Hadot Pierre. La notion de "cas" dans la logique stoïcienne. In Le langage. Actes du XIII Congrés des Sociétés de philosophie de langue française. Genève, 2-6 août 1966. Neuchâtel: La Baconnière 1966. pp. 109-112
Hagius Hugh, "The Stoic theory of the parts of speech", 1979.
Ph. D. Dissertation, Columbia University available at: ProQuest Dissertation Express n. 8008733.
Contents: Preliminary remarks IV--IX; Chapter I. Chrysippus 1; Chapter II. The Techne concerning sounds of Diogenes of Babylon 101; Chapter III. Aristarchus and the Aristarcheans 171; Chapter IV. The Dialectica of Augustine 249; Concluding remarks 260; Appendix I 265; Appendix II 280; Bibliography 283-290.
Abstract: "This dissertation relates the history of the theory of the parts of speech from its origin in the Stoic school of dialectics through its passage into the Alexandrian school of literary criticism in the second century B.C.
It pays especial attention to the way in which the theory was transformed in that passage. The Stoics had used it as part of their general system of dialectics, intended to give an account of the truth of true sentences and the validity of valid deductions. The Alexandrians, whose main activity was textual criticism, used the parts of speech as a system of naming and classifying the forms of Greek. The dissertation argues that for each of these purposes a different theory is required, and that in the Alexandrian grammarians' application of the theory two different ways of analyzing language were confused.
The chief figures in this history are the Stoics, Chrysippus of Soloi (c. 281 to 208 B.C.) and his student, Diogenes of Babylon (c. 238 to 150 B.C.), and the Alexandrian, Aristarchus of Samothrace (c. 216 to 144 B.C.). One chapter is devoted to each of them.
The first chapter is a reconstruction of Chrysippus's version of the theory of the parts of speech. It discusses the terminology which he inherited, such as "element of logos," the forerunner of our phrase "part of speech," as well as the notions of noun, verb, conjunction and article. It examines Chrysippus's theory of the significate (alternatively called the lekton), which was described as being what "the barbarians, although hearing the sound, do not understand," and also as being "just what is true or false." The several parts of speech were distinguished according
to their association with significates.
The second chapter is a reconstruction of a lost work of Diogenes of Babylon, his Techne Concerning Sound. This was a handbook which treated language as a single topic, beginning with acoustics and proceeding to the parts of speech. Diogenes's Techne probably was the vehicle by which the theory of the parts of speech reached Alexandria.
The third chapter discusses Aristarchus's adaptation of the parts of speech to the purposes of textual criticism, and some of the ways in which he used it in his own edition of the Iliad. It also considers the difficulty which the confusion within the theory caused for Aristarchus's successors. Finally it compares the grammatical theory of the Alexandrians with that of the great Indian grammarian Panini and his commentators.
The fourth and final chapter is devoted to a post-classical Latin text which has come down to us as the De Dialectica of Augustine. Its sources are obscure, but it appears to represent a development of Stoic theory later than Diogenes. It considers questions of metalanguage, and draws a distinction between use and mention very like the one made by Panini. This stage of Stoic theory did not pass into the grammatical tradition, but the De Dialectica was read during the medieval and Renaissance periods in Europe.
The dissertation contains two appendices. The first is a collection of fragments upon which the reconstruction of Diogenes's Techne Concerning Sound was based. The second discusses Aristarchus's pupil Dionysius Thrax, and the grammar attributed to him."
Hamelin Octave, "Sur la logique des stoïciens," Année philosophique 12: 13-26 (1902).
Hay William, "Stoic use of logic," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 51: 145-157 (1969).
"To sum up. I began by reporting briefly the present widely held opinion that Stoic logic was a logic of propositions. I reminded us that in twentieth-century logic, the logic of propositions, consists of rules governing inferences according to their sentence-connectives and that it by no means exhausts the rules of logic. Rather propositional functions or predicates are added to that, and in turn many-place predicates are added. Some investigators have supposed that Stoic logic was confined to a logic of propositions. That restriction may be suggested by the concentration of the Stoics on singular propositions as those which express what exists most clearly and by their claim that all inferences depend on their logic. If, however, the Stoics had no more logic than the logic of propositions, they had no way of accounting for believing (much less for knowing) non-simple propositions in conditional or disjunctive forms, so that such non-simple propositions would be useful in inference.
Evidence was introduced that the Stoics had and used a rule of instantiation in conditional propositions. This led us to see a use for their rules about the three kinds of simple propositions, those with indefinite subjects, tis, ti, 'someone,' 'something;' those with definite subjects, demonstrative articles such as outos, touto, 'this one', 'that thing' and those with intermediate subjects, 'Socrates', 'Dion', anthropos, 'a man'.
There is further evidence that the Stoics claimed to be able to rephrase universal propositions of the Peripatetic form as conditional propositions with indefinite subjects. Some philosophers from other schools acknowledged that the conditionals followed from the standard universal. There was disagreement about the converse. The charge was made that the Stoics failed to acknowledge eternal forms and that they replace them by things which existed in the mind only, or rather since they were corporealists in the body of the knower only. Another paper would be required to discuss the place of these grasps in the Stoic account of knowledge and of ethics, for action involves how I take things." pp. 155-156
Hossenfelder Malte, "Zur stoischen Definition von Axioma," Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 11: 238-241 (1967).
Hülser Karlheinz. The fragments on Stoic dialectic: a new collection. In Meaning, use, and interpretation of language. Edited by Bäuerle Rainer, Schwarze Christoph, and von Stechow Arnim. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1983. pp. 235-249
Ierodiakonou Katerina, "Analysis in Stoic logic", University of London, 1990.
Ierodiakonou Katerina. Rediscovering some Stoic arguments. In Greek studies in the philosophy and history of science. Edited by Nicolacopoulos Pantelis. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1990. pp. 133-148
Ierodiakonou Katerina, "The Stoic division of philosophy," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 38: 57-74 (1992).
Ierodiakonou Katerina. Stoic logic. In A Companion to Ancient philosophy. Edited by Gill Mary Louise and Pellegrin Pierre. Malden: Blackwell 2006. pp. 505-529
"Conclusion. As I indicated at the beginning of the chapter, it was only towards the middle of the twentieth century that Stoic logic began to be studied on its own merits and not as an appendix to Aristotle's syllogistic. To a great extent it was the revival of interest in the logical contributions of the Stoics that convinced scholars to investigate more carefully the other parts of Stoic philosophy, namely ethics and physics. The literature on Stoic logic that has since been published has managed to reconstruct a logical calculus, which still surprises us with its sophistication and its similarities to modern systems of logic. At the same time, though, it also has become clear that we should not fail to take seriously into account what differentiates Stoic logic from its modern counterparts. For only in this way can we get a better understanding of how the history of logic has evolved in close connection to the other parts of philosophy, and more importantly, only in this way do we have a chance to appreciate the peculiar features and insights of ancient logic." p. 527
Ildefonse Frédérique. La naissance de la grammaire dans l'Antiquité grecque. Paris: Vrin 1997.
Chapitre II: Les Stoïciens - pp. 119-251
Imbert Claude. Stoic logic and Alexandrian poetics. In Doubt and dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic epistemology. Edited by Schofield Martin, Burnyeat Myles, and Barnes Jonathan. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1980. pp. 183-216
Jackson Darrell B., "The Stoic theory of signs in St. Augustine's "De doctrina christiana"," Revue des Études Augustiniennes 15: 9-49 (1969).
Reprinted in: Robert Austin Markus (ed.) - Augustine: a collection of critical essays - Garden City, Anchor Books, 1972, pp. 92-147
Jedan Christoph and Strobach Nico. Modalities by perspective. Aristotle, the Stoics and a modern reconstruction. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2002.
Kahn Charles H., "Stoic Logic and Stoic Logos," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 51: 158-172 (1969).
'"I turn now to the principal claim of Professor Hay's paper: that the logic of the Stoics was not exclusively a logic of propositions but that it included arguments whose major premiss was, in effect, a universally quantified conditional, "(x) (If Ax, then Bx)," instead of the ordinary conditional composed of two selfcontained sentences "If A, then B." Hay brings evidence of three sorts to bear in favor of this thesis. (1) First of all, there are the logical and historical considerations already alluded to: how could the Stoics have claimed to reduce all valid arguments, including the Aristotelian syllogism, to their five undemonstrated schemata, if they did not have some device equivalent to quantification"? (2) Secondly, there is the question of the epistemic function of logic: where the major premiss is a conditional such as If Plato lives, then Plato breathes interpreted truth-functionally, and I am able to draw the conclusion Plato breathes, how could I be in a position to know or believe the conditional premiss without already knowing or believing the conclusion? (For the truth of the conditional depends upon the truth of the consequent in this case,
since the antecedent is taken as true.) But the epistemic problem will not arise in this form if the major premiss may be universally quantified. I do not need to know that Socrates breathes - I do not need to know anything about Socrates at all - in order to agree that if anything is alive, that same thing (or animal) breathes. (3) Furthermore, Hay calls our attention (and apparently for the first time) to several decisive texts in which the Stoics make theoretical use of generalized conditionals of the form 'If anyone is born under the Dog Star, he will not die at sea.' Finally (4)
Hay suggests that the Stoic motive for the alleged reformulation of universal propositions as conditionals was their desire to avoid positing essences or classes or universals of any sort.
I am inclined to believe that Hay's principal thesis is correct, at least in principle; but it raises new problems almost as serious as those it solves. First of all, did the Stoics realize that they were introducing quantification when they offered a conditional compounded in this way of two indefinite propositions? If so, this seems to defeat their claim that all valid arguments could be reduced to their five undemonstrated forms. But if they did not see this, they were poorer logicians than Aristotle at a crucial point they will have set up a propositional calculus only at the cost of distorting the facts concerning quantification. We seem to be faced with a dilemma. Either Stoic logic is based solely on the propositional connectives, and then it is epistemically sterile. (This appears to be Mueller's view.) Or else it involves generalized conditionals and a rule of instantiation, but then it is defective as logic since we are left without any account of the quantified conditional. (1) I suspect that the latter is likely to be true, and that by formulating indefinite conditionals to achieve generality, and then instantiating for a definite, ostensibly indicated subject, the Stoics believed that they could in fact do without quantification, i. e. without any theory involving 'all' and 'none.' " pp. 163-164.
(1) I have oversimplified in order to put the problem sharply. It is worth noting that the decisive text from De Fato is explicitly meta-linguistic: "If G (a generalized conditional) is true, then C (an ordinary conditional) is also true" (see Hay, note 15). Therefore arguments making use of such a rule of instantiation will be valid but not necessarily reducible to one of the five undemonstrated schemata (compare the examples in Mates, p. 64 and p. 65 n. 32). In the Symposium discussion in St. Louis several suggestions were made for reconstructing the Stoic generalized conditional without quantification theory, as the meta-linguistic representation for a "bundle of individual conditionals" (Quine, Methods of Logic, p. 13), much as an axiom schema may represent an infinite set of individual axioms. I leave it to others to decide how far such a suggestion can be worked out systematically.
Kneale William and Kneale Martha. The development of logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1962.
Reprinted 1975 with corrections.
See Chapter III: The Megarian and the Stoics pp. 113-176
Layrand Valéry. Le vocabulaire des stoiciens. Paris: Ellipses Marketing 2002.
Réédition in Jean Pierre Zarader (ed.), Le vocabulaire des philosophes, Vol. I. De l'Antiquité à la Renaissance, Paris, Ellipses, 2002, pp. 219-268
Lewis Eric, "The Stoics on identity and individuation," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 40: 89-108 (1995).
Long Anthony Arthur. Language and thought in Stoicism. In Problems in Stoicism. Edited by Long Anthony Arthur. London: Athlone Press 1971. pp. 75-113
Long Anthony Arthur. Hellenistic philosophy. Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. Berkeley: University of California Press 1974.
Second edition 1986 with a Bibliographical Postscript 1985 pp. 257-268.
See Chapter 4: Stoicism § III: Stoic logic pp. 121-146
Long Anthony Arthur. Dialectic and the Stoic sage. In The Stoics. Edited by Rist John M. Berkeley: University of California Press 1978. pp. 101-124
Reprinted in: A. A. Long - Stoic studies - Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 85-106
Long Anthony Arthur. Stoic psychology and the elucidation of language. In Knowledge through signs. Ancient semiotic theories and practices. Edited by Manetti Govanni. Turnhout: Brepols 1996. pp. 109-131
"(1) During the creative period of Stoicism grammar was still in its infancy as a determinate field of study. I mention this fact because, as is well known, the Stoics were enormously influential on the Graeco-Roman grammatical tradition, which extends from the later Hellenistic epoch into the Christian period of the Roman Empire. Recourse to the Stoic influence on that tradition, excellently facilitated now by Karlheinz Hülser's collection (1987), can give the impression that these philosophers were merely pioneers in starting what the grammarians carried forward more fully and systematically. I want to suggest that such an impression may be seriously misleading in two respects.(2) First, it implies, incorrectly I believe, that the Stoics approached language as a phenomenon calling primarily for the kind of grammatical and syntactical description later grammarians developed. Secondly, it fails to identify the philosophical considerations that underpin the Stoics' principal interests in language. The Stoics had some splendid intuitions about the phonetic, grammatical and semantic levels of linguistic structure. Although these bear directly on the development of traditional grammar, they also seem to have clear affinities with what contemporary experts in linguistics call universal grammar.
The material I have chosen in order to make this point will be drawn primarily from sections of Diogenes Laertius' doxography of Stoicism (7.41-83). This is our only comprehensive account of "the logical part" of Stoic philosophy. I shall be dealing mainly with Diogenes' section "on utterance" (peri phonés) or "on signifiers" (peri semainonton), which forms the first part of the subdivision of "dialectic" (D.L. 7.55-62). The second part of that subdivision (D.L. 7.63-82) is "on significations" (peri semainomenon). This division of dialectic into signifiers and significations has a clear rationale, as we shall see, but it too can yield misleading impressions, especially if it is taken to imply that the subdivisions are independent of one another or that there are no superordinate concepts that unite them. I shall argue that there are two such concepts, (phantaisia and logos, and that these together provide the foundations of the Stoic theory of language and logic.(3)
There is a third general point that I want to address. Scholars have become accustomed to making a sharp distinction between the Stoic concept of linguistic signs (words and sentences) and their concept of semeion.(4) They applied the latter term (as distinct from the term semainon) to a pattern of sign-inference from a fact or proposition that is evident to a fact or proposition that is non-evident. It so happens that nothing is said about sign-inference in Diogenes Laertius' doxography of Stoic logic.(5)
Whatever the explanation for this omission may be, it cannot be doubted that the Stoics classified sign-inferences under the "significations" heading of the division of dialectic. As such, they are not linguistic signs but a class of propositions signified by linguistic signs. The antecedent or "if' clause of a sign inference is a meaning or sayable (lekton), not the sentence by which this meaning is expressed, and what the "if' clause is the sign for is the truth value of its consequent and the connexion of that truth value to itself. However, what we should conclude from this is not that sign-inference is a function of logic as distinct from language, but that it is a normative function of language, i.e., language in its epistemic and truth-signifying capacity. Not only do sign-inferences require language for their expression; they are also tied to language as lekta, or sentence content. Correspondingly, language is tied to lekton (including sign inferences) for its semantic content. The Stoics applied the term logos both to significant utterances (linguistic signifiers) and to sign-inferences of the form: if p, then q. The presence of logos on both sides of the division of dialectic is hardly inadvertent. I take it as an indication that what the Stoics were seeking to elucidate was a unitary science of discourse, which would comprehend both linguistic signs and sign-inferences without reducing one to the other." pp. 109-110
(1) (...) I have deliberately focused upon a limited range of texts, and I say virtually nothing about the antecedents of Stoic doctrines or their reception by later philosophers and grammarians. That is due in part to reasons of time and space, and also to the excellent studies covering these matters by Ax (1986), Frede (1977, 1978) and others. However, given the extremely fragmentary nature of our evidence, it also seemed to me important to focus rather narrowly on texts which have at least the appearance of being systematically Stoic and uncontaminated by other material. Hence my concentration on the "logical" doxography of Diogenes
Laertius 7.
(2) The three studies from which I have learned most about the complex relation between Stoicism and the work of grammarians are Lloyd (1971) and Frede (1977, 1978).
(3) There is no novelty about this claim. Its implications are explored by Imbert (1978) and Manetti (1988), and I dealt with them at some length in Long (1971b). My main point here is to elucidate the primacy attached to phantasia in Stoic logic.
(4) See for instance Long (1971b: 84-88).
(5) This is noted and explored by Ebert (1991: 54 ff.).
Long Anthony Arthur. Stoic linguistics, Plato' Cratylus, and Augustine's De dialectica. In Language and learning. Philosophy of language in the Hellenistic age. Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium Hellenisticum. Edited by Frede Dorothea and Inwood Brad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005. pp. 36-55
"Anthony Long also elaborates on the influence of Plato's Cratylus on Stoic theory. But he goes much further than Allen with his hypothesis that the Stoics not only made use of Plato's dialogue, but did so in a way that justifies he presentation of many central features of their linguistic theory as being he result of a revisionary reading of the Cratylus. It is a reading that makes Socrates' suggestions about the 'natural' relation of names to things much more coherent than they are in the dialogue itself. This also applies to their etymological explanation of the names of the gods that they suggested as a revision of a corrupted tradition and a return to the original name-givers' comprehension of the true nature of the universe. Given their `synaesthetic' reconstruction of the relation between phonetics and semantics, the Stoics could avoid the Cratylus' more absurd features of onomatopoetics, as Long shows by analysing different forms of 'naturalism', including 'formal and phonetic naturalism', and their application by the Stoics that not only ins hides names but also the famous lekta or 'sayables'. Long contends that the Stoics not only found a better balance between the phonetic and the formal constituents of meaningful discourse than emerges from Plato's dialogue itself, but restricted their use of etymology as a back-up to their theology, i.e. the naturalistic reconstruction of the names of the gods. As an additional witness to the sophistication of the Stoic linguistic theory Long adds an appendix on the four-fold semantic distinction (between dicibile, res, verbum, and dictio) in St Augustine's De dialectica, which he takes to be largely of Stoic origin.
The Epicureans also held that language is part of the natural emergence of human culture. But here the similarity between the Stoic and the Epicurean theory of language ends. For instead of an early stage of rationality and inspired `name-givers', the Epicureans proposed a quite different account of the evolution of language as part of their mechanical reconstruction of the order in nature, which includes an animal-like primitive stage of human beings. Unfortunately the information on this early stage in the development of humans as cultural beings in Epicurean theory is extremely meagre; attempts to reconstruct it have to rely on a few lines in Epicurus' Letter to Herodotus and in Lucretius' poem." From the Introduction by Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood, pp. 5-6
Löbl Rudolf. Die Relation in der Philosophie der Stoiker. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1986.
Inhaltsübersicht: Literaturangaben 7; Einleintung 13; Teil 1 17; A. Physis 19; B. Logos 62; Teil II 111; A. Die äusseren Relationen 113; B. Die inneren Relationen 129; C. Die transcendentale Relationen 134; Excursus: Zu Physik 141-150.
On Logic see pp. 77-102.
Luhtala Anneli. On the origin of syntactical description in Stoic logic. Münster: Nodus Publikationen 2000.
Łukasiewicz Jan. On the history of the logic of propositions. In Polish logic 1920-1939. Edited by McCall Storrs. Oxford: Oxford University press 1967. pp. 66-87
Originally published in Polish as Z historii logiki zdan, Przeglad Filozoficzny, 37, 1934; translated by the author in German as: Zur Geschichte der Aussagenlogik, Erkenntnis, 5, 1935, pp. 111-131.
Translated in English in: Storrs McCall (ed.) - Polish logic 1920-1939 - Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967 pp.66-87 and also in: J. Łukasiewicz - Selected works - Ludwik Borowski (ed.) - Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1970 pp. 197-217.
Manetti Giovanni, "Perception, encyclopaedia, and language among the Stoics," Versus.Quaderni di Studi Semiotici 50%1: 123-144 (1988).
Manetti Giovanni. Theories of the sign in classical antiquity. Bloomngton: Indiana University Press 1993.
Original Italian edition: Le teorie del segno nell'antichità classica - Milano, Gruppo Editoriale Fabbri, 1987.
Translated by Christine Richardson.
See Chapter Six: Theory of language and semiotics in Stoic philosophers - pp. 92-106
Marek Nasieniewski, "Is Stoic logic classical?," Logic and Logical Philosophy 6: 55-61 (1998).
"In this paper I would like to argue that Stoic logic is a kind of relevant logic rather than the classical logic. To realize this purpose I will try to keep as close as possible to Stoic calculus as expressed with the help of their arguments."
Mates Benson, "Stoic logic and the text of Sextus Empiricus," American Journal of Philology 70: 290-298 (1949).
"The text of Sextus Empiricus contains a number of corrupt places which can easily be corrected by reference to a few technical terms and elementary concepts of Stoic logic. It is the aim of the present paper to prove this assertion with respect to a certain class of cases and, in so doing. to show that any future editor of Sextus ought to have a clear understanding of Stoic logic."
Mates Benson. Stoic logic. Berkeley: University of California Press 1953.
Contents: I. Introduction 1; Chapter I. § 1: The problem § 2: Stoic authors to be considered §3: Sources for Stoic logic; Chapter II. Signs, sense, and denotation 11; § 1: Exposition of the Stoic theory § 2: Comparison with modern theories; Chapter III. Propositions, truth, and necessity 27; § 1: Propositions § 2: Truth § 3: Necessity and Possibility; Chapter IV. Propositional connectives 42; § 1: Implication § 2: Disjunction § 3: Conjunction and the other logical connectives § 4: The interdefinability of the connectives; Chapter V. Arguments 58 § 1: Definition and Classification § 2: The five basic yypes of Undemonstrated Argument § 3: The Principle of Conditionalization § 4: The analysis of nonsimple arguments § 5: Invalid arguments; Paradoxes; Chapter VI. Evaluations of Stoic logic 86; § 1: The judgments of Prantl and Zeller § 2: The confusion about sunemménon - § 3: Conclusion; Appendix A. Translations 95; Appendix B. Glossary 132; Bibliography 137; Indices -141-148
"Summary: The aim of this study is to present a true description of the logic of the Old Stoa. It repeats most of Łukasiewicz's published conclusions on the subject and offers additional evidence for them. It also (1) describes the Stoic semantical theory and compares it with certain similar modern theories, (2) attempts to give a better account of the heretofore misunderstood Diodorean implication, (3) points out the Stoic version of the conditionalization principle, and (4) discusses the contention of the Stoics that their propositional logic was complete. In appendices it offers and justifies new translations of some important fragments pertaining to Stoic logic.
The Stoic authors in whose work we shall be interested primarily are Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus. Closely associated with them were Diodorus Cronus and Philo, of the Megarian school. Since the writings of these men have been lost, and since our sources usually do not distinguish between the views of the various Stoics, we are forced to treat the entire Old Stoa as a unit. This, of course, creates many difficulties. The best of our sources are Sextus Empiricus and Diocles Magnes (apud Diogenes Laertius). We also derive bits of information from Cicero, Gellius, Galen, Boethius, Apuleius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Simplicius, Philoponus, Origen, Proclus, Stobaeus, Epictetus, Seneca, and a few others. Of these, only Epictetus and Seneca were favorably inclined toward Stoicism, and they, unfortunately, restricted their attention almost entirely to ethics. It is thus remarkable that the fragments of Stoic logic, transmitted by unsympathetic hands, are as clear and consistent as they are." p. 1
Mau Jürgen, "Stoische Logik. Ihre Stellung gegenüber der Aristotelischen Syllogistik un des modernen Aussagenkalkül," Hermes 85: 147-158 (1957).
Melazzo Lucio, "La teoria del segno linguistico negli Stoici," Lingua e Stile 10: 199-230 (1975).
Mignucci Mario. Il significato della logica stoica. Bologna: Patron 1965.
Mignucci Mario. Il problema del criterio di verità negli stoici antichi. In Posizione e criterio del discorso filosofico. Bologna: Patron 1967. pp. 145-169
Mignucci Mario. The Stoic notion of relatives. In Matter and Metaphysics. Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum (Pontignano, August 21-28, 1986). Edited by Barnes Jonathan and Mignucci Mario. Napoli: Bibliopolis 1988. pp. 129-221
"The fragments of the Stoics which are explicitly concerned with a theory of relations are few, scattered and difficult to interpret. The largest of them is preserved in Simplicius' commentary on the Categories (165.32 ff.; SVF ii 403) and it expounds an important distinction which the Stoics made between two kinds of relatives. This doctrine is attributed to the Stoics, but no representative of the school is mentioned. Echoes of it are reflected in some sceptical arguments reported by Sextus Empiricus (M viii 455-456) and Diogenes Laertius (IX 87-88) (1). Besides, there are some related passages in the scholia on Dionysius Thrax's Ars grammatica which are supposed to go back to Apollonius Dyscolus (II century A.D.), where, although the Stoics are not explicitly named, Stoic material is believed to be used and referred to (2). There is also a text of Sextus (M VIII 453-454; SVF II 404) in which a general definition of relatives is attributed by him to the Dogmatists and reasons can be given for saying that his Dogmatists must be identified with the Stoics. Finally, some passages in which the name of Chrysippus is tied to questions which are supposed to concern our problems are difficult to interpret and on closer inspection they reveal themselves not to pertain to the theory of relatives (3).
In the face of this complicated situation in our sources, I will examine first Simplicius' passage, trying to disentangle it from spurious connections with other parts of the Stoic doctrine which have generated more than one misunderstanding of it. Secondly, I will inquire to what extent a possibly general definition of relatives implied in Simplicius' distinction is consistent with the statements reported by other sources, in order to determine whether Simplicius' report can be inserted in a coherent framework.
This sketch of the plan of our inquiry shows that we confer a central role on Simplicius' passage, and this assumption might be disputed, since Simplicius is a late authority and no Stoic master of the first generation is mentioned in it. We will discuss these problems later. Whatever their solution might be, it must be pointed out that Simplicius' text is almost the only one in which a relevant aspect of the Stoic doctrine of relatives is expounded and discussed. The other sources are much vaguer and mostly concerned with a general characterization of the notion of relative. Therefore, it is difficult in this situation not to confer a special position on Simplicius passage." pp 129-130
1) These texts are not found in von Arnim's collection. They will be discussed in section VIII.
(2) These passages too are not in von Arnim. We will examine them later (cf. sections XI-XII).
(3) I am thinking especially of three passages we will consider later, namely Varro De lingua latina X 59 (SVF a 155); Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantibus 1054 EF (SVF II 550); Aulus Gellius Noctes atticae VII 1, 1-6 (SVF II 1169): cf. sections XIV and XV.
Mignucci Mario. The Stoic themata. In Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer. Edited by Döring Klaus and Ebert Theodor. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 1993. pp. 217-238
Mignucci Mario. The Liar Paradox and the Stoics. In Topics in Stoic philosophy. Edited by Ierodiakonou Katerina. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1999. pp. 54-70
Milne Peter, "On the completeness of non-Philonian Stoic logic," History and Philosophy of Logic 16: 39-64 (1995).
"The majority of formal accounts attribute to Stoic logicians the classical truth-functional understanding of the material conditional and exclusive disjunction.These interpretations were disputed, some Stoic logicians favouring modal and/or temporal analyses; moreover, what comes down to us of Stoic logic fails to secure the classical interpretations on purely formal grounds.It is therefore of some interest to see how the non-classical interpretations fare. I argue that the strongest logic we have good grounds to attribute to Stoic logicians is not complete with respect to the non-classical interpretations of disjunction and the conditional."
Montoneri Luciano. I Megarici. Studio storico-critico e traduzione delle testimonianze antiche. Catania: Università di Catania 1984.
Mueller Ian, "Stoic and Peripatetic logic," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 51: 173-187 (1969).
"We know that one of the issues dividing the Stoics and the Peripatetics concerned the use of logic. Alexander [of Aphrodisias] (1) insists that only Peripatetic logic is an organon for philosophy, an instrument for making unknown things known through known premisses. Since the Stoics called logic a part of philosophy, they may well have considered their propositional logic a theoretical discipline for which epistemological considerations were irrelevant. This modern attitude seems quite commensurate with the Stoics' presentation of logic. They seem to have been interested in technical devices and formalization for its own sake.
I suggest, then, that an important disagreement between the Peripatetic and Stoic logicians concerned the power of their respective logics to represent arguments. The Peripatetic claims were that all scientific proofs are categorical syllogisms and that the inference schemata of the Stoics represented techniques of argument having no place in science. The Stoic reply was that the first claim is false since there are very elementary relational arguments in mathematics which are not syllogisms. Moreover, they pointed out that all conclusive arguments, including categorical syllogisms, could be represented as propositional arguments by a (trivial) technical device. Formally the Stoics held an unassailable position, but they were vulnerable to attack on methodological grounds, since establishing the truth of the premisses of the newly formulated argument seemed to involve making an inference in terms of the old logic. The Peripatetics therefore insisted on the claim, believed for many centuries after them, that their logic was the instrument of science. We do not know the Stoic response to this claim, but it is reasonable to suppose that they retreated to the view that the theory of deductive inference was a technical discipline studied for some ethical end perhaps, but not as the method of scientific discovery." p. 184
(1) In Analyticorum Priorum 1 ff.
Mueller Ian. An introduction to Stoic logic. In The Stoics. Edited by Rist John M. Berkeley: University of California Press 1978. pp. 1-26
Mueller Ian, "The completeness of Stoic propositional logic," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20: 201-215 (1979).
"In this paper I wish to pursue in more detail the question of the completeness of Stoic propositional logic. I shall bring out certain anomalies in Becker's [1957] argument which obscure the precise sense in which his system is complete. The Kneales' system (*) will be shown to be complete in a stronger sense than Becker's but not to be as historically plausible a reconstruction of the Stoic theory. In conclusion I shall suggest a modification of both systems which is historically more plausible than either and also complete in the stronger sense. In the course of the paper I will also discuss other logical and historical points about the systems.
I shall take for granted the truth-functionality of the Stoic propositional connectives but disregard interdefinability relationships. I will also formulate the systems of Becker and the Kneales in ways which diverge slightly but unproblematically from their own presentations." p. 202
William and Marta Kneale - The development of logic Oxford, 1962
Muller Robert. Les Stoïciens. Paris: Vrin 2006.
Table des matières: Avertissement 7; Introduction 11; Chapitre I: L'école stoicienne 17; Chapitre II: La physique 61; Chapitre III: La logique 127; Chapitre IV: L'éthique 187; Conclusion: La liberté et l'ordre du monde 255; Annexe 272; Bibliographie 275; Index nominum 284; Table des matières 288-290.
Nasieniewski Marek, "Is Stoic logic classical?," Logic and Logical Philosophy 6: 55-61 (1998).
"In this paper I would like to argue that Stoic logic is a kind of relevant logic rather than the classical logic. To realize this purpose I will try to keep as close as possible to Stoic calculus as expressed with the help of their arguments."
Nasti de Vincentis Mauro. Logica scettica e implicazione stoica. In Lo scetticismo antico. Edited by Giannantoni Gabriele. Napoli: Bibliopolis 1981. pp. 501-532
Nasti de Vincentis Mauro, "Stopper on Nasti's Contention and Stoic logic," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 29: 313-324 (1984).
Nasti de Vincentis Mauro. Stoic implication and Stoic modalities. In Le teorie delle modalità. Atti del Convegno internazionale di storia della logica. Edited by Corsi Giovanni, Mangione Corrado, and Mugnai Massimo. Bologna: CLUEB 1989. pp. 258-263
Nasti de Vincentis Mauro, "From Aristotle's syllogistic to Stoic conditionals: Holzwege or detectable paths?," Topoi.An International Review of Philosophy 23: 113-137 (2004).
"This paper is chiefly aimed at individuating some deep, but as yet almost unnoticed, similarities between Aristotle's syllogistic and the Stoic doctrine of conditionals, notably between Aristotle's metasyllogistic equimodality condition (as stated at Prior Analytics I 24, 41b27-31) and truth-conditions for third type (Chrysippean) conditionals (as they can be inferred from, say, Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Pyrrhonism II 111 and 189). In fact, as is shown in §1, Aristotle's condition amounts to introducing in his (propositional) metasyllogistic a non-truthfunctional implicational arrow '', the truth-conditions of which turn out to be logically equivalent to truth-conditions of third type conditionals, according to which only the impossible (and not the possible) follows from the impossible. Moreover, Aristotle is given precisely this non-Scotian conditional logic in two so far overlooked passages of (Latin and Hebraic translations of) Themistius' Paraphrasis of De Caelo (CAG V 4, 71.8-13 and 47.8-10 Landauer). Some further consequences of Aristotle's equimodality condition on his logic, and notably on his syllogistic (no matter whether modal or not), are pointed out and discussed at length. A (possibly Chrysippean) extension of Aristotle's condition is also discussed, along with a full characterization of truth-conditions of fourth type conditionals."
Nasti de Vincentis Mauro, ""Boethiana". La logica stoica nelle testimonianze di Boezio: nuovi strumenti di ricerca," Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico: 377-408 (2006).
"In view of the importance of Boethius' "In Ciceronis Topica" as a source for Stoic logic, argues for the constitution of an index of divergent readings between the editions of Orelli (Zurich 1833) and Migne, including those omitted by Stangl (1882). Such an index would show that while Orelli's edition is better, sometimes the reading of Migne is to be preferred. Includes considerations on the gradual Stoicization of Aristotelian syllogistics, on Boethius' reliability as a source for Stoic logic, and on the genuine editio princeps of Boethius' "De topicis differentiis" (Rome 1484, rather than Venice 1492)."
Normore Calvin G. Medieval connectives, Hellenistic connections; the strange case of propositional logic. In Atoms, pneuma, and tranquillity. Epicurean and Stoic themes in European thought. Edited by Osler Margaret J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991. pp. 25-38
Nuchelmans Gabriel. Theories of proposition. Ancient and medieval conceptions of the bearers of truth and falsity. Amsterdam : North-Holland 1973.
Chapter 4. The Stoic lekton 45; 5. The Stoic axioma 75-88.
"The Stoic conception of the bearers of truth and falsity centres around the notion of axioma. As an axioma is a species of the genus lekton, I shall first discuss the nature of the lekton. It will be maintained that the word lekton must have had several shades of meaning, although the deplorable state of our sources makes it impossible to reach a high degree of certainty about the exact borderlines between these different nuances and their ascription to definite authors or periods." p. 45
"As we saw in the foregoing chapter, an axioma is a complete and independent pragma which is expressed in a speech act of asserting. The complete and independent pragma is the thought of an action or passion and its indispensable complements. In so far as this pragma is put into words it is a Iekton; in so far as it is expressed in a speech act of asserting it is an apophanton or axioma, an asserted thought-content. A pragma such as 'Plato liking Dion' can be expressed in different speech acts: for instance, in a yes-or-no question, 'Does Plato like Dion?', in a wish, 'May Plato like Dion', or in an assertion, 'Plato likes Dion'. On the other hand, the same type of speech act, say asserting, may be related to different pragmata; for I may assert many different things. Reflections of this kind must have led the Stoics to a distinction between the generic element of the pragma or Iekton and the specific element of the speech act in which a certain thought is expressed.
As a rule, then, an axioma is a thought-content which is in fact asserted. Nevertheless, the Stoics used the name axioma also for the antecedent and consequent of a conditional, although as parts of the composite whole these are not actually asserted. This may be accounted for by the fact that axioma originally meant that which is assumed or taken to be true. Or, as I suggested at the end of 4.2.5, the Stoics may have regarded the antecedent and consequent as potential axiomata, just as they held that a privative assertion of the form 'Un(kind he is)' contains the potential axioma 'Kind he is'. Such an assertable would lie somewhere between the neutral pragma or Iekton and the factually asserted axioma." p. 75
O'Toole Robert R. and Jennings Raymond E. The Megarians and the Stoics. In Greek, Indian and Arabic logic. Edited by Gabbay Dov and Woods John. Amsterdam: Elsevier 2004. pp. 397-522
Handbook of the History of Logic: Vol. 1
Ophuijsen Johannes M.Van. Parts of what speech? Stoic notions of statement and sentence; or, how the dialectician knew voice and began syntax. In Syntax in antiquity. Edited by Swiggers Pierre and Wouters Alfons. Louvain: Peeters 2003. pp. 77-94
Orth Emil, "Lekton = dicibile," Helmantica 32: 221-226 (1959).
"L'article est en latin. L'A. y explique le sens de lekton, terme stoïcien, en analysant la gnoseologie stoïcienne, sans faire appel aux textes. Il ajoute un bref aperçu de l'histoire du terme où il signale, entre autres choses, qu'Apulée, Peri hermeneias, emploie pronuntiabile pour lekton et Augustin, Principia Dialecticae, 5, P.L., 32, 1411, dicibile; Isidore de Seville, Etymol. 2, 22, 2, dictio. L'article n'est pas conçu comme une recherche philologique, mais comme un exposé théorique." Bulletin Augustinien pour 1959.
Pinborg Jan, "Das Sprachdenken der Stoa und Augustins Dialektik," Classica et Medievalia 23: 148-177 (1962).
Pohlenz Max. Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1948.
Two volumes: I (1948), II (1949).
See: Vol. I - Die Logik. Der Logos als Träger unserer geistigen Existenz pp. 37-62.
Traduzione italiana: La Stoa. Storia di un movimento spirituale - Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1967.
Pozzi Lorenzo. Il nesso di implicazione nella logica stoica. In Atti del Convegno di storia della logica (Parma, 8-10 ottobre 1972). Padova: Liviana 1974. pp. 177-187
Preti Giulio, "Sulla dottrina del semieion nella logica stoica," Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia 10: 5-14 (1956).
Reprinted in: G. Preti - Saggi filosofici. Storia della logica e storiografia filosofica - Vol. II - Firenze, La Nuova Italia, pp. 3-16.
Repici Luciana. The Stoics and the Elenchos. In Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer. Edited by Döring Klaus and Ebert Theodor. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 1993. pp. 253-270
Rist John M. The importance of Stoic logic in the Contra Celsum. In Neoplatonism and early christian thought. Essays in honour of A. H. Armstrong. Edited by Blumenthal Henry Jacob and Markus Robert Austin. London: Variorum publications 1981. pp. 64-78
Rüstow Alexander. Der Lugner. Theorie, Geschichte, und Auflösung. Leipzig: Teubner 1910.
Sandbach Francis Henry. Aristotle and the Stoics. Cambridge: The Cambridge Philological Society 1985.
Contents: Preface IV, Abbreviations V; List of works cited VI-XI; I. Introduction 1; II. References to Aristotle 4; III. Methods of estimating influence 16; IV. Logic 18; V. Ethics 24; VI. Physics 31; VII: Disregard of peculairly Aristotelian ideas 53; VIII. Conclusion 55; Panaettius and Posidonius 58; Appendix: Ocellus Lucanus 63; Notes 65; Index 82-88.
"This essay maintains that the extent of influence exerted by Aristotle on the Stoics has often been exaggerated by modern scholars. A collection of all references to him by authors other than Peripatetics, whether contemporary or belonging to the following century, shows that his importance as a philosopher was not then recognised and reveals a lack of evidence that his school-works were known. Professor Sandbach argues that it is a mistake to proceed on the assumption that the Stoics must have known his work, or even an outline of it, and been stimulated whether to agreement or to modification. If the supposed evidence for Aristotelian influence is examined without this presumption, much is found to be flimsy and some can be confidently rejected. A residue remains of varying degrees of probability, which it is hard to estimate owing to our insufficient information, particularly about Zeno, about the Academy of his time, about Aristotle's exoteric works, and about memory of him in oral tradition." (Abstract, p. 89)
Schmidt Rudolf T. Die Grammatik der Stoiker. Brauschweig/Wiesbaden: Friedr. Vieweg & Sohn 1979.
Einführung, Übersetzung un Bearbeitung von Karlheinz Hülser. Mit einer kommentierten Bibliographie zur stoischen Sprachwissenschaft (Dialektik) von Urs Egli
Schubert Andreas. Untersuchungen zur stoischen Bedeutungslehre. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1994.
Inhalt: Vorwort 7; Einleitung 9; I. Kapitel: Die Identität des Lektons 15; II. Die Identität der unvollständingen Lekta und die stoischen "Fälle" 57; III. Die Unkörperlichkeit der Lekta 110; IV. Das Konzept des Lektons in seiner Genese und in der philosophischen Diskussion 131; V. "hyparchein" und "hyphistasthai" bei den Stoikern 149; VI. "Bedeutungslehre" bei Aristoteles und Augustinus und ihr Verhältnis zur stoischen Semantik 175; VII. Die stoische "Kategorienlehre" 199; Appendix: Bemerkungen zu "hyparchein" und "hyphistasthai" im philosophischen Schriftttum und im Corpus Hippocraticum 246; Abkürzungsverzeichnis 261; Bibliographie 263; Index nominum 275; Index locorum 278-284
Sedley David, "The Stoic criterion of identity," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 27: 255-275 (1982).
Sedley David. The Stoic theory of universals. In Recovering the Stoics. Edited by Epp Ronald H. Memphis: Memphis University Press 1985. pp. 87-92
Supplementary volume to the Southern Journal of Philosophy
Sedley David, "Le critère d'identité chez les Stoïciens," Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 94: 513-533 (1989).
Speca Anthony. Hypothetical syllogistic and stoic logic. Leiden : Brill 2001.
Contents: Acknowledgments VII; Abstract IX; Preface XI-XIII; 1. The Aristotelian background 1; 2. The Greek Commentators on Aristotle 35; 3. Boethius: On hypothetical syllogisms 67; 4. Boethius: On Cicero's Topics 101; References 135; General index 139; Index locorum 141
Tracy Kevin, "The development of dialectic from Aristotle to Chrysippus", 2006.
Dissertation presented to the University of Pennsylvania (available on ProQuest: http://gradworks.umi.com/32/25/3225558.html).
"From Aristotle onward, formal logic was an element of ancient Greek dialectic (dialektiké). Aristotle's Prior Analytics (4th century BCE) is the earliest evidence of a formal logic in antiquity. The evidence for the formal logic of the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus (3rd century BCE) is fragmentary; nonetheless it makes clear that not more than a century or so after Prior Analytics, Chrysippus revolutionized formal logic. The scholarship on Stoic logic has not yet presented the history of dialectic from Aristotle to Chrysippus as an intelligible narrative. Without such a narrative, one cannot explain what, in general, motivated the innovations of Chrysippus, what made Stoic logic coherent as a unified project, or what relationship that project had to earlier work in logic. This dissertation approaches the problem through the presentation and interpretation of the ancient source material. First it describes the logical doctrines of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and the 'Megarics' in such a way as to make clear what questions these predecessors left for Chrysippus. It then describes how Chrysippus addressed these questions. Finally, it uses the resulting narrative to give a detailed account of Stoic formal logic. The dissertation yields five principal conclusions. First, neither the Peripatetics or the 'Megarics' described logical forms of propositional logic; Chrysippus was the first to do so. Second, the guiding aim of Chrysippus' logic was to avoid adopting a semantic stance in describing logical forms and explaining logical relationships. Third, the Stoics distinguished 'valid' (hugies) from 'true' (aléthes), so that sunartésis is a standard for the validity rather than the truth of the Stoic conditional (sunhémmenon). Fourth, the Stoics produced derivations for categorical arguments in their deduction system. Fifth, the Stoic deduction system is roughly analogous to the first-order fragment of Frege's system, except on two points: it most likely was not designed to accommodate the use of polyadic predicates with multiple quantifiers, although the possibility for doing so inheres in its approach to the analysis of propositions, and it uses the 'natural' approach rather than the 'axiomatic' approach of Frege."
Verbeke Gérard. Philosophie et semeiologie chez les Stoïciens. In Études philosophiques offertes au Ibrahim Madkour. Le Caire: Organisation Egyptienne Générale du livre 1974. pp. 15-38
Réimprimé dans: G. Verbeke - D'Aristote à Thomas d'Aquin. Antécedents de la pensée moderne. Recueil d'articles - Leuven, Levuven University Press, 1990, pp. 341-364.
Verbeke Gérard, "Der Nominalismus der stoischen Logik," Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 3: 36-55 (1977).
Verbeke Gérard. Ethics and logic in Stoicism. In Atoms, pneuma, and tranquillity. Epicurean and Stoic themes in European thought. Edited by Osler Margaret J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991. pp. 11-24
Verbeke Gérard. Meaning and role of the expressible (lekton) in Stoic logic. In Knowledge through signs. Ancient semiotic theories and practices. Edited by Manetti Govanni. Turnhout: Brepols 1996. pp. 133-154
"In his critical survey of Stoic dialectic Sextus states that the doctrine of the expressible, which plays an important part in the theory of knowledge, has been repeatedly put into question:(1) the lexton is an incorporeal, together with time, place and empty space, it belongs to the group of incorporeal objects generally accepted by the Stoics. In their opinion incorporeals are not active, they are unable to effect or produce something: yet they are indispensable in view of a coherent understanding of the universe.(2) Within this framework it was agreed that each argument is composed of incorporeal expressibles, since it is a combination of sentences which are considered to be complete lekta.(3) The question however was asked whether expressibles are really necessary, if they are totally ineffective. Even the meaning of the notion is questionable: it is obviously related to language, but it is not a component neither of spoken nor of written language. In other words it is not a verbal utterance and yet it is referred to by linguistic terms.(4) So it seems to have a definite function in the Stoic theory of knowledge." p. 133
(1) Sextus, M 8. 336. The author states that the existence of expressibles has been heavily discussed: there was no agreement about this issue. In some other passage Sextus even speaks of an unending debate (8. 262). Sextus lived in the second half of the second century and in the beginning of the third A.D.: at that time Stoicism was still very influential. No other philosophical school ever accepted this doctrine, but it was not disregarded: philosophers had to cope with it especially in their dialectic.
(2) Sextus, M 8. 262. An incorporeal object could not affect anything, nor could it be affected. For it could only be affected by something corporeal, and that is excluded, since corporeal and incorporeal are not on the same level.
(3) Sextus, M 8. 260-261; 8. 404: every proof is composed of incorporeal expressibles. In Sextus' opinion a vicious circle is unavoidable.
(4) Sextus, M 8. 264: according to Sextus lekta are signified and among them are also propositions, which are regarded as complete expressibles.
Viano Carlo Augusto, "La dialettica stoica," Rivista di Filosofia 49: 179-227 (1958).
Ristampato in: Autori Vari - Studi sulla dialettica - Torino, Taylor, 1969 pp. 63-111
Virieux-Reymond Antoinette. La logique et l'épistémologie des Stoïciens. Leurs rapports avec la logique d'Aristote, la logistique et la pensée contemporaine. Lausanne: Librairie de l'Université 1949.
White Michael J., "The fourth account of conditionals in Sextus Empiricus," History and Philosophy of Logic 7: 1-14 (1986).
"This paper develops an interpretation of the fourth account of conditionals in Sextus Empiricus's "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" that conceptually links it with contemporary 'relevance' interpretations of entailment. It is argued that the third account of conditionals, which analyzes the truth of a conditional in terms of the joint impossibility of antecedent and denial of consequent, should not be interpreted in terms of a "relative" incompatibility of antecedent and denial of consequent because of Stoic acceptance of the truth of some conditionals of the form "p" (--"p") and its converse. Rather, it is suggested, ancient attempts to avoid the so-called paradoxes of implication involve the fourth account of conditionals. I hypothesize that this account is related to Stoic attempts to define truth conditions for conditionals in terms of a theory of the concludency (validity) of arguments in opposition to the more common procedure (represented by the first three accounts of conditionals) of specifying truth conditions for conditionals 'semantically' and using those truth conditions in the development of a theory of argument validity."
Zarnecka-Bialy Ewa, "Stoic logic as Investigated by Jan Łukasiewicz," Reports on Philosophy 3: 27-40 (1979).
Zoecklein Walter O., "The ontological commitments in Stoic logic", University of California, San Diego, 1969.
Available at ProQuest Dissertation Express. Order number: 6919703
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