Theory and History of Ontology
by Raul Corazzon - e-mail: raul.corazzon[at]formalontology.it
For an overview see the Index of the Pages, the SITE MAP or the Alphabetical Index of the Philosophers: A-F - G-O - P-Z; You can also download this page as 
Table of Contemporary Ontologists 
(click on the image to see the PDF file)
Indian Logic and Ontology.
Bibliography: More Advanced Readings
Pathways to Non-Western Philosophy
MORE ADVANCED READINGS IN INDIAN LOGIC AND ONTOLOGY
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Knowing from words. Western and Indian philosophical analysis of
understanding and testimony. Edited by Matilal Bimal Krishna and Chakrabarti
Arindam. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1994.
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Aklujkar Ajok, "The word is the world: nondualism in Indian
philosophy of language," Philosophy East and West 51 (4): 452-473
(2001).
"The meanings in which the word 'word' can be taken, the
interpretations that the relevant meanings would necessitate of the
'word-equals-world' thesis, and the extent to which Bhartrhari can be said to be
aware of or receptive to these interpretations are considered. The observation
that more than one interpretation would have been acceptable to Bhartrhari
naturally leads to a discussion of his notion of truth, his perspectivism, and
his understanding of the nature of philosophizing as an activity in which
language pays a basic role and epistemology and ontology are interdependent. The
difference of Bhartrhari's thinking from that of the Vedantins of Sankara's
tradition is identified, and a brief comment on the history of vivarta
and parinama as philosophical terms is offered."
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Alackapally Sebastian. Being and meaning: reality and language in
Bhartrhari and Heidegger. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 2002.
Contents:
Foreword. General introduction. Philosophical background of Bhartrhari and
Heidegger: Bhartrhari: the grammarian philosopher. Heidegger: the philosopher of
being and language. 1. Sabdatattva: the ultimate reality; 2. Sabdatattva: the
Sphota of language; 3. Heidegger's concept of reality; 4. Language: the saying
of being; General conclusion; Being and language in Bhartrhari and Heidegger: a
synthesis; Glossary; Appendix; Bibliography. Index.
"Being and Meaning is a
comparative study of the concepts of being and language in Bhartrhari and Martin
Heidegger, emphasising the universality of their thinking. Language in
Bhartrhari's vision is the medium of the self-expression for the ultimate
reality ( Sabdatattva). In Heidegger's thinking language is the original
utterance ( sage) which being speaks to man. Being expresses itself in language,
and phenomena in the world occur simultaneously with the occurrence of language.
Bhartrhari and Heidegger lead one to the belonging togetherness of being and
being beyond all conceptualizing, transcending the bounds of orient and
occident."
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Arnold Dan, "Intrinsic validity reconsidered: a sympathetic study of the
Mimamsaka inversion of Buddhist epistemology," Journal of Indian
Philosophy 29: 589-675 (2001).
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Arnold Daniel, "Of intrinsic validity: a study on the relevance of Purva
Mimamsa," Philosophy East and West 51 (1): 26-53 (2001).
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Balcerowicz Piotr, "The logical structure of the Naya method of the Jainas,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 29: 379-403 (2001).
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Bandyopadhyay Nandita. Definition of valid knowledge: Pramalaksana in
Gangesa's Tattvacintamani. Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar 1989.
Vol.
I: Opponents position (Purvapaksa)
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Bandyopadhyay Nandita, "The concept of contradiction in Indian logic and
epistemology," Journal of Indian Philosophy 16: 225-246 (1988).
"The
article seeks to introduce to the students of philosophy the concept of
contradiction in Indian philosophy. contradiction and contrariety fall under the
common class of opposition called "Virodha". the former means "pervasion of
mutual negation by two predicates," the latter means "pervasibility of two
predicates by their mutual negation." Vontradiction is a purely logical
relation, while contrariety is semilogical. The author suggests that
contradiction and contrariety should better be called, respectively, "absolute
contradiction" and "relative contradiction", both being based on contradiction
of identity. Some formidable Indian philosophers argue that contradiction
(including contrariety) is a purely logical category, for contradiction of facts
is impossible."
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Banerjee Hiranmoy, "On a mistranslation of the terms 'Visesya' and
'Prakara'," Philosophy East and West 22 (1): 93-96 (1972).
"The
translation of the Nyaya terms, 'Visesya' and 'Prakara' as
'subject' and 'predicate' is mistaken. This mistake is the progenitor of the
philosophical mistake that a particular can possibly be a predicate. In 'ram is
possessed of a stick', the stick is the 'Prakara', but being possessed of
a stick is the predicate. This inclusion of relation in the predicate is alleged
to lead to an infinite regress, for the predicate's relation to the subject
should be included in it ad infinitum. There is, however, a tie and not a
relation between the subject and the predicate. A relation, being a universal,
is a prediate of particulars whereas a tie binds together entities of
heterogeneous types."
-
Bharadwaj Krishna Datta. The philosophy of Ramanuja. New Delhi: Sir
Shankar Lall Charitable Trust Society 1958.
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Bharadwaja Vijay K., "Implication and entailment in Navya-Nyaya logic,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 15: 149-154 (1987).
"It is argued against
the claim that there exist in the concept of "Vyapti" and "Paramarsa" the two
notions of implication and entailment in the Navya-Nyaya logic. Also, it is
suggested that the "Pancavayava-Vakya" form of "Anumana" does not represent the
deductive model of inference."
-
Bhattacharya Bhaswati, "The concept of existence and Nagarjuna's doctrine of
Sunyata," Journal of Indian Philosophy 7: 337-344 (1979).
-
Bhattacharya Chandidas, "Can there be empirical evidence for general
truth?," Journal of Indian Philosophy 15: 333-347 (1987).
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Bhattacharya Kamaleswar, "A note on formalism in Indian Logic," Journal
of Indian Philosophy 29: 17-23 (2001).
-
Bhattacharyya Hari Mohan. Jaina logic and epistemology. Calcutta:
K.P. Bagchi & Co 1994.
-
Bhattacharyya Krishnachandra. Studies in philosophy. Calcutta:
Progressive Publishers 1956.
Two volumes edited by Gopinath Bhattacharyya
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Bhattacharyya Sibajiban, "Daniel H. H. Ingalls on Indian logic,"
Philosophy East and West 5 (2): 155-162 (1955).
-
Bhattacharyya Sibajiban. Gadadhara's theory of meaning of pronouns. In
Relativism, suffering and beyond. Essays in memory of Bimal K. Matilal.
Edited by Bilimoria Purusottama and Mohanty Jitendra Nath. New Delhi: Oxford
University Press 1997. pp. 16-31
"In order to explain Gadadhara's theory of meaning of pronouns, it is necessary first to briefly state his theory of word meaning. In Indian philosophy in general and in Navya-nyaya in particular, theories of meaning of sentences are regarded as a part of theories of origin of true cognition. Hence in discussing theories of meaning, Indian philosophical systems almost exclusively consider how a hearer acquires information second-hand from what a speaker tells him. Indian
theories of meaning refer to the speaker's intention only in so far as it is necessary for the hearer to cognize truly what the speaker says.According to Navya-nyaya, a word means an object only under a mode of presentation. Anyone who knows the meaning of the word knows the object under this mode on hearing, remembering, or otherwise cognizing, the word. The problem of meaning of words is the problem of explaining how the hearer knows the object under the particular mode.The mode of presentation of an object,
according to Navya-nyaya, must be a property of the object. A property is anything which may be said to be in the object. According to Navya-nyaya, this is the case if and only if what is to be regarded as a property of an object is related to the object by an occurrence-exacting relation. Anything related to an object by such a relation will be its property."
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Bhattacharyya Sibajiban. Gangesa's Theory of Indeterminate Perception.
Nirvikalpakavada, Part 1. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical
Research 1993.
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Bhattacharyya Sibajiban. Gangesa's Theory of Indeterminate Perception.
Nirvikalpakavada, Part 2. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical
Research 1996.
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Bhattacharyya Sibajiban, "Some features of Navya-Nyaya logic," Philosophy
East and West 24 (3): 329-342 (1974).
"Navya-Nyaya developed a technical
(non-symbolic) language tied to a realistic ontology, but this became the
language of all serious discourse in India -- of all philosophies, grammar, law,
medicine. The problem is primarily to explain how this was possible. The answer
suggested is that Navya-Nyaya developed a language for 'describing' cognitions
by stating not merely the objects recognized, but also the 'mode of cognition of
the object'. This necessitated the development of special concepts like the
concept of limitor (Avacchedaka). in ontology, Navya-Nyaya made extensive use of
Occam's razor to decide which abstract terms stood for abstract entities, and
which, though abstract grammatically, still denoted entities identifiable as
concrete objects."
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Bhattacharyya Sibajiban, "Some features of the technical language of
Navya-Nyaya," Philosophy East and West 40 (2): 129-149 (1990).
"The
technical language of Navya-Nyaya uses concepts like limitor, determiner, etc.,
to deal with sentences expressing cognition like perception, inference, memory,
belief, doubt, supposition. As such sentences are not extensional, Navya-Nyaya
distinguishes between what is cognised and the mode under which what is cognised
is cognised. Limitor, in the technical language, determines the mode of
cognition and is also used to express quantity of cognition, universality,
particularity, etc. The concept of determiner is used to show what predicate is
asserted of what subject in the same cognition."
-
Bhattacharyya Sibajiban, "The Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrine of qualities,"
Philosophy East and West 11 (3): 143-151 (1961).
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Bilimoria Purusottama, ""Jnana" and "Prama": the logic of knowing. A
critical appraisal," Journal of Indian Philosophy 13: 73-102
(1985).
"The thrust of this paper is to investigate the relative difference
between "Jnana" and "Prama", two crucial concepts in Indian epistemology, since
more recent treatment of them would seem to be confused. Utilizing the framework
developed by Nyaya and Advaita, it is argued that the former describes a wide
range of cognitive processes, such as 'cognition', 'judgment', 'remembering',
'doubting', etc., while the latter defines the bounds of cognition in respect of
its truth-value. A theory of knowledge is developed that accounts for the rise
of 'true' knowledge in terms of the 'psyche-activity' involved and the set of
criteria ("Pramanya") that renders a "Jnana" as a "Prama". The intensional
structure of such a judgment, it is argued, involves a complex
qualified-qualifier relation in conformity with the property-content relation of
the objective correlate."
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Bronkhorst Johannes, "On the history of Paninian grammar in the early
centuries following Patanjali," Journal of Indian Philosophy 11: 357-412
(1983).
"Virtually no literature of the Paninian School of grammar has
survived belonging to the period after Patanjali (2nd century b.C.?) and before
Bhartrhari (5th century a. D). Some verses in Bhartrhari's Vakyapadiya deal with
this time, but they allow of different interpretations. A close study of certain
indications pertaining to this period reveals that Panini's grammar and its
appendixes were modified to an unknown extent and that Patanjali's Mahabhasya
was studied but not taken as the final authority, as it was later."
-
Bronkhorst Johannes, "The Peacock's egg: Bhartrhari on language and
reality," Philosophy East and West 51 (4): 474-491 (2001).
"Bhartrhari
was not only a clever and well-informed philosopher but also a conservative
Brahmin who maintained his own tradition's superiority against the philosophies
developed in his time. He exploited a problem that occupied all his
philosophical contemporaries to promote his own ideas, in which the Veda played
a central role. Bhartrhari and his thought are situated in their philosophical
context. As it turns out, he dealt with issues that others had dealt with before
him in India and suggested solutions to existing problems. Indeed it becomes
clear that he was both a philosopher who dealt with current problems and
challenges and a traditionalist who used the philosophical debate of his time to
gain respectability for his own Vedic tradition."
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Butzenberger Klaus, "On doubting what there is not: the doctrine of doubt
and the reference of terms in Indian grammar, logic and philosophy of language,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 24: 363-406 (1996).
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Cardona George, "Paraphrase and sentence analysis: some Indian views,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 3: 259-281 (1975).
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Cardona George, "Some principles of Panini's grammar," Journal of Indian
Philosophy 1: 40-74 (1970).
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Chakrabarti Arindam, "Against immaculate perception: seven reasons for
eliminating Nirvilkalpaka perception from Nyaya," Philosophy East and
West 50 (1): 1-8 (2000).
"Besides seeing a rabbit or seeing that the
rabbit is grayish, do we also sometimes see barely just the particular animal
(not as an animal or as anything) or the feature rabbitness or grayness? Such
bare, non-verbalizable perception is called "indeterminate perception"
(nirvikalpaka pratyaksa) in Nyaya. Standard Nyaya postulates such
pre-predicative bare perception in order to honor the rule that awareness of a
qualified entity must be caused by awareness of the qualifier. After connecting
this issue with the Western debate concerning the "myth of the given," seven
distinct arguments are presented showing that the very notion of such
indeterminate perception is epistemically otiose and that the Nyaya theory of
perception is better off without it."
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Chakrabarti Arindam. Denying existence. The logic, epistemology and
pragmatics of negative existentials and fictional discourse. Dordrecht:
Kluwer 1997.
See the Appendix: "The problem of the
nonexistent in Indian philosophy of logic and language" pp. 211-245.
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Chakrabarti Arindam, "On knowing by being told," Philosophy East and
West 42 (3): 421-439 (1992).
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Chakrabarti Arindam, "Reply to Stephen Phillips," Philosophy East and
West 51 (1): 114-115 (2001).
-
Chakrabarti Chandana and Chakrabarti Kisor Kumar, "Toward dualism: The
Nyaya-Vaisesika way," Philosophy East and West 41 (4): 477-492 (1981).
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Chakrabarti Kisor Kumar, "Some remarks on Indian theories of truth,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 12: 339-356 (1985).
"Some of the points
sought to be established are (1) an overly pragmatic reading of the concept of
truth in Indian philosophy should be avoided; (2) notions similar to that of
knowledge as justified true belief and to the distinction between analytic and
synthetic truths are found in Indian philosophy; (3) confirmation of truth
through an inferential process, when properly analyzed, does not lead to an
infinite regress and that (4) in some cases truth is known immediately."
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Chakrabarti Kisor Kumar. The logic of Gotama. Honolulu: University
Press of Hawaii 1977.
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Chakrabarti Kisor Kumar, "The Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of universals,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 3: 363-382 (1975).
"The paper consists in
three parts. The first part gives an exposition of the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory
that universals are real entities distinct from and independent of the
particulars to which they may be related. Various arguments for the theory are
stated. The distinctive features of the theory are brought out by way of
comparison and contrast with the views of Aristotle and Plato in particular. The
second part discusses some objections to the theory. The third part explains the
so called 'preventive conditions for universals' together with their bearings on
recent philosophical developments."
-
Chakrabarti Kisor Kumar, "The Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of negative entities,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 6: 129-144 (1978).
"The paper consists in
three parts. The first part criticizes the attempt of some major Indian and
Western philosophers like Plato, Cook Wilson, the Buddhists, the Prabhakaras,
etc., to dispense with negative entities and builds up the case for them. The
second part is devoted to their classification and contains additional arguments
in favour of negative entities of particular kinds. The third part discusses
some problems of a specialized nature such as the criteria for distinguishing
one negative entity from another."
-
Chapple Christopher Key, "Sources for the study of Jaina philosophy: a
bibliographic essay," Philosophy East and West 50 (3): 408-411
(2000).
"Primary titles in the area of Jaina philosophy are identified,
focusing on English-language materials published in the Twentieth century.
Included is a brief survey of individual books and book series, with more
extensive commentary on two important books published within the past five
years: Nathmal Tatia's translation of Umasvati's "Tattvarthasutra" (that which
is) and Nagin J. Shah's translation of Nyayavijayaju's "Jaina Darsana" (Jaina
philosophy and religion)."
-
Coward Harold, ""Speech versus writing" in Derrida and Bhartrhari,"
Philosophy East and West 41 (2): 141-162 (1991).
"This study
identifies points of formal and substantive contact between Derrida and
traditional Indian thought. Reading Bhartrhari with Derrida highlights the error
of previous interpretations that have read the Vakyapadiya through Advaitic
eyes. it also highlights Bhartrhari's accommodation of Buddhist stress on
individual experience while retaining an orthodox grounding in Vedic dharma, now
reinterpreted as sabdatattva. Derrida, however, challenges Bhartrhari's notion
of pratibha or "pure" mystical perception. The study calls into question current
suggestions that Derrida can be understood as a Madhyamikan Buddhist -- for this
analysis shows him to agree with Bhartrhari on exactly those points which
separate Bhartrhari and Nagarjuna."
-
Coward Harold, "Derrida and Bhartrhari's Vakyapadiya on the origin of
language," Philosophy East and West 40 (1): 3-16 (1990).
"This article
compares the views of a traditional Indian (hindu) philosopher of language,
Bhartrhari, with the modern Western deconstructionist view of language of
Derrida. Both see time, as the sequencing of language, to be its basic character
and language's constituting source. Both seek to show how the unitary word
manifests itself in experience as the diversity of speech and writing -- without
recourse to an external other (God or Logos). For both language is neither
logocentric nor empty of reality (the Buddhist view) but is a dynamic becoming
that is itself the very stuff of our experience of reality."
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Coward Harold, "Time (Kala) in Bhartrhari's "Vakyapadiya".," Journal of
Indian Philosophy 10: 277-287 (1982).
"Behind the discussion of the
levels of language in the Vakyapadiya is Bhartrhari's notion of the dynamic
limiting function of time (Kalasakti). After setting forth the absolute nature
of Brahman as the one eternal essence of word and consciousness Bhartrhari then
introduces the notion of time as the power or means by which this one unchanging
Absolute (Sabdatattva--Brahman) manifests itself as the dynamic diversity
mankind experiences as creation. Time is the creative power of Brahman."
-
Cox Collett, "From category To ontology: the changing role of Dharma
In Sarvastivada Abhidharma," Journal of Indian Philosophy 32: 543-597
(2004).
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Dasgupta Probal, "Modern Indian work at the logic-linguistics boundary,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 9: 217-225 (1981).
"The mainstream
Western logico-linguistic assumption that wh-words ("who", "when",...) in
constituent questions manifest a wh-quantifier reflects features of Western
languages, which position wh-words clause-initially. Languages like Sanskrit,
Hindi, and Bangla form indefinite expressions systematically by adding an
existential element to interrogative K-words, suggesting that K expresses a
variable and not a quantifier. Further probing indicates that existential and
universal quantifiers are based respectively on free and bound variables.
Independent linguistic arguments show that these proposals work better than the
quantifier theory of questions even for Western languages. Frege and Felix Cohen
have, on logical grounds, already argued for a variable theory."
-
Daye Douglas Dunsmore, "Circularity in the inductive justification of formal
arguments (Tarka) in the Twelfth-century Indian Jaina logic,"
Philosophy East and West 29 (2): 177-188 (1979).
-
Dixit Krishna Kumar. Jaina ontology. Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of
Indology 1971.
-
Faddegon Barend. The Vaiçesika-system, described with the help of the
oldest texts. Amsterdam: J. Muller 1918.
Rreprinted Wiesbaden, M. Sändig,
1969.
-
Ganeri Jonardon, "Ancient Indian logic as a theory of case-based reasoning,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 31: 33-45 (2003).
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Ganeri Jonardon, "Meaning and reference in Classical India," Journal of
Indian Philosophy 24: 1-19 (1996).
"In another paper, I discussed the
grammarian Vyadi's realist' theory of meaning, and showed how its failure to
distinguish between the concepts of meaning' and reference' laid open his theory
to a series of powerful objections. Later grammarians and Naiyayikas were forced
to seek new, more sophisticated, accounts of the semantics of proper names and
nominals, and in doing so introduced important innovations in the theory of
meaning. I would like in this paper to discuss the contributions of these
authors, especially to our understanding of the relation between the meaning of
a term and its reference, and to the semantics of context-sensitive
expressions."
-
Ganeri Jonardon. Semantic powers. Meaning and the means of knowing in
classical Indian philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1999.
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Ganeri Jonardon, "The Hindu syllogism: Nineteenth-Century perceptions of
Indian logical thought," Philosophy East and West 46 (1): 1-16
(1986).
"Following H. T. Colebrooke's 1824 'discovery' of the Hindu
syllogism, his term for the five-step inference schema in the Nyaya-Sutra,
European logicians and historians of philosophy demonstrated considerable
interest in Indian logical thought. This is in marked contrast with later
historians of philosophy, and also with Indian nationalist and neo-Hindu
thinkers like Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan, who downgraded Indian rationalist
traditions in favor of 'spiritualist' or 'speculative' texts. This article
traces the role of these later thinkers in the origins of the myth that Indian
thought is spiritual and a-rational. The extent to which Nineteenth-century
European philosophers were aware of Colebrooke's 'discovery' is documented, and
then their criticisms of the Hindu syllogism and its defense by orientalists
like Ballantyne and Muller are examined."
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Ganeri Jonardon, "Vyadi and the realist theory of meaning," Journal of
Indian Philosophy 23: 403-428 (1995).
"Vyadi, a celebrated Indian
linguist, endorses a version of the realist theory of meaning, that the meaning
of a word is the object for which it stands. As applied to generic nominals like
"(the) cow", Vyadi's thesis faced two much rehearsed objections: 1) if, for each
token utterance, a separate meaning rule must be given, then the number of such
rules will be "limitless", and the word will be radically homonymous; 2) if only
some finite set is given, use of the word to refer outside this set will be
"aberrant". These arguments significantly resemble certain Davidsonian
constraints on a theory of meaning. The application of Vyadi's theory to proper
names is also examined."
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Gangopadhyay Mrinal Kanti, "The concept of Upadhi in Nyaya logic,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 1: 146-166 (1971).
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Gangopadhyay Mrinalkanti, "Gangesa on the means for the ascertainment of
invariable concomitance," Journal of Indian Philosophy 3: 167-208
(1975).
"The article is an exposition of the Vyaptigrahopaya (means for the
ascertainment of invariable concomitance) section of the Tattvacintamani, the
famous NavyaNyaya work of Gangesa. The Sanskrit original, given in
transliteration, is divided into nineteen short texts. Texts 1-15 give the
Prabhakara position: invariable concomitance is not ascertained through
'repeated observation', but through 'single observation'. texts 16-18 give
Gangesa's refutation of the Prabhakara. Text 19 gives Gangesa's own position:
the cause for the ascertainment of invariable concomitance is the perception of
the coexistence of the probans with the probandum along with the absence of
cognition concerning the irregularity of the probans."
-
Gangopadhyaya Mrinalkanti. Indian logic in its sources: on validity of
inference. New Delhi: Munhsiram Monoharlal 1984.
-
Gerow Edwin, "Language and symbol in Indian semiotics," Philosophy East
and West 34 (3): 245-260 (1984).
-
Gillon Brendan S. Negative facts and knowledge of negative facts. In
Relativism, suffering and beyond. Essays in memory of Bimal K. Matilal.
Edited by Bilimoria Purusottama and Mohanty Jitendra Nath. New Delhi: Oxford
University Press 1997. pp. 128-149
"Negative facts have perplexed Western
philosophers ever since the time of Plato.' But the philosophers of Europe and
America have not been the only philosophers to have been perplexed by them;
classical Indian philosophers too have pondered their nature. My interest here
is to explore how the reflections of these classical Indian philosophers,
transposed into the contemporary philosophical idiom, might enrich current
metaphysical thinking about negative facts; and what I shall conclude is that at
least one of these philosophers has a view of negative facts and knowledge of
them, which, when so transposed, is very plausible indeed.
I shall begin by
asking the fundamental ontological question of whether or not negative facts
exist and then sketch various replies which European and American philosophers
have given to it. Since these replies have not led to any decisive answer to the
question, I shall then ask two other questions: the more specific ontological
question of whether or not absences-surely paradigmatic examples of negative
facts-exist; and the related epistemological question of what is known when the
absence of something is said to be known. Answers to these questions comprise an
important part of classical Indian philosophy; and I shall outline their answers
to them, concluding that the most plausible answers to these questions are those
of Jayanta Bhatta, who maintained that absences do indeed exist and that they
are known not only by inference but also by perception."
-
Glashoff Klaus, "On Stanisaw Schayer's research on Nyaya," Journal of
Indian Philosophy 32: 295-319 (2004).
-
Gokhale Pradeep P. Inference and fallacies in ancient Indian logic: with
special reference to Nyaya Buddhism. New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications
1992.
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Gokhale Pradeep P., "The terms Padartha and Prameya in the
context of Nyayasutra," Philosophy East and West 32 (2): 207-211
(1982).
"In this paper an attempt has been made to show that the Vaisesika
concept of "padartha" as 'a type of object in this world' is not properly
applicable to the sixteen terms mentioned by Gautama in Nyaya-Sutra III.
Traditionally "artha" (in Gautama's list of "prameyas") was identified with
"padartha" of Vaisesika's. But identification of Gautama's "prameya" or "artha"
with Vaisesika "padartha" is misleading. The sixteen terms of Nyaya are also not
'categories' in the technical sense. Gautama's definition of 'padartha' has
linguistic import rather than ontological."
-
Gopalan Subramania. Outlines of Jainism. New Delhi: Wiley Eastern
Private 1973.
-
Gradinarov Plamen. Phenomenology and Indian epistemology: studies in
Naya-Vaisesika transcendental logic and atomism. New Delhi: Ajanta Books
International 1990.
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Gupta Bina, "Are "Hetvabhasas" formal fallacies?," Journal of Indian
Philosophy 8: 135-147 (1980).
"The first part of the paper examines the
"Hetvabhasas" of the Nyaya school. The second part analyzes the differences
between Indian and Western conceptions of fallacy and deals with the question
whether the Indian account of the "Hetvabhasas" is totally devoid of the notion
of formal fallacy as it is understood in the West. I have suggested that though
the "completed" Nyaya inference includes the properties of formal validity, the
notion of "Hetvabhasa" presents only the necessary conditions for satisfactorily
completing such an inferential process. Thus, while the Nyaya inference
adequately accounts for the validity of the final "product" of inference, the
Nyaya "Hetvabhasas" account for the inferential process leading up to a sound
product of inference."
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Hayes Richard P., "Dignaga's views on reasoning (Svarthanumana).,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 8: 219-277 (1980).
"This paper presents
the views of the Sixth century Indian Buddhist epistemologist Dignaga on the
reliability of reasoning in the acquisition of knowledge. In stating the
necessary conditions for reliability in inference, Dignaga outlined an
elementary logic of classes that served as the foundation for all later
extensional logics in India. The first part of the paper presents an overview of
Dignaga's epistemology, followed by a more detailed discussion of his
presentation of the test of validity in reasoning. The second part comprises an
annotated translation of a previously untranslated passage from Dignaga's
principal work."
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Herzberger Hans Georg, "Bhartrhari's paradox," Journal of Indian
Philosophy 9: 1-17 (1981).
"The thesis that some things cannot be named
was characteristic of certain Schools of traditional Indian philosophy. The
problem we call 'Bhartrhari's paradox' arises from efforts to verify this thesis
by positive instances. We examine Bhartrhari's position on the unnameability
thesis in general and on the more particular thesis that the naming relation
itself is unnameable. We then show how this more particular thesis is entailed
by the set-theoretical proposition that no relation can be one of its own
relata. Finally we generalize the set-theoretical argument and embed it within
the paradox with which we began."
-
Ho Chien Hsing, "How not to avoid speaking -- "A free exposition of
Dignaga's Apoha doctrine"," Journal of Indian Philosophy 24: 541-562
(1996).
-
Houben, Jan E. M., "Bhartrhari's solution to the Liar and some other
paradoxes," Journal of Indian Philosophy 23: 381-401 (1995).
"In a
passage in the Vakyapadiya which should be of special interest to logicians and
semanticists, the grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari (India, 5th century c.e.)
deals with paradoxes of negation, self-reference and truth (including the
so-called 'Liar paradox'). The strategy of Russell and others attempting to
establish a perfect formal language was to try to preclude their occurrence. The
more recent trend to accept them as paradoxes has stimulated interesting
developments in semantics, formal logic and related areas. Bhartrhari, however,
presents the key to a solution based on the way intention, reference, and
negation work in everyday language and communication."
-
Ingalls Daniel Henry Holmes, "A reply to Bhattacharya," Philosophy East
and West 5 (2): 163-166 (1955).
-
Ingalls Daniel Henry Holmes. Materials for the study of Navya-Nyaya
logic. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1951.
-
Iwata Takashi, "An Interpretation of Dharmakrti's Svabhava-Hetu,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 31: 61-87 (2003).
-
Jha Vashishtha Narayan. Relations in Indian philosophy. Delhi: Sri
Satguru Publications 1992.
-
Joshi N.V. Indian philosophy: from the ontological point of view.
Bombay : Somalya Publications 1977.
-
Joshi Rasik Vihari. Studies in Indian logic and metaphysics. Delhi:
Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan 1979.
-
Joshi S.D., "Syntactic and semantic devices in the Astadhyayi of Panini,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 29: 155-167 (2001).
-
Kellner Birgit, "Negation - failure or success? Remarks on an allegedly
characteristic trait of Dharmakirti's Anupalabdhi-theory," Journal of Indian
Philosophy 29: 495-517 (2001).
-
Kiparsky Paul, "On Paninian studies: a reply to Cardona," Journal of
Indian Philosophy 19: 331-367 (1991).
-
Larson Gerald James, "The format of technical philosophical writing in
Ancient India: inadequacies of conventional translations," Philosophy East
and West 30 (3): 375-380 (1980).
-
Matilal Bimal Krishna, "A note on the Nyaya fallacy sadhyasama and petitio
principii," Journal of Indian Philosophy 2: 211-224 (1974).
"When H.
N. Randle (in 1930) interpreted 'sadhyasama' as petitio principii, he made a
mistake. Unfortunately, many scholars accepted randle's interpretation. It has
been shown that Randle was wrong about this interpretation. 'Sadhyasama' can be
correctly translated as a fallacy of being in the same predicament with
yet-to-be-proven proposition. Petitio is a different fallacy, as it has been
described by Aristotle. Some general comments have been made on the notion of
fallacy, and on the distinction between 'formal' and 'non-formal' fallacies."
-
Matilal Bimal Krishna. Analytical philosophy in comparative perspective.
Exploratory essays in current theories and classical Indian theories of meaning
and reference. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company 1985.
-
Matilal Bimal Krishna, "Causality in the Nyaya-Vaisesika School,"
Philosophy East and West 25 (1): 41-48 (1975).
"The meaning of "cause"
is much wider in some Indian philosophical schools than in the West. the
Buddhist terms, "hetu" and "pratyaya", cover an unusual variety of causal
notions. The Vaisesika notion of cause is said to be closer to commonsense. A
causal substrate in this system approximates the notion of "material" cause in
Aristotle, but the "non-substantial" cause is a unique notion in this system.
The Nyaya critique of causation (in Udayana) can be profitably compared and
contrasted with that of David Hume. It has been further argued in the paper that
Mill was a poor defender of Hume against Reid, and that the Navya-Nyaya analysis
of the 'unconditionality' criterion was slightly better than that of Mill."
-
Matilal Bimal Krishna. Epistemology, logic, and grammar in Indian
philosophical analysis. The Hague: Mouton 1971.
Second revised edition
with a new preface by Jonardon Ganeri and the additions and changes made by
Matilal in his personal copy: Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005.
-
Matilal Bimal Krishna, "Error and truth. Classical Indian theories,"
Philosophy East and West 31 (2): 215-224 (1981).
"Classical Indian
theories of error are discussed to show their relevance to the philosophical
problems of the Cartesian epistemologists in general and the British empiricists
in particular. The concept of "alambana" and "pratibhasa" as discussed by the
Ssautrantika-Yogacara School is explained and the views of the "sense-data"
philosophers are discussed in this connection."
-
Matilal Bimal Krishna, "Gangesa on the concept of universal property
(Kevalanvoyin)," Philosophy East and West 18 (3): 151-161 (1968).
-
Matilal Bimal Krishna. Mind, language, and world. New York: Oxford
University Press 2002.
Edited by Jonardon Ganeri
-
Matilal Bimal Krishna. Nyaya-Vaisesika. Wiesbaden: O. Harrasowitz
1977.
A history of Indian literature: vol. 6, II.
-
Matilal Bimal Krishna, "Ontological problems in Nyaya, Buddhism and Jainism:
a comparative analysis," Journal of Indian Philosophy 5: 91-105
(1977).
"The Nyaya-Vaisesika believed that we can achieve a satisfactory
explanation of 'what there is' if we can analyse and classify the concrete
objects of our experience into 'substance', 'quality' and 'action'. The Buddhist
thought reality to be in perpetual flux and thus the objects of experience are
synthetic and analysable into what they called "dharmas". The Jainas compromised
by saying that reality is 'many-sided', both substantial (when we take the Nyaya
point of view) and ever fluctuating (when we take the Buddhist position). In
Whiteheadean terms, it is a combination of 'process' and 'reality'. A
comparison, in some details, of these three Schools is attempted in the paper."
-
Matilal Bimal Krishna. Perception. An essay on classical Indian theories
of knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986.
-
Matilal Bimal Krishna, "Reference and existence in Nyaya and Buddhist
logic," Journal of Indian Philosophy 1: 83-108 (1970).
"This
Nyaya-Buddhist controversy over the empty subject term may well recall to a
modern mind the Meinong-Russell controversy about 'existence' and 'denotation'.
The Nyaya and the Buddhist logicians worried over the logical and the
epistemological problem connected with the issue. The Nyaya interpreted "the
rabbit's horn" not as a singular term but as a predicate complex attributing
'hornness' to something that belonged to the rabbit. "The rabbit's horn does not
exist" ascribes the absence of hornness to something belonging to a rabbit, and
is true. This analysis is closer to Russell's theory of description. The
Buddhist, on the other hand, is prepared to allow some sort of 'fictional
existence' to "the rabbit's horn" which is perhaps not very different from
Meinong's 'theory of objects'. In epistemology the Nyaya believed that any
object of cognition (which is expressible in words) must be either real or
analyzable into constituents which are ultimately identifiable with some real
entity or other. Only a complex object can be fictional. The Buddhists, however,
hold that the objects of erroneous cognition are fictional."
-
Matilal Bimal Krishna. The Navya-Nyaya doctrine of negation. The
semantics and ontology of negative statements in Navya-Nyaya philosophy.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1968.
-
Matilal Bimal Krishna. The word and the world. India's contribution to
the study of language. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990.
-
McCrea Lawrence, "The hierarchical organization of language in Mimansa
interpretive theory," Journal of Indian Philosophy 28: 429-459 (2000).
-
McDermott Charlene Senape A., "Mr. Ruegg on Ratnakirti," Journal of
Indian Philosophy 2: 16-19 (1972).
"This point-for-point response to Mr.
D. S. Ruegg's criticisms of my "An Eleventh century Buddhist logic of 'exists'"
is at the same time an argument for a true interdisciplinary dialogue between
philosophers and indologists."
-
Mehta Mohan Lal. Outlines of Jaina philosophy. The essential of Jaina
ontology, epistemology and ethics. Bangalore: Jain Mission Society 1954.
-
Mejor Marek, "Contribution of Polish Scholars to the study of Indian logic,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 31: 9-20 (2003).
-
Misra Ganewar. Language, reality, and analysis. Essays on Indian
philosophy. Edited by Mohanty Jitendra Nath. Leiden: E. J. Brill 1990.
-
Mohanty Jitendra Nath. Gangesa's theory of truth. Containing the text of
Gangesa's Pramanya Jnapti Vada with an English translation, explanatory notes,
and an introductory essay. Santiniketan: 1966.
Second revised edition:
Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1989
-
Mohanty Jitendra Nath, "Indian theories of truth: thoughts on their common
framework," Philosophy East and West 30 (4): 439-451 (1980).
"The
peculiar features of Indian theories of truth, according to this paper, are: (I)
a theory of cognitive occurrent; (II) absence of a theory of meaning as distinct
from reference; (III) a consequent position that avoids the extremes of logicism
and psychologism; (IV) a restricted theory of necessary truths, a fallibilism
with regard to empirical truths and infallibilism with regard to moral truths;
(V) a close connection between cognitive enterprise and practice; and (VI)
reliance on reflective analysis of the cognitive situation."
-
Mohanty Jitendra Nath, "On Matilal's understanding of Indian philosophy,"
Philosophy East and West 42 (3): 397-406 (1992).
-
Mohanty Jitendra Nath, "Pramanya and workability -- Response to Potter,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 12: 329-338 (1984).
-
Mohanty Jitendra Nath. Reason and tradition in Indian thought. An essay
on the nature of Indian philosophical thinking. New York: Oxford University
Press 1992.
-
Mohanty Jitendra Nath, "Reflections on the Nyaya theory of
Aavayavipratyaksa," Journal of Indian Philosophy 1: 30-41 (1961).
-
Mohanty Jitendra Nath, "Understanding some ontological differences in Indian
philosophy," Journal of Indian Philosophy 8: 205-218 (1980).
"Taking
up the pluralistic realism of Nyaya Vaisesika and monistic idealism of Advaita
Vedanta, the paper enquires into the origins of this ontological difference.
While the theory of "Pramanas" (or theory of knowledge) was used to certify the
ontology, the epistemology itself was incorporated into the ontology. No
absolute point of beginning is available for a system, both the systems claim to
give accounts of ordinary language and ordinary experience. The search for an
extra-systemic evidence is frustrating."
-
Mukherjea A.K., "The definition of pervasion ("vyapti") in Navya-Nyaya,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 4: 1-50 (1976).
-
Mullick Mohini, "Implication and entailment in Navya-Nyaya logic,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 4: 127-134 (1976).
"My attempt is to
produce some evidence to show that the notions of implication and entailment are
clearly distinguished in Navya-Nyaya logic. This is done by examining the nature
of the Navya-Nyaya syllogism and showing that the Naiyayikas were aware of
various definitions of material implication but rejected them as definitions of
vyapti (implication), not because they led to inferential paradoxes but to
semantic ones; they in fact never confused implication with entailment. The
entailment relation is contained in their notion of "paramarsa" and appears as
the last premise in the argument which immediately precedes and thus 'causes'
the conclusion."
-
Murti Srimannarayana. Bhartrhari. The grammarian. Sahitya Akademi
1997.
Contents: Date and Works of Bhartrhari; Language, Grammar and
Culture; Scope and Scheme of the Vakyapadiya; Communicative and Analytic
Language; Sentence; Indivisibility of Sentence; Theory of Sphota; Sentence Sense
Pratibha Word; Intention of the Speaker; Referent of the Word; Substance and
Universal; The Qualifier and the Qualificant; Basal and Contextual Referents;
Negative Particle; Yugapadadhikaranavacana; Abhedaikatvasamkhya; Time
Sabdadvaita Philosophy; Epilogue; Bibliography.
"Bhartrhari, the celebrated
grammarian philosopher, is believed to have lived in the 5th century. This
monograph presents the linguistic and philosophical theories connecting the
analysis of the sentence with the ultimate reality-Sabdabrahman. The linguistic
principles dealt with here are applicable not only to Sanskrit but to any
language. His magnum opus the Vakyapadiya, even though partly incomplete, is the
only extant work comprehensively dealing with the linguistic features of the
Sanskrit language and the philosophy of grammar. It contains three
kandas-Brahma-kanda or Agama-kanda, Vakya-Kanda and Prakirna-Kanda. The first
two kandas together consist of 635 slokas, and deal with the Sabdabrahman, the
creation of the world, jiva, world and language. The Prakirna-kanda running into
1300 slokas, divided into 14 sections called samuddesas, deals with the
linguistic categories and semantic speculations prevalent in the Indian
grammatical tradition. The other extant works of Bhartrhari are his fragmentary
commentary of the Mahabhasya of Patanjali and auto-commentary on the kandas I
and II of the Vakyapadiya."
-
Nicholson Hugh R., "Specifying the nature of substance in Aristotle and
Indian philosophy," Philosophy East and West 54 (4): 533-554
(2004).
"Aristotle struggles with two basic tensions in his understanding of
reality or substance that have parallels in Indian metaphysical speculation. The
first of these tensions, between the understanding of reality as the underlying
substrate (to hupokeimenon) and as the individual "this" (tode
ti), finds a parallel in the concept of dravya in Patanjali's
Mahâbhasya. The second tension, between the understanding of reality as
the individual this and as the intelligible essence of the individual this
(to ti en einai), corresponds to an ambiguity in the concept of
vastu in Kumarila's Slokavarttika."
-
Nieuwendijk Arthur, "Semantics and comparative logic," Journal of Indian
Philosophy 20: 377-418 (1992).
"The paper takes up the question as to
which logical framework is most suitable for a formal interpretation of
Navya-Nyaya logic. It is claimed that, for this purpose, the framework offered
by extensional first-order predicate logic is inadequate. This claim is
established by discussing three well-known difficulties: the interpretation of
the notion of Jnana, the question whether contraposition is a law of NavyaNyaya
logic, and the interpretation of the Navya-Nyaya scheme of inference. Next, the
interrelatedness of these difficulties is pointed out, and, carrying through the
analysis, it is examined whether situation semantics offers a suitable
alternative framework."
-
Oetke Claus, "Ancient Indian logic as a theory of non-monotonic reasoning,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 24: 447-539 (1996).
"The aim of the paper
is to demonstrate that the most ancient varieties of "Indian logic" are
significantly related to theories associated with the term "non-monotonc logic"
in so far as they try to account for reasoning relying on the ability to use
general rules subject to exceptions and indicate a conception of
context-dependent validity implying that valid inferences or arguments can lose
this status in the context of additional information. On that background it is
possible to give a theoretical justification for a number of features of Indian
theories of inference which previously appeared theoretically ill motivated and
which were often explained by historical coincidences."
-
Oetke Claus, "Indian logic and Indian syllogism," Indo-Iranian
Journal 46 (1): 53-69 (2003).
-
Ogawa Hideyo, "Bhartrhari on A.1.1.68," Journal of Indian Philosophy
29: 531-543 (2001).
-
Padmarajiah Y.J. A comparative study of the Jaina theories of reality and
knowledge. Bombay: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal 1963.
-
Parsons Terence, "Bhartrhari on what cannot be said," Philosophy East and
West 51 (4): 525-534 (2001).
" Bhartrhari claims that certain things
cannot be signified - -for example, the signification relation itself. Hans and
Radhika Herzberger assert that Bhartrhari's claim about signification can be
validated by an appeal to twentieth-century results in set theory. This appeal
is unpersuasive in establishing this view, but arguments akin to the semantic
paradoxes (such as the "liar" paradox) come much closer. Unfortunately, these
arguments are equally telling against another of his views: that the thatness of
the signification relation can be signified. Bhartrhari also claims that the
relation of inherence cannot be signified -- a quite different view that is not
borne out by twentieth-century results. Finally, further research is needed to
investigate what Bhartrhari's own reasons might have been for these views."
-
Perett Roy W., "Is whatever exists knowable and nameable?," Philosophy
East and West 49 (4): 401-414 (1999).
"Naiyayikas are fond of a slogan,
which often appears as a kind of motto in their texts: "Whatever exists is
knowable and nameable". What does this mean? Is it true? The first part of this
essay offers a brief explication of this important Nyaya thesis; the second part
argues that, given certain plausible assumptions, the thesis is demonstrably
false."
-
Perett Roy W., "Self-refutation in Indian philosophy," Journal of Indian
Philosophy 12: 237-264 (1984).
"Utilizing a taxonomy of types of
self-refutation, I examine a number of classical Indian debates in epistemology,
metaphysics and methodology in order to clarify the structure and status of some
of the varieties of self-refutation arguments used. I argue that some of the
arguments, though ostensibly minimal, invoke concealed presuppositions. Once
these are revealed the arguments are often unsuccessful, (at least as "minimal"
arguments), though important metaphilosophical issues are thereby highlighted."
-
Perrett Roy, "A note on the Navya-Nyaya account of number," Journal of
Indian Philosophy 13: 227-234 (1985).
"I maintain (contra Ingalls) that
the Navya-Nyaya account of number as a property of classes should be understood
intensionally, not extensionally. Such a theory is closer to Frege's earlier
views than to Russell's and also has certain advantages over Russell's theory.
However it seems that Navya-Nyaya cannot provide a criterion of identity for
such intrinsically intensional properties; and this difficulty is particularly
important for Navya-Nyaya, given its epistemological and metaphysical realism."
-
Perrett Roy, "Self-refutation in Indian philosophy," Journal of Indian
Philosophy 12 (3): 237-264 (1984).
-
Perszyk Kenneth J., "'Virtue is not blue': Navya-Nyaya and some Western
views," Journal of Indian Philosophy 11: 325-338 (1983).
"The primary
aim is to construct, within the Navya-Nyaya system, an analysis of sentences
such as 'virtue is not blue', which they would claim are meaningful. There is a
discussion of their important distinction between meaningful sentences and
sentences which generate or have the ability to generate a cognition, and their
concept of negation. The secondary aim is to compare their analysis with certain
Western philosophers, especially those who follow the theory of types."
-
Perszyk Kenneth J., "Negative entities and negative facts in Navya-Nyaya,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 12: 265-276 (1984).
"The purpose of this
article is to discuss the Navya-Nyaya's thesis that absence is an ontological
category, which is to say that there are negative entities, and its corollary
that there are negative facts. The Nyaya resists all attempts to eliminate
negative facts in favour of positive facts. In addition, we see that no atomic
sentence can have a negative subject-term."
-
Perszyk Kenneth J., "The Nyaya and Russell on empty terms," Philosophy
East and West 34 (2): 131-146 (1984).
"The purpose of this paper is to
demonstrate how the Navya-Nyaya school of Indian philosophy determines the truth
or falsity of a sentence which contains an empty term, and to point out some
similarities and differences between its method of analysis and truth-value
determinations of such sentences and that of Bertrand Russell."
-
Phillips Stephen H. and Chakrabarti Arindam. Epistemology of perception:
Gangesa's Tattvacintamani, Jewel of reflection on the truth /about
epistemology). The perception chapter (Prataksa-khanda). New York: American
Institute of Buddhist Studies 2004.
Transliterated text, translation, and
philosophical commentary.
-
Phillips Stephen H., "From Gangesa's Tattvacintamani: discourse on
perceptual presentation of something as other than what it is," Journal of
Indian Philosophy 28: 567-650 (2000).
"Classical Indian theory of
perceptual illusion is refined by Gangesa (c. 1325) in this translation (with
explanation) of an important section of his masterwork, "Jewel of reflection on
the truth (about epistemology)". Illusion is a single cognition of an entity as
qualified by a qualifier that is fused by memory into current perception. This
view is challenged by various adversaries (mainly Mimansaka but also Buddhist
and Vedantic). Examples agreed to are of people making false statements on the
basis of perceptual evidence, e.g., "this is silver," when an object in front is
really mother-of-pearl. One rival camp sees the unsuccessful effort to pick up
silver as flowing from a failure to cognize of a certain sort, not from a
perceptual misrepresentation. Gangesa devotes (successful) effort to refuting
this and other views, his overall strategy being that though his view faces
difficulties they are much less severe than those faced by the alternatives."
-
Phillips Stephen H., "Gangesa on characterizing veridical awareness,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 21: 107-168 (1993).
": Within the context
of a causal theory of knowledge, Gangesa, the revolutionary 14th-century Indian
logician and epistemologists, considers and reflects about twenty-five
definitions of knowledge (in his view, "veridical awareness," "Prama"), and
accepts about eight, with one in particular acquiring the status of Plato's
"justified true belief" for all later epistemologists (writing in Sanskrit) to
the present. This article is an annotated translation, introducing technical
notions of Gangesa's system (in particular for an audience of non-Sanskritist
philosophers). The notes provide some historical context but are devoted chiefly
to the question of the success of the project."
-
Phillips Stephen H., "There's nothing wrong with raw perception: a response
to Chakrabarti's attack on Nyaya's Nirvikalpaka Pratyaksa," Philosophy East
and West 51 (1): 104-113 (2001).
"As part of its direct realism in the
epistemology of perception, classical Indian Nyaya posits indeterminate
perception where a qualifier is grasped immediately without being grasped as
qualifying its qualificandum, the thing whose property it is. Contemporary
philosopher, Arindam Chakrabarti, argued in Philosophy East and West 50, no. 1
(January 2000) that Nyaya would best eschew such "indeterminate perception."
This paper offers a defense drawing on the classical texts. It is explained in
particular that while there is no claim of direct, apperceptive evidence for raw
perception, there is an argument that ties up all verbalizable cognition,
including verbalizable perception, as having the qualifier it presents as
available through previous experience. But with a first-time perception of
something as, say, a cow, the cognizer's memory not informed by previous cow
experience could not possibly provide the qualifier, cowhood, and the best
candidate seems its perception in the raw."
-
Potter Karl H., "Are the Vaisesika "Gunas" qualities?," Philosophy East
and West 4 (3): 259-264 (1954).
-
Potter Karl H., "Does Indian epistemology concern justified true belief?,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 12: 307-328 (1984).
"I endeavor to show
that J. N. Mohanty's claim of incommensurability among Indian epistemological
theories is based on a justified true belief account of knowledge; that
"Pramanya" doesn't mean truth but rather workability; that Indian theories of
knowledge are not predicated on noncognitivism in values as Western ones are;
that the claim incommensurability among Indian epistemological theories is a
result of imposing on them shortcomings in contemporary Western ways of
thinking."
-
Potter Karl H., "On the realistic proclivities of Navya-Nyaya as explicated
by Bhattacharyya," Philosophy East and West 24 (3): 343-347 (1974).
-
Potter Karl H., "Some thoughts on the Nyaya conception of meaning,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 3: 209-216 (1975).
-
Pradyot Kumar Mukhopadhyay. Indian realism. A rigorous descriptive
metaphysics. Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi 1984.
-
Prasad Jwala. History of Indian epistemology. Delhi: Munshiram
Monoharlal 1958.
-
Prets Ernst, "Futile and false rejoinders, sophistical arguments and early
Indian logic," Journal of Indian Philosophy 29: 545-558 (2001).
-
Ranade Ramachandra Dattatraya. A constructive survey of Upanishadic
philosophy being a systematic introduction to Indian metaphysics. Oriental
Book Agency: Oriental Book Agency 1926.
-
Rao K.L.Seshagiri, "On truth: A Hindu perspective," Philosophy East and
West 20 (4): 377-382 (1970).
"The article shows how the Hindu tradition
and specially Vedanta has come to express its own experience of truth. It views
the problem of truth ontologically: ultimate truth cannot be 'known' like a
finite object; it is in fact the 'knower' himself, Atman, the unconditioned
being. Both absolutistic and theistic interpretations of Atman/Brahman are
considered. It concludes: truth is spiritual reality, being of our being and the
meaning of all finite existence."
-
Ruegg Seyfort, "On Ratnakirti," Journal of Indian Philosophy 1:
300-309 (1971).
-
Scharf Peter M. The denotation of generic terms in ancient Indian
philosophy. Grammar, Nyaya and Mimamsa. Philadelphia : American
Philosophical Society 1996.
-
Schuster Nancy, "Inference in the Vaisesikasutras," Journal of Indian
Philosophy 2: 341-386 (1972).
"Conflicting statements appear in the
Vaisesikasutras about how knowledge of imperceptible entities is attained.
Passages from the Sutras are compared with the Samkhya Sastitantra, the
Nyayasutras, Nyayabhasya, and other early texts. Impact of the Sastitantra on
Vaisesikasutras and Nyayabhasya was strong. Contradictions within
Vaisesikasutras reveal the compilers' grappling with the Samkhya theory over a
period of time. Bias in favor of direct perception dominates the Vaisesika
text."
-
Shastri Dharmendra Nath. Critique of Indian realism. A study of the
conflict between the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Buddhist Dignaga school. Agra:
Agra University 1964.
-
Shastri Dharmendra Nath. The philosophy of Nyaya Vaisesika and its
conflict with the Buddhist Dignaga School (A critique of Indian Realism).
Delhi: Bharatiya Vidy Prakashan 1976.
Third edition 1997.
-
Shastri Gaurinath Bhattacharyya. The philosophy of word and meaning. Some
Indian approaches with special reference to the philosophy of Bhartrhari.
Calcutta: Sanskrit College 1959.
-
Shaw Jaysankar Lal, "Conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence:
The Nyaya and the Advaita Vedanta," Journal of Indian Philosophy 28:
273-293 (2000).
-
Shaw Jaysankar Lal. Some logical problems concerning existence.
Calcutta: Punthi Pustak 2003.
-
Shaw Jaysankar Lal, "The Nyaya on cognition and negation," Journal of
Indian Philosophy 8: 279-302 (1980).
"The aim of this paper is to discuss
the Nyaya concept of negation and the different types of negation. This
discussion involves a discussion of the Nyaya concept of cognition, relation and
meaning. The Nyaya has drawn a distinction between qualificative and
non-qualificative cognition. A qualificative cognition can be represented by the
form "arb". The Nyaya concept of negation cannot be said to be a term-negation,
or a sentence-negation, or a propositional function negation. The conclusion is
that the Nyaya concept of negation does not correspond to any Western concept of
negation."
-
Shaw Jaysankar Lal, "The Nyaya on existence, knowability and nameability,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 5: 255-266 (1978).
"One of the aims of
this paper is to discuss the different senses of the term 'existence' as used by
the Nyaya philosophers. This discussion leads us to a discussion on absence or
negation and its role in logic. A discussion on empty terms has also been
introduced in this context. According to the Nyaya, existence, knowability and
nameability are considered as universal properties. The distinction between
these universal properties has been discussed in this context. I have also
discussed the question whether the Nyaya has used redundant terms in designating
the same imposed property by using three different terms. A distinction between
different senses of the term 'property' has also been discussed in this
context."
-
Shaw Jaysankar Lal. The Nyaya on meaning: a commentary on Pandit
Visvabandhu. Calcutta: Punthi Pustak 2003.
-
Shaw Jaysankar Lal, "Universal sentences: Russell, Wittgenstein, Prior, and
the Nyaya," Journal of Indian Philosophy 19: 103-119 (1991).
"The aim
of this paper is to discuss I) whether the following sentences have the same
meaning, II) whether they have the same truth-value, III) whether there is some
assertion common to all of them, and IV) if there is some such assertion,
whether it can be defined. 1) all men are mortal, 2) whoever is a man is mortal,
3) wherever there is humanity, then there is mortality, 4) if anyone is a man,
then he is mortal, 5) if humanity is present somewhere, then mortality is also
present there."
-
Siderits Mark. Indian philosophy of language. Studies in selected
issues. Dodrecht: Kluwer 1991.
-
Siderits Mark, "The sense-reference distinction in Indian philosophy of
language," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 14: 331-355 (1987).
-
Staal Frits, "The concept of 'paksa' in Indian logic," Journal of Indian
Philosophy 2: 156-165 (1973).
"The customary assumption that the Indian
concepts of hetu, sadhya and paksa correspond to the Aristotelian middle, major
and minor terms, respectively, is incorrect. The concept of paksa is used
ambiguously in Indian logic, where it denotes either the term whose property is
the sadhya, or the relation between that term and the sadhya. Another ambiguity
of the Sanskrit originals, between paksa as used and paksa as mentioned, is
resolved in a Chinese translation."
-
Staal Frits, "The concept of metalanguage and its Indian background,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 3: 315-354 (1975).
"In Indian culture the
concept of metalanguage originated early in the context of linguistics and
speculations on language; in the West, late in the context of logic. This is
related to the grammatical character of Indian culture and the mathematical
character of Western culture. Connections are made between metalinguistic
notions and technical, in particular poetic and ritual languages; Mantras; the
origin of phonetic writing; communication and metacommunication among animals
and men; and the origin of language."
-
Staal Frits. Universals. Studies in Indian logic and linguistics.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1988.
-
Taber John A., "Is Indian logic nonmonotonic?," Philosophy East and
West 54 (2): 143-170 (2004).
"Claus Oetke, in his ''Ancient Indian logic
as a theory of non-monotonic reasoning,'' presents a sweeping new interpretation
of the early history of
Indian logic. His main proposal is that Indian logic
up until Dharmakirti was nonmonotonic in character-similar to some of the newer
logics that have
been explored in the field of Artificial Intelligence, such
as default logic, which abandon deductive validity as a requirement for formally
acceptable
arguments; Dharmakirti, he suggests, was the first to consider
that a good argument should be one for which it is not possible for the property
identified as the ''reason'' (hetu) to occur without the property to be
proved (sadhya) -- a requirement akin to deductive validity. Oetke's approach is
challenged here, arguing that from the very beginning in India something
like monotonic, that is, deductively valid, reasoning was the ideal or norm,
but that the conception of that ideal was continually refined, in that the
criteria for determining when it is realized were progressively sharpened"
-
Taber John A., "The theory of the sentence in Purva Mimansa and Western
philosophy," Journal of Indian Philosophy 17: 407-430 (1989).
"The
Mimansa school of Indian philosophy developed two distinct theories of the
relation of the meaning of a sentence to the meanings of the words that comprise
it, the Anvitabhidhana or "qualified designation" theory and the Abhihitanvaya
or "designated relation" theory. Both of these theories, I attempt to show, turn
on the observation that the meanings of individual words change in different
sentences. I go on to suggest that an appreciation of this fact can lead to a
solution of the problem, first raised by Frege, of the change of meaning of
terms in intensional contexts."
-
Tachikawa Musashi, "A Sixth-century manual of Indian logic," Journal of
Indian Philosophy 1: 111-145 (1971).
"This article consists of four
parts: explanations of basic technical terms as an introduction, a translation
of the Nyayapravesa, notes to the translation, and a romanized text based upon
Dhruva's edition. This work is Samkarasvamin's introduction to Dignaga's logic,
and deals with means of proof, fallacious means of proof, means of refutation,
perception, inference, fallacious perception and fallacious inference."
-
Tarkatirtha Visvabandhu, "The Nyaya on the meaning of some words,"
Journal of Indian Philosophy 20: 41-88 (1991).
Translated by Jaysankar
Las Shaw.
"The aim of this paper is to discuss the views of Nyaya
philosophers on meaning. This paper deals with the meaning and reference of
proper names, and general terms. It also deals with the meanings of homonymous
expressions, and discusses the question whether demonstrative pronouns are
homonymous terms. Different uses of personal pronouns have been mentioned. The
section on the quantifier 'all' deals with different uses of it. Similarly, the
section on interrogative pronoun deals with as many as seven uses of an
interrogative pronoun. This paper ends with the discussion of the meaning of a
sentence."
-
Tiwari Heeraman, "One and many: the early Naiyayikas and the problem of
universals," Journal of Indian Philosophy 22: 137-170 (1994).
"The
problem of universals in Indian philosophy is as old as c. 400 b. C. In his
great work, Astadhyayi, the grammarian Panini introduced the problem of
universals while discussing the meaning of a noun. Later, the Nyaya and
Vaisesika systems of Indian philosophy discussed the universals in great detail.
The present article deals with the early Nyaya view of universals. The article
is divided in two parts: one gives a brief general introduction to the problem;
the other contains a fresh translation of the Nyaya-Sutras 2.2.58-70 and
Vatsyayana's commentary on them. The translation is also supplied with
discussions and analysis. The article tries to demonstrate that the Nyaya system
extends the debate about word and meaning which was inaugurated by early
Sanskrit grammarian (viz., Panini, Patanjali etc.)."
-
Tripathi R.K., "The central problem of Indian metaphysics," Philosophy
East and West 19 (1): 39-43 (1969).
"The main argument of my article is
to show that the question regarding the metaphysical status of relation is the
central problem of Indian metaphysics as it is this that determines the nature
of the major systems. four possible alternatives have been discussed: a)
relation is as real as the terms (pluralistic realism like the Nyaya etc.), b)
the terms are real but the relation (between Prakrti and Purusa) is false
(Samkhya dualism), c) the falsity of relation means the falsity of one of the
terms also (Advaita Vedanta and Vijnanavada), d) the falsity of relation entails
the falsity not only of one term but of both the terms (Madhyamika). I have
treated the relation between identity and difference as most basic."
-
Van den Bossche Frank, "Existence and non-existence in Haribhadra Suri's
Anekanta-jaya-pataka," Journal of Indian Philosophy 23: 429-468
(1995).
"In part I of the article the author explains how the problem of
negation has led the Jains to accept non-existence as well as existence as
constituents or 'Dharmas' of every real object in the world and to formulate the
first dialectical principle of the "Anekanta-vada" doctrine: 'Sad-asad-rupam
vastu' or 'every real object possesses a mode as an existent and as a
nonexistent'. In part II of the article the author explains, using mereology as
a logical tool, how Haribhadra Suri defends the Jain viewpoint in his
'Anekanta-jaya-pataka'."
-
Vattanky John. A system of Indian logic: the Nyaya theory of inference.
Analysis, text, translation and interpretation of the anumana section of
Karikavali, Muktavali and Dinakari. London: Routledge Curzon 2003.
"Nyaya
is the most rational and logical of all the classical Indian philosophical
systems. In the study of Nyaya philosophy, Karikavali with its commentary
Muktavali, both by Visvanatha Nyayapancanana, with the commentaries Dinakari and
Ramarudri, have been of decisive significance for the last few centuries as
advanced introductions to this subject. The present work concentrates on
inference (anumana) in Karikavali, Muktavali and Dinakari, carefully divided
into significant units according to the subject, and translates and interprets
them. Its commentary makes use of the primary interpretation in Sanskrit
contained especially in the Ramarudri and Subodhini. The book begins with the
Sanskrit texts of Karikavali and Muktavali; followed by English translation of
these texts. Next is given the Sanskrit text of Dinakari which comments on the
first two texts, followed by its English translation. Lastly, the book contains
a commentary on all the texts included."
-
Vattanky John. Nyaya philosophy of language. Analysis, text, translation
and interpretation of Upamana and Sabda sections of Karikavali, Muktavali and
Dinakari. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications 1995.
-
Vattanky John, "The referent of words: universal or individual, the
controversies between Mimansakas and Naiyayikas," Journal of Indian
Philosophy: 51-78 (1993).
"One of the most important problems discussed
in Nyaya philosophy of language is whether words denote an individual or a
universal. On this point there are basically two schools of thought which oppose
one another, i.e., the Mimansakas and the Naiyayikas. The texts of Muktavali,
Dinakari and Ramarudri dealing with this topic give a brilliant summary of the
long drawn out conflict between the two Schools. The authors of these texts
established the Nyaya position that the denotative function of words is in the
individual as qualified by the universal and the present essay examines these
arguments and counterarguments."
-
Wada Toshihiro, "The analytical method of Navya-Nyaya," Journal of Indian
Philosophy 29: 519-530 (2001).
RELATED PAGES
Ontology and the History of Western Logic. An Introduction
Last modified: Monday, February 08, 2010