Edmund Husserl, Analyses concerning passive and
active synthesis. Lectures on transcendental logic," Husserl Studies
20: 135-159 (2004).
Harvey Charles W. and Shelton Jim D. Husserl's phenomenology and the
ontology of the natural sciences. In Phenomenology of natural science.
Edited by Hardy Lee and Embree Lester. Dordrecht: Kluwer
1992. pp.
Heffernan George. Bedeutung und Evidenz bei Edmund Husserl. Das
Verhältnis zwischen der Bedeutungs- und der Evidenztheorie in den "Logischen
Untersuchungen" und der "Formalen und transzendentalen Logik" : ein
Vergleich anhand der Identitätsproblematik. Bonn: Bouvier 1983.
Heffernan George. Am Anfang war die Logik. Hermeneutische
Abhandlungen zum Ansatz der Formalen und Transzendentalen Logik von Edmund
Husserl. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company 1989.
Heffernan George, "In the beginning was the "Logos": hermeneutical
remarks on the starting-point of Edmund Husserl's "Formal and transcendental
logic"," Man and World 22: 185-213 (1989).
"According to the leading commentators and the author himself, Edmund
Husserl's "Formal and transcendental logic" is the most important work on
phenomenological logic ever written. Nonetheless, it has, in general, gained
far less attention than the "Logical investigations" and the "Ideas on a
pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy". In particular, the
argument of section 1 of the "Logic", namely, that it is fruitful to start
with the meanings of the expression "Logos" in order to develop a genuinely
transcendental logic, has received virtually no consideration. This paper
takes a step towards filling this empty space by analyzing and criticizing
the argument of section 1 as a problem to which (a) solution(s) must be
found. Throughout, the paper reads Husserl's "descriptions" as 'arguments'
for his positions, thereby avoiding any of the obscurity sometimes infecting
work in continental philosophy."
Heffernan George. Isagoge in die phänomenologische Apophantik. Eine
Einführung in die phänomenologische Urteilslogik durch die Auslegung des
textes der Formalen und transzendentalen Logik von Edmund Husserl.
Dordrecht: Kluwer 1989.
Heffernan George, "Miscellaneous lucubrations on Husserl's answer to the
question "was die Evidenz sei": a contribution to the phenomenology of
evidence on the occasione of the publication of Husserliana volume XXX,"
Husserl Studies 15: 1-75 (1998).
Heffernan George, "Language, logic, and logocentrism in transcendental
phenomenology: critical reflections on the Sprachvergessenheit of the
later Husserl," New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological
Philosophy 2: 205-247 (2002).
Hill Claire Ortiz. Word and object in Husserl, Frege, and Russell.
The roots of twentieth-century philosophy. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University
Press 1991.
Reprinted 2001.
From the Introduction: "As a book by the founder of phenomenology that
examines Frege's ideas from Brentano's empirical standpoint, Husserl's
Philosophy of Arithmetic is both an early work of phenomenology and of
logical empiricism. In it Husserl predicted the failure of Frege's attempt
to logicize arithmetic and to mathematize logic two years before the
publication of the Basic Laws of Arithmetic in 1893. I hope to show
that Husserl did so in terms that would prefigure both the account Frege
would give of his error after Russell encountered the paradoxes ten years
later and the discussions of Principia Mathematica. Moreover, in
locating the source of Frege's difficulties in the ambiguous theory of
identity, meaning, and denotation that forms the basis of Frege's logical
project and generates Russell's contradictions, Husserl's discussions
indicate that these contradictions may have as serious consequences for
twentieth century philosophy of language as they have had for the philosophy
of mathematics.
This book is about these Austro-German roots of twentieth century
philosophy. It is mainly about the origins of analytic philosophy, about the
transmission of Frege's thought to the English speaking world, and about the
relevance of Husserl's early criticism of Frege's Foundations of
Arithmetic to some contemporary issues in philosophy. It is more about
Husserl the philosopher of logic and mathematics than it is about Husserl
the phenomenologist, and it is principally addressed to those members of the
philosophical community who, via Russell, have been affected by Frege's
logic.
This makes it very different from work on Husserl and Frege that has focused
on the importance of Frege's criticism of Husserl's Philosophy of
Arithmetic and attendant issues. The goal of this book is quite the
opposite. It studies the shortcomings in Frege's thought that Husserl
flagged and Russell endeavored to overcome. One possible sequel to this book
would be a thorough study of Husserl's successes and failures in remedying
the philosophical ills he perceived all about him, but that goes beyond the
scope of this work, which follows the issues discussed into the work of
Russell and his successors." (pp. 3-4)
Contents: Abbreviations IX; Preliminary terminological comments XI; Glossary
XIII; Acknowledgments XIV; Introduction 1.
Part One: Logic, realism and the foundations of arithmetic
1. The argument that Frege influenced Husserl 7; 2. Husserl, Frege, and
psychologism 13; 3. Sense, meaning, and noema; 4. Husserl's 1891 critique of
Frege 43; 5. Frege's review and the development of Husserl's thought 57;
Conclusion: analiticity 91.
Part Two: Conceptual clarity
Introduction 99; 6. Intensions and extensions 103; 7. Presentation and ideas
125; 8. Function and concept 137; 9. On denoting 147; Conclusion: The way
things are 163; Notes 175; Bibliography 191; Index 215.
Hill Claire Ortiz, "Frege's attack on Husserl and Cantor," Monist
77: 345-357 (1994).
Hill Claire Ortiz, "Did Georg Cantor influence Edmund Husserl?,"
Synthese 113: 145-170 (1997).
"Few have entertained the idea that Georg Cantor, the creator of set theory,
might have influenced Edmund Husserl, the founder of the phenomenological
movement. Yet an exchange of ideas took place between them when Cantor was
at the height of his creative powers and Husserl in the throes of an
intellectual struggle during which his ideas were particularly malleable and
changed considerably and definitively. Here their writings are examined to
show how Husserl's and Cantor's ideas overlapped and crisscrossed in the
areas of philosophy and mathematics, arithmetization, abstraction,
consciousness and pure logic, psychologism, metaphysical idealism, new
numbers, and sets and manifolds."
Hill Claire Ortiz and Rosado Haddock Guillermo. Husserl or Frege?
Meaning, objectivity, and mathematics. Chicago: Open Court 2000.
Hill Claire Ortiz. On Husserl's mathematical apprenticeship and
philosophy of mathematics. In Phenomenology world-wide: foundations,
expanding dynamisms, life-engagements. A guide for research and study.
Edited by Tymieniecka Anna-Teresa. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002. pp. 74-94
Hintikka Jaakko, "Husserl: la dimension phénoménologique," Les Études
Philosophiques: 481-496 (1996).
Hintikka Jaakko. L'idée de phénoménologie chez Wittgenstein et Husserl.
In Jaakko Hintikka: questions de logique et de phénoménologie. Edited
by Rigal Élisabeth. Paris: Vrin 1998. pp.
Hintikka Jaakko, "The notion of intuition in Husserl," Revue
Internationale de Philosophie 57: 169-192 (2003).
Huemer Wolfgang. Husserl's critique of psychologism and his relation to
the Brentano School. In Phenomenology and analysis. Essays on Central
European philosophy. Edited by Chrudzimski Arkadiusz and Huemer
Wolfgang. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2004. pp. 199-214
(click on the image to see the PDF file)