Kaminski Régine. Genèse du logique dans la phénoménologie de Husserl.
Paris: Editions L'Harmattan 2003.
Kontos Pavlos, "Heidegger, lecteur de Husserl: logique formelle et
ontologie materielle," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 92: 53-81
(1994).
"The indications provided by Heidegger himself in his course on
'Phenomenological interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason' make it
possible to pinpoint his debt to Husserl. It turns out that this course
followed the same main steps in its argument as Husserl in 'Formal logic and
transcendental logic': a) formal logic and transcendental logic; b) the
subordination of formal logic to transcendental logic; c) regional unity as
a basis for formal logic; d) transcendental subjectivity as ultimate basis.
The account of this parallel structure makes it possible to interpret from a
different point of view Heidegger's reading of Husserl and provides the
proof of the phenomenological closeness of these two texts as regards the
basis of their 'logic'."
Kremer Marietti Angèle. Cours sur la première recherche logique de
Husserl. Paris: Editions L'Harmattan 2003.
Kusch Martin. Language as calculus vs. language as universal medium.
A study in Husserl, Heidegger, and Gadamer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers 1989.
Contents: Preface IX-XI; Part I. Introduction: Language as calculus vs.
language as the universal medium 1; Part II. Husserl's phenomenology and
language as calculus 11; Part III. Heidegger's ontology and language as the
universal medium 135; Part IV. Between Scylla and Charybdis -- Gadamer's
hermeneutics 229; Notes to Part I 259; Notes to Part II 260; Notes Part III
290; Notes to Part IV 310; Bibliography 315; Index of names 343; Index of
subjects 353.
Kusch Martin. Husserl and Heidegger on meaning. In Lingua universalis
versus calculus ratiocinator: An ultimate presupposition of
thwentieth-century philosophy. Edited by Hintikka Jaakko. Dordrecht:
Kluwer 1997. pp. 240-266
Küng Guido, "The world as noema and as referent," Journal of the
British Society for Phenomenology 2: 15-26 (1972).
Künne Wolfgang, "Are questions propositions?," Revue Internationale
de Philosophie 57: 157-168 (2003).
Lampert Jay. Synthesis and backward reference in Husserl's Logical
Investigations. Dodrecht: Kluwer 1995.
Landgrebe Ludwig. Regions of being and regional ontologies in Husserl's
phenomenology. In The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Six essays.
Ithaca (New York): Cornell University Press 1981. pp. 149-175
Edited and with an introduction by Donn Welton; Translation of:
Seinsregionen und regionale Ontologien in Husserls Phänomenologie -
Studium generale 9, 1956 pp. 313-324
Lavigne Jean-François, "Du psychologisme logique à la phénoménologie
pure," Recherches Husserliennes 18: 59-90 (2002).
Lavigne Jean-François. Husserl et la naissance de la phénoménologie
(1900-1913). Des Recherches logiques aux Ideen: la genèse de l'idéalisme
transcendantal phénoménologique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France
2004.
Lerner Rosemary, "Husserl's breaktrough revisited: genesis of the
Logical Investigations," Études Phénomenologiques 35: 71-98
(2002).
Lohmar Dieter. La genèse du jugement antéprédicatif dans les
Recherches logiques et dans Expérience et jugement. In
Phénomenologie et logique. Edited by Courtine Jean-François. Paris:
Presses de l'Ecole normale supérieure 1996. pp. 217-238
Lohmar Dieter. Edmund Husserls Formale und transzendentale Logik.
Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 2000.
Mays Wolfe, "Edmund Husserl's grammar. 100 years on," Journal of the
British Society for Phenomenology 33: 317-340 (2002).
McCarthy Thomas A., "Logic, mathematics and ontology in Husserl,"
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 3: 158-164 (1972).
McGuire Brigitte, "L'origine monadique de la logique selon Husserl,"
Les Études Philosophiques: 161-178 (1998).
Meiland Jack W., "Psychologism in logic: Husserl's critique," Inquiry
19: 325-339 (1976).
"Psychologism in logic holds that logic is a branch of psychology. This view
has been vigorously defended by John Stuart Mill and by a number of German
philosophers of logic, notably Erdmann. Its chief critics have been Husserl
and Frege and, to a lesser extent, Russell. Husserl set forth a profound and
detailed critique of psychologism in "Logical Investigations".
This paper examines this critique. First, I explain why the psychologistic
theory is attractive. Then I show that Husserl's critique is not convincing,
partly because he does not take the theory in its most plausible form and
partly because he ignores certain important distinctions (for example,
between what a statement is about and what it is true in virtue of).
Then I raise two new objections to the psychologistic theory. The purpose of
this paper is to suggest that the psychologistic theory remains an important
and serious position from which we can learn much about the status of
logic."
Melandri Enzo. Logica e esperienza in Husserl. Bologna: Il Mulino
1960.
Melandri Enzo. Le 'Ricerche logiche' di Husserl. Introduzione e
commento alla Prima ricerca. Bologna: Il Mulino 1990.
Melle Ulrich, "La théorie husserlienne du jugement," Revue
Philosophique de Louvain 99: 683-714 (2001).
Mensch James R. The question of Being in Husserl's Logical
Investigations. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1981.
Metcalfe John F., "Husserl and early Victorian philosophical logic,"
Eidos 7: 15-33 (1988).
"I present a detailed itemization of Husserl's criticisms of logical
psychologism. I use this to explore H. L. Mansel's formulation of his
self-proclaimed psychologism. I argue that Husserl's criticisms do not
engage Mansel's views. Thus the common view that Husserl presents a mortal
attack on psychologism is misleading. The lessons of this comparison are
two: first, the standard cursory dismissal of the Victorian psychologicists'
program needs reexamination. And second, the contrasts between this program
and its transcendental counterparts need sharpening or dissolution."
Miller Philip J. Numbers in presence and absence. A study of
Husserl's philosophy of mathematics. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1982.
Mohanty Jitendra Nath. Edmund Husserl's theory of meaning. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1964.
Third edition 1976.
Mohanty Jitendra Nath. Phenomenology and ontology. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff 1970.
Mohanty Jitendra Nath, "Husserl and Frege: a new look at their
relationship," Research in Phenomenology 4: 51-62 (1974).
Reprinted in: J. N. Mohanty (ed.) - Readings on Husserl's Logical
Investigations - The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1977 pp. 22-32.
Mohanty Jitendra Nath. Husserl and Frege. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press 1982.
Mohanty Jitendra Nath. Husserl's formalism. In Phenomenology and the
formal sciences. Edited by Seebohm Thomas, Föllesdall Dagfinn, and
Mohanty Jitendra Nath. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1991. pp.
Mohanty Jitendra Nath, "The concept of psychologism' in Frege and
Husserl," Philosophy and Rhetoric 30: 271-290 (1997).
Mohanty Jitendra Nath. Logic, truth, and the modalities: from a
phenomenological perspective. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1999.
Mohanty Jitendra Nath. The philosophy of Edmund Husserl. A historical
development. Yale: Yale University Press 2008.
This first volume traces the development of Husserl's thought from his
earliest investigations in philosophy to his publication of Ideas in
1913.
Mulligan Kevin and Smith Barry, "Husserl's Logical Investigations,"
Grazer Philosophische Studien 27: 199-206 (1986).
Mulligan Kevin, "Husserl on States of Affairs in the 'Logical
Investigations'," Epistemologia 12: 207-234 (1989).
Munch Dieter, "The early Husserl," Journal of the British Society for
Phenomenology 20: 173-178 (1989).
Natorp Paul, "Les Idées pour une phénoménologie pure de Husserl,"
Recherches Husserliennes 15: 3-30 (2001).
Nef Frédéric. L'ontologie formelle de Bolzano à Husserl. In L'object
quelconque: recherches sur l'ontologie de l'objet. Paris: Vrin 1998. pp.
Nenon Thomas. Two models of foundation in the Logical investigations.
In Husserl in contemporary context: prospects and projects for
phenomenology. Edited by Hopkins Burt. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1997. pp.
97-114
Nuki Shigeto. Phenomenology as calculus? In Phenomenology: Japanese
and American perspective. Edited by Hopkins Burt C. Dordrecht: Kluwer
1999. pp. 1-14
Null Gilbert T., ""On connoting": the relational theory of the concept
in Husserlian phenomenology," Journal of the British Society for
Phenomenology 11: 69-76 (1980).
Null Gilbert T. Formal and material ontology. In Encyclopedia of
phenomenology. Edited by Embree Lester et alii. Dordrecht: Kluwer
academic Publishers 1997. pp. 237-241
Patzig Günther. Husserl on truth and evidence. In Readings on Edmund
Husserl's Logical Investigations. Edited by Mohanty Jitendra Nath. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1977. pp. 179-196
Translation of an article published in Neue Hefte für Philosophie I,
1971, pp. 12-32.
Peruzzi Alberto, "Towards a real ohenomenology of logic," Husserl
Studies 6: 1-24 (1989).
"The paper deals with the phenomenological roots of logic, and suggests a
strict link of such roots with concepts of category theory. The project
stems from a new consideration of the philosophy of logic developed by
Husserl. Differences between this approach and intuitionism are examined.
The objectivity of logical constructions is seen from the viewpoint of
natural epistemology. An essential complementarity of descriptive and
constructive components is reached and related to formal developments in
category theory."
Peursen Cornelis van, "Phenomenology and ontology," Philosophy Today
4: 35-42 (1959).
Picardi Eva, "Sigwart, Husserl and Frege on truth and logic, or is
psychologism still a threat?," European Journal of Philosophy 5:
162-182 (1997).
"The paper argues that Husserl's criticism of Sigwart's normative conception
of logical laws rests on an absolutist conception of truth and content which
is itself in need of justification. Also the contrast between psychological
laws of holding true and logical laws of being true used by Frege in his
criticism of psychologism fails to explain the epistemological status of
logical laws. A better understanding of the latter is to be found in Frege's
conception of truth and justification. Sigwart's psychologism comes to the
fore in the privileged role he assigned in his logic to judgments of
recognition and naming. While the attention paid to the indexical component
of certain utterances enables Sigwart to give an original account of the
import of impersonal judgments, his concentration on a first-person account
of sentence meaning prevents him from appreciating the public dimension of
meaning, which alone renders communication possible."
Pietersma Henri, "Husserl's concept of philosophy," Dialogue 5:
425-442 (1966).
Pietersma Henri, "Husserl and Frege," Archiv fur Geschichte der
Philosophie 49: 298-323 (1967).
Pietersma Henri, "Husserl's concept of existence," Synthese 66:
311-328 (1986).
Poli Roberto, "Husserl's conception of formal ontology," History and
Philosophy of Logic 14: 1-14 (1993).
"The concept of formal ontology was first developed by Husserl. It concerns
problems relating to the notions of object, substance, property, part,
whole, predication, nominalization, etc. The idea of formal ontology is
present in many of Husserl's works, with minor changes. This paper provides
a reconstruction of such an idea. Husserl's proposal is faced with
contemporary logical orthodoxy and it is presented also an interpretative
hypothesis, namely that the original difference between the general
perspective of usual model theory and formal ontology is grounded in the
fact that this latter starts from an intended interpretation and not
from the set of all the possible interpretations."
"1. Introduction
The term 'formal ontology' has been given two different interpretations. The
first of these, entirely in keeping with the mainstream of contemporary
philosophy, has been what I shall call analytic: formal ontology is that
branch of ontology which is analysed within the framework of formal logic.
The leading exponent of this approach has undoubtedly been Nino
Cocchiarella. (1) On the premise that each particular science has its own
'mode of being', Cocchiarella has written that 'metaphysics [...] - or what
we might instead call formal ontology - is concerned with the study and
development of alternative formalizations regarding the systematic
co-ordination of all the "modes" or "categories of being" under the most
general laws' (1974, 29-30). From this point of view, formal ontology
studies the logical characteristics of predication and the various theories
of universals.
The other interpretation, which I shall call phenomenological, developed
from Husserl's early works, in particular Logical investigations. As a first
approximation, we may say that this approach mainly addresses the problems
of parts and wholes and of dependence. Despite their differences, these two
varieties of formal ontology quite frequently overlap each other, although
to date there has been no systematic study of the categories and layers that
constitute formal ontology and no systematic analysis of the issues
addressed by it." p. 1.
(1) Formal ontology and the foundations of mathematics in: G.
Nakhnikian (ed.), - Bertrand Russell's philosophy - London,
Duckworth, 1974 pp. 29-46 and Logical investigations pf predication
theory and the problem of universals - Naples, Bibliopolis, 1986. For a
general reconstruction see: Ontology II: formal ontology in: H.
Burkhardt and B. Smith (eds.) - Handbook of metaphysics and ontology
- Münich, Philosophi Verlag, 1991, pp. 640-647.
Priest Stephen. Husserl's concept of being: from phenomenology to
metaphysics. In German philosophy since Kant. Edited by O'Hear
Anthony. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999. pp. 209-222
Reiner Hans and Schuhmann Karl, "Ein Protokoll aus Husserls Logikseminar
vom Winter 1925," Husserl Studies 6: 199-204 (1989).
"We began by tentatively defining logic as a science of meanings,
distinguishing between meanings and their objects (references). We
established that meanings exist concretely in psychic acts, thus allowing
logic to be seen also as the science of thinking. After further
consideration we concluded that logic is only concerned with true meanings,
and is therefore a practical normative science. Its normative character,
however, is limited to formal truths. In addition logic can also be defined
as the science of objects taken in their most general sense. Indications
were given how this general science of objects includes various mathematical
disciplines."
Rivenc François, "Husserl, with and against Frege," Harvard Review of
Philosophy 6: 95-116 (1996).
Rodriguez Ramon, "La cuestion del ser en la fenomenologia de Husserl,"
Pensamiento 52: 21-48 (1995).
Rollinger Robin. Husserl's position in the School of Brentano.
Dordrecht: Kluwer 1999.
Rollinger Robin, "Husserl's elementary logic," Studia
Phaenomenologica 3: 107-117 (2003).
Rosado Haddock Guillermo. Edmund Husserls Philosophie der Logik und
Mathematik im Lichte der gegenwärtigen Logik und Grundlagenforschung.
Bonn: Rheinische Fr.-Wilhelms-Universität 1973.
Rosado Haddock Guillermo, "The structure of Husserl's Prolegomena,"
Manuscrito 23: 61-69 (2000).
Rosiak Marek. Twardowski and Husserl on wholes and parts. In The
Lvov-Warsaw school and contemporary philosophy. Edited by Kijania-Placek
Katarzyna and Wolenski Jan. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1998. pp. 85-100
Rouilhand Philippe de, "Introduction aux problèmes fondamentaux d'une
logique du sens," Les Études Philosophiques: 107-127 (1996).
Roy Jean-Michel, "Comment peut on parler du sens? Russell critique de
Husserl," Les Études Philosophiques: 65-90 (1996).
Roy Jean-Michel. La dissociation husserlienne du Sinn et
Bedeutung . Part I: Le fondement de la dissociation. In
Phénomenologie et logique. Edited by Courtine Jean-François. Paris:
Presses de l'École normale supérieure 1996. pp. 149-169
Scanlon John, "Formal logic and formal ontology," Research in
Phenomenology 5: 95-107 (1975).
Schérer René. La phénoménologie des "Recherches logiques" de Husserl.
introduction à la lecture des 'Recherches logiques'. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France 1967.
Schuhmann Karl, "Husserl's concept of philosophy," Journal of the
British Society for Phenomenology 21: 274-283 (1990).
"Philosophy as Universal Science
Husserl insisted from the very beginning that the concept of philosophy
involves two different, yet equally essential elements. Philosophical
knowledge is both absolutely valid and completely universal. The
first aspect concerns the way in which philosophical truths are known, i.e.
the quality of philosophical cognition. Philosophy, Husserl says, is
apodictic, evident and radical; it yields absolutely legitimized knowledge
whose evidence flows from ultimate sources of cognition and is founded upon
definitive fundaments. Philosophy, in short, is a rigorous science. The
second aspect concerns the object of philosophical knowledge, i.e. the
quantity of its field. The range of philosophy, as Husserl conceives it, is
the universe of whatever can be known. Philosophy is all comprehensive
knowledge or "universal knowledge of what is". Husserl thereby takes up the
traditional definition of philosophy as the science of being qua being. But
he also goes along with the traditional division of philosophy into a number
of special disciplines, which together constitute philosophy as such.
Two main divisions of philosophical disciplines are to be found in Husserl's
writings, which at first sight seem to have no connection with one another.
On the one hand, he divides philosophy into a theoretical and a
practical branch. Philosophy is, first of all, theoretical because it
defends the idea of absolute knowledge and is to issue forth in 'pure
theory'. The philosopher is from this perspective an uninterested spectator
watching over subjective acts and their objective correlates. On the one
hand, however, philosophy is practical also because its goal is
absolute ethical life and rational practice, and from this perspective
philosophy aims at a revolution in our life and habits in order to make us
perfect personalities. Its purpose is to bring about a philosophical culture
in which reason alone will determine the will and decisions of mankind.
In addition to this however Husserl also, and indeed more frequently, adopts
a tripartite division into theoretical, axiological and practical
philosophy. This division agrees with the three main areas of reason -
cognitive (logical) reason, evaluative and practical. Since the
phenomenological elucidation of reason is at the same time a critique of the
possibilities of reason, Husserl also says that phenomenology aims at a
critique of knowledge, of value and of practice.
Let us first turn to theoretical philosophy. According to Husserl, it is
natural that philosophy should "set out from what is most general and from
there pass over to the particulars contained under it". Correspondingly he
introduces into theoretical philosophy a distinction between a discipline of
general forms and the doctrine of their material specifications. The first
he calls 'formal ontology'; it deals with the forms of objects. The second
he divides into a number of different 'material ontologies', each one of
which relates to a region of objects circumscribed by certain features they
have in common.
Formal ontology - or, as he also sometimes calls it, mathesis universalis
- is, Husserl says, the science of the pure forms of something-in-general
and of its modalities or derivations. It treats formal categories such as
state of affairs, genus and species, identity and difference, number, whole
and part. This shows that formal ontology is the sphere to which Husserl
devoted most of his work in the period ranging from the Philosophy of
Arithmetic (1891) to the Logical Investigations (1901). He
distinguishes between several sub-disciplines of formal ontology, reflecting
diverse formal aspects of the object-as-such. Thus as parts of formal
ontology he mentions logic (i.e. the formal doctrine of meanings), pure
arithmetic and the pure theory of manifolds or sets.
Only in later years did Husserl turn to material ontologies, e.g., in his
lectures on nature (1907), on intersubjectivity (1910/11) or in Ideas
II (1912ff.), as well as in his various lectures and seminars on Natur
and Geist. Nowhere does he give an exhaustive list of disciplines
which together would make up the realm of material ontology in its entirety.
He does, though, repeatedly mention nature, soul and society
as delimiting three corresponding material ontologies." pp. 274-275 (Notes
omitted).
Schuhmann Karl. Representation in early Husserl. In The dawn of
cognitive science. Early European contributors. Edited by Albertazzi
Liliana. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2001. pp. 167-184
Seebohm Thomas, "Phenomenology of logic and the problem of modalizing,"
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 19: 235-251 (1988).
Seebohm Thomas. "Tertium Non Datur:" Husserl's Conception of a Definite
Multiplicity. In Phenomenology and the formal sciences. Edited by
Seebohm Thomas, Föllesdall Dagfinn, and Mohanty Jitendra Nath. Dordrecht:
Kluwer 1991. pp.
Seebohm Thomas. Individuals, identity, names: phenomenological
considerations. In Husserl in contemporary context: prospects and
projects for phenomenology. Edited by Hopkins Burt. Dordrecht: Kluwer
1997. pp. 115-150
Simons Peter. The formalisation of Husserl's theory of wholes and parts.
In Parts and moments. Studies in logic and formal ontology. Edited by
Smith Barry and Simons Peter.1982. pp. 113-160
Reprinted in: Peter Simons - Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from
Bolzano to Tarski. Selected essays - Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1992 pp. 71-116
Simons Peter. Three essays in formal ontology. In Parts and moments.
Studies in logic and formal ontology. Edited by Smith Barry. München:
Philosophia Verlag 1982. pp. 111-260
Smith Barry, "The ontogenesis of mathematical objects," Journal of
the British Society for Phenomenology 6: 91-101 (1975).
Smith Barry, "An essay in formal ontology," Grazer Philosophische
Studien 6: 39-62 (1978).
Smith Barry, "Frege and Husserl: the ontology of reference," Journal
of the British Society for Phenomenology 9: 111-125 (1978).
Smith Barry, "Ontologische Aspekte der Husserlschen Phänomenologie,"
Husserl Studies 3: 115-130 (1986).
Smith Barry. Logic and formal ontology. In Husserl's phenomenology. A
textbook. Edited by Mohanty Jitendra Nath and McKenna William. Lanham:
University Press of America 1989. pp. 29-67
Smith David Woodruff and McIntyre Ronald. Husserl and intentionality.
A study of mind, meaning, and language. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing
Company 1982.
Smith David Woodruff. Ontological phenomenology. In The Proceedings
of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy - Volume 7: Modern Philosophy.
Edited by Gedney Mark. Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center 2000.
pp.
Smith David Woodruff. What is "Logical" in Husserl's Logical
Investigations ? The Copenhagen interpretation. In One hundred years
of phenomenology: Husserl's Logical Investigations revisited. Edited by
Zahavi Dan and Stjernfelt Frederik. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002. pp. 51-65
Smith David Woodruff, ""Pure" logic, ontology, and phenomenology,"
Revue Internationale de Philosophie 57: 133-156 (2003).
Smith David Woodruff. Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations
(1900-1901): From logic through ontology to phenomenology. In The
classics of Western philosophy. A reader's guide. Edited by Garcia Jorge
E. Malden: Blackwell 2003. pp. 423-439
Smith David Woodruff. The unity of the Logical investigations:
then and now. In Husserl's Logical investigations reconsidered.
Edited by Fisette Denis. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2003. pp. 21-34
Smith David Woodruff. Husserl. New York: Routledge 2007.
Snyder Lee R., "The concept of evidence in Edmund Husserl's genealogy of
logic," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41: 547-555 (1981).
Sokolowski Robert, "The logic of wholes and parts in Husserl's
Investigations," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28:
537-553 (1968).
Sokolowski Robert. Logic and mathematics in Husserl's "Formal and
transcendental logic". In Explorations in phenomenology. Edited by
Carr David and Casey Edward. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1973. pp. 306-327
Reprinted in: Husserlian meditations. How words present things pp. 271-289
Sokolowski Robert. Husserlian meditations. How words present things.
Evanston (Illinois): Northwestern University Press 1974.
Sokolowski Robert, "Husserl and Frege," Journal of Philosophy 84:
521-528 (1987).
Sokolowski Robert, "Husserl as a tutor in philosophy," Journal of the
British Society for Phenomenology 19: 296-309 (1988).
Sokolowski Robert. Semiotics in Husserl's Logical Investigations.
In One hundred years of phenomenology: Husserl's Logical Investigations
revisited. Edited by Zahavi Dan and Stjernfelt Frederik. Dordrecht:
Kluwer 2002. pp. 171-183
Soldati Gianfranco, "What Is "formal" in Husserl's "Logical
Investigations"?," European Journal of Philosophy 3: 330-338
(1999).
"It is sometimes said that questions of form are questions of logic or
language. In his "Logical Investigations" Husserl, however, clearly
distinguished formal ontology from formal grammar and formal logic. The
article attempts to explain Husserl's notion of formal ontology. It
investigates the relation between formal and material ontology as well as
the relation between epistemic and metaphysical necessity. The article
provides an interpretation of Husserl's claim that there are metaphysical
necessities which are necessarily recognized by the human mind on the basis
of Husserl's well-known
distinction between the meanings of mental acts and their objective
correlates."
Soldati Gianfranco. Abstraction and abstract concepts: On Husserl's
Philosophy of arithmetic. In Phenomenology and analysis. Essays on
Central European philosophy. Edited by Chrudzimski Arkadiusz and Huemer
Wolfgang. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2004. pp. 215-232
Spiegelberg Herbert, "Remarks on Findlay's translation of Edmund
Husserl's "Logical Investigations"," Journal of the British
Society for Phenomenology 3: 195-196 (1972).
"I have the highest admiration for this effort and its result, much higher
than for all other Husserl translations known to me. But it would be too bad
if the users of this translation were denied the chance of minor emendations
which I would like to suggest as a result of an intensive reading of the
translation in a seminar at Washington University along with the German
text. I shall therefore select some of the more important ones as follows:
1. On page 218 line 20 read "quantitative" for "qualitative," (pointed out
by Robert Sokolowski in Inquiry 14 (1971), 347).
2. On page 225 in the first line of paragraph 62 the phrase "unified item in
anthropology" (as a characterization of science) for "anthropologische
Einheit" might better be rendered as "cultural system". In Husserl's
framework anthropology, as introduced in Chapter VII ("Anthropologismus")
has no relation to the science of anthropology, at the time mostly physical,
but to the emphasis on human factors.
3. In the title of Chapter I in Investigation II (p. 535) the rendition of
the German Bestand ("Bewusstsein als phaenomenologischer Bestand
des Ich . . .") by "Subsistence" ("Consciousness as Phenomenological
Subsistence of the Ego") is misleading, since here the German word (of many
meanings) clearly refers to the composition or content of the ego, rather
than to any mode of its existence in the sense of Meinong's Bestand
of his Objektive (states of affairs).
4. In the title and text of Chapter IV in Investigation VI the rendition of
the German Verträglichkeit and Unverträglichkeit by
"Consistency and Inconsistency" seems to me debatable, since their German
equivalents are Widerspuchsfreiheit and Widerspruchlichkeit.
Closer English equivalents of the words in the German title are
"Compatibility" and "Incompatibility".
5. On p. 804 line 17 from the bottom the word "own" (repeated in the
following line) ought to be dropped.
6. On p. 812 line 10 the proper translation of the idiomatic Mit nichten,
wurden wir einwenden would be "By no means, we would object" (rather
than "Binding them with nothing . . .").
I have only one serious regret about these two volumes. The distribution of
the two very unequal German volumes of the first and even of the second
edition (subdividing volume II) may be technically defensible, provided that
it does not conceal the fact that the German volumes appeared separately in
two subsequent years (1900 and 1901 respectively). It is also only a minor
incongruency that volume II begins on the back page of volume I, thus
minimizing the break by not even inserting a new page; whereas each of the
six Investigations within volume II is preceded by a special title page. But
what is really unfortunate is that the title of volume II (Untersuchungen
zur Phaenomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis) is missing both on p.
248 and in the Table of Contents, this all the more since the title of
volume I ("Prolegomena to Pure Logic") appears correctly in both places.
Among other things this conceals the important historical fact that it was
in the title of the second volume that Husserl for the first time used the
term "phenomenology," still absent from volume I, explicitly and
conspicuously. While it is controversial whether the undeniable historical
impression was correct that Volume II meant a new departure in Husserl's
development, as it was certainly interpreted at the time, the fact that
there was definite reason for this impression must not be forgotten." p.
196.
Spinicci Paolo. I Pensieri dell'esperienza. Interpretazione di
'Esperienza e giudizio' di Edmund Husserl. Firenze: La Nuova Italia
1985.
Stapleton Timothy, "The "logic" of Husserl's transcendental reduction,"
Man and World 15: 369-382 (1982).
"This article is an attempt to displace many of the traditional, overly
Cartesian (epistemological) interpretations of Husserl's transcendental
turn, and to replace them with an interpretation based on Husserl's formal
ontology as developed in the "Logical Investigations". In particular, the
theory of wholes and parts in conjunction with Husserl's principle of
intuitive, eidetic rationality, it is argued, lead directly to
transcendental idealism. And as a consequence, the fundamental unity of
Husserl's entire philosophical project, from the pre-transcendental through
the transcendental period, is established."
Stepanians Markus S. Frege und Husserl über Urteilen und Denken.
Paderborn: Schöningh 1988.
Stjernfelt Frederik. Categories, diagrams, schemata: the cognitive
grasping of ideal objects in Husserl and Peirce. In One hundred years of
phenomenology: Husserl's Logical Investigations revisited. Edited by
Zahavi Dan and Stjernfelt Frederik. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002. pp. 147-167
Ströker Elisabeth, "Husserl and philosophy of science," Journal of
the British Society for Phenomenology 19: 217-234 (1988).
Taylor Matt, "The consistency of Husserl's theory of meaning," Grazer
Philosophische Studien 60: 171-196 (2000).
Tieszen Richard, "Gödel's path from the incompleteness theorems (1931)
to phenomenology," Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4: 181-203 (1998).
"In a lecture manuscript written around 1961 Gödel describes a philosophical
path from the incompleteness theorems to Husserl's phenomenology. Using this
manuscript as a basis, I present and discuss the arguments in Gödel's
recently published papers that led him to the work of Husserl. In
particular, I focus on arguments concerning Hilbert's program and an early
version of Carnap's program."
Tieszen Richard l. Husserl's Logic. In Handbook of the history of
logic. Vol. III. The Rise of Modern Logic: From Leibniz to Frege. Edited
by Gabbay Dov and Woods John. Amsterdam: Elsevier North Holland 2004. pp.
207-321
Tito Johanna Maria. Logic in the Husserlian context. Evanston:
Northwestern University Press 1990.
Tragesser Robert. Phenomenology and logic. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press 1977.
Tragesser Robert. Husserl and realism in logic and mathematics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984.
Tugendhat Ernst. Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger.
Berlin : Walter de Gruyter 1967.
Velarde-Mayol Victor. On Husserl. Belmont: Wadsworth 2000.
Verley Xavier. Pensée, symbole et représentation. Logique et
psychologie chez Frege et Husserl. Chennevières-sur-Marne: Dianoia 2005.
Watson Laurence W., "A remark on Husserl theory of multiplicities,"
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 11: 180-185 (1980).
Welton Donn. The origins of meaning: A critical study of the
thresholds of Husserlian phenomenology. Dordrecht : Kluwer Academic
Publishers 1983.
Willard Dallas, "Husserl on a logic that failed," Philosophical
Review 89: 46-64 (1980).
"In this paper I try to identify the deficiency of logic which Husserl
refers to in the "Forward" to his "Logical Investigations" of 1900. Logics
known to him were unable to explain how formal systems of signs function to
advance knowledge, as in the case of formal arithmetic. Simultaneous efforts
to elucidate the procedures of general arithmetic (in the last part of his
"Philosophy of arithmetic") and to write a review of Schroder's "lectures on
the algebra of logic", made Husserl (by 1891) forsake Weierstrass's program
of reconstructing mathematics from the concept of number alone, which
he had hoped to carry out with tools drawn from Brentano's psychology."
Willard Dallas. Logic and the objectivity of knowledge. Studies in
Husserl's early philosophy. Athens: Ohio University Press 1984.
" This book attempts to explain the path by which Husserl's concern for an
elucidation of mathematical, chiefly arithmetical, knowledge led to an
analysis of the mental act which allows for a realist interpretation of
science and ordinary perceptual experience. It attempts to go more
thoroughly than has been done into the content and significance of his first
book, "The philosophy of arithmetic". It provides discussion of many
Husserlian texts not available in English and little discussed in the
English literature. Its aim is not merely historical, but systematic as
well."
Willard Dallas. The theory of wholes and parts and Husserl's explication
of the possibility of knowledge in the Logical investigations. In
Husserl's Logical investigations reconsidered. Edited by Fisette Denis.
Dordrecht: Kluwer 2003. pp.
Winance Eleuthère, "Intention and nature of Husserl's logic,"
Philosophia Mathematica 2: 69-85 (1965).
Winance Eleuthère, "Logique, mathématique et ontologie comme 'mathesis
universalis' chez Edmund Husserl," Revue Thomiste 66: 410-434
(1966).
Wojciech Krysztofiak, "Noemata and their formalization," Synthese
105: 53-86 (1995).
"The presentation of the formal conception of noemata is the main aim of the
article. In the first section, three informal approaches to noemata are
discussed. The goal of this chapter is specifying main controversies and
their sources concerned with different ways of the understanding of noemata.
In the second section, basic assumptions determining the proposed way of
understanding noemata are presented. The third section is devoted to the
formal set-theoretic construction needed for the formal comprehension of
neomata. In the fourth section, definitions of neomata and their various
kinds, as well as definitions of other phenomenological notions are
formulated. In the last section, possibilities of further developing the
proposed formal conception are indicated."
Wolenski Jan, "Husserl and the development of semantics," Philosophia
Scientiae 2: 151-158 (1997).
"This paper investigates the role of Edmund Husserl in the development of
formal or model-theoretic semantics through glasses of the distinction of
language as calculus vs. language as universal medium, introduced by Jaakko
Hintikka and Martin Kusch. In particular, the paper raises the question of
possible Husserl's influence on the conception of language accepted in
Polish philosophy, in particular by Lesniewski and Tarski."
Zahavi Dan, "Constitution and ontology: some remarks on Husserl's
ontological position in the Logical Investigations," Husserl
Studies 9: 111-124 (1992).
"One of the major exegetical difficulties in connection with Husserl's
Logical Investigations has always been the clarification of his ontological
position and the closely related concept of constitution. Ever since the
publication of the first edition - which will be the point of departure - in
1900-1, there has been an ongoing discussion as to which concept of reality
Husserl had committed himself, initiated with a realistic interpretation by
his Gottingen students. My aim in the following paper will be a critical
evaluation and interpretation of this relationship, thereby also taking
Husserl's philosophical development - especially as concerns his idea of
phenomenology - into consideration."
Zahavi Dan, "A propos de la neutralité métaphysique des "Recherches
logiques"," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 99: 715-736 (2001).
Zahavi Dan. Metaphysical neutrality in Logical Investigations. In
One hundred years of phenomenology: Husserl's Logical Investigations
revisited. Edited by Zahavi Dan and Stjernfelt Frederik. Dordrecht:
Kluwer 2002. pp. 93-108
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