"At the end of the fourteenth
century there were roughly three categories of work available to those
studying logic. The first category is that of commentaries on Aristotle's
'Organon'. The most comprehensive of these focussed either on the books of
the Logica Vetus, which included Porphyry's Isagoge along with the Categories
and De Interpretatione; or on the books of the Logica Nova,
the remaining works of the 'Organon' which had become known to the West only
during the twelfth century. In addition there were, of course, numerous
commentaries on individual books of the 'Organon'. The second category is
that of works on non-Aristotelian topics. These include the so-called
Parva logicalia, or treatises on supposition, relative terms,
ampliation, appellation, restriction and distribution. To these could be
added tracts on exponibles and on syncategorematic terms. Peter of Spain is
now the best-known author of parva logicalia, but such authors as
Thomas Maulvelt and Marsilius of Inghen were almost as influential in the
late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Another group of works belonging to
the second category consists of the so-called 'tracts of the moderns',
namely treatises on consequences, obligations and insolubles. A third group
includes treatises on sophisms, on the composite and divided senses, and on
proofs of terms, especially the well-known Speculum puerorum by
Richard Billingham. The third and last category is that of comprehensive
textbooks. The most famous example is the Summulae logicales of
Peter of Spain, which gives a complete outline of Aristotelian logic,
including categories, syllogisms, topics and fallacies; but others must be
mentioned. John Buridan's Summulae, which
was printed several times with a commentary by John Dorp, was a reworking of
Peter of Spain, but integrated the topic of supposition by placing it in
Book IV. It also added a new tract on definition, division and
demonstration. Paul of Venice's Logica parva, which was to be very
popular in Italy, presented the material of the summulae (except
for topics and fallacies) in tract one, and then added a series of tracts
dealing with the parva logicalia and with consequences, obligations
and insolubles. All three categories of works had a role in the curriculum
of the late medieval university, though the authors and tracts chosen varied
from place to place. It is a mistake to think that Peter of Spain provided
the only supplement to Aristotle,
for in some places he was not read at all, and in other
places only a part of his work was read. Moreover, when studied he was
studied through the medium of later commentators.
The medieval traditions of logical writing survived well into the
sixteenth century particularly at Paris and at the Spanish universities,
though with considerable internal changes. Treatises on sophisms and on
proofs of terms ceased to be written; whereas there was a sudden flurry of
activity concerned with the various divisions of terms and with the
opposition of propositions, i.e. the logical relations between different
kinds of categorical proposition. These internal changes were not, however,
sufficient to keep the tradition alive, and after about 1530 not only did
new writing on the specifically medieval contributions to logic cease, but
the publication of medieval logicians virtually ceased. The main exceptions
were the logical commentaries by (or attributed to) such authors as Thomas
Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, which found a place in their Opera Omnia,
and which benefited from a revived interest in the great medieval
metaphysicians.
The main changes in the teaching and writing of logic during the
sixteenth century were due to the impact of humanism. First, commentaries on
Aristotle came to display a totally new style of writing. One reason for
this was the influence of new translations of Aristotle, and new attitudes
to the Greek text. Another reason was the publication of the Greek
commentators on Aristotle's logic, Alexander, Themistius, Ammonius,
Philoponus and Simplicius. A third reason was the new emphasis on Averroes,
which expressed itself in the great Aristotle-Averroes edition of 1550-1552.
(30) The effects of these new factors can be seen in the commentaries
on individual works of the 'Organon' by such Italians as Agostino Nifo
(1473-1546) and Jacopo Zabarella (1533-1589), the latter of whom offered a
particularly influential account of scientific method. They can also be seen
in the 'Organon' edition of Giulio Pace (15501635), which was first
published in 1584 and contained the
Greek text side-by-side with a new translation which was
designed not only to read well but also to capture the philosophical
significance of Aristotle's words. The culmination of the new style of
writing on Aristotle is found in the Conimbricenses, the great series of
commentaries produced by the Jesuits of Coimbra, especially (for our
purposes) the Commentarii in universam dialecticam Aristotelis
which appeared in 1606. This has aptly been described as presenting a fusion
of two late sixteenth century approaches to Aristotle, the philosophical one
of Zabarella and the philological one of Pace. (31)
In addition it contains a wealth of material about different interpretations
of Aristotle found in the Greek and Arab commentators, the medieval writers
such as Aquinas, and more recent Thomists such as Cardinal Cajetan and
Capreolus. One finds the occasional reference to Ockham or Marsilius of
Inghen, but the perception of who constituted the important logical writers
of the middle ages had clearly changed radically since the beginning of the
sixteenth century.
Humanism can also be held at least partially responsible for the virtual
disappearance of works on the specifically medieval contributions to logic,
including the parva logicalia, and for the replacement of medieval
textbooks by textbooks in a completely new style. The disgust that humanists
expressed at the barbarous language and twisted latin of the scholastics was
in itself a minor factor. More important were the philosophical ideals that
lay behind the work of Lorenzo Valla (1407-1457) and his follower Rudolph
Agricola (1444-1485). As Lisa Jardine has argued, both Valla and, to a
lesser extent, Agricola were concerned to offer a logic which was linked
with Cicero's Academic skepticism rather than with Aristotelian certainties.(32)
They wished to present argumentative strategies for rendering plausible each
of the two sides of an undecidable question, or for supporting one of them
as, perhaps only marginally, more plausible than the other. They were thus
drawn to consider a variety of non-deductive
strategies in lieu of the formal techniques
which had dominated a large part of medieval logic, especially in the
treatises on consequences, and in lieu of Aristotle's own syllogistic. Their
attention was focussed on the Topics which, especially as presented by
Cicero and Quintilian, seemed to offer a method of classifying these
strategies by their key terms rather than by their form. At the same time,
much of Agricola's concern was with the art of discourse as such, that is,
with the problem of presenting and organizing complete arguments and
narrations, whether written or spoken. Logic, or as he preferred to call it,
dialectic, was to be applied to all types of discourse, and hence to all
areas of teaching. As a result of this interest both in persuasive
techniques and in discourse as such, logic came to embrace much of what had
traditionally been regarded as belonging to rhetoric; and rhetoric came to
be seen as concerned not with the invention of topics but with the
ornamentation of discourse.
These doctrines as presented in Agricola's De inventione dialectica
libri tres, first published in 1515, turned out to be seductive. One of
those who was considerably influenced by Agricola was Philip Melanchthon
(1497-1560) whose logic text, first published in 1520 as Compendiaria
dialectices ratio, but replaced by two later versions, became very
popular. In it we see how the insights of Valla and Agricola were transmuted
to serve the textbook tradition. Melanchthon enjoyed the Agricolan emphasis
on clarity of style and the use of literary allusions; he accepted the
importance of the Topics and that part of logic called invention; and some
remarks on order in the first version of his text grew into a full section
on logical method as a way of ordering discourse.(33) At the same time,
Melanchthon was a convinced Aristotelian. The formal techniques he used were
those of syllogistic, and his work included a discussion of the other
standard Aristotelian subjects including the categories and the square of
opposition for propositions. Indeed, the last version of his logic, the
Erotemata dialectices of 1547, seems
considerably less Agricolan in
tune than the earlier versions,
though it retains references to Cicero and Quintilian.
(34)
Another writer who was influenced by Agricola is Petrus Ramus or Pierre
de la Ramie (1515-1572), the most notorious logician of the sixteenth
century. He is known both for his attacks on Aristotle and for the
simplified logic presented in his Dialectique of 1555
(published in Latin in 1556 as Dialecticae libri duo), a
work which enjoyed a remarkable publishing history. Ong lists 262 editions,
151 of which appeared in Germany. (35) The
Dialectique had two parts. The first, on invention, covered the Topics;
and the second, on judgment, presented a deliberately simplified version of
the syllogism followed by an account of method as a means of ordering in the
arts and sciences. No reference was made to such standard material as the
categories, the square of opposition, conversion, demonstration and
fallacies. On the other hand, the work is rich with quotations from the
poetry and prose of classical authors, which must have strengthened the
impression among students that logic was both easy and fun. It is small
wonder that (in Jardine's words), Ramus 'cornered the textbook market'
despite the absence of genuine logical innovation.(36)
Whatever its attractions, the deficiencies of Ramus's book as a teaching
tool became rapidly apparent to those seriously interested in logic at the
university level. As a result, a new school of textbook writers known as the
Philippo-Ramists appeared in Germany in the 1590s. These authors had the aim
of combining what was best in Ramus with what was best in the more
Aristotelian work of Philip Melanchthon. Thus they tended to restore all
those parts of Aristotelian logic which Ramus had deliberately omitted. An
important writer who can be seen as
allied to the Philippo-Ramist school, though he is more
frequently described as a Systematic, is Bartholomew Keckermann (c.
1572-1609). Keckermann was primarily concerned to defend Aristotle and such
Aristotelians as Zabarella, but he paid careful attention to Ramist
doctrines. He was particularly noteworthy for his theoretical discussion of
the notion of a system, and the criteria for determining whether a body of
doctrine, such as logic or ethics, could properly be called a system.(37) J.
H. Alsted (1588-1638) was also an important
Systematic, who displayed a good deal of sympathy toward Ramism.(38)
Another important group of textbooks from the latter half of the
sixteenth century owed a smaller debt to the humanist logic of Rudolph
Agricola and Petrus Ramus, and is noteworthy for an attempt to integrate
certain parts of the specifically medieval contribution to logic into a
generally Aristotelian framework. I shall mention three such texts. The
earliest, and most medieval in tone, is the Compendium logicae by
Chrysostomo Javelli (d. c. 1538) which was first
published posthumously in 1551. Javelli retained discussion of such topics
as the proofs of terms, and he also retained a number of sophisms and
puzzle- cases from the medieval literature. He can therefore be described as
a transitional author, representing an intermediate stage between the old
medieval textbooks and the Counter- Reformation texts of the Jesuits
Francisco de Toledo (1533-1596) and Pedro de Fonseca (1528-1599). Toledo's
Introductio in dialecticam was first published in 1561 in Rome; and
Fonseca's Institutionum dialecticarum was first published in 1564 in Lisbon.
The Jesuit Ratio Studiorum of 1586 had recommended the Summula of Fonseca
for its breadth, clarity, relevance to Aristotle and lack of sophistry;
(39)
and in the Ratio Studiorum of 1599, Toledo was recommended in addition to
Fonseca.(40) The two books share important features. Their main objective is to
present standard Aristotelian logic. This material is
supplemented with an account
of certain medieval doctrines, specifically supposition theory, exponible
propositions, and consequences, but the presentation of these doctrines is
new. There is a complete absence of the sophisms which had formed a
prominent feature of late medieval texts. There is also little discussion of
problems caused for such operations as conversion by the presence of
different linguistic structures. The highly technical language which struck
the humanist as barbaric has gone and, in Fonseca at least, there is a
conscious attempt to use classical terminology. All three texts were widely
disseminated in Europe and, interestingly enough, all seem to have
disappeared at much the same time. The last editions that I know of are as
follows: Toledo: Milan, 1621; Fonseca: Lyon, 1625; Javelli: Cologne, 1629."
(30)
See C. B. Schmitt,
"Renaissance Averroism studied through the Venetian Editions of
Aristotle-Averroes", Atti dei Convegni Lincei 40 (1979), pp. 131-140.
(31) C.
B. Schmitt, "Towards a Reassessment of Renaissance
Aristotelianism", History of Science 11 (1973), p. 170.
(32)
Lisa Jardine, "Lorenzo Valla and the Intellectual Origins of Humanist
Dialectic", Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (1977), 143-164. For
further discussion and references see the chapter by Jardine in The
Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (forthcoming)
[Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, Humanistic logic pp.
173-198]
(33)
See Philip Melanchthon, Compendiaria Dialectices Ratio in Opera (Corpus Reformatorum XX, Brunsvigae 1854: reprinted New York and Frankfurt am Main
1963) columns 724-726; and Erotemata Dialectices in Opera (Corpus Reformatorum XIII, Halis Saxonum, 1846: reprinted New York and Frankfurt am
Main 1963) columns 573-578.
(34)
Wilhelm Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit. 1 Band. 1500-1640 (Stuttgart- Bad
Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann, 1964), p. 89, wrote of the Erotemata
Dialectices: "Melanchthon proklamiert hier eine reine, unverdebt
aristotelische Logik.... Cicero and Agricola sind nicht mehr als Autoritaten
genannt." Risse's judgment is perhaps too strong.
(35)
W. J. Ong, Ramus and Talon
Inventory (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958). For a full
discussion of Ramus, see W.J. Ong, Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue
(Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958).
(36)
Jardine, The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy.
(37)
For some discussion of Keckermann, see Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit, pp.
440-450; and N.W. Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method (New York,
Columbia University Press, 1960), pp. 214-220.
(38) For
discussion, see Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit, pp. 477-485.
(39)
Karl Kehrbach, Monumenta Germaniae Paedagogica Band V. (Berlin, 1887) p.
131.
(40)
Kehrbach, ibid., p. 332.
From: Earline Jennifer Ashworth - Editor's
Introduction to: Robert Sanderson - Logicae Artis Compendium
[1618] - Bologna, Clueb 1985 pp. XVI-XXII
The Development of Renaissance and Modern Logic from 1400 to Boole
Logicians of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Century
George of Trebizond (1395 - 1472/3)
Lorenzo Valla (1406 - 1457)
Rodolphus Agricola (1443 - 1485)
Jean Luis Vivés (1493 - 1540)
Domingo de Soto (1494 - 1560)
Petrus Ramus (1515 - 1572)
Giacomo (Jacopo) Zabarella (1533 - 1589)
Juan Caramuel y Lobkowtiz (1606 -
1682)
Logicians of the Seventeenth Century
The Conimbricenses' In universam dialectica Aristotelis (1606)
Logic and the workings of the mind. The logic of ideas and faculty
psychology in early modern philosophy. Edited by Easton Patricia A.
Atascadero: Ridgeview 1997.
The medieval heritage in early modern metaphysics and modal theory,
1400-1700. Edited by Friedman Russell L. and Nielsen Luge O. Dordrecht :
Kluwer 2003.
The rise of modern logic: from Leibniz to Frege. Edited by Gabbay Dov
and Woods John. Amsterdam: Elsevier 2004.
Handbook of the History of Logic: vol. 3.
Contents: Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods: Preface VII; List of Contributors IX-X;
Wolfgang Lenzen: Leibniz's logic 1; Mary Tiles: Kant: From General to
Transcendental Logic 85; John W. Burbidge: Hegel's logic 131; Paul Rusnock and
Rolf George; Bolzano as logician 177; Richard Tieszen: Husserl's logic 207;
Theodore Hailperin: Algebraical logic 1685-1900 323; Victor Sanchez Valencia:
The algebra of logic 389; Ivor Grattan-Guinness: The mathematical turn in logic
545; Volker Peckhaus: Schröder's logic 557; Risto Hilpinen: Peirce's logic 611;
Peter M. Sullivan: Frege's Logic 659; Index 751-770.
British logic in the Nineteenth century. Edited by Gabbay Dov and
Woods John. Amsterdam: Elsevier 2008.
Handbook of the History of Logic: vol. 4.
Contents: Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods: Preface VII; List of Contributors
XIII-XIV; Gordon R. McOuat and Charissa S. Varma: Bentham's logic 1; Tim Manes:
Coleridge's logic 33; James Van Evra: Richard Whately and logical lheory 75;
Ralph Jessop: The logic of Sir William Hamilton: tunnelling through sand to
place the keystone in the Aristotelic arch 93; Laurta J. Snyder:
"The whole box of tools": William Whewell and the logic of induction 163; Fred
Wilson: The logic of John Stuart Mill 229; Michael E. Hobart and Joan L.
Richards: De Morgan's logic 283; Dale Jacquette: Boole's logic 331; Maria
Panteki: French 'Logique' and British 'Logic': on the origins of Augustus de
Morgan's early logical enquiries, 1805-1835 381; Amirouche Moktefi: Lewis
Carroll's logic 457; James Van Evra: John Venn and logical theory 507; Bert
Mosselmans and Ard van Moer: William Stanley Jevons and the substitution of
similars 515; Shahid Rahman and Juan Redmond: Hugh McColl and the birth of
logical pluralism 533; David Sullivan: The Idealists 605; William J. Mander:
Bradley's logic 663; Index 719-735.
Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic. Edited by Gabbay Dov and Woods John.
Amsterdam: Elsevier 2008.
Handbook of the History of Logic: vol. 2.
Contents: Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods: Preface VII; List of Contributors IX;
John Marenbon: Logic before 1100: the Latin tradition 65; Ian Wilks: Peter
Abelard and his contemporaries 83; Terence Parsons: The development of
Supposition Theory in the later 12th through 14th centuries 157; Henrik
Lagerlund: The assimilation of Aristotelian and Arabic logic up to the later
thirteenth century 281; Ria van der Lecq: Logic and theories of meaning in the
late 13th and early 14th century including the Modistae 347; Gyula Klima: The
nominalist semantic of Ockham and Buridan: a 'rational reconstruction' 389;
Catarina Dutilh Novaes: Logic in the 14th century after Ockham 433; Simo
Knuuttila: Medieval modal theories and modal logic 505; Mikko Yrjönsuuri:
Treatments of the paradoxes of self-reference 579; E. Jennifer Ashworth:
Developments in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 609; Peter Dvorák:
Relational logic of Juan Caramuel 645; Russell Wahl: Port-Royal: the stirrings
of modernity 667; index 701.
Anellis Irving and Houser Nathan. Nineteenth century roots of algebraic
logic and universal algebra. In Algebraic logic. Edited by Andréka H.,
Monk J.D., and Németi I. Amsterdam: North-Holland 1991. pp. 1-36
Angelelli Ignacio, "The techniques of disputation in the history of logic,"
Journal of Philosophy 67: 800-815 (1970).
"The aim of this paper is to outline tentatively some aspects of the techniques
of disputation in their history, on the basis of some texts. Modern logic
("mathematical" logic) was conceived more geometrico by Frege, who
intended to improve upon Euclid essentially by adding an explicit list of rules
of inference (Grundgesetze I, p. VI). Thus, the notion of dialectica
in the sense of "speech between two," so important in the past, could hardly be
found relevant by modern historians of logic, who were guided by the new model.
These, in fact, have so far neglected to investigate this portion of the logical
heritage.(1) Only recently there has been an increasing interest in the
Topica, not extended, however, to the medieval and post-medieval
developments. Good old Prantl seems to be still the best source in this respect.
Historical works of a more general nature are of very little help even when they
abundantly refer to disputation, because the formal aspects are usually
overlooked. For example, a direct examination of the sources mentioned by Thurot
would be very rewarding, but what Thurot himself says on disputation is simply
useless from a technical point of view.(2)
The dialogical logic developed in the last ten years by Paul Lorenzen and his
school provides the needed "modern" motivation to go back to the ars
disputandi.(3) Sources for antiquity and for medieval obligationes (a
form of disputation) are known. Before 1800 disputation was considered by a very
large number of books on logic; after 1800 at least by most neoscholastic
treatises. Fortunately, in recent years bibliographical research in the history
of logic has increased so much (4) that now we also know of a small, yet
interesting list of postmedieval (second-scholastic) works especially devoted to
the theory of disputation."
(1) There are hardly any references in the most distinguished works on the
history of logic. In E. Moody's The Logic of William of Ockham (London:
Sheed & Ward, 1935), the topic of obligations is considered "not very relevant
to logic" 294.
(2) Charles Thurot, De l'Organisation de l'enseignement dans l'Universiteé de
Paris au Moyen Age (Paris: E. Magdeleine, 1850); pp. 87-90 for the
disputes.
(3) Paul Lorenzen, Normative Logic and Ethics (Mannheim:
Bibliographisches Institut, 1967); Kuno Lorenz. "Dialogspiele als Semantische
Grundlage von Logik-kalkulen," Archiv fur mathematische Logik und
Grundlagenforschung (1966).
(4) Above all W. Risse, Bibliographia logica (Hildesheim: 0lms, 1965).
Additions in W. Redmond, Bibliography of Philosophy in the Spanish-Portuguese
Colonies (The Hague: Nijhoff, forthcoming) [publlished in 1972 wit the
title: Bibliography of the philosophy in the Iberian colonies of America];
L. Hickman, Late Scholastic Logic: Another Look; to appear in Journal
of the History of Philosophy [1971, 9 pp. 226-234]
Angelelli Ignacio, "Aristotelian-Scholastic ontology and predication in the
Port-Royal logic," Medioevo: Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale
24: 283-310 (1998).
Angelelli Ignacio. Predication theory: classical vs modern. In Relations
and Predicates. Edited by Hochberg Herbert and Mulligan Kevin. Frankfurt:
Ontos Verlag 2004. pp. 55-80
"This essay aims, first, at describing the conflict between the theory of
predication (classical, Aristotelian) prevailing in philosophy until the end of
the 19th century, and the theory arisen with the new logic (modern, Fregean).
Three features characterize the pre- Fregean period: 1) conflation of
predication and subordination (extensionally: membership and class-inclusion),
2) conflation of identity and predication, 3) the view of quantificational
phrases (e.g. "some men") as denoting phrases. A possible fourth feature is
suggested by the consideration of the so-called Locke's "general triangle". Most
of the paper is devoted to the first feature, also called the "principal" one,
stated by Aristotle. Frege seems to be the first, in 1884, to reject the first
feature; he E ISO rejected, not less vehemently, the second and the third
features. Fregean predication theory became standard, and just taken for granted
in the subsequent developments of logic as well as in the mainstream of
philosophy. The second aim of this paper is to evaluate- relative to the notion
of predication submitted in section I - the conflict between the two traditions,
and to determine if both are somehow right, or one is right and the other wrong.
The main result is that the Fregean revolution in predication theory is, at
least with regard to the first and second features of the classical view, a
clarification that would probably be welcomed by the classical authors
themselves (pace Hintikka's "logic of being")."
Ashworth Earline Jennifer. Language and logic in the Post-Medieval
period. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company 1974.
This book is the first attempt to provide a general introduction to the type of
logical inquiry pursued in Europe after 1429 by means of a systematic
presentation of the doctrines which were actually written about and taught. It
radically alters traditional views of the period by demonstrating that not only
were medieval doctrines still of overriding importance at the beginning of the
sixteenth century, but that they continued to be discussed in many European
universities at least until the mid-seventeenth century.
TABLE OF CONTENTS; PREFACE IX; NOTE ABOUT ABBREVIATIONS XIII; ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
XV; CHAPTER I - HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 1; l. The Publication of Medieval Works
2; 2. Scholasticism in Italy and Germany 4; 3. Scholasticism in France and Spain
5; 4.Humanism 8; 5. Rudolph Agricola and His Influence 10; 6. Petrus Ramus and
His Influence 15; 7. Seventeenth Century Logic: Eclecticism 17; 8. Humanism and
Late Scholasticism in Spain 19; 9. Other Schools of Logic 20; 10. A Note on
Terminology 22; CHAPTER II / MEANING AND REFERENCE 26; I. The Nature of Logic
26; 1. The Contents of Logical Text-books 26; 2. The Definition of Logic 29; 3.
The Object of Logic 32; II. Problems of Language 37; 1. Terms: Their Definition
and Their Main Divisions 38; 2. The Relationship between Mental, Spoken and
Written Terms 42; 3. Other Divisions of Terms 45; 4. Sense and Reference 47; 5.
Propositions and their Parts 49; 6. Sentence-Types and Sentence-Tokens 52; 7.
Complex Signifiables and Truth 55; 8. Other Approaches to Truth 62; 9.
Possibility and Necessity 66; III. SUPPOSITION THEORY 77; 1. Supposition,
Acceptance and Verification 78; 2. Proper, Improper, Relative and Absolute
Supposition 82; 3. Material Supposition 83; 4. Simple Supposition 84; 5. Natural
Personal Supposition 88; 6. Ampliation 89; 7. Appellation 92; IV. SEMANTIC
PARADOXES 101; 1. Problems Arising from Self-Reference 101; 2. Solution One:
Self-Reference Is Illegitimate 104; 3. Solution Two: All Propositions Imply
Their Own Truth 106; 4. Solution Three: Insolubles Assert Their Own Falsity 108;
5. Solution Four: Two Kinds of Meaning 110; 6. Solution Five: Two
Truth-Conditions 112; 7. Later Writing on Insolubles 114; CHAPTER III / FORMAL
LOGIC. PART ONE: UNANALYZED PROPOSITIONS 118; I. THE THEORY OF CONSEQUENCE 120;
1. The Definition of Consequence 120; 2. The Definition of Valid Consequence
121; 3.Formal and Material Consequence 128; 4. 'Ut Nunc' Consequence 130; 5. The
Paradoxes of Strict Implication 133; 6. Rules of Valid Consequence 136; II.
PROPOSITIONAL CONNECTIVES 147; 1. Compound Propositions in General 147; 2.
Conditional Propositions 149; 3A. Rules for Illative Conditionals 154; 3B. Rules
for Promissory Conditionals 156; 4. Biconditionals 156; 5. Conjunctions 157; 6.
Disjunctions 161; 7. De Morgan's Laws 166; 8. Other Propositional Connectives
177; III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE RULES FOUND IN SOME INDIVIDUAL AUTHORS 171; 1.
Paris in the Early Sixteenth Century 171; 2. Oxford in the Early Sixteenth
Century 181; 3. Germany in the Early Sixteenth Century 183; 4. Spain in the
Third Decade of the Sixteenth Century 184; 5. Spain in the Second Part of the
Sixteenth Century 184; 6. Germany in the Early Seventeenth Century 185; CHAPTER
IV / FORMAL LOGIC. PART TWO: THE LOGIC OF ANALYZED PROPOSITIONS 187; I. The
Relationships Between Propositions 189; 1. The Quality and Quantity of
Propositions 189; 2. Opposition 192; 3. Equipollence 194; 4. Simple and
Accidental Conversion 195; 5. Conversion by Contraposition 199; II. Supposition
Theory and Quantification 207; 1. The Divisions of Personal Supposition 207; 2.
Descent and Ascent 213; III. Categorical Syllogisms 223; 1. Figures and Modes
224; 2. How to Test the Validity of a Syllogism 230; 3. Proof by Reduction 239;
4. Syllogisms with Singular Terms 247; APPENDIX / LATIN TEXTS 253; BIBLIOGRAPHY
282; 1. Primary Sources 282; 2. Secondary Sources on the History of Logic
1400-1650 291; INDEX OF NAMES 297.
Ashworth Earline Jennifer. Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics.
London: Variorum Reprints 1985.
Reprint of 12 essays already published.
CONTENTS: Preface;
REFERENCE IN INTENSIONAL CONTEXTS; I 'For Riding is Required a Horse": A Problem
of Meaning and Reference in Late fifteenth and Early sixteenth Century Logic -
Vivarium XII. 1974; II I Promise you a Horse": A Second Problem of Meaning and
Reference in Late fifteenth and Early sixteenth Century Logic (Parts 1 & 2) -
Vivarium XIV. 1976; III Chimeras and Imaginary Objects: A Study in the
Post-Medieval Theory of Signification - Vivarium XV. 1977;
PROPOSITIONS AND MENTAL LANGUAGE
IV Theories of the Proposition: Some Early sixteenth Century Discussions -
Franciscan Studies 38. 1978 (1981); V The Structure of Mental Language: Some
Problems Discussed by Early Sixteenth Century Logicians - Vivarium XX. 1982; VI
Mental Language and the Unity of Propositions: A Semantic Problem Discussed by
Early Sixteenth Century Logicians - Franciscan Studies 41. 1981 (1984);
SCHOLASTIC INFLUENCES ON JOHN LOCKE
VII "Do Words Signify Ideas or Things?" The Scholastic Sources of Locke's Theory
of Language - Journal of the History of Philosophy XIX. 1981; VIII Locke on
Language - Canadian Journal of Philosophy XIV/1. 1984;
LOGICAL ANALYSIS
IX The Doctrine of Exponibilia in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries -
Vivarium XI. 1973; X Multiple Quantification and the Use of Special Quantifiers
in Early Sixteenth Century Logic - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic XIX. 1978;
SEMANTIC PARADOXES
XI Thomas Bricot (d. 1516) and the Liar Paradox - Journal of the History of
Philosophy XV. 1977; XII Will Socrates Cross the Bridge? A Problem in Medieval
Logic - Franciscan Studies 46. 1976 (1977);
Addenda et Corrigenda; Index
Ashworth Earline Jennifer. Traditional logic. In The Cambridge History of
Renaissance Philosophy. Edited by Schmitt Charles B. and Skinner Quentin.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988. pp. 143-172
"I outline the developments and changes in logic and logic teaching between 1350
and 1600, paying attention to the survival of medieval doctrines and to the
renewed Aristotelianism of the sixteenth century. I also discuss the philosophy
of language in the same period, paying attention to speculative grammar, to the
doctrines of signs and signification, and to the clash between medieval
doctrines of conventional signification and the new renaissance interest in the
idea of a naturally significant spoken language."
Ashworth Earline Jennifer. Developments in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. In Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic. Edited by Gabbay Dov and
Woods John. Amsterdam: Elsevier 2008. pp. 609-644
Handbook of the history of logic: Vol. 2.
"To understand the significance of these developments for the logician, we have
to consider three questions. First, how much of the medieval logic described in
the previous chapters survived? Second, insofar as medieval logic survived, were
there any interesting new development in tit? Third, does humanist logic offer
an interesting alternative to medieval logic?
In Part One of this chapter I shall consider the first two questions in the
context of a historical overview in which I trace developments in logic from the
later middle ages thorough to 1606, the year in which the Jesuits of Coimbra
published their great commentary on Aristotle's logical works, the
Commentarii Conimbricenses in Dialecticam Aristotelis. I shall begin by
considering the Aristotelian logical corpus, the six books of the Organon,
and the production of commentaries on this work. I shall the examine the fate of
the specifically medieval contributions to logic. Finally, I shall discuss the
textbook tradition, and the ways in which textbooks changes and developed during
the sixteenth century. I shall argue that the medieval tradition in logic
co-existed for some time with the new humanism, that sixteenth century is
dominated by Aristotelianism, and that what emerged at the end of the sixteenth
century was not so much a humanist logic as a simplified Aristotelian logic.
In Part Two of this chapter, I shall ask whether the claims made about humanist
logic and its novel contributions to probabilistic and informal logic have nay
foundation. I shall argue that insofar as there is any principled discussion of
such matters, it is to be found among writers in the Aristotelian tradition." p.
610
Auroux Sylvain. La logique des idées. Paris: Vrin 1993.
Barone Francesco. Logica formale e trascendentale. Torino: Edizioni
di Filosofia 1957.
Vol. I: Da Leibniz a Kant (1957); Vol. II: L'algebra della logica
(1965).
Nuova edizione con una nuova introduzione dell'autore ed un aggiornamento
bibliografico a cura di Enrico Moriconi e Arianna Corotti, Milano, Unicopli,
1999 (vol. I) e 2000 (vol II).
Bellissima Fabio and Pagli Paolo. Consequentia mirabilis. Una regola
logica tra matematica e filosofia. Firenze: Olschki 1996.
Beth Evert Willem, "Hundred years of symbolic logic. A retrospect on the
occasion of the Boole-de Morgan centenary," Dialectica: 331-346 (1947).
Broadie Alexander. The Circle of John Mair. Logic and logicians in
Pre-Reformation Scotland. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1985.
Buickerood James, "The natural history of the Understanding: Locke and the
rise of facultative logic in the Eighteenth Century," History and Philosophy
of Logic 6: 157-190 (1985).
Ceñal Ramón, "La historia de la lógica en España y Portugal de 1500 a 1800,"
Pensamiento 28: 277-319 (1972).
Cosenza Paolo. Logica formale e antiformalismo (Da Aristotele a
Decartes). Napoli: Liguori Editori 1987.
Coxito Amândio A. Lógica, semântica e conhecimento na Escolastica
Peninsular pré-Renascentista. Coimbra: Biblioteca Geral da Universidade
1981.
Croizer Jacques. Les héritiers de Leibniz. Logique et philosophie, de
Leibniz à Russell. Paris: L'Harmattan 2001.
Frisch Joseph C. Extension and Comprehension in logic. New York:
Philosophical Library 1969.
Contents: Foreword by John R. Gallup VII; Introduction XV-XVI; Part I.
Historical survey. Chapter I. Modern logicians (1662-1966) 1; Chapter II.
Medieval and ancient logicians (1658-530 B.C.) 78; General summary of Chapter I
and II 124; Part II: A doctrinal survey. Chapter III. An essay in doctrine 129;
1. Non-logical meanings of 'extension' 129; 2. Non-logical meanings of
'comprehension' 135; 3. Extension and comprehension with reference to the theory
of knowledge 142; 4. Extension and comprehension in logic 149; 5. General
summary of Chapter III 172; Epilogue 177; Appendix I. Grammatical sources 179;
Appendix II: Different terminology and meanings 183; Bibliography 215; Footnotes
243-293.
"The purpose of this work is to analyze what has been frequently described by
logicians as the extension and comprehension of concepts. Even if there is a
justification for extension and comprehension in logic, it may be questioned
whether there are any concomitant dangers since one historian of logic claims
that this distinction has done more harm than good. Can it be said that the
importance of extension and comprehension has been magnified out of proportion
to the other parts of logic? Would it be more advantageous to correlate
extension and comprehension with the predicables, or would it be better to try
to eliminate the distinction altogether?
It is the aim of this study to explore the distinction existing between
extension and comprehension, to ascertain whether such distinction is
justifiable, where it should be placed in a treatise on logic, and how it should
be presented. These are questions which should be answered if one intends to
have a thorough grasp of logic.
This treatise will be divided into two parts. The first part will be subdivided
into two chapters. Chapter I will examine the writings of modern logicians
starting from 1662. Chapter II will treat of the works of classical and ancient
authors in a reverse order of time starting from 1658. The second part will
present an evaluation of extension and comprehension as a doctrine of logic.
It might be stated briefly here that the conclusion of this treatise hopes to
present as probable the following declarations: (1) Extension and comprehension
are basically an Aristotelian distinction. (2) Extension and comprehension are
closely allied with the predicables. A logician cannot have a proper
understanding of the former without a thorough understanding of the latter. (3)
Any well-organized treatise on logic should begin with a study of the
predicables.
The method of the first part which will be employed in this research is the
empirical, or a posteriori, method. This particular mode is
characteristic of all historical research. On the other hand,
the deductive, or a priori, method is unsound because it would oblige one to
posit a principle according to which all subsequent facts ought to correspond.
There is a constant danger associated with such procedure, namely, the tendency
to misstate or distort historical facts for the sake of preserving a methodic
balance. However, inasmuch as the second part involves an evaluation, both the a
posteriori and a priori methods will be utilized.
Perhaps it will seem strange to the reader to discover that in the initial
historical research, the philosophical works of modern logicians will be
examined in a chronological order, whereas, when attention is turned to the
classical and ancient authors, the order of time will be reversed for this
historical research. This mode of procedure was not adopted in any haphazard
manner, nor was it introduced merely for the sake of adding variety to the
presentation of the study. Inasmuch as the historical evidence on the
distinction of extension and comprehension is limited and oftentimes confusing,
it was not deemed feasible to begin the investigation at the very moment when
the reality underlying the distinction was first discovered and introduced into
logic so as to trace its development in one chronological direction. Instead it
seemed more reasonable to select one source of information to which many modern
authors had recourse and by which they were greatly influenced. It was not
difficult to make such a choice. The text which was cited most frequently and
which influenced modern logicians was none other than the Port Royal Logic
(1662)."
Giard Luce, "Du latin médiéval au pluriel des langues, le tournant de la
Renaissance in logique et grammaire," Histoire, Epistémologie, Langage 6:
35-55 (1984).
"L'Auteur étudie la manière dont, dans l'Europe de la Renaissance, les relations
entre langue, logique et grammaire se sont modifiées, passant de l'étude du
latin et des modèles logiques d'analyse à la pluralité des approches des langues
vernaculaires prônées par les Humanistes."
Giard Luce, "La production logique de l'Angleterre au XVI siècle in Bacon,"
Études Philosophiques: 303-324 (1985).
"La production logique éditée en Angleterre, majoritairement rédigée en latin,
est analysée en quatre blocs: l'héritage médiéval de grammaire modiste et de
logique, le renouveau aristotélicien progressif, la querelle ramiste, enfin les
premiers traités en anglais."
Hailperin Theodore, "The development of probability logic from Leibniz to
MacColl," History and Philosophy of Logic 9: 131-191 (1988).
Hickhman Larry, "Late Scholastics logics: another look," Journal of the
History of Philosophy 9: 226-234 (1971).
Hickman Larry. Modern theories of higher level predicates. Second
intentions in the Neuzeit. München: Philosophia Verlag 1980.
Howell Wilbur Samuel. Logic and rhetoric in England, 1500-1700.
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1956.
Contents: Prefgace V-VII;m 1. Introduction 3; 2. Scholastic logic 12; 3.
Traditional rhetoric: the three patterns 64; 4. The English Ramists 146; 5.
Counterreform: systematics an neo-Ciceronians 282; 6. New horizons in logic and
rhetoric 342; Index 399-411.
"Logic, conceived today as the science of validity of thought, and as the term
for the canons and criteria that explain trustworthy inferences, was in the
English Renaissance a theory not so
much of thought as of statement. For all practical purposes, the distinction
between thoughts and statements is not a very real distinction, since the latter
are merely the reflection of the former, and the former cannot be examined
without recourse to the latter. But what distinction there is consists in a
differentiation between mental phenomena and linguistic phenomena, the
assumption being that the thing to which either set of phenomena refers is
reality Itself. Logicians of the twentieth century are primarily interested in
mental phenomena as an interpretation of the realities of man's environment, and
in that part of mental phenomena which we call valid or invalid inference.
Logicians of the English Renaissance were primarily interested in statements as
a reflection of man's inferences, and in the problem of the valid and invalid
statement. Thus Renaissance logic concerned itself chiefly with the statements
made by men in their efforts to achieve a valid verbalization of reality. Since
such statements were the work of scholars and science, not of laymen,
Renaissance logic founded itself upon scholarly and scientific discourse and was
in fact the theory of communication in the world of learning. The data upon
which this theory rested were all learned tractates of that and earlier times.
The theory itself attempted on the one hand to explain the nature of these
tractates, as to language, sentence structure, and organization, and on the
other to offer assistance to the learner in his effort to master learned
communication, as part of his entrance fee to the scientific and philosophical
world." p. 3
Howell Wilbur Samuel. Eighteenth-century British logic and rhetoric.
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1971.
Contents: Preface VII-IX; 1. Introduction 5; 2. The Aristotelian inheritance in
logic (1615-1825). I. Some Seventeenth-century Peripatetics 13; II. Bishop
Sanderson and the attack on Ramus 16; III. Crakanthorp's Logicae Libri
Quinque 22; IV. John Wallis's Institutio Logicae 29; V. Dean
Aldrich's famous Artis Logicae Compendium 42; VI. Syllogisms and science:
John Sergeant's view 61; 3 The Eighteenth-century Ciceronians (1700-1759). 1.
Rhetoric as the counterpart of logic 75; II. John Ward's Lectures at Gresham
College 83; III. John Holmes's The Art of Rhetoric Made Easy 125; IV.
Separative tensions in rhetoric: a retrospect 142; 4 The British elocutionary
movement (1702-1806). I. Rhetorical delivery adopts a new name 145; II. Some
reflections on a semantic problem 147; III: Why delivery aroused urgent interest
152; IV. Continental backgrounds of British elocution 160; V. Le Faucheur's
Traitté in England 164; VI. Betterton: Major actor as minor elocutionist
182; VII. Some rules for speaking and action 190; VIII. Orator Henley: preacher,
elocutionist, merry-andrew 193; IX. Mason's Essay on Elocution 204; X.
Action proper for the pulpit 209; XI. Sheridan: minor actor as major
elocutionist 214; XII. Burgh, Herries, Walker, Austin 244; 5.The new logic
(1690-1814). I. Seven points of friction 259; II. John Locke and the new logic
264; III. Other voices: Le Clerc, Crousaz, Watts, Duncan, Wolff 299; IV. The new
accent: Reid, Kames, Campbell, Stewart 372; 6 The new rhetoric (1646-1800). I.
Rhetoric versus rhetoric: a litigation in six issues 441; II. Voices of the
Royal Society: Wilkins, Boyle, Sprat, Glanvill, Locke 448; III. Influences from
abroad: Lamy, Fénelon, Rapin, Bouhours, Rollin 503; IV. The new rhetoric comes
of age: Adam Smith's Lectures at Edinburgh and Glasgow 536; V. George Campbell
and the philosophical rhetoric of the new learning 577; VI. Discordant
consensus: Hume, Lawson, Priestley, Blair, Witherspoon 613; 7 Conclusion 695;
Index 719-742
"This book undertakes to present an analysis of the major eighteenth-century
British writings on logic and rhetoric and to place those writings in a
chronological perspective, so that the reader may see them in relation to their
antecedents in the seventeenth and their consequents in the nineteenth centuries
and also in relation to their influences upon each other. Moreover, this book
undertakes, as part of these two objectives, to introduce the reader to the
authors of these writings and to make them and their works stand together as
partners in an intellectual effort of appreciable size and duration. If history,
as Carl Becker observed, is the memory of things said and done, then the present
history is an attempt to tell our modern world what the chief British logicians
and rhetoricians of the 1700's said when they wrote about their specialties, and
what their works mean within the context of their particular time.
The main conclusion to be drawn from this history is that the changes which took
place in logical and rhetorical doctrine between 1700 and i 800 are perhaps best
interpreted as responses to the emergence of the new science.
The old science, as the disciples of Aristotle conceived of it at the end of the
seventeenth century, had considered its function to be that of subjecting
traditional truths to syllogistic examination, and of accepting as new truth
only what could be proved to be consistent with the old. Under that kind of
arrangement, traditional logic had taught the methods of deductive analysis, had
perfected itself in the machinery of testing propositions for consistency, and
had served at the same time as the instrument by which truths could be arranged
so as to become intelligible and convincing to other learned men. In short,
traditional logic prided itself upon being a theory of learned enquiry and of
learned communication. Meanwhile, traditional rhetoric also prided itself upon
having a share in these same two offices, its special purpose being to
communicate truths through a process which, on the one hand, blended scientific
conclusions with popular opinions and manners, and, on the other hand,
transmitted that blend to the general populace. For all practical purposes, the
differences between logic and rhetoric, within the context of the old science,
were derived from the differences between the learned and the popular audience.
A good statement of the concepts which governed this view of the relations of
these disciplines to each other is contained in the epigraph at the head of this
chapter.
The new science, as envisioned by its founder, Francis Bacon, considered its
function to be that of subjecting physical and human facts to observation and
experiment, and of accepting as new truth only what could be shown to conform to
the realities behind it. Bacon's vision became that of the Royal Society of
London, and of similar organizations throughout Europe. The intoxicating novelty
and enormous productivity of the new methods of investigation led young
scientists and scholars to practice them with increasing sophistication; and
logic, which had always claimed anyway to be the theory of enquiry, began to
incorporate the new methods into its doctrines and ended by becoming so enamored
of them that it allowed them to crowd out its waning interest in the methods of
learned communication. Meanwhile, rhetoric began to see itself as the rightful
claimant to the methods of learned communication and as the still unrivaled
master of the arts of popular discourse; and by making these two activities its
new concern, it came ultimately to think of itself as the art which governed all
forms of verbal expression, whether popular or learned, persuasive or didactic,
utilitarian or aesthetic. Thus in the context of eighteenth-century learning,
rhetoric became the sole art of communication by means of language, and logic
moved towards the realization that it was destined to become the science of
scientific enquiry. A good statement of the concept which controlled these
emerging relations of logic and rhetoric to each other was made by John Stuart
Mill in the first half of the nineteenth century, and I have quoted it as the
epigraph of Chapter 7, although in a real sense it also belongs to this
Introduction." pp. 5-6
Jardine Lisa, "The place of dialectic teaching in sixteenth century
Cambridge," Studies in the Renaissance 21: 31-62 (1974).
Jardine Lisa. Humanism and dialectic in sixteenth century Cambridge: a
preliminary investigation. In Classical influences on European culture, AD
1500-1700. Edited by Bolgar Robert Ralph. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press 1976. pp. 141-154
Jardine Lisa. Humanism and the theaching of logic. In The Cambridge
History of Later Medieval Philosophy. Edited by Kretzmann Norman, Kenny
Anthony John Patrick, and Pinborg Jan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1982. pp. 797-807
Jardine Lisa. Humanistic logic. In The Cambridge History of Renaissance
Philosophy. Edited by Schmitt Charles B. and Skinner Quentin. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1988. pp. 173-198
"The history of medieval and Renaissance logic has traditionally been the
history of the great medieval syllogistic logicians and the fortuna of
their innovatory treatments down through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
When historians of logic characterise humanist dialectic as a misguided and
non-rigorous intervention which disrupted the smooth development of medieval
syllogistic logic, they confirm their own commitment to the interests and
techniques pioneered by logicians like William of Sherwood. It is not
surprising, then, if these scholars find the very different approach of the
humanists trying. They hold up against the `non-rigorous' humanist treatment of
ratiocination, the 'rigour' of a commitment to formal validity as the central
focus for the study of logic - a commitment, that is to say, to those fixed
patterns of argumentation which guarantee that from any true premises whatsoever
one can only infer a true conclusion Humanist treatments of logic, on the other
hand, have a good deal in common with the interests of some recent, modern
logicians, who have chosen to give a good deal of attention to non-deductive
inference, and to 'good' arguments (arguments which can be counted on to win in
debate), and the problematic nature of their validity. Like modern logicians
they are interested, above all, in 'good' arguments.
A humanist treatment of logic is characterised by the fundamental assumption
that oratio may be persuasive, even compelling, without its being
formally valid (or without the formal validity of the argument being
ascertainable). It takes the view, therefore, that any significant study of
argument (the subject-matter of logic/dialectic) must concern itself equally
with argument (strictly, argumentation) which is compelling but not amenable to
analysis within traditional formal logic.' It is this fundamental difference of
opinion over what is meant by 'compelling' argument which accounts for the
dogmatic insistence (on ideological grounds) of the scholastic (and of the
historian of scholasticism) that the humanist is a 'grammarian' or a
'rhetorician'. Either term announces that what the humanist is concerned with is
not 'rigorous' in the restricted scholastic sense: all discourse not amenable to
such 'rigorous' analysis is, for the scholastic, a matter for the grammarian (to
parse and construe) or the rhetorician (to catalogue its persuasive devices). It
is in the same spirit that humanists always refer to their study of
ratiocination as 'dialectic' (reasoning conducted between two interlocutors),
rather than as 'logic', to emphasise the active, pragmatic nature of the
argumentation which captures their interest." (pp. 175-176, notes omitted)
Michael Frederick S. Why logic become epistemology: Gassendi, Port Royal and
the Reformation in logic. In Logic and the workings of the mind. The logic of
ideas and faculty psychology in early modern philosophy. Edited by Easton
Patricia A. Atascadero: Ridgeview 1997. pp. 1-20
Mugnai Massimo. Denken und Rechnen: über die Beziehung zwischen Logik und
Mathematik in der frühen Neuzeit. In Neuzeitliches Denken. Festschrift für
Hans Poser zum 65. Geburtstag. Edited by Abel Günter, Engfer Hans-Jürgen,
and Hubig Christoph. Berlin: de Gruyter 2002. pp. 85-100
Mugnai Massimo. Logic and mathematics in the 18th century: before and after
Christian Wolff. In Wolffiana 1: Macht und Bescheidenheit der Vernunft:
Beiträge zur Philosophie Christian Wolffs; Gedenkband für Hans Werner Arndt.
Edited by Cataldi Madonna Luigi. Hildesheim: Georg Olms 2005. pp. 97-109
Muñoz Delgado Vicente. La lógica nominalista en la Universidad de
Salamanca, 1510-1530. Ambiente, literatura, doctrinas. Madrid: Revista
Estudios 1964.
Muñoz Delgado Vicente, "Logica hispano-portuguesa hasta 1600 (notas
bibliográfico-doctrinales)," Repertorio de Historia de las Ciencias
Eclesiásticas en España 4: 9-122 (1972).
Muñoz Delgado Vicente, "España en la historia de la lógica prerrenacentista
(1350-1550)," La Ciudad de Dios 186: 372-394 (1973).
Muñoz Delgado Vicente, "La lógica formal y su dimensión histórica,"
Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia 1: 111-156 (1974).
Muñoz Delgado Vicente, "Introducción al patrimonio escolastico de lógica,"
Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia 2: 45-76 (1975).
Muñoz Delgado Vicente, "Lógica hispano-portuguesa e iberoamericana en el
siglo XVII," Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia 9: 279-398 (1982).
Nuchelmans Gabriel. Late-Scholastic and Humanist theories of proposition.
Amsterdam: North-Holland 1980.
Contents: Part One: Late-Scholastic theories of the proposition. 1. Introduction
3; 2. Different kinds of propositions and their ways of signifying 9; 3. The tie
between the principal parts of a proposition 27; 4. The adequate signification
and the adequate significate of a proposition 45; 5. Disguised propositions 74;
6. Judgment 90; 7. The object of judgment 103; 8. Propositions as bearer of
truth-values 114; Part Two: Humanist theories of proposition. 9. Introduction
143; 10. The first attempt at reorientation 146; 11. The Melanchtonian treatment
of a theme 159; 12. Peter Ramus 168; 13. The diffusion of Ramist terminology
180; 14. Eclectics 189; Epilogue 204; Bibliography 209; Indices 224-237.
"After publishing, more than six years ago, my Theories of the Proposition.
Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity, I
initially intended to cover the remaining phases of the history of the semantics
of declarative sentences in one volume. As the material proved more abundant and
unwieldy than I had anticipated, I decided to limit the next instalment to the
period between 1450 and 1650. Accordingly, the present book treats the theories
of the proposition put forward by late-scholastic and humanist philosophers. It
will be followed, in the not too distant future, I hope, by a third volume which
will continue the account until the first decades of the nineteenth century.
In making my way through the intricate mass of sources, which are often works
that are completely forgotten and extremely hard to obtain, I was greatly
assisted by Professor Ashworth's pioneering book on Language and Logic in the
Post-Medieval Period. Moreover, when I had practically finished my
manuscript, she was kind enough to send me the draft of an article entitled
'Theories of the Proposition: Some Early Sixteenth Century Discussions'. As this
article is based on a corpus of texts which is slightly different from mine, it
enabled me to check some of my results against the findings of a very competent
collaborator in this lonely field of research. I can only advise the reader to
do the same when the article will have been published (in Franciscan Studies
[38, 1978 pp. 81-121])."
Nuchelmans Gabriel. Judgment and proposition. From Descartes to Kant.
Amsterdam: North-Holland 1983.
Contents: 1. The legacy of scholasticism and humanism 9; 2. Idea and judgment in
Descartes 36; 3. Repercussions of Descartes' theory of judgment 55; 4. Arnauld
and the Port-Royal Logic 70; 5. Some eighteenth-century critics of the
Port-Royal view 88; 6. Geulincx's contribution to Cartesian philosophy of logic
99; 7. Ideas and Images. Gassendi and Hobbes 121; 8. The heyday of British
empiricism 139; 9. Sensationalism and its critics in France 174; 10. Common
sense philosophy and nominalism in Great Britain 194; 11. Leibniz's logical
realism 214; 12. The German enlightenment 233; 13. Some problems in Kant and his
contemporaries 246; Epilogue 257; Bibliography 262; Indices 280-295
Nuchelmans Gabriel, "Can a mental proposition change its truth-value? Some
17th-century views," History and Philosophy of Logic 15: 69-84 (1994).
" In the first half of the seventeenth century the Aristotelian view that the
same statement or belief may be true at one time and false at another and, on
the other hand, the conception of a mental proposition as a fully explicit
thought that lends a definite meaning to a declarative sentence originated a
lively debate concerning the question whether a mental proposition can change
its truth- value. In this article it is shown that the defenders of a negative
answer and the advocates of a positive answer argued on the basis of different
notions of what a mental proposition is: one side taking it as more or less
equivalent to a specific utterance- meaning and the other side as more or less
equivalent to a generic sentence-meaning."
Nuchelmans Gabriel. Deductive reasoning. In The Cambridge history of
Seventeenth-century philosophy. Edited by Garber Daniel and Ayers Michael.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998. pp. 132-146
Vol. I
Nuchelmans Gabriel. Logic in the Seventeenth century: preliminary remarks
and the constituents of the proposition. In The Cambridge history of
Seventeenth-century philosophy. Edited by Garber Daniel and Ayers Michael.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998. pp. 103-117
Vol. I
Nuchelmans Gabriel. Proposition and Judgement. In The Cambridge history
of Seventeenth-century philosophy. Edited by Garber Daniel and Ayers
Michael. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998. pp. 118-131
Vol. I
Peckhaus Volker, "19th century logic between philosophy and mathematics,"
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 5: 433-450 (1999).
"The history of modern logic is usually written as the history of mathematical
or, more general, symbolic logic. As such it was created by mathematicians. Not
regarding its anticipations in scholastic logic and in the rationalistic era,
its continuous development began with George Boole's The Mathematical
Analysis of Logic of 1847, and it became a mathematical subdiscipline in the
early 20th century. This style of presentation cuts off one eminent line of
development, the philosophical development of logic, although logic is evidently
one of the basic disciplines of philosophy. One needs only to recall some of the
standard 19th century definitions of logic as, e.g., the art and science of
reasoning (Whateley) or as giving the normative rules of correct reasoning
(Herbart).
In the paper the relationship between the philosophical and themathematical
development of logic will be discussed. Answers to the following questions will
be provided:
1. What were the reasons for the philosophers' lack of interest in formal logic?
2. What were the reasons for the mathematicians' interest in logic?
3. What did "logic reform" mean in the 19th century? Were the systems of
mathematical logic initially regarded as contributions to a reform of logic?
4. Was mathematical logic regarded as art, as science or as both?"
Picardi Eva. Assertion and assertion sign. In Le teorie delle modalità.
Atti del Convegno internazionale di storia della logica. Edited by Corsi
Giovanni, Mangione Corrado, and Mugnai Massimo. Bologna: CLUEB 1989. pp. 139-154
Proust Joëlle. Questions of form. Logic and the analytic proposition from
Kant to Carnap. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1989.
Original French edition: Questions de forme. Logique et proposition analytique
de Kant à Carnap - Paris, Fayard, 1986.
Translated by Anastasios Albert Brenner.
See the Third Chapter: Bolzano's renovation of analiticity - pp. 49-108.
Redmond Walter. La lógica del Siglo de Oro: Una introducción histórica a
la lógica. Pamplona: Eunsa 2002.
Roncaglia Gino, "Cum Deus calculat -- God's evaluation of possible worlds
and logical calculus," Topoi 9: 83-90 (1990).
Roncaglia Gino, "Buone e cattive fantasie: la riflessione sugli enti
inesistenti nella logica di Bartholomäus Keckermann," Metaxy 13: 80-104
(1992).
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