John Patrick Doyle (born 1930) is Professor Emeritus of philosophy at Saint Louis University and Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at
Kenrick-Glennon Seminary in Shrewsbury, Missouri; his main area research is late medieval philosophy; he has published seven volumes of translations from Latin
and over fifty articles, essays, and encyclopedia entries.
I wish to thank Professor Doyle for helping me to complete this bibliography.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
"The metaphysical nature of the proof for God's existence according to Francis Suarez S.J.", University of Toronto, 1966.
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (not available at UMI Dissertation Express)
"Suarez on the reality of the possibles," Modern Schoolman 44: 29-48 (1967).
"This article shows that for Francisco Suarez the core reality of possible beings is their non-self-contradiction. Their intrinsic claim to inclusion under the
common concept of Being and the Suarezian analogy of Being resides in the fact that as non-repugnant they are not non-being. So understood, they are actually
nothing but still more than mere beings of reason. Of themselves, they are eternally true and apt to be known, even if there were no God. Far beyond this,
their reality is such that if they were not what they are, there would be no God and, 'a fortiori', none of the actual creatures which depend upon
him."
"Suarez on the analogy of Being (First part)," Modern Schoolman 46: 219-249 (1969).
"Francis Suarez's doctrine of the analogy of being requires that one common character of being be found intrinsically but unequally, according to an order of
prior and posterior, in those inferiors of which the one, common, objective concept of being as a noun is predicated.
Problems are that the requirement of intrinsicality has forced Suarez to give a shadow reality to merely possible things while the need for inequality has
militated against the all important unity of the common character or concept of being."
"Suarez on the analogy of Being (Second part)," Modern Schoolman 46: 323-341 (1969).
"Heidegger and Scholastic metaphysics," Modern Schoolman 49: 201-220 (1972).
"Regarding Heidegger's appraisal of Scholastic metaphysics, we have asked: (1) is he right about the sort of metaphysics represented by Scotus and Suarez? and
(2) is he correct in equating all medieval metaphysics with this type of Scotistic-Suarezian metaphysics?
We have answered the first question in the affirmative and have replied negatively to the second."
"Person: a Christian contribution," Social Justice Review LXV: 184-186 (1972).
"Ipsum Esse as God-surrogate: the point of convergence of faith and reason for St. Thomas Aquinas," Modern Schoolman 50:
293-296 (1973).
"Since, for St. Thomas Aquinas, "cognita sunt in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis," even revealed truths must be phrased in terms which we can naturally
understand. But the very best term which we can naturally muster for God-talk is "ipsum esse," a term to which we come across the medium of a demonstration
"quia" from the being of creatures. As such, it has obvious limitations.
It does not supply us with an immediate knowledge of the divine reality, but it is, instead, a surrogate for God who remains unknown in himself. This surrogate
then is employed in theology not only at the level of "de Deo uno" but also at the very heart of "de Deo trino". As so employed, it is patently the point of
convergence of faith and reason for St Thomas."
"Saint Bonaventure and the ontological argument," Medieval Studies 52: 27-48 (1974).
"For St Bonaventure the self-evident truth of God's existence can be shown forth by 'intellectual exercises' like that of St Anselm.
Such exercises are not simple-minded transits from the ideal to the real order. Rather they are based upon a sophisticated metaphysics; they involve the
experience of common intelligibility.
With Plato, they accept the 'really real' character of that intelligibility. Implicitly, they also accept a plurality and a one-way hierarchy of intelligibles
leading up to a 'First'. Turning then precisely upon the unprincipiated nature of this 'First', they spread before us its absolute necessity both in reality
and for thought."
"Some thoughts on Duns Scotus and the ontological argument," New Scholasticism 53: 234-241 (1979).
"Duns Scotus has substituted the notion of a "highest thinkable" for Anselm's "that than which a greater cannot be thought." For Scotus, the touchstone of
"thinkability" is non-contradiction. He resumes the non-contradictory and therefore the thinkable character of God. He then shows God's existence in two steps:
(1) from thinkability to essential reality, and (2) from essence to existence. The first step involves Scotus in some inconsistency and also comes close to
making man's mind the very rule of reality. The second step entails a confusion of internal possibility with total possibility, which ordinarily, beyond
internal possibility, includes an external potency."
The Suarezian proof for God's existence. In A history of philosophy in the making: A symposium of essays to honor Professor James D.
Collins on his 65th birthday. Edited by Thro Linus J. Washington, D.C.: 1982. pp. 105-117
"Prolegomena to a study of extrinsic denomination in the work of Francis Suarez S.J.," Vivarium 22: 121-160 (1984).
"At times, extrinsic denomination for Suarez seems close to, if not synonymous with, a mere naming from the outside. But at other times, it is regarded as a
feature of things themselves. In this article, there is some description and some examples of extrinsic denomination according to Suarez. Following this, are
some of his reasons for and sources of such denomination. Special attention is paid to his use of extrinsic denomination in connection with the properties and
categories of being. Finally, there are listed conventions and other items observed in Suarez's use of extrinsic denomination."
The Unborn as Person. In Restoring the right to life: the human life amendment. Edited by Bopp James Jr. Provo, Utah: 1984. pp.
81-88-218-221
The Conimbricenses on the relations involved in signs. In Semiotics 1984. Edited by Deely John. New York: University Press of
America 1985. pp. 567-576
"Conimbicenses is the name of a group of Jesuit professors of philosophy at the University of Coimbra during the latter half of the sixteenth century.
It is also the name given to a five volume set of philosophical commentaries on Aristotle which they edited and published between 1592 and 1606. The last
volume to appear was a Logic entitled: Commentarii in universam dialecticam Aristototelis (Friedrich Stegmuller, Filosofia e teologia nas
universidades de Coimbra e Evora no seculo XVI, Coimbra, Universidade de Coimbra, 1959 pp. 95-96).
(...)
The particular work, with which I am now concerned, is their commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione. More precisely, my concern is with the
first chapter of that commentary. Entitled De signo (On the Sign), it runs over 60 pages in quarto. While some treatment of signs at this place in
Aristotelian commentary was common among the Scholastics, these pages of the Conimbricenses represent, as far as I know, the first really major
treatise on signs as such which we have from the Scholastic period. The table of contents of the chapter gives a pretty fair indication of its character.
Principal issues raised are four: (1) On the nature and conditions common to signs; (2) On the divisions of signs; (3) On the signification of spoken words
(voces) and of writing; (4) Whether some concepts in our minds are true or false, and others devoid of truth and falsity. Along the way there are
sub-questions about the essence of a sign, the possibility of something being a sign of itself, signs as actual or aptitudinal, the relations involved in
signs, et cetera. Although this commentary is a work of logic, the Conimbricenses explicitly aware of further epistemological, psychological,
metaphysical, and theological questions which can be raised with regard to signs and signification. At the same time, they also display a remarkable
understanding of the breadth and scope of semiotics itself. Some of the items which they have touched on different ways are the following: language, syntactical speech, laughing, nodding, coughing, persons
talking in sleep, persons lying, persons emitting words without thought. They consider the signification of negative words, of syncategorematic words such as
"if", nonsense words like "Blictri", and words like "chimaera" and "goat-stag" to which no real things correspond. They are interested in the signs involved in
writing and reading, especially voiceless reading. Coupled with a discussion of the physiological bases of speech and hearing, they treat the relation of
deafness and an inability to speak or communicate." pp. 567-568.
Peter John Olivi on Right, Dominion, and Voluntary Signs. In Semiotics 1986. New York: 1987. pp. 419-429
"Suarez on Beings of Reason and Truth (First part)," Vivarium 25: 47-75 (1987).
"From Parmenides on, it has been a commonplace in the Western philosophical tradition that truth is a function of being. One need only remember the general
Platonic doctrine of Forms, which are at once 'really real' and the locus of intelligibility of truth. Francis Suarez has passed on the common teaching of the
Schoolmen that truth is threefold. (1) There is a truth in words, in writing, and in what he calls 'non-ultimate concepts' which is termed truth 'in
signifying'. (2) There is a truth in the intellect knowing things, which is called truth 'in knowing'. And (3) there is a truth in things, which is a truth 'in
being'."
Suarez on truth and mind-dependent Beings: implications for a unified semiotic. In Semiotics 1983. Edited by Evans Jonathan and
Deely John. New York: University Press of America 1987. pp. 121-133
"Suarez on Beings of Reason and Truth (Second part)," Vivarium 26: 51-72 (1988).
"This is the completion of a two-part article which considers Suarez's reply to the question of truth where there is no real being independent of the mind.
That reply turns upon the significative cast of the words expressing beings of reason, especially "impossible" beings. Because such words, unlike nonsense
syllables, have signification, there is in their regard, and in regard to the beings of reason they express, the possibility of some statements being true even
as others are false."
"Thomas Compton Carleton S.J.: on words signifying more than their speakers or makers know or intend," Modern Schoolman 66: 1-28
(1988).
"For Carleton (1591-1666) words have power to signify independent of their speakers. Moreover, while first wordmaker may control the extension of his words, he
cannot control their intension. Words can signify something more clearly to a hearer than that same thing was understood by the one who first established a
word to express it. Carleton clearly demarcates the roles of speakers and wordmakers and foreshadows current concerns about extension versus intension of
words."
"Extrinsic Cognoscibility: a Seventeenth Century supertranscendental notion," Modern Schoolman 68: 57-80 (1990).
"This essay explores the area of intentionality in late Scholasticism. For Suarez the subject of metaphysics is 'real being' which is transcendental but
exclusive of beings of reason. After Suarez, the Calvinist Clemens Timpler says that the subject of metaphysics is 'the intelligible,' which encompasses both
real and unreal, even impossible, beings. Also for 17th century Jesuit logicians what seems common to real beings and beings of reason, including impossible
objects, is 'cognoscibility.' More precisely, this is 'extrinsic cognoscibility,' which is labeled 'supertranscendental.' In Timpler and the Jesuits I see
anticipations of Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie (Theory of objects)."
"Francisco Suarez: on preaching Gospel to people like the American Indians," Fordham International Law Journal 15: 879-951 (1991).
"Suarez on the unity of a scientific habit," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65: 311-334 (1991).
"Despite the fact that it is made up of many different conclusions and despite the fact that it undergoes development, how does a science such as geometry have
and retain its unity? That is to say, how is it somehow undivided in itself and divided off from arithmetic, or from other speculative sciences such as physics
and metaphysics? Is there a basic in things themselves for such indivision and division? Is it something entirely supplied by the knower? Or can it be in some
way partly from things and partly from knowers? In any event, how should it be explained in detail?"
"On the self-refuting statement 'There is no truth'. A medieval treatment," Vivarium 31: 241-266 (1993).
"It is commonly known that medieval logicians were interested in self-referring statements. It could be better know that medieval theologians were also
interested in them -- an important discussion centering on the proposition "There is no truth" ("Nulla veritas est"). The story here begins with Augustine,
following through Anselm and Bonaventure, who claim to have found in the self-refutation of the denial of truth a foundational premise for a proof of God's
existence. This was not without opposition from Aquinas, Scotus, Cajetan and Toletus. This paper unravels this debate, revealing the development by these
theologians of ever more powerful tools of logical analysis."
"Poinsot on the knowability of Beings of Reason," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 68: 337-362 (1994).
"John Poinsot (a.k.a. Joannes a sancto Thoma (1589-1644) was heir to a common division of beings into these that are in themselves real and those which are
entirely dependent upon human reason. Those division went back to Aristotle's split between being as found in the categories and being as true. In the Middle
Ages and thorough the period of the Spanish Revival, it was found, mutatis mutandis, in Averroes (d. 1198), St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), Henry of
Ghent (1217?-1293), John Duns Scotus (1266-1308), Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), and just about everyone else in the Scholastic tradition.
One of the very few exceptions that I know to this general rule was Francis of Mayronnes, O.F.M. (d. ca. 1325), who denied the existence of beings of reason.
Not only an heir, Poinsot himself embraced and transmitted the common view. For him, beings were either real or rational. Real beings (res extra
animam) were those which exist, or can exist, independently of the human mind and which belong in the Aristotelian categories. Rational beings, or beings
of reason, in the sense which contrasts with this, were those which do not belong to the categories, and which cannot exist outside human understanding. That
there are such beings of reason was not for Poinsot a matter of doubt."
"Another God, Chimerae, Goat-Stags, and Man-Lions: a Seventeenth Century debate about impossible objects," Review of Metaphysics
48: 771-808 (1995).
"This article concerns a 17th Century debate over whether there are self-contradictory impossible objects of understanding or whether there is no intellectual
object which is not some actual or possible being. The debate, which has its roots in the Greek and Scholastic traditions, is presented especially between two
Jesuits: Thomas Compton Carleton and John Morawski, respectively, a proponent and an opponent of impossible objects. The article itself does not take sides in
the debate, but, inasmuch as he wrote later, Morawski is presented as espousing his own view and answering arguments in support of Carleton's position."
On Beings of Reason (De Entibus Rationis). Metaphysical Disputation LIV - by Francisco Suarez. Milwaukee: Marquette University
Press 1995.
Translated from the Latin with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.
"Suárez's Disputationes metaphysicae is to this day the most comprehensive and systematic treatise on metaphysics written from an Aristotelian
perspective. It addresses every metaphysical issue raised by medieval and Renaissance scholastics and discusses the views of all important figures who preceded
Suárez. As such it is a treasure-trove not only for the metaphysician but also for the historian and has exercised enormous influence on early modern
philosophy, particularly in Continental Europe. (...) The Disputation deals with mental entities and, therefore, contains relevant discussions to the
philosophy of mind and the ontological status of intensional objects."
Jorge J. E. Gracia - State University of New York at Buffalo
"In a finely wrought and philosophically intelligible translation of this 54th Disputation of Suárez, John P. Doyle has documented with care the ancient Greek
and Medieval sources of Suárez's discussion, its influence upon many hitherto unknown late Scholastic writers and the relevance of Suárez's intentionality
theory to such prominent figures in early, middle and late Modern thought as Descartes, Berkeley, Leibniz, Kant, Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, B. Russell,
Heidegger and others."
Norman J. Wells - Boston College
"Silvester Mauro, S.J. (1619-1687) on four degree of abstraction," International Philosophical Quarterly 36: 461-474 (1996).
"Mauro says there are four degrees of abstraction. The lowers is 'physical', abstracting from material singulars. The second is 'mathematical', abstracting not
just from singulars, but also from sensible and changeable matter as such. A third is 'metaphysical', abstracting from all matter and opening on to real
immaterial being. Peculiar to Mauro and marking a departure from orthodox Aristotelianism is the last and highest degree, which is 'logical'. At this level, we
consider intentional being -- which he says is more immaterial than real being, including that studied by metaphysics, in as much as 'being known' is identical
with being elevated from matter."
"Between Transcendental and Transcendental: the missing link?," Review of Metaphysics 50: 783-815 (1997).
"Medieval transcendentals are on the side of things while Kantian transcendentality is on the side of the knower. Is there a link between the two in the
Seventeenth-Century scholastic understanding of 'supertranscendentals'? In the century before Kant, scholastic supertranscendental being was primarily
identified with extrinsic intelligibility and regarded as a contribution of the knower. It was said to be the same as 'the object as such' (objectum ut tale).
This seems very close to 'der Gegenstand uberhaupt' which Kant has called a 'missing concept' above the dichotomy of the possible and the impossible."
On homicide and Commentary on Summa Theologiae IIa-IIae Q. 64 (Thomas Aquinas) - by Francisco de Vitoria. Milwaukee, Wisconsin:
Marquette University Press 1997.
Translated from the Latin with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle
"Reflections on persons in Petri Dishes," Linacre Quarterly 64: 62-76 (1997).
"Two Thomists on the morality of a jailbreak," Modern Schoolman 74: 95-115 (1997).
Vitoria on choosing to replace a king. In Hispanic philosophy in the age of discovery. Edited by White Kevin. Washington D. C.: The
Catholic University of America Press 1997. pp. 45-58
"Anyone familiar with the development of Hispanic philosophy in the Age of Discovery must be aware of the importance of Francisco de Vitoria (c. 1492-1546).
Perhaps, however, that person will be surprised to hear that Vitoria, the holder of the Catedra de Prima in theology at the University of Salamanca,
never published any of his own works. Instead, it was through his teaching that, during and after Spain's golden century, Vitoria influenced countless
disciples, especially in areas of ethical and political thought. There are estimates of up to one thousand auditors attending some of his lectures. He himself
in one place comes close to confirming that figure. But more than this, in the decades that followed, almost all the great moralists of the age looked back to
Vitoria as their foremost authority. Their names read like the honor roll of Spanish and Counter-Reformation Scholasticism. But also outside Spain and Catholic
Scholastic circles, in the dawning age of international jurisprudence, Vitoria exercised patent influence on important figures such as Hugo Grotius (1583-1645)
and Alberico Gentili (1552-1608). Looking at all his influence and at the dearth of work published while he lived, it was with perfect truth that Domingo Bañez
(1528-1604) could refer to him as "another Socrates"."
"Supertranscendental nothing: a philosophical Finisterre," Medioevo 24: 1-30 (1998).
"For the innocent of geography, let me first explain that Finisterre is a cape in northern Spain at the westernmost point of the Spanish mainland. It marks an
end of Europe; beyond Finisterre there is only the ocean. As readers of this essay may see, 'supertranscendental nothing' is arguably a philosophical
Finisterre which was a farthest point of speculation reached by European philosophers in the seventeenth century. But what readers also may see is that this
apparently ultimate item of seventeenth-century European philosophy was possibly pushed even farther out, at what might then to some have seemed beyond Spain
and Europe the very end of the earth itself, in Santiago, Chile [by Miguel Viñas, S. J. (1642-1718)]."
Supertranscendental Being: On the verge of modern philosophy. In Meeting of the minds. The relation between medieval and classical
modern European philosophy. Edited by Brown Stephen F. Turnhout: Brepols 1998. pp. 297-315
"As every historian of philosophy knows, Aristotle thought the subject of metaphysics was «being insofar as it is being» and from this subject he excluded
«being as true». Centuries after Aristotle, Francisco Suarez, S.J., (1548-1617) designated the subject of metaphysics more explicitly as «being insofar as it
is real being» (*).
The addition of «real» to Aristotle's formula highlighted the inclusion of all that can as well as does exist. Against the backdrop of two already
well known distinctions -- (1) between formal and objective concepts, and (2) between being as a participle and being as a noun -- for Suarez the subject so
conceived was identical with "the objective concept of being as a noun". Concurrently, while being was said to be analogous with regard to hierarchically
ordered objects (God and creatures, substance and accidents) with an intrinsic attribution of the perfection it represented, such analogy presupposed a common,
unitary, and all but univocal, concept. But from that concept and from the subject of metaphysics Suarez excluded "beings of reason", which he subsumed under
Aristotle's being as true, and of which impossible objects, in the sense of those that would be self-contradictory, furnished the paradigm case.
On at least one occasion, Suarez did use the word "supertranscendental" to label a notion wide enough to cover both a transcendental and a predicamental
relation (**) -- but not to signify anything common between real beings and beings of reason. Nevertheless, there does seem to be some kind of
supertranscendent community here. Real being is transcendent, but real beings and beings of reason are in some more than transcending way the same inasmuch as
they both can be objects of cognition. Yet Suarez will allow only a community of name and not of concept between real being and being of reason. At the same
time, he has distinguished between being which is the object of metaphysics and being which is the object of cognition generally." (notes omitted)
(*) Cf. Disputationes Metaphysicae (hereafter DM), d. 1, s. 1, n. 26, Opera omnia, ed. C. Berton. Paris, Vivés, 1856-1866, XXV, p. 11.
(**) 11 DM 48, s. 1, n. 5 (XXVI, p. 869).
"The 'Conimbricenses' on the semiotic character of mirror images," Modern Schoolman 76: 17-31 (1998).
"Seneca distinguished two theories about images in a mirror. The first is that we see 'simulachra' and through their mediation we pass to things. The second is
that in the mirror we immediately see things. The 'Conimbricenses', Jesuits at the Sixteenth-Century University of Coimbra, regarded mirror images as signs
and, aware of Seneca's distinction, they favored the second theory. In so doing, they contrasted formal and instrumental signs and thought mirror images to be
formal signs. All of this put them at odds with Thomas Aquinas who apparently favored Seneca's first theory. It also puts them at odds with the present-day
semiotician, Umberto Eco, who says that mirror images are not signs."
Translated in Russian by Lada Tsipana as: Koimbrskie scholastiki o semioticheskom charaktere zerkalnich otrazhenij - Verbum (St.Petersburg Society of
Philosophy), 5, pp. 93-109.
Francisco Suarez on the Law of Nations. In Religion and International Law. Edited by Janis Mark W. and Evans Carolyn. London: 1999.
pp. 103-120
"Suarez on the truth of the proposition: This is my Body," Modern Schoolman 77: 145-163 (2000).
"Best known for his systematic study of metaphysics and his teaching on law, Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) was arguably the greatest theologian in the history
of the Jesuits. While the particular doctrine that I am now treating was published in 1587 in the wake of his teaching sacramental theology at Alcali de
Henares, there is no indication that he ever changed his mind on it.
My precise present focus is on Suarez's treatise, De Eucharistia, Disputation 58, Sections 4 to 9, which cover pages 322-336, in Volume 20 of the
Vivès edition (Paris, 1856-78) of his Opera omnia. In that place, he is commenting on St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae, Part III,
Question 78, and is raising questions with regard to the formula of Eucharistic consecration: most specifically, the words: This is my Body." p. 145
Francisco Suarez, S.J. on Human Rights. In Menschenrechte: Rechte und Pflichten in Ost und West. Edited by Wegmann Konrad,
Ommerborn Wofgang, and Roetz Heiner. Muenster/Hamburg/Berlin/London: LIT Verlag 2001. pp. 105-132
áá"For most observers, the American Declaration of Independence is a milestone in the history of human rights. From its promulgation in 1776 down to present
time it has served as a philosophical base for various democratic systems of government and as a logical, if not an always demonstrably historical, starting
point for the expansion of human rights claims in such current-century documents as the United Nations Universal Declaration and the. Geneva Conventions.
However, it has long been recognized that the Declaration of Independence has its own philosophical antecedents, most notably perhaps in the work of John Locke
(1632-1704). Our aim now is to go back before Locke and to show such antecedents in the Scholastic philosophy which Locke himself imbibed as a young student at
Oxford where he first enrolled in 1652. More specifically, I will point to their presence in the work of arguably the greatest Jesuit philosopher-theologian of
all time, Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). (*)
(*) For a recent overview of Suarez, the man, his work, and his influence, See John P. Doyle, "Suárez, Francisco," Routledge Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (London and New York, 1998), vol. 8; pp. 189-196.
"On the pure intentionality of pure intentionality," Modern Schoolman 79: 57-78 (2001).
"With his own intention of instructing novices, Luis de Lossada, S.J. (1681- 1748), has summarized the new, yet old, terminology of the disputed Scholastic
doctrine of intellectual intentionality. (*) Although the Scholastics (and I to entitle the present essay) have ambiguously used the term 'intention' -- first
in relation to will and then to understanding, in executing his intention Lossada has employed it simply to designate an act of the human intellect. Such an
act may be either first or second, depending upon whether it directly represents the physical reality of its object or reflexly represents an object as already
known or insofar as it has some being derived from the intellect. From these intellectual acts, the words which signify things as first and directly conceived
are called `terms of first intention,' while those which signify things as secondly and reflexly known are called 'terms of second intention,' that is to say
terms corresponding to a second intending by the intellect. Examples of the former terms may be 'man,' 'animal,' or 'sun,' while terms like 'universal,
'genus,' 'species,' 'subject,' or 'predicate' are examples of the latter. Moreover, since objects are customarily named from the knowledge they terminate, both
first and second intentions (whether one looks at acts of understanding or the words which express them) may be either 'formal' or 'objective'."
(*) Cursus philosophici Logica. Tr. I disp. 2 c. 4, n.1; ed. Barcinonae: Apud Vid. et Fil. J. Subirana, 1883 [originally: Salamanca, 1724], vol. I, p.
204. (Notes omitted).
The Conimbricenses: some questions on signs. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 2001.
Translated with introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.
"The Conimbricenses were late sixteenth and early seventeenth century Jesuit philosophy professors at the University of Coimbra. Chief among them were
Emmanuel de Goes (1542-1597), Cosmas de Magelhães (1551-1624), Balthasar Alvarez (1561-1630), and Sebastian do Couto (1567-1639). Although not usually numbered
among the Conimbricenses, their confrere in the Society, Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599), had promoted the novel idea of a philosophical cursus
authored by the Jesuits of Coimbra.
The treatise De Signo (On the Sign) is the commentary to the first chapter of Aristotle's De Interpretatione. The work raises five
principal questions: (1) On the nature and conditions common to signs; (2) On the division of signs; (3) On the signification of spoken words and of writing;
(4) Whether concepts are the same among all and whether spoken words are different; then (5) Whether some concepts in our minds are true or false, and others
devoid of truth or falsity."
Gedankendinge und Imagination bei den Jesuiten des 17. Jh. In Imagination -- Fiktion -- Kreation: Das kulturschaffende Vermögen der
Phantasie. Edited by Dewender Thomas and Welt Thomas. München - Leipzig: K. G. Saur - Verlag 2003. pp. 213-228
Translated in German by Thomas Dewender: Imagination, Fiction, Creation: The culture-creation power of the fantasy.
"Wenn man unter "wirklichem" Sein dasjenige Sein versteht, das unabhängig vom menschlichen Geist existieren kann, dann sind Gedankendinge "unwirklich". Sie
haben weder eine aktuale noch eine bloss mögliche Existenz. Die besten Beispiele dafür dürften sich selbst widersprechende Gegenstände sein, die zwar irgendwie
in unserem Geist existieren, aber dennoch in sich selbst widersprüchlich sind und daher ausserhalb ihres Gedachtseins nicht existieren können. Konkrete
Beispiele mögen hier Zentauren, Chimären und Bockhirsche sein, die man sich zwar alle vorstellen kann, deren Existenz ausserhalb des Geistes aber undenkbar
ist, weil ihre Teile miteinander wesentlich unvereinbar sind."
The borders of knowability: thoughts from or occasioned by Seventeenth-century Jesuits. In Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift
für Jan A. Aerstsen zum 65. Geburtstag. Edited by Pickavé Martin. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter 2003. pp. 643-658
"This essay concerns the upper and the lower borders between what is and what is not knowable for human beings, particularly as these borders were variously
considered by some seventeenth-century Jesuit thinkers. Expanding, let me say that the boundary above is reached when one confronts the reality of God, who
while He may be evidently knowable in Himself is not so, at least in this life, for us. In contrast, the lower boundary seems to run between that which is in
itself knowable and that which is totally unknowable either for us or for God. This lower boundary is reached at the level of what is intrinsically impossible
and what to that extent fails of being and of being knowable.
A further refinement is suggested from geography. Take the Alps as a natural boundary between Italy and France. As any tyro knows, this boundary has a double
face, inasmuch as we can view it either from the side of Italy or of France, that is from either a cisalpine or a transalpine perspective. Apply this to the
borders of knowability. The cisalpine side of the upper border is somehow supplied by our human knowledge groping toward God - especially through negative
theology in the wake of Pseudo-Dionysius and through what seventeenth-century Scholastics termed the metaphysical essence of God. The transalpine side is the
reality of God in Himself which is beyond the present grasp of a human mind. The lower border will be at the interface of the possible and the impossible. More
exactly, its cisalpine side will enclose both the possible and the impossible. Its transalpine side will in some way exclude both the possible and the
impossible.
For what follows I will use Jesuit sources in the wake of Francisco Suarez, S. J. (1548-1617), but I will principally focus on one Jesuit, Maximilian
Wietrowski (1660-1737), whom I have treated in other places. This will occasion forays into Jesuits between him and Suarez, most singularly: Thomas Compton
Carleton (1591 -1666), Sylvester Mauro (1619-1687), and André Semery (1630-1717), as well as one publishing after, Miguel Viñas (1642-1718). At times I will go
outside Jesuit writings to clarify or to confirm points and finally I will suggest conclusions against the backdrop of Thomistic theology, which the Jesuits,
by their "Constitutions" and "Ratio Studiorum", were obliged wherever possible to follow." (notes omitted)
A commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics (Index locupletissimus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis) - by Francisco Suarez. Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press 2004.
Translated from the Latin with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.
"As the reader will see, the following volume is divided into translations and the corresponding Latin texts. The translations are in order:
(1) Suarez's Plan for his Metaphysical Disputations. This is his preface to the 1597 edition. It is an address to his reader in which he lays out his
intention as a Christian theologian to pursue a Christian philosophy, specifically a metaphysics which will be at the service of his theology. This metaphysics
will be in two main parts. The first of these will be what will shortly after be called an "ontology" or a general science of being, in which after
establishing "real being insofar as it is being" as the object of metaphysics, he will proceed to study its properties, its principles, and its causes. The
second part will then descend from the general concept of being to study those beings, God and creatures, substances and accidents, which are contained under
that concept. Finally, it should be noted that in this preface he speaks of the present Index and gives his reader some idea of its purpose.
(2) The Proemium to the Second Metaphysical Disputation. This short piece is important. After again indicating the systematic plan of the
Disputationes, it contrasts that with the disorganized text of Aristotle and commentaries on it. But then he says that, in order to satisfy "students
of Aristotle," he has added the present Index which follows the order of the Metaphysics and which gives cross-references to the
Disputations. It will also, he tells us, comment at times directly on the text of Aristotle and will explore matters which for whatever reasons have
not been covered well enough in the Disputations.
(3) Next comes the Most Ample Index itself. In this Suarez, as he promised, follows the order of the Metaphysics, essentially commenting on
it as I have said, "by way of question." To appreciate this Index, a modem reader should have some familiarity with Aristotle's text and the main problems
interpreters have encountered with it. To facilitate that, I have at he start of most Books added a summary of the remarks of Jules Tricot, the important
French translator of the Metaphysics. I chose Tricot's remarks for a number of reasons. First, they were succinct. Second, they were the thoughts of
an authentic scholar. Third, while Tricot's scholarship may be a few decades old, it is still valuable for understanding the main nineteenth and
twentieth-century debates about the composition and the meaning of Aristotle's Metaphysics, debates which often bear on problems which Suarez and the
medievals encountered. Finally, there is something which will not be evident from the summaries I gave, but which was in the background of my choosing Tricot.
This is that he, unlike many contemporary writers, extends his interest out beyond the text of Aristotle to the traditions of his Greek and Latin commentators.
In short, Tricot pursues understanding of Aristotle in a way which I am certain Suarez would endorse.
(4) An Index of Disputations: This amounts to a Table of Contents for the fifty-four Disputations which comprise the main portion of Suarez's work. To
make it easier for readers to find these Disputations I have added volume and page numbers to Suarez's list. A further benefit of this may be that a reader
will be able to see at a glance the relative importance which Suarez attached to each Disputation from the number of pages he allotted to it. In passing I did
notice minor variations between some of the Section headings in the main text of the Disputationes and the Index of Disputations. Generally, in my
notes I ignored such variations and mentioned them only on rare occasions.
Following the translations, the next portion of the current volume is devoted to the Latin texts. Thus I have transcribed in their original language the
Preface to the whole work, the Prologue to the Second Disputation, the Most Ample Index itself, and the Index of the Disputations. The most important notes
that I added contain the Latin translations mentioned above, i.e., those of Moerbeke, Argyropoulos, Bessarion, and Fonseca. On this score, let me say that I
deliberately separated the Greek of Aristotle from the Latin of Suarez and these others. My purpose in this was to allow interested persons to compare the
Latin translations without the immediate distraction of the Greek. At the same time, the Greek will be available and matched directly to my English translation
of Suarez's Latin. My hope is that this is clear and that it makes some sense to interested readers.
The volume includes a Dramatis Personae, that is, a list of and a few facts about persons whom Suarez mentions in the Ample Index. Again, I have added
a bibliography of sources in various languages to which readers may go for more in depth understanding of the issues raised in the translated texts."
The metaphysical demonstration of the existence of God. Metaphysical Disputations 28-29 by Francisco Suárez, S.J. South Bend: St.
Augustine Press 2004.
Translated and edited from the Latin with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.
"The two Disputations that are translated in the present work open the second part of the Disputationes metaphysicae and mark the turn from being in
general lo particular beings. Their concern is with, first in Disputation 28, a comprehensive division of being in general, and after in Disputation 29, the
existence of the principal member of this division, namely, that being which is God.
Disputation 28 is divided into three Sections, which ask about the legitimacy and the sufficiency of the division, as well as whether the dividend, i.e. being,
is univocal or analogous between God and creatures. In the first Section (Vivès: vol. 26, pp. 1-8), the question is whether being is rightly divided into
infinite and finite being? Doubts arise from the fact that "infinite" and "finite" on their face do not appear to cover the whole range of being but rather
look to be restricted to accidental being in the category of quantity (§ 1). In addition, the terms of the proposed division seem obscure, especially the term
"infinite" (§ 2). Suarez's answer is to analyze the terms (§ 3) and then to defend the division as one that is good and necessary (§ 4) as well as first and
most evident (§ 5). It is equivalent to other divisions such as being by itself (ens a se) and being from another (ens ab alio) (§§ 6-7) or,
with clarifications, necessary being and contingent being (§§ 8-12). It is also equivalent to: essential being and being by participation (§ 13), created being
and uncreated being (§ 14), or being in act and being in potency (§§ 15-16). Suarez next compares the first division with the rest (§ 17), explains the terms
of the first division by comparison with quantity (§ 17), and closes the first Section (§ 18) with a reply to objections raised at its beginning." p. XIV
"Though almost twice as long, Disputation 29 like the one before is again divided into three Sections. Section 1 (vol. 26, pp. 21-34) begins after two
introductory paragraphs (§§ 1-2) in which Suarez gives reasons for the location of the subject matter of the Disputation in this place and remarks how he will
leave aside as much as possible items which depend for their understanding on Revelation. The first Section then asks whether and/or by what means the
existence of God can be demonstrated. Among the Scholastic Doctors, Peter d'Ailly (1350-1420) has denied the possibility of such a demonstration. To this
Suarez makes the brief but revealing reply that already by the various divisions of being that have been presented in the previous Disputation the
existence of "some being which is uncreated or not produced" has been proven (§ 1). The obvious implication is that by now the existence of God has in effect
been proven. But immediately the question arises: by what means, physical or metaphysical, is this properly done? On one side, the opinion of Averroes is that
the means is physical, namely the motion of the heavens (§ 2). The contrary opinion, that of Avicenna and later of Duns Scotus among others, holds that the
means must be metaphysical (§ 3) -- that is, not motion but being itself. A third and a fourth opinion hold in different ways that the task must belong to both
physics, that is natural philosophy, and metaphysics (§§ 4-5). In different ways the means would thus be both physical and metaphysical. In Suarez's judgment
the second opinion is certainly the true one but there can be some probability in the fourth position, if it is rightly explained (§ 6).
At this juncture, he examines at length the physical argument that proceeds by the medium of motion and for various reasons he finds it wanting (§§ 7-17). Then
he considers another physical argument, from the operations and the essence of the rational soul (§ 18). This too comes up short, unless we first pose a
question about the soul's being, which is a metaphysical question (§ 19). Here Suarez gives the metaphysical argument that is based upon a broader and deeper
principle than the physical one, "Whatever is moved is moved by another." The metaphysical principle is "Whatever is made or produced is made by
another" and the argument itself concludes to an unmade Maker (§§ 20-21). An objection of a possibly circular chain of causes is dismissed as every bit as
inadmissible as a thing's causing itself (§ 22). Other objections involve an infinite number of causes that would preclude any arriving at a first uncaused or
unmade cause. There are different ways to conceive such an infinity of causes. Suarez explains such ways in detail and shows their insufficiencies (§§ 23-40).
The first Section ends (§§ 41-42) with a brief rehearsal of and summary judgment upon the opinions listed at the beginning." pp. XV-XVI.
Wrestling with a wraith: André Semery, S. J. (1630-1717) on Aristotle's goat-stag and knowing the Unknowable. In The impact of
Aristotelianism on modern philosophy. Edited by Pozzo Riccardo. Washington: Catholic University of America Press 2004. pp. 84-112
Two Sixteenth-Century Jesuits and a plan to conquer China: Alonso Sanchez and Jose de Acosta: An outrageous proposal and its rejection. In
Rechtsdenken: Schnittpunkte West und Ost. Recht in den gesellschafts- und staatstragenden Institutionen Europas und Chinas. Edited by Wegmann Konrad
and Holz Harald. Münster: LIT Verlag 2005. pp. 253-273
"Francisco Suárez, S. J. (1548-1617) on the interpretation of laws," Modern Schoolman 83: 197-222 (2006).
"Hervaeus Natalis, O.P., (d. 1323) on intentionality: its direction, context, and some aftermath," Modern Schoolman 83: 85-124
(2006).
"It is generally known that Franz Brentano (1828-1917) came through a tradition Aristotelian-Scholasticism to a philosophy which stood in opposition to Kant
and to the main stream of German idealism after. It is also often thought that nothing in that tradition was more influential than its intentionality doctrine.
Central for Brentano's early development, intentionality was a doctrine whose Scholastic origin he himself indicated, when in 1874, he wrote:
"Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages referred to as the intentional (and also mental) inexistence of the
object, and what we, although with not quite unambiguous expressions, would call relation to a content, direction upon an object (which is not here to be
understood as a reality) or immanent objectivity."
Since 1874, for proponents, opponents, and simple observers of Brentano and of intentionality doctrine, whatever else may be at issue the general consensus has
been that the term "intentionality" indicates a direction from knower to known. Mutatis mutandis, so understood, intentionality continued to be
important for various phenomenological philosophies which stemmed from Brentano. In this vein, Brentano's most recognized disciple, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938),
who is credited with introducing the term itself into modern philosophy, has described its basic signification as "the property of being conscious of
something." This direction from consciousness to the object (which Brentano himself influenced by the problem of non-existent objects later at least in part
rejected in his famous Abkehr vom Nichtrealen has been regarded as central in Husserl's work even by critics. The same direction appears in the work
of others dependent upon Brentano and a glance at secondary sources will confirm its almost universal acceptance as the common view.
In the Middle Ages, from the Latin Avicenna on, the term "intention" (intentio) can be found throughout the thirteenth century. However, to my
knowledge, somewhat surprisingly, the actual word, "intentionality" (intentionalitas), first appears only when we come to the fourteenth-century
writing of Hervaeus Natalis. It was a bigger surprise for me to find that Brentano in one place actually mentioned Hervaeus and listed three of his works. But
the biggest surprise was to discover that for Hervaeus the direction of intentionality as such was not from knower to known but rather opposite wise
-- from known to knower! My purpose now is to recount and perhaps to sharpen that discovery as well as to go further and touch on some of its possible
Wirkungsgeschichte." pp. 85-86 (notes omitted).
On real relation (Disputatio Metaphysica XLVII) - by Francisco Suarez. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 2006.
Translated from Latin with an introduction and notes by John P. Doyle.
"There are two main places in which Aristotle has dealt with the category of relation. These are: (a) Categories, Chapter 7, and (b)
Metaphysics, Book V, Chapter 15. As will become apparent, these places will be central for Suarez's treatment of relation in Disputation 47."
p. 19.
"At very least, without pinning the matter down at all points, it is safe to say that relation is central to any overall understanding of Aristotle's doctrine
of the categories and even more to any understanding of his wider doctrine beyond.
As I have mentioned, there are two principal places in the Disputationes metaphysicae (DM) in which Suarez treats relation. These are the present
Disputation 47 and then Disputation 54, Section 6. The obvious dividing line between them is that between real being in the categories and "being as true"
which by Suarez's time has come to be identified with being of reason. (77) But even as we say this, it is important once again to note that real relation
extends beyond the category of relation and also that in the Second Section, Paragraph 22, of Disputation 47 Suarez will come exceedingly close to a reduction
of real relation to a simple act of the knower, that is, a connotation.
There are other places in the Disputationes where in various ways Suarez has touched upon relation. While I have not explored them all in the present
work, they do frequently shine added light on this work. For examples, let me mention his treatment of "prior and posterior" in the Index
locupletissimus at Book Five, Chapter 11; (78) his discussion-in the context of his treatment of distinction -- of relation and its terminus; (79) his
discussion of relation in the context of truth; (80) various points he makes about relation in treating transcendental goodness; (81) his contrast of finite
created relations and infinite divine relations as regards the essences in which they are found; (82) the divine relations of paternity and filiation as
dissimilar; (83) or within a context of his discussion of quantity, a further discussion of the characters of "measure" and "measured," (84) etc.
As may be gathered from some of the examples just mentioned, there are Christian dimension of relation both in Suarez's sources and in his own teaching. These
are linked particularly with the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. On both these themes, besides what he has said in the Disputationes,
(85) he has written special works, which contain much on the subject of relation." pp. 26-27.
(77) For some of the history of this identification, cf. Theo Kobusch, "Ens inquantum ens und ens rationis: ein aristotelisches Problem in der Philosophie des
Duns Scotus und Wilhelm von Ockham," in Aristotle in Britain during the Middle Ages: Proceedings of the International Conference at Cambridge, 8 -11 April 1994
organized by the Société internationale pour l'Étude de la philosophie médiévale, edited by John Marenbon (Turnhout, Brepols, 1996), pp. 157-175, esp.
158-9.
(78) See Index ..., V, c. 11, q. 1, vol. 25, p. xxii; Francisco Suarez, A Commentary ..., pp. 89-90.
(79) DM 7, 2, n. 26, vol. 25, p. 270.
(80) DM 8, 2, nn. 3-9, vol. 25, pp. 278-9.
(81) For example, cf. DM 10, 1, nn. 3-5, vol. 25, p. 329; ibid., 3, nn. 11-15, pp. 350-51
(82) DM 28, 2, nn. 5,6, 8-13, vol. 26, pp. 9-12.
(83) DM 29, 3, nn. 16-17, vol. 26, p. 53.
(84) DM 40, 3, nn. 9-10, vol. 26, pp. 540-41.
(85) As regards relation and the Trinity, cf. DM 7, 2, n. 27, vol. 25, p. 270; DM 10, 3, nn. 16-18, pp. 351-2; DM 28, 2, nn. 5,6, 8-13, vol. 26, pp. 9-12; DM
29, 3, nn. 16-17, vol. 26, p. 53; and DM 47, 4, n. 21, below. As regards relation and the Incarnation, sec., e.g.: DM 47, 4, n. 9, below.
Hispanic Scholastic philosophy. In The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance philosophy. Edited by Hankins James. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 2007. pp. 250-269
"Hispanic scholastic philosophy in this chapter designates a sixteenth and seventeenth-century stream of philosophy which flowed out of medieval universities,
increased to a torrent on the Iberian peninsula, then poured into other regions of Europe, America, Africa, and Asia. Arising in the wake of Spanish and
Portuguese explorations and conquests, which at the end of fifteenth and through the sixteenth century brought radically new, and usually bloody, encounters
between European and non-European peoples, it was at its core concerned with such encounters. Other background were furnished by the Counter-Reformation,
especially the reforms of the Council of Trent (1545-63) and its aftermath; the late Renaissance debates among philosophers, humanists and skeptics; and the
revival of Thomistic texts and thought. Two subjects stand out as particularly important and influential: (1) moral and juridical philosophy centering on "the
law of nations" (the jus gentium) and (2) theoretical philosophy, which included Aristotelian physics but culminated in metaphysics.
For present purposes the birth year of Hispanic philosophy was 1526, when Francisco de Vitoria, OP (1492-1546), was elected to the Cátedra de Prima, in
theology at Salamanca and began lectures on the "Second Part of the Second Part" (IIa-IIae) of the Summa theologiae of Thomas Aquinas. This introduced the
Summa as the principal textbook in theology and also inaugurated a Thomistic revival in theology and in philosophy at Salamanca, then elsewhere. Choosing a
terminal date for Hispanic philosophy here is more arbitrary, but a plausible one is 1718, when Miguel Viñas, SJ (1642-1718) died. It may immediately be noted
that while Vitoria taught in Spain and belonged to the older religious order of the Dominicans, Viñas was a Jesuit who taught at Santiago in Chile. In the
period under discussion two salient facts are the passage of philosophical leadership from the Dominicans to the Jesuits, and the spread of Hispanic philosophy
overseas from the Iberian peninsula, especially to Latin America. The development of that philosophy between 1526 and 1718 occurred within this broader context
of a general shift from an old to a new religious order and from the Old World to a New. What follows is a very limited sketch of figures and themes in that
development." pp. 250-251.
A Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis (d.1323) The Doctor Perspicacissimus On Second Intentions. Milwaukee: Marquette University
Press 2008.
Volume One - An English translation and Volume Two - A Latin edition by John P. Doyle.
"These volumes present a first critical Latin edition and an English translation of an important, but very difficult to read and understand, medieval treatise.
As almost everyone knows, the notion of intentionality comes from the Middle Ages. What is less known is that Hervaeus Natalis, O.P. (d. 1323) was the first
one explicitly to consider it as such. Even less known is the fact that he carne to it not immediately from the Aristotelian De Anima, but rather from
the division in Aristotle's Metaphysics between "being as being" and "being as true." Least of all known is the fact that Hervaeus, who uses the
term"intentionality" in the present work 235 times, regards its significance as a relation of reason which runs in the direction of known or knowable to
knower. Apart from its exceedingly obscure Latin style, what particularly makes this work difficult to understand is its multi-layered reflection on things and
non-things, its reflection on Hervaeus thinking itself, and its reflection on his thinking about his thinking about things and non-things."
Collected Studies on Francisco Suarez SJ (1548-1617). Edited by Stone M.W.F. Leuven: Leuven University Press 2010.
To be published in May 2010.
"Of all the major philosophers from the late medieval and early modern periods, the work of the Jesuit Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) has been largely ignored by
English-speaking scholars. A notable exception to this trend is the work of the American scholar John P. Doyle, whose ground-breaking studies of several
important areas of Suarez's imposing yet highly original system of scholasticism have helped to make the Jesuit's ideas tractable and accessible to successive
generations of historians of philosophy. The fruit of over forty years of labour, this volume collects together Doyle's most important articles on the
philosophical theology metaphysics, ethics, and legal philosophy of Suarez, and is prefaced by an introductory chapter that places the Jesuit's life and
thought in context. The volume is a fitting and timely tribute to a scholar whose selfless and sympathetic concern with the ideas and Suarez have served the
cause of Suarezian scholarship with great distinction."
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES
Nineteen articles in Academic American Encyclopedia, Princeton, Aretê Publishing Co., 1998:
Bacon Francis vol. III pp. 13-14
Bayle, Pierre vol. III p. 113
Bodin, Jean vol. III p. 356;
Bruno, Giordano vol. III p. 525
Cambridge Platonists vol. IV p. 52
Descartes, René vol. VI pp. 125-126
Ficino, Marsilio vol. VIII p. 70
Hobbes, Thomas vol. X p. 192
Innate Ideas vol. XI p. 178
Malebranche, Nicolas vol. XIII p. 87
Occasionalism vol. XIV p. 320
Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni vol. XV p. 294
Ramus, Petrus vol. XVI; p. 82
Rationalism vol. XVI pp. 92-93
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, vol. XVII p. 234
Spinoza, Baruch vol. XVIII pp. 187-188
Suarez, Francisco vol. XVIII p. 312
Telesio, Bernardino vol. XIX p. 83
William of Ockham vol. XX pp. 154-155.
Six articles in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (edited by Edward Craig) New York, Routledge 1998:
Collegium Conimbricense vol.II pp. 406-408
Fonseca, Pedro da (1528-1599) vol. III pp. 688-690
John of St. Thomas (1589-1644) vol. V pp. 117-120
Soto, Domingo de (1494-1560) vol. IX pp. 37-40
Suarez, Francisco (1548-1617) vol. IX pp. 189-196
Toletus, Franciscus (1533-1596) vol. IX pp. 433-435
One article in the Historische Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Forschungsprojekt der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, -
Edited by Joachim Ritter & Karlfried Gründer - Basel, Schwabe AG. Verlag 1999: Supertranszendent vol. X cols. 643-649.
TRANSLATION
"Peter John Olivi (1248-1297): A Disputed Question: 'What Does Right or Dominion Posit?' or 'About Voluntary Signs'."
Translated from: "Question de P. J. Olivi 'Quid ponat ius vel dominium' ou encore 'De signis voluntariis'", ed. P. Ferdinand Delorme, O.F.M.,
Antonianum, XX (1945) pp. 309-330. Published by the Translation Clearing House, Department of Philosophy, Oklahoma State University.
LINKS
On early-modern Scholastics see the excellent site SCHOLASTICON by Jacob Schmutz
(in French).
(click on the image to see the PDF file)