School of Athens

Theory and History of Ontology

by Raul Corazzon - e-mail: raul.corazzon[at]formalontology.it

For an overview see the Index of the Pages, the SITE MAP or the Alphabetical Index of the Philosophers: A-F - G-O - P-Z; You can also download this page as Ontology in PDF format

Table of Contemporary Ontologists Ontology. Table of Ontologists (click on the image to see the PDF file)

 

History of the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God. General Introduction

Index of the Section: "Pages on the History of Philosophy"

 

PROLOGUE

"Philosophers who address the questions of what it is for an individual to exist, or what it is for an individual to be actual, often do so with reference to the fallacy they have uncovered in the classical Ontological Argument for God's existence. Indeed, the Ontological Argument is useful as a vehicle by which this and other issues in ontology and the philosophy of logic may be introduced and sharpened."

Nathan Salmon - Existence - in: Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 1 "Metaphysics" edited by James E. Tomberlin, 1987, p. 49.

"Higher-type classical logic is intensional logic with the intensional features removed, so this is a good place to start. Ontological arguments, Gödel's in particular, are natural examples of intensional logic at work, so this is a good place to finish." (page XI)

"There are many directions form which people have tried to prove the existence of God. There have been arguments based on design: a complex universe must have a designer. There have been attempts to show that the existence of an ethical sense implies the existence of God. There have been arguments based on causality: trace chain of effect and cause backward and one must reach a fist cause. Ontological arguments seek to establish the existence of God based on pure logic: the principles of reasoning require that God be part of ones ontology." (p. 133)

Melvin Fitting - Types, tableaus and Gödel's God - Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2002.

 

INTRODUCTION

"Of all the arguments for the existence of God, the one which Anselm first formulated is the most refined and the least capable of a finally satisfactory statement. It draws its strength from an ambiguity, which appears to be an ambiguity in language, but is more deeply an ambiguity in human experience. If God exists, there must be a level of experience at which it is impossible to think of God as not existing. But at what level can this impossibility be made to appear? Must the demonstration await the experience of the Beatific Vision? Or can it, at the very opposite extreme, be made out at the level of linguistic-logical analysis? Whether valid or not, the first three chapters of the Proslogion were the first piece of writing in which this problem was raised and a solution proposed which will probably never be finally buried. It may be agreed that Descartes put it better, because more simply and with fewer philosophical presuppositions. He had the advantage, which Anselm lacked, of inheriting, if only to reject, a long philosophical tradition. The Augustinian and grammatical background of Anselm's thought, which made it possible for him to formulate the argument, also burdened it with limitations. But these pages of Anselm must be placed among the most deeply interesting pieces of reasoning ever written The early chapters of the Proslogion, in which the argument was first expressed, will never be read without excitement, nor thought about without appearing to be more cogent than they are. For the most extraordinary thing about the argument is that it loses nothing of its power, its freshness, or even in a curious way its persuasiveness, by being refuted. The Proslogion may not set forth a valid argument for belief in God, and even if it were valid it is doubtful whether it would ever persuade an unbeliever; but in its subtlety, and in a certain unsubstantial, ethereal quality which antagonizes men of robust common sense, it perfectly reflects the quality and mystery of Anselm's personality." (pp. 74-75).

Richard William Southern - Saint Anselm and His Biographer: A Study of Monastic Life and Thought 1059-c. 1130, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963.

 

"The ontological argument for the existence of Cod has fascinated philosophers ever since it was formulated by St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109). It is doubtful, I think, that any person was ever brought to a belief in God by this argument, and unlikely that it has played the sort of role in strengthening and confirming religious belief that, for example, the teleological argument has played. To the unsophisticated, Anselm's argument is (at first sight at least) remarkably unconvincing, if not downright irritating, it smacks too much of word magic. And yet almost every major philosopher from the time of Anselm to the present has had his say about it; the last few years have seen a remarkable flurry of interest in it.

What accounts for this fascination? Not, I think, the religious significance of the argument, although no doubt that can be underrated. The cause is perhaps twofold. First, the ontological argument offers an enormous return on a pretty slim investment - a definition, and a perplexing but not altogether implausible premise connecting existence and 'greatness,' yield the theistic conclusion. Second, although the argument certainly looks at first sight as if it ought to be unsound, it is profoundly difficult to say what exactly is wrong with it. Indeed, it is doubtful that any philosopher has given a really convincing and thorough refutation of the ontological argument. Too often philosophers merely remark that Kant refuted the argument by showing that existence is not a predicate and that 'one cannot build bridges from the conceptual realm to the real world.' But it is very doubtful that Kant specified a sense of 'is a predicate' such that, in that sense, it is clear both that existence is not a predicate and that Anselm's argument requires that it be one. Nor are the mere claims that no existential propositions are necessary or the above comment about bridge building impressive as refutations of Anselm - after all, he claims to have an argument for the necessity of at least one existential proposition. So one must either show just where his argument goes wrong, or else produce a solid argument for the claim that no existential (in the appropriate sense) propositions can be necessary-and this, I think, no one has succeeded in doing."

Alvin Plantinga - God and others minds. A study of the rational justification of belief in God. - Cornell University Press (1967) pp. 26-27.

 

"PROSLOGION 2-4 consists of four pages. Barth's book about them ["Fides Quaerens Intellectum" (1931)] has 165 pages. All the books and essays written about them in the last eight hundred years would fill libraries. It is a legitimate question to ask, What is it, in these four pages, that makes them so potent a challenge to the best minds of humanity? What is the spell they cast over the reader so that occupation with them becomes a passionate enterprise? These pages do not seem to have the completeness and remoteness of a classic; rather, they seem to call on the reader personally to do something about them. They arouse in him an intellectual passion -- either for or against them -- which makes him feel that the core of his own thinking is being touched. On the one hand, they seem so concise that nothing can be added, on the other, so loose that everything still has to be done. But what? The reader feels puzzled, teased, imposed upon. He feels called to take a personal part in a herculean intellectual struggle.

The reason for this spell -- which was already felt in Anselm's life time --cannot be solely Anselm's subject matter, for this has treated by many before and after with less than intriguing effects. It must be, to a large degree, his method. But what can there be so exciting about a logical demonstration?"

Robert S. Hartman - Prolegomena to a meta-Anselmian axiomatic -  Review of Metaphysics, XIV, 4, June 1961 p. 637.

 

"No logician wishes to deny that in ordinary speech sentences such as 'tame tigers exist' can be used with perfect propriety. Some of them may be false, but it is not for the logician to determine which are and which are not. If, however, we assume that grammatical form is a sure guide to logical structure, we may be tempted to say that in these sentences the word 'existence' stands for a predicate, where 'predicate' has a logical sense distinct from its grammatical sense. That some philosophers have taken the word 'existence' to stand for a predicate in the logical sense, i.e., for an attribute, may be seen from their use of the ontological argument to prove the existence of God.

Descartes' exposition of the argument is clearer than most others. He starts from the position, supposed to be already established, that we can know some propositions, e.g., simple theorems of mathematics, to be necessarily true. It does not matter for our purposes whether he thinks that his necessary propositions are analytic or synthetic, although we may remark in passing that the language in which he refers to them suggests that they are analytic. He wishes to say that the proposition that God exists can be proved in the same way as that in which a necessary proposition of mathematics is proved.(...) [His] argument is based on the assumption that 'God exists' is a proposition of the same sort as a theorem of geometry. Descartes writes as though both propositions predicated something of a subject, the one being about 'God,' the other about 'the triangle.' If he did not assume this, he would not say that they can be proved in the same fashion. Gassendi was the first, I think, to criticize the argument on the ground that existence is not a property of God or of anything else. (...) No doubt Descartes and those who agree with him would say, if questioned, that they wished to make a distinction between existence and qualities such as redness. But refinements of the theory of existence as a predicate only introduce fresh difficulties. The theory is unacceptable."

William Calvert Kneale - Is Existence a Predicate? - Aristotelian Society, Supplementary volume 15, 1936 (reprinted in: Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars (eds.) - Readings in Philosophical Analysis - New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. (1949) pp. 29-30.

 

"It is much harder than one might first suspect to see what is wrong - if anything - with the ontological argument, in some of its variants at least. By way of criticism, it is often said that the argument fails because 'existence is not a predicate'. However, there are senses - and what is more, senses other than the purely grammatical one - in which existence clearly is a predicate. It is sometimes said that existence is not the kind of property that can be included in the essence of anything; but the reasons for saying so are far from clear, and the notion of essence is a notorious mess in the best of circumstances. One might suspect that something goes wrong with the logic of definite descriptions in the modal contexts involved in the argument; but I shall try to reconstruct some of the most important aspects of the ontological argument in terms having little to do with ordinary modalities and nothing whatsoever with definite descriptions. In fact, the independence of the essential features of the ontological argument from the theory of definite descriptions ought to be clear enough without much detailed argument. If what we are trying to do is to establish that there exists a unique being 'than which nothing greater can be conceived' - in short, a unique supremely perfect Being - surely the great difficulty is to show that there exists at least one such being, whereas we can face the problem of uniqueness with relative calm.

Furthermore, it has been complained that the notion 'being greater than anything else that can be conceived of' and the notion of supreme perfection are unclear. More than that, it is sometimes suggested that they are systematically ambiguous - that they make no sense until it has been specified in what respect greatness or perfection is to be measured. Certainly, greater evil or more perfect vice cannot be what is meant - but even if there be no such things as these, what precisely is meant? Yet a straightforward answer to this question is forthcoming. What is at stake is surely greatness or perfection with respect to existence. It does not take a neo-Platonist to agree that the greatest or most supreme being intended in the argument is certainly one whose powers of existing are maximal or whose mode of being is, as existence qua existence goes, supremely perfect."

Jaakko Hintikka - On the Logic of the Ontological Argument. Some elementary remarks - in: Models for Modalities - Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Company (1969) pp. 45-46.

 

"Modal reasoning can be replaced by non-modal, ordinary reasoning about possible things. Given an obscure modal argument, we can translate it into a non-modal argument - or into several non-modal arguments, if the given argument was ambiguous. Once we have a nonmodal argument, we have clear standards of validity; and once we have non-modal translations of the premises, we can understand them well enough to judge whether they are credible. Foremost among our modal headaches is Anselm's ontological argument. How does if fare under the translation treatment I have prescribed? It turns out to have two principal non-modal translations. One is valid; the other has credible premises; the difference between the two is subtle. No wonder the argument has never been decisively refuted; no wonder it has never convinced the infidel. (pp. 10-11).

 

CONCLUSION. Of the alternative non-modal translations of our ontological argument, the best are the arguments from 3A and 3B. The premises of the argument from 3B enjoy some credibility, but the argument is invalid. The argument from 3A is valid, but 3A derives its credibility entirely from the illusion that because our world alone is actual, therefore our world is radically different from all other worlds - special in a way that makes it a fitting place of greatest greatness. But once we recognize the indexical nature of actuality, the illusion is broken and the credibility of 3A evaporates. It is true of any world, at that world but not elsewhere, that that world alone is actual. The world an ontological arguer calls actual is special only in that the ontological arguer resides there - and it is no great distinction for a world to harbor an ontological arguer. Think of an ontological arguer in some dismally mediocre world - there are such ontological arguers - arguing that his world alone is actual, hence special, hence a fitting place of greatest greatness, hence a world wherein something exists than which no greater can be conceived to exist. He is wrong to argue thus. So are we." (p. 20)

David Lewis - Anselm and Actuality - Noûs, 4 (1970) pp. 175-188 (reprinted with a Postscript (pp. 21-25) in: Philosophical Papers - vol. I Oxford, Oxford University Press 1983 p. 10-20.

 

"In the preface to his Proslogion Anselm audaciously claims discovery of 'a single formula which needs no other to prove itself but itself alone, and which by itself suffices to establish that God truly is, and that he is the greatest good needing no other, and that which everything needs if it is to be and be well, and whatever else we believe about divine being' (93.6-10). Anselm published his argument in 1077 or 1078. The dispute immediately kindled was bright but brief; and after Anselm's death his argument lay fallow for some hundred years. Then, in the thirteenth century, it was widely debated, and widely accepted, (...) until it received the authoritative disapproval of St Thomas Aquinas.

In the Seventeenth century Descartes discovered and vigorously defended an argument for the existence of God which was plainly similar to and allegedly identical with Anselm's argument. Controversy over the Cartesian argument culminated with Kant; in a section 'On the Impossibility of an Ontological Argument for the Existence of God' in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant performed for Descartes the service Aquinas had rendered Anselm. Incidentally he gave the argument a title, imposing, universally adopted, and wholly opaque.

After Kant's assault the argument again languished - for the Hegelian claim to have revived it is specious (...). In recent years, however, philosophers and theologians have again looked with favour, or at least attention, on the Ontological Argument. In this renaissance of interest a new version of the argument has been brought to birth; Norman Malcolm and Charles Hartshorne, its independent obstetricians, both maintain that the new version, unlike the old, does provide a proof of the existence of God."

Jonathan Barnes - The Ontological Argument - London, Macmillan St. Martin's Press (1972) p. 1

 

"This argument has excited enormous controversy. Nearly every great philosopher from Anselm's time to ours had his say about it: Aquinas rejected it, John Duns Scotus 'coloured' (modified) it a bit and accepted it. René Descartes and Nicolas Malebranche accepted it; Leibniz accepted a version of it; Kant rejected it (and delivered what many have thought the final quietus to it); Arthur Schopenhauer thought it at best a charming joke; and many contemporary philosophers seem to think it as a joke all right, but at all a charming joke."

Alvin Plantinga - Ontological Arguments. I: Classical - in: Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, eds., B. Smith and H. Burkhardt, Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 1991pp. 622-623.

 

"Gödel showed his *1970 [Ontological Proof] to Dana Scott, and discussed it with him, in February 1970. Gödel was very concerned about his health at that time, feared that his death was near, and evidently wished to insure that this proof would not perish with him. Later in 1970, however, he apparently told Oskar Morgenstern that though he was 'satisfied' with the proof, he hesitated to publish it, for fear it would be thought "that he actually believes in God, whereas he is only engaged in a logical investigation (that is, in showing that such a proof with classical assumptions [completeness, etc.], correspondingly axiomatized, is possible)." Scott made notes on the proof and presented a version of the argument to his seminar on logical entailment at Princeton University in the fall of 1970. Through this presentation and the recollections and notes of those who attended the seminar, Gödel's  ontological proof has become fairly widely known. Discussion of the proof, thus far, has been based largely on Scott's version of it (Dana Scott  'Gödel's ontological proof' in: Judith Jarvis Thomson (ed.) 'On being and saying: essays for Richard Cartwright' - Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press 1987), which differs somewhat in form from Gödel's own memorandum. The latter is published here - though not for the first time; like Scott's version, it was published as an appendix to John Howard Sobel 'Gödel's ontological proof' in: J. J. Thomson cit. pages 256-7.

Gödel had devised his ontological proof some time before 1970. Other, presumably earlier, versions of it have been found among his papers. A sheet of paper headed "Ontological Proof' (in German), and dated, in Gödel's own hand, 'ca. 1941', contains some but not all of the ideas of the proof. Extensive preparatory material is contained in the philosophical notebook 'Phil XIV'. The first page of this notebook bears a notation indicating that it was written during the period 'Ca. Ju1y 1946-May 1955". The last page of the notebook contains the note 'Asbury Park 1954 p. 100 ff.', which presumably applies to the pages (103-109) pertaining to the ontological proof. Other documents, including letters, indicate that Gödel intended to leave Princeton for the shore 9 August 1954, was vacationing in Asbury Park on 25 August 1954, and was probably back in Princeton by 3 October 1954. We may reasonably assume, then, that the notebook pages on the ontological proof were written in the late summer and early fall of 1954 and were completed at any rate by May 1955. Relevant excerpts from the notebook, and two of the (presumably earlier) loose sheets headed 'Ontological Proof', including the one dated 'ca. 1941', are published in Appendix B to this volume."

Robert Merrihew Adams - Introductory note to *1970 [Ontological proof] in: Kurt Gödel - Collected Works - vol. III Unpublished essays and lectures - Edited by Solomon Feferman and alii. - New York - Oxford University Press 1995 p. 388-389 (notes omitted).

 

HISTORY OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Graham Oppy wrote (Ontological Arguments and Belief in God - Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 202-203):

"1. SOME HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

As far as I know, there has been no exhaustive historical study of ontological arguments, even for relatively narrow historical periods. In particular, I found the pre-Cartesian discussion of ontological arguments very hard to investigate. An accessible book of translations, commentary, and analysis would be very useful.

1.1 HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS.

Gilson (1955) [History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages] contains much information about the status of ontological arguments - versions of the arguments of St. Anselm - in the Middle Ages. Unfortunately, there is no subject index to this book, so the information is not easily accessed. As we have seen, Thomists rejected ontological arguments; but other philosophers of a more rationalistic bent - for example, Scotists - accepted them. Consequently, there were lively debates about ontological arguments during the golden age of Scholasticism. However, the victory of Occamist nominalism seems to have led to a widespread rejection of those arguments by the end of the fourteenth century. Among those who discussed St. Anselm's argument, there are the following: William of Auxerre, Richard Fishacre, Alexander of Hales, Matthew of Aquasparta, Johannes Peckham, Nicolaus of Cusa, [this is the same error of Hartshorne (1965) p. 154: Daniels (1909) speaks of Nicolaus Occam] Aegidius of Rome, William of Ware, Albertus Magnus, Peter of Tarentaise, Henry of Ghent, Gregory of Rimini, Robert Holcot, John of Beverley, John Wyclif, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, Pierre Oriole, and Richard Middleton."

That no historical study of ontological arguments exists, is not exact (see the bibliography at the bottom of this page).

 

HISTORICAL STUDIES

In English: The Part Two of Hartshorne (1965) titled "A critical survey of responses to Anselm's proof" pp. 137-303, Harrelson (2009) and Logan (2009) Chapter 6, 7, 8.

In German: Grunwald (1907), Daniels (1909), Dyroff (1928), Henrich (1960), Rohls (1987), Röd (1992).

In French: Chatillon (1959).

In Italian: Scribano (1994), Tomatis (1997), Piazza (2000).

In Spanish: Ceñal (1970.

Daniels (1909) contains "an invaluable collection of medieval Latin texts referring to the Argument, with a penetrating analysis of them as indications that the author accepted or rejected Anselm's Proof, and a careful discussion of the philosophical beliefs which determined this acceptance or rejection" Hartshorne (1965) p. 306.

 

 

"The reception of the Argument in the Twelfth and thirteenth centuries was almost as odd as what happened in its inventor's own lifetime or in the modern period. (In this section I am heavily indebted - and deeply grateful -to P. A. Daniels 1909). In the twelfth century the Proof was simply ignored, so far as our records go. Three conclusions have been drawn from this: all accepted the Proof, all rejected it, they were unacquainted with it. Daniels shows that the last is the most reasonable. In the next three centuries things were dramatically different. Fifteen authors refer to the Proof, of whom the following ten accept it: William of Auxerre, Richard Fishacre, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventura, Matthew of Aquasparta, Johannes Peck ham, Nicolaus of Cusa, [this is a lapsus: Daniels (1909) speaks of Nicolaus Occam] Aegidius of Rome, William of Ware, and Duns Scotus. Of these at least four, Alexander, Bonaventura, Nicolaus, and Scotus seem to have some appreciation of Proslogion III and of the true Anselmian Principle; the rest seem to be thinking largely or exclusively of Proslogion II. Albertus Magnus, Peter of Tarentaise, and Henry of Ghent take no position on the Proof; of these, only the first seems to have read past Proslogion II. St. Thomas and his disciple Richard of Middleton reject the Proof; Richard cites only Proslogion II, while Thomas refers (in five different writings) sometimes to this and sometimes to the following chapter; however, where he is explicitly rejecting the Proof (in the two Summas) he mentions only Proslogion II; and where he does mention the other chapter he, in my opinion, misconceives the relationship of the two.

We have then fifteen medieval judges, of whom at most five show that they have the Principle clearly and centrally in mind; one or two others exhibit some conception of it, and the rest, little or none. Of the five having the Principle (as Anselm did) clearly and centrally in mind, four accept the Proof, and the fifth takes no stand. Of the other ten, those who seem not to grasp the centrality of Proslogion III, six accept, two reject, and two give no verdict. Thus even where the Proof was taken at its weakest, still six found it convincing and but two rejected it; and where it was taken at its strongest, four out of five accepted and none rejected i t. This seems to show the power of the Proof even when incompletely grasped, and its much greater power when fully grasped. It also shows the blighting influence of Gaunilo's inability to read beyond Chapter II.

Unfortunately, the example of Thomas has in the end outweighed in prestige all the others put together. Bonaventura's cogent rebuttal of Gaunilo's 'island' analogy has been passed over as though it had never happened, while the objections of Thomas have been treasured."

Charles Harstshorne - Anselm's Discovery: A re-examination of the Ontological Proof for God's Existence - Lasalle - Open Court 1965 pp. 154-155.

 

A SELECTION OF PRIMARY AUTHORS, WITH ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHIES

Legenda: P = Pro (accept the proof); C = Contra (rejected the proof); I = indifferent (take no position on the proof); ca. = circa; fl = flourished; d. died.

References are to the most important works where ontological argument is discussed.

 

 

The Medieval Period from Anselm to Scotus: (on the following authors)

 

The Modern Era from Suárez to Frege: (on the following authors)

 

The Contemporary Debate: (on the following authors)

 

GENERAL HISTORIES OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

  1. Ceñal Ramon. El argumento ontologico de la existencia de Dios en la escolastica de los siglos 17 y 18. In Homenaje a Xavier Zubiri. Madrid: Editorial Moneda y Crédito 1970. pp. 247-325
    Edited by the Sociedad de Estudio y Publicaciones

     

  2. Chatillon Jean. De Guillaume d'Auxerre à saint Thomas d'Aquin: l'argument de Saint Anselme chez les premiers Scolastiques du XIII siècle. In Spicilegium Beccense I. Congrés International du IX centenaire de l'arrivée d'Anselme au Bec. Paris: Vrin 1959. pp. 209-231

     

  3. Daniels Augustinus. Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im Dreizehnten Jahrundert, mit besonderer Beruchsichtigung des Arguments im Proslogion des Hl. Anselm. Münster: Druck und verlag der Aschendorffschen Buchhandlung 1909.
    Inhaltsverzeichins. A. Texte.
    I. Anselm von Canterbury 3; II. Richard Fishacre 21; III. Wilhelm von Auxerre 25; IV. Alexander von Hales 28; V. Albert der Grosse 36; VI. Bonaventura 38; VII. Johannes Peckham 41; VIII. Matthaeus von Aquasparta 51; IX. Thomas von Aquino 64; X. Peter of Tarentaise 68; XI. Ägidius von Rom 72; XII. Heinrich von Gent 79; XIII. Nicolaus Occam 82; XIV. Richard von Middleton 84; XV. Wilhelm von Ware 89; XVI. Johannes Duns Scotus 105;
    B. Untersuchungen.
    I. Vorfragen.
    1. Die Bedeutung des Schweigens gewisser Scholastiker mit Bezug auf Anselms Argument 111; 2. Der scholastische Lehrbetrieb und das gegenwärtige Problem 115;
    II. Das Ergebnis der Texte.
    III. Die Voraussetzungen, welche für die Annahme von Anselms Argument in Frage kommen 131.
    1. Die angeborene Gottesidee bei S. Bonaventura und seiner Schule 132; 2. Das primum cognitum bei den Anhängern des Gottesbeweises des Proslogion 143; 3. Der Satz "non ens non potest esse obiectum intellectus" in seiner Beziehung zum Gottesbeweis des Proslogion 154;
    Anhang.
    1. Scholastiker des dreizehnten Jahrunderts, die den Gottesbeweis des Proslogion nicht erwähnen 157; 2. Die Abhängigkeit des Matthaeus von Aquasparta von Bonaventura 159; 3. Die Unechtheit der dom Scotus zugeschriehenen Schrift: Expositio et Quaestiones in VIII Libros Physicorum Aristotelis 162; Namenregister 165-167.

     

  4. Dyroff Adolf. Der ontologische Gottesbeweis des hl. Anselmus in der Scholastik. In Probleme der Gotteserkenntnis. Münster: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung 1928. pp. 79-115

     

  5. Grunwald Georg von. Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im Mittelalter bis zum Ausgang der Hochscholastik. Münster: Aschendorff 1907.

     

  6. Harrelson Kevin J. The ontological argument from Descartes to Hegel. Amherst: Prometheus Books 2009.
    Contents: Preface 9; List of Abbreviations 11; Introduction: an episode in the history of an argument 15; Chapter One: Proof and perception: the contest of the Argumentum Cartesianum 41; Chapter Two: Refutations of atheism: ontological arguments in English philosophy, 1652-1705 79; Chapter Three: Being and intuition: Malebranche's appropriation of the Argument 101; Chapter Four: An adequate conception: the argument in Spinoza's philosophy 121; Chapter Five: Ontological Arguments in Leibniz and the German Enlightenment 141; Chapter Six: Kant's systematic critique of the Ontological Argument 167; Chapter Seven: Hegel's reconstruction of the Argument 197; Glossary of terms, arguments, and positions 231; Bibliography 235; Index 249-253.

    "This book provides a philosophical analysis of the several debates concerning the "ontological argument" from the middle of the seventeenth to the beginning of nineteenth century. My aim in writing it was twofold. First, I wished to provide a detailed and comprehensive account of the history of these debates, which I perceived to be lacking in the scholarly literature. Second, I wanted also to pursue a more philosophically interesting question concerning the apparent unassailability of ontological arguments. In pursuit of this latter problem, the driving question that my account addresses is "why has this argument, or kind of argument, been such a constant in otherwise diverse philosophical contexts and periods?"
    As familiar as the ontological argument is, there have been no book- length studies in English about the historical development of the arguments of Anselm, Descartes, etc. A vast collection of articles and chapter-length treatments of the history of these arguments does exist, however; and in composing this work I have benefited from the labors of numerous scholars. Particularly helpful was the work of Bernardino Bonansea, Charles Hartshorne, Asnat Avshalom, and Oded Balabon. Even more influential were the many monograph-length studies that have long appeared in other Western languages, especially in German and French. In conducting the necessary research I accrued an enormous debt to the authors of these texts. I thus owe my sincere gratitude to Wolfgang Röd, Louis Girard, and Jan Rohls. My greatest debt in this regard, however, is to Dieter Henrich. My work is little more than an extended argument with him." (From the Preface)

     

  7. Hartshorne Charles. Anselm's discovery. A re-examination of the ontological proof for God's existence. La Salle: Open Court 1965.

     

  8. Henrich Dieter. Der ontologische Gottesbeweis. Sein Problem und seine Geschichte in der Neuzeit. Tübingen: Mohr 1960.
    Translated in Italian.

     

  9. Henrich Dieter. La prova ontologica dell'esistenza di Dio. La sua problematica e la sua storia nell'età moderna. Napoli: 1983.

     

  10. Micheletti Mario. Il problema teologico nella filosofia analitica. Padova: La Garangola 1972.
    Vol. I: Teologia come grammatica (1971); vol. II: Lo status logico della credenza religiosa (1972).

     

  11. Piazza Giovanni. Il nome di Dio. Una storia della prova ontologica. Bologna: Edizioni dello Studio Domenicano 2000.

     

  12. Rohls Jan. Theologie und Metaphysik. Der ontologische Gottesbeweis und seine Kritiker. Gütersloher: Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn 1987.

     

  13. Rõd Wolfgang. Der Gott der reinen Vernunft. Die Ausenaindesetzung um den ontologischen Gottesbeweis von Anselm bis Hegel. München: Beck 1992.

     

  14. Scribano Emanuela. L'esistenza di Dio. Storia della prova ontologica da Descartes a Kant. Bari: Laterza & Co. 1994.

     

  15. Staglianò Antonio. La mente umana alla prova di Dio: filosofia e teologia nel dibattito contemporaneo sull'argomento di Anselmo d'Aosta. Bologna: Edizioni Dehoniane 1996.

     

  16. Tomatis Francesco. L'argomento ontologico: l'esistenza di Dio da Anselmo a Schelling. Roma: Città Nuova 1997.

 

GENERAL AND INTRODUCTORY STUDIES ON THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

  1. The ontological argument from St. Anselm to contemporary philosophers. Edited by Plantinga Alvin. London: Macmillan 1965.
    Contents: Richard Taylor: Introduction VII-XVIII; Part I. The ontological argument in the history of philosophy; 1. St. Anselm 3; 2. St. Thomas Aquinas 28; 3. René Descartes 31; 4. Benedict de Spinoza 40; 5. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 54; 6. Immanuel Kant: The impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the existence of God 57; 7. Arthur Schopenhauer 65; Part II. Contemporary views of the ontological argument; 8. G. E. Moore: Is existence a predicate? 9. William P. Alston: The ontological argument revisited 86; 10. J. N. Findlay: Can God's existence be disproved? 111; 11. Charles Hartshorne; The Necessarily Existent 123; 12. Norman Malcolm: 136-180.

     

  2. The many-faced argument. Recent studies on the ontological argument for the existence of God. Edited by Hick John and McGill Arthur C. London: Macmillan 1967.
    Contents: Preface VII;
    Part I. The argument in Anselm; I. Anselm: Proslogion (Chapter II-IV) 3; Gaunilo and Anselm: Criticism and reply 9; III: Arthur C. McGill: Recent discussions of Anselm's argument 33; IV. A. Beckaert: A Platonic justification for the argument a priori (1959) 111; V. Karl Barth: A presupposition of the proof: the Name of God (1931) 119; VI. Karl Barth: Proslogion III: the special existence of God (1931) 135; VII. André Hayen: The role of the Fool in St. Anselm and the necessarily Apostolic character of true Christian reflection (1959) 162; VIII. Anselm Stolz: Anselm's theology in the Proslogion (1933) 183; Part II. The argument in recent philosophy; IX. John Hick: Introduction 209; A. Is existence a predicate?; X. Bertrand Russell: General propositions and existence (1918) 219; XI. Jerome Shaffer: Existence, predication and the ontological argument (1962) 226; B. The Hegelian use of the argument; XII. Gilbert Ryle: Mr. Collingwood and the ontological argument (1935) 246; XIII. E. E. Harris: Mr. Ryle and the ontological argument (1936) 261; XIV. Gilbert Ryle: Back to the ontological argument (1937) 269; XV. Aimé Forest: St. Anselm's argument in reflexive philosophy (1959) 275; C. The second form of the argument; XVI. Norman Malcolm: Anselm's ontological arguments (1960) 301; XVII. Charles Hartshorne: What did Anselm discover? (1962) 321; XVIII. Charles Hartshorne: The irreducibly modal structure of the argument (1962) 334; XIX. John Hick: a critique of the "Second argument" 341; Selected bibliography 357; Index of topics 371; Index of names 373.

     

  3. L'argomento ontologico / The ontological Argument / L'argument ontologique / Der Ontologische Gottesbeweis. Edited by Olivetti Marco Maria. Padova: Cedam 1990.

     

  4. Con Dio e contro Dio. Raccolta sistematica degli argomenti pro e contro l'esistenza di Dio. Edited by Sciacca Michele Federico. Milano: Marzorati 2009.
    Vol. I: Dai Presocratici a Kant (1972); Vol. II: Dal pensiero romantico a oggi (1972); Vol. III: Novecento teologico. Il Dio dei teologi (1995); Vol. IV: Novecento teologico: Il Dio dei filosofi e degli scienziati (1995).

     

  5. Barnes Jonathan. The ontological argument. London: Macmillan 1972.
    "The Ontological Argument has been debated for eight centuries, and never more energetically than in the last decade. The present essay is less concerned to break new ground than to harrow land already ploughed. Thus Chapter 1 expounds, perhaps rather more particularly than is customary, some of the chief versions of the Ontological Argument; while Chapters 2-3 attempt to appraise and then to outflank the two main manoeuvres which opponents of the Argument have essayed. Finally, Chapter 4 outlines and advocates a more elementary plan of attack.
    My goal has been to state, as plainly as I can, what the Ontological Argument is, and what is and is not most wrong with it. But I have tried to keep in mind a secondary objective, and to provide some intimation of a few of the wider philosophical issues which the Argument raises. For even those philosophers who are sceptical of the merits of the Argument itself must allow that it has inspired and stimulated some considerable work in philosophical logic, and that it still offers a pointed introduction to a number of peculiarly recalcitrant problems.
    The literature on the Ontological Argument is of daunting magnitude, and it swells almost daily: I am acutely conscious of broad lacunae in my reading, especially of the more theologically inclined matter. Nevertheless, my debts to the published thoughts of others are frequent and heavy; I have tried to acknowledge the most important in the text."

     

  6. Bourgeois-Gironde Sacha. L'argument ontologique. In Analyse et théologie. Croyances religieuses et rationalité. Edited by Bourgeois-Gironde Sacha, Gnassounou Bruno, and Pouivet Roger. Paris: Vrin 2002. pp. 31-52

     

  7. Breton Stanislas. L'argument ontologique aujourd'hui. Problèmes et perspectives. In L'argomento ontologico / The ontological Argument / L'argument ontologique / Der Ontologische Gottesbeweis. Edited by Olivetti Marco Maria. Padova: 1990. pp. 665-678

     

  8. Dore Clement. Theism. Dordrecht: Reidel 1984.

     

  9. Durrant Michael. The logical status of 'God' and the function of theological sentences. London: Macmillan 1973.

     

  10. Gale Richard. On the nature and existence of God. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991.
    See Chapter 6: Ontological arguments pp. 201-237.

     

  11. Kutschera Franz von. Vernunft und Glaube. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1990.
    See in particular: Anhang: 1) Zum ontologischen Gottesbeweis pp. 323-334

     

  12. Leftow Brian. The ontological argument. In The Oxford handbook of philosophy of religion. Edited by Wainwright William J. New York: Oxford University Press 2005. pp. 80-116
    "I analyze and evaluate ontological arguments and objections to them in Anselm, Gaunilo, Descartes, his immediate objectors, Leibniz, Kant and Brouwer. Anselm comes off rather better than he is often portrayed, Kant rather worse; Descartes (I argue) is as bad as you've heard."

     

  13. Logan Ian. Reading Anselm's Proslogion: the history of Anselm's Argument and its significance today. Farnham: Ashgate 2009.
    Contents: Acknowledgements VII; List of Abbreviations IX; 1. Introduction 1; 2. The pre-text: the dialectical origins of Anselm's Argument 7; 3. The Text Proslogion 25; Pro Insipiente 59; Responsio 67; 4. Commentary on the Proslogion 85; 5. Anselm's defence and the Unum Argumentum 115; 6. The medieval reception 129; 7. The modern reception 151; 8. Anselm's Argument today 175; Conclusion: the significance of Anselm's Argument 197; Bibliography 203; Index 215.

    "Presenting an account of Anselm's Proslogion argument, its background and its subsequent history in later thought is more than an exercise in intellectual archaeology. Work still needs to be done to understand what Anselm was trying to achieve arid how he was trying to achieve it, Anselm's argument presents an important paradigm for the history or ideas, since it has been treated directly or indirectly by so many different thinkers in subsequent centuries, and it provides a direct challenge to the way philosophy has been done over those centuries. That Anselm has been consistently misunderstood and misrepresented is a central thesis of this book. It is only by returning to and reading Anselm's text that we can hope to establish what he was trying to say and understand how he was trying to say it. Anselm's argument has fascinated and continues to fascinate philosophers and theologians, to such an extent that it is no longer possible in a single work to review exhaustively the history of its reception. Thus, the account of the reception in this book is selective, particularly n Chapter 8 where I limit myself in the main to its reception amongst modern English speaking philosophers. It is these philosophers who have been particularly concerned with the logical form, validity and soundness of. Anselm's argument, and to whom it is necessary to respond, if one wishes to discover wether Anselm still has something of philosophical interest to say to us in the Proslogion.
    There has been a natural tendency amongst modern thinkers to adhere, wittingly or unwittingly, to a Whig view of history, to see the history of ideas as the steady progress of enlightened thought over benighted ignorance. The past is a bad or at best confused place, in which people concerned themselves 'with a lot of outdated foolishness', such as questions about the existence of God, which we now correctly consider to be irrelevant. (1) It is my hope that the study of Anselm's argument and its subsequent reception will help to counter such views, not because everything in the past was good, but because some things were, and it may just be that some of those good things are what 'we' now consider outdated and irrelevant.
    Anselm's argument is frequently identified with later ontological arguments. It is one of my tasks in this work to show how that has happened, and that Anselm's argument has to be addressed in its specificity, that 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' is the irreplaceable middle term of Anselm's argument, which for Anselm functions as the 'natural or proper word' for God. This is not simple a question of scholarship, but also of philosophy, for in my view the latter is aided by the former.
    In this book I seek to create and 'audit trail' which stretches from (I) a prehistory of the text (Chapter 2) to (ii) the manuscript tradition and a translation which seeks to remain faithful to Anselm's Latin text (Chapter 3), presenting the Latin and English texts in parallel to (iii) a commentary on the text (Chapter 4) to (iv) an exposition of the debate that immediately followed its 'publication' (Chapter 5) to (v) a review and evaluation of the historical ongoing reception of the Proslogion (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). It concludes with an assessment of the significance of Anselm's argument." (pp. 1-2)

    (1) See R. Rorty, 'The historiography of philosophy: four genres', in R. Rorty et al. (eds.), Philosophy in History. Essays on the historiography of philosophy, Cambridge 1984, pp. 49-75, p. 52.

     

  14. Mackie John Leslie. The miracle of Theism. Arguments for and against the existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1982.

     

  15. Matthews Gareth B. The ontological argument. In The Blackwell Guide to the philosophy of Religion. Edited by Mann William E. Malden: Blackwell 2004. pp.

     

  16. Miethe Terry, "The ontological argument: a research bibliography," Modern Schoolman 54: 148-166 (1977).
    "Within the past two decades or so there has been a gradual renewal of interest in metaphysics in general and in the theistic arguments in particular. This is the most comprehensive bibliography ever done on this argument for God's existence, with over 330 items listed. The article is divided into the following categories:
    I. General histories of the argument; II. The argument in Anselm; III. The argument in the Middle Ages after Anselm; IV: The argument from Descartes to Kant; V: The Hegelian and Idealist use of the argument; VI. The argument in Continental philosophy; VII: The argument in British and American philosophy; VIII. The logic of "exists"; IX. The concept of necessary being; X: Additions as a result of additional research."

     

  17. Oakes Robert, "A prolegomenon to future exploration of the ontological argument," Personalist 58: 344-351 (1977).
    "The objection which appears to bedevil modal "as well as" non-modal versions of the ontological argument is that no modality of 'real' (i.e., denotational) existence can be contained in any concept whatever, and, consequently, that 'God exists' cannot constitute a conceptual truth. I attempt to establish the rationality of maintaining that whether or not this is so is irrelevant to the integrity of the modal version of the ontological argument, since the falsity of the 'containment-objection' is not a necessary condition of its being a conceptual truth that God exists. In sum, I show that it is perfectly rational to believe "both" that 'God exists' constitutes a truth-of-meaning and that no modality of existence can be "contained" in the concept of God."

     

  18. Rescher Nicholas, "The ontological proof revisited," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37: 138-148 (1959).
    Reprinted in: N. Rscher - Issues in the philosophy of religion - Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2007, pp. 13-24

     

  19. Seifert Josef. Gott als Gottesbeweis. Eine phänomenologische Neubegründung des ontologischen Arguments. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter 2000.
    Second improved and substantially (by a new statement of the core of the ontological argument of 102 pages and a Preface for the Arabic translation of 29 pages) enlarged edition. (First edition 1996).

     

  20. Shaffer Jerome, "Existence, predication, and the ontological argument," Mind: 307-325 (1962).
    "This is an examination of the ontological argument and its consistency with existential propositions. Clarification of the ontological argument is made in light of Hume, Kant, and Carnap with regard to its empirical, predicative, a priori, a posteriori and linguistic proofs and refutations. A further refinement of the presentation is the establishment of the intensional and extensional character of the ontological argument."

     

  21. Sienra Adolfo García de la. The ontological argument. In The rationality of theism. Edited by Sienra Adolfo García de la. Amsterdam: Rodopi 2000. pp. 127-142

     

  22. Steinitz Yuval, "Necessary Beings," American Philosophical Quarterly 31: 177-182 (1994).
    "Anselm, Descartes and Leibniz held that there are "necessary beings" whose existence is necessitated by the very concept; Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein denied this. Whether or not necessary beings exist cannot have a contingent answer: this is the article's elementary premise. And this, together with the law of the excluded middle, tells us that either existence or non-existence must be derivable from the concept of necessary beings; nonexistence, if the concept is self-contradictory, and existence if the concept is not self-contradictory. Also, if there is a positive ontological argument concerning necessary beings, this could be constructed by either of the following strategies: [a] by arguing that the expression, "necessary beings do not exist," is self-contradictory -- the classical strategy of Anselm, Descartes and Leibniz; or [b] by claiming the coherence of necessary beings, based on the fact that necessary beings either exist out of necessity or are absent out of necessity. This is the view of Hartshorne, Malcolm, and Plantinga, utilized in their respective attempts to prove God's existence. Steinitz argues that their ontological arguments are unsatisfactory, but that if we apply the Hartshorne-Malcolm-Plantinga basic strategy to the sheer concept of necessary beings -- rather than to more complicated concepts, such as God or a most perfect being or an unsurpassable greatness -- this helps to avoid some of the difficulties. Swinburne, van Inwagen and others argue convincingly that one can find a conclusive argument for the coherence of any concept of any kind whatsoever. Yet, replacing the concept of God with that of necessary beings can help defend the possibility of an ontological argument, resulting in an inconclusive yet reasonable justification for its coherence."

     

  23. Tilliette Xavier. Quelques défenseurs de l'argument ontologique. In L'argomento ontologico / The ontological Argument / L'argument ontologique / Der Ontologische Gottesbeweis. Edited by Olivetti Marco Maria. Padova: CEDAM 1990. pp. 403-420

     

  24. Van Inwagen Peter. Arguments for God's existence: ontological arguments. In Philosophy of religion. Edited by Davies Brian. Washington: Georgetown University Press 1998. pp. 54-58
    "This chapter gives a very compressed history of the ontological argument from Anselm to Kant, and discusses briefly a modern, modal version of the argument. It is argued that Anselm's and Descartes's versions of the argument are flawed, and that one cannot know the main premise of the modal argument -- 'It is possible for there to be a perfect being (a being that has all perfections essentially)' -- to be true otherwise than by knowing, on some ground independent of the modal argument, that a perfect being actually exists."

     

  25. Van Inwagen Peter. Necessary Being: the ontological argument. In Metaphysics. Boulder: Westview Press 2002. pp. 91-114
    Second revised edition (first edition 1993).
    Reprinted in: Eleonore Stump, Michael J. Murray (eds.) - Philosophy of religion. The big questions - Malden, Blackwell, 1999 pp. 69-83.

     

 

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