Theory and History of Ontology
by Raul Corazzon - e-mail: raul.corazzon[at]formalontology.it
For an overview see the Index of the Pages, the SITE MAP or the Alphabetical Index of the Philosophers: A-F - G-O - P-Z; You can also download this page as 
Table of Contemporary Ontologists 
(click on the image to see the PDF file)
Index of the Section "The Rediscovery of Ontology in Contemporary Thought"
Table of Formal and Descriptivists Ontologists (PDF - from Bernard Bolzano to present time)
Ontologists of the 19th and 20th Centuries (a selection of critical judgments about some of the greatest philosophers of the recent past)
Living Ontologists (a list of authors with an interest in ontology, with synthetic bibliographies)
The Authors to which I devoted an entire page are marked with an asterisk (*)
Professor of Theoretical Philosophy, Universität Bern (Switzerland)
Books
Jacquette Dale. Meinongian logic. The semantics of existence and nonexistence. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1996.
Contents: Preface IX; Introduction 1;
Part One: Meinong's theory of Objects.
I. Elements of Object theory 7; II. Formal semantic paradox in
Meinong's Object theory 12; III. Meinong's theory of Defective Objects
37; IV. The Object theory intentionality of ontological committment 56;
V. Logic, mind and Meinong 70; VI. Meinong's doctrine of the modal
moment 80;
Parto Two: Object theory O.
I. Syntax, formation and inference principles 95; II. Semantics 101; III. Developments of the logic 114;
Part Three: Philosophical problems and applications.
I. Twardowski on Content and Object 193; II: Private language and
private mental objects 200; III. God an impossible Meinongian Object
230; IV. Meinongian models of scientific law 238; V. Aesthetics and
Meinongian Logic of Fiction 256; VI. The Paradox of Analysis 265;
Bibliography 269; Index 285.
"Alexius Meinong and his circle of students and collaborators at the
Philosophisches Institut der Universität Graz formulated the basic
principles for a general theory of objects.(1) They developed branches
and applications of the theory, outlined programs for further research,
and answered objections from within and outside their group, revising
concepts and sharpening distinctions as they proceeded. The object
theory that emerged as the result of their efforts combines important
advances over traditional systems of logic, psychology, and
semantics.The fate of object theory in the analytic philosophical
community has been unfortunate in many ways. With few exceptions, the
theory has not been sympathetically interpreted. It has often met with
unfounded resistance and misunderstanding under the banner of what
Meinong called "The prejudice in favor of the actual". (2) The idea of
nonexistent objects has wrongly been thought to be incoherent or
confused, and there are still those who mistakenly believe that the
theory inflates ontology with metaphysically objectionable
quasi-existent entities.' These criticisms are dealt with elsewhere by
object theory adherents, and are not considered here. In what follows,
the intelligibility of an object theory such as Meinong envisioned is
assumed, and ultimately vindicated by the construction of a logically
consistent version. The inadequacies of extensionalist theories of
ontological commitment and definite description, hallmarks of the
Russell-Quine axis in recent analytic philosophy, justify an
alternative intentional Meinongian object theory logic. Analytic
philosophy survives the rejection of extensionalist treatments of
definite description and ontological commitment, since analytic methods
are not inherently limited to any particular set of extensional or
intentional assumptions.
A comprehensive historical treatment of Meinong's philosophy is not
attempted in these chapters, though some historical issues are
addressed. Some of Meinong's most important philosophical writings have
now been translated or are expected to appear in the near future, and
there are several recent commentaries on Meinong's work, including
Richard Routley's Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, Terence Parsons' Nonexistent Objects,
and Karel Lambert's Meinong and the Principle of Independence.
These studies have contributed to renewed interest in and unprejudiced
reappraisal of object theory. Analyses of the subtle turnings in
Meinong's thought over several decades may be found in J. N. Findlay's Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values,
Reinhardt Grossmann's Meinong, Robin Rollinger's Meinong and Husserl on Abstraction and Universals,
and Janet Farrell Smith's essay "The Russell-Meinong Debate". These
works trace the complex development of Meinong's early nominalism or
moderate Aristotelian realism in the Hume-Studien to his mature
realistic interpretation of relations and factual objectives or states
of affairs as subsistent entities, the theory of objects of higher
order, and the doctrine of the Aussersein of the pure object. I
have relied on these among other sources, I cannot hope to improve on
them in some respects, and my topic in any case is somewhat different.
I am concerned exclusively with the logic, semantics, and metaphysics
or ontology and extraontology of Meinong's theory. Accordingly, I shall
not discuss Meinong's epistemology, theory of perception, or value
theory, which I nevertheless regard as essential to an understanding of
his philosophy as a whole. The logic, semantics, and metaphysics of
object theory are in a sense the most fundamental aspects of Meinong's
thought, and therefore require the most careful preliminary
investigation.
The formal system I develop is a variation of Meinong's vintage Gegenstandstheorie,
refined and made precise by the techniques of mathematical logic. The
proposal offers an integrated three-valued formalization of Meinongian
object theory with existence-conditional abstraction, and modal and
non-Russellian definite description subtheories. The logic is motivated
by considerations about the need for an object theory semantics in the
correct analysis of ontological commitment and definite description.
Applications of the logic are provided in phenomenological psychology,
Meinongian mathematics and metamathematics, criticism of ontological
proofs for the existence of God in rationalist theodicy, the
interpretation of fiction and scientific law, and formal resolutions of
Wittgenstein's private language argument and the paradox of analysis.
In some areas it has been necessary to depart from Meinong's official
formulation of the theory. But I have tried to make these differences
explicit, justifying them by argument and evaluating alternative
interpretations. This I believe is in keeping with the spirit of the
first exponents of object theory, who did not advance their views as a
fixed body of doctrine, but maintained an openminded scientific
attitude, and continually sought to achieve a more accurate
approximation of the truth.
(1) I refer to Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie as a theory of
objects, but alternative English equivalents have been proposed which
should also be considered. Reinhardt Grossmann argues that the theory
must be called a theory of entities because it includes not merely
objects (Objekte), but objectives or states of affairs (Objektive).
Grossmann, Meinong [1974], pp. 111-12: "If we keep in mind that Meinong
will eventually divide all entities (other than so-called dignitatives
and desideratives) into objects on the one hand and objectives on the
other, we cannot speak of a theory of objects as the all-embracing
enterprise, but must speak -- as I have done and shall continue to do
-- of a theory of entities." This argument is inconclusive, since
objectives are also objects of a kind, which Meinong describes as
objects of higher order (hOherer Ordnung), superiora founded on
inferiora or lower order objects. An objective in any case can be as
much an object of thought as any other nonobjective object, as when
someone thinks about the fact that Graz is in Austria, and thereby
makes that state of affairs an object of thought. In this sense, the
theory of objects, of lower and higher order, is already all-embracing
in the way Grossmann thinks Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie is
meant to be. Nicholas Griffin identifies a further difficulty in
Grossmann's terminological recommendation. In "The Independence of
Sosein from Sein" [1979], p. 23, n. 2, Griffin writes: "Grossmann
standardly uses the term 'entity' for Meinong's 'Gegenstand',
which is usually translated as 'object'. Since the Oxford English
Dictionary defines 'entity' as 'thing that has real existence', this
switch is unsatisfactory. Accordingly I have switched back either to
'object' or to the even more neutral term 'item'." Griffin's choice of
translation agrees with Richard Routley's in Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond
[1981], where Routley refers to a theory of items distinct in some
respects from but directly inspired by Meinong's theory of objects.
Routley's 'theory of item'' is perhaps better used to designate his own
special version of object theory, which he also denotes 'noneism'.
Neither Grossmann's nor Routley's terminology carries the intentional
force of 'Gegenstand', which as Meinong explains is etymologically releated to 'gegenstehen',
to stand against or confront, as objects of thought are supposed to confront and presetn themselves to the mind.
(2) Alexius Meinong, "The Theory of Objects" ("Uber Gegenstandstheorie") [1904], pp. 78-81.
(3) In his early work, Meinong expressed the belief that nonexistent objects have what he then called Quasisein. "
The Theory of Objects", pp. 84-5. Meinong here refers to the first edition of his Über Annahmen [1902], p. 95.
See J. N. Findlay, Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values [1963], pp. 47- 8. Routley, Exploring
Meinong's Jungle and Beyond [1981], pp. 442, 854. Routley reports that Meinong renounced the theory of Quasisein in favor of the Aussersein
thesis by 1899 (presumably with the publication in that year of his essay "Uber Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren
Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung"). As a statement of the frequent misinterpretations of Meinong's object theory that persist today,
see P.M. S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein,
revised edition [1986], p. 8: "The Theory of Descriptions ... enabled
Russell to thin out the luxuriant Meinongian jungle of entities (such
as the square circle) which, it had appeared, must in some sense
subsist in order to be talked about ..."
Jacquette Dale. Ontology. Chesham: Acumen 2002.
Content: Preface XI; Acknowledgements XV; Introduction: Being as such 1;.
First Part: Pure philosophical ontology. 1. What is to be (on
Heidegger) 12; 2. Combinatorial ontology 42; 3. Why there is something
rather than nothing 89; 4. Why there is only one logically contingent
actual world 109; 5. Concepts of existence in philosophical logic and
the analysis of being qua being 134;
Second Part: Applied ontology and the metaphysics of science. 6.
Ontological commitment (on Quine) 156; 7. Appearance, reality,
substance, transcendence 182; 8. Physical entities: space, time, matter
and causation, physical states of affair and events, natural laws 193;
9. Abstract entities, particular and universal: numbers, sets,
properties, qualities, relations, propositions, and possibilities,
logical, mathematical and metaphysical laws 206; 10. Subjectivity of
mind in the world of objective physical facts 233; 11. God, a divine
supernatural mind? 253; 12. Ontology of culture: language, arts and
artefacts 265; Conclusion: scientific-philosophical ontology 275; Notes
281; Bibliography 309; Index 329-348.
Articles
Jacquette Dale, "A Fregean solution to the Paradox of Analysis," Grazer Philosophische Studien 37: 59-73 (1990).
Jacquette Dale, "The origins of Gegenstandstheorie. Immanent and transcendent intentional objects in Brentano, Twardowski and Meinong," Brentano Studien: Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 3: 177-202 (1990).
Jacquette Dale, "Wittgenstein's critique of propositional attitudes and Russell's theory of judgment," Brentano Studien: Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4: 193-220 (1993).
"Wittgenstein's attempt to eliminate propositional attitude contexts
from a logically correct symbolism is aimed not only at defending the
finite extensionality thesis or general form of proposition, but serves
also as an attack on the concept of the self or metaphysical subject in
traditional psychology, and a critique of Russell's multiple relation
theory of judgment. The elimination strategy is unsuccessful however in
reducing nested or higher-order iterated intentionalities. If iterated
propositional attitudes cannot be reduced via the picture theory
semantics, then propositional attitude contexts have a legitimate place
in logic and the philosophy of mind. Wittgenstein's effort to eliminate
reference to the metaphysical soul or psychological subject in a
radical no-ownership doctrine of psychological experience and the
extra-worldly transcendence of self collapses with the failure of his
attempt to reduce the intentional elements of propositional attitude
contexts to a purely extensional semantic philosophy."
Jacquette Dale, "Formalization in philosophical logic," Monist 77: 358-375 (1994).
Jacquette Dale, "Meinong's concept of implexive Being and Nonbeing," Grazer Philosophische Studien 50: 233-271 (1995).
Jacquette Dale, "Confessions of a Meinongian logician," Grazer Philosophische Studien 58/59: 151-180 (2000).
"In a chapter of - so to speak - an intellectual autobiography I sketch
the reasons and ways I became a practitioning Meinongian logician. The
way is a chain of transgressions, e.g., the transgression of
extensionalism or of the law of excluded middle, and a struggle against
widespread misinterpretations of Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie.
Although the opposition towards Meinong's theory of objects persists in
analytic philosophy, its main insights - that thought is intentional
and that logic must be ontologically neutral - haven't lost their
attraction. Moreover: there is no substantive criticism to show that we
cannot refer and truely predicate properties of intended objects
regardless of their ontic status."
Jacquette Dale. Aussersein of the pure object. In The School of Alexius Meinong. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana, Jacquette Dale, and Poli Roberto. Aldershot: Ashgate 2001. pp. 373-396
Jacquette Dale. Brentano's concept of intentionality. In The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Edited by Jacquette Dale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001. pp. 98-130
Jacquette Dale. Introduction: Brentano's philosophy. In The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Edited by Jacquette Dale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001. pp. 1-19
Jacquette Dale. Nuclear and extranuclear properties. In The School of Alexius Meinong. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana, Jacquette Dale, and Poli Roberto. Aldershot: Ashgate 2001. pp. 397-426
Jacquette Dale, "Truth and fiction in David Lewis' critique of Meinongian semantics," Metaphysica.International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics 2: 73-106 (2001).
"I criticize all four of Lewis's objections to a Meinongian theory of
fiction, suggesting that they can be answered or refuted, thereby
blunting Lewis's charge that a Meinongian semantics is at a theoretical
disadvantage in comparison with his modal story-contexting. Lewis-style
modal story-contexting, moreover, is not incompatible with a Meinongian
logic of fiction. By itself, without Meinongian object theory, Lewis's
proposal moreover is subject to equally powerful countercriticisms.
Some version of Lewis-style story-contexting needs to be combined with
a Meinongian semantics of fiction in order to avoid Lewis's objections
to Meinongian object theory, and to avoid Meinongian objections to
Lewis's story-context-prefixing."
Jacquette Dale. David Lewis on Meinongian Logic of Fiction. In Writing the Austrian tradition. Relations between philosophy and literature. Edited by Huemer Wolfgang and Chrudzimski Arkadiusz. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2003. pp.
"In his (1978) article, "Truth in Fiction", David Lewis considers four
objections to a Meinongian logic of fiction. I answer Lewis's
objections and criticize his alternative 'de dicto' modal story
contexting as disadvantageous in comparison with a Meinongian semantics
of fiction. Finally, I indicate directions for further development of a
universal logic of fiction and nonfictional discourse that takes its
main point of departure from Meinong's object theory."
Jacquette Dale. Psychologism revisited in logic, metaphysics, and epistemology. In Philosophy, psychology, and psychologism. Critical and historical readings on the psychological turn in philosophy. Edited by Jacquette Dale. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2003. pp. 245-262
"1. Psychology and psychologism
The word 'psychologism' historically has meant many things, but has
mostly been considered a term of abuse leveled against efforts to
explain philosophical concepts or address philosophical problems from
the standpoint of subjective psychological experience. The same degree
of opprobrium, notably, does not attach to psychology itself, which has
generally been regarded as a legitimate subject of scientific and
philosophical investigation. This is true even for opponents of
conventional psychological theories, ranging from Cartesian dualism to
phenomenology to behaviorism, computationalism, and other branches of
cognitive science. The trouble, according to critics, occurs
specifically when the attempt is made to turn psychology of any form
and following any methodology into a philosophical ideology, whenever
and to whatever extent psychology becomes an 'ism'." p. 245
(...)
"7. Toward new paradigms of psychologism
To begin with and end with the limitations of any particular psychology
or particular type of psychology in philosophy is bad psychologism,
whether in logic, metaphysics, or epistemology, ethics or aesthetics.
But to conclude that because some psychologism is or can be bad, that
therefore all psychologism is bad, or that psychology has no place
whatsoever in philosophy, is bad metaphilosophy.
The word 'psychologism' has acquired such negative connotations that I
doubt whether many of the philosophers I have mentioned would much
appreciate being classified as advocating any form psychologism,
including what I have called 'good psychologism'. Yet that, by my
definition, albeit in different ways, is precisely what Rescher, Quine,
and others, are doing. There are unlimitedly many opportunities for
elaborating good psychologistic philosophies. I have argued that it is
a fundamental mistake to suppose that we can or should try to do
entirely without psychological considerations in philosophy. An
anti-psychologism that is not merely a criticism of bad psychologism,
but that takes issue with psychology in any form in philosophy, as I
have tried to show, is misdirected and self-defeating.
I have here barely taken the first steps in discriminating between good
and bad psychologisms, let alone indicating how a good psychologism
ought to be developed in logic, metaphysics, and epistemology. I will
be satisfied if I am perceived as having at least said something
convincing by way of distinguishing between psychologism and bad
psychologism, indicating the possibility of a good psychologism with
virtues and advantages that are worth considering in light of the most
virulent generalized antipsychologisms that persist in philosophy. If
my conclusions are correct, then no one who is conscientious about the
proper conduct of philosophy can afford blithely to turn the page on
psychologism, and assume, as many of its detractors have done, that
psychologism is dead, buried, and never going to be resurrected. I have
suggested, on the contrary, that psychologism needs to be revisited in
more searching and rigorous ways." p. 258
Links
Dale Jacquette (Personal page, with a complete list of publications)
Head of Department of Logical Semiotics, (Warsaw University)
Books
Jadacki Jacek Juliusz and Augustynek Zdzislaw. Possible ontologies. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1993.
Jadacki Jacek Juliusz. From the viewpoint of the Lvov-Warsaw school. Amsterdam : Rodopi 2003.
Jadacki Jacek Juliusz and Pasniczek Jacek. The Lvov-Warsaw school: the new generation. Edited by Jadacki Jacek Juliusz and Pasniczek Jacek. Amsterdam: Rodopi 2006.
Articles
Jadacki Jacek Juliusz. On forms of objects. In Shapes of forms. From Gestalt psychology to phenomenology to ontology and mathematics. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1999. pp. 341-359
"Let us call all objective objects simply 'objects', and all subjective
objects 'quasi-objects'. Two distinctions - between
concreteness-abstractness and extramentality-mentality - seem to be
made, strictly speaking, only among objects: quasi-objects are at most
quasi-concrete or quasi-abstract, and quasiextramental or quasi-mental.
Secondly, only objects can be observable or material, although some of
them are probably noumenal or ideal. Thirdly, all objects are empirical
or individual. Fourthly, all quasi-objects are noumenal or ideal. Thus
we cannot claim that the differences between observability and
noumenality are not "ontologically essential". On the other hand, it is
true that ontological forms are not identical with epistemological
forms. "Objects perceived in different ways need not belong to
different ontological categories". Fifthly, only quasi-objects can be
fictitious or universal, though some of them are probably empirical or
individual. Thus, since only (individual or universal) fictions are
incompatible, only quasi-objects possess the property of
incompatibility.
(...)
I am dubious of the view that existence is not a property, since it is
not backed by adequate arguments. An answer to the question 'which
objects exist?' should be preceded by an answer to the question 'which
intuitions ought to be preserved?'. It seems to me that the following
statement comes closest to the intuitions of common sense:
For every x: x exists iff x is objective.
Existence would not be a property only if it had to be something
identifiable with no property from among properties characterized in
this paper. But then the question of what exists would be questionae
gustuum and not questionae fact.
The problem of ontological forms puts us to a great deal of trouble not
so much because scholars differ on accepted solutions as because we do
not exactly know what these differences consist of." pp. 355-356.
(Notes omitted)
Links
Swedish Philosopher
Books
Articles
Johansson Ingvar, "Determinables as Universals," Monist 83: 101-121 (2000).
Links
Ingvar Johansson Philosophy Home Site
Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, The City University of New York Graduate Center
Books
Articles
Studies
The new theory of reference: Kripke, Marcus, and its origins. Edited by Humphreys Paul W. and Fetzer James H. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1998.
Fitch George W. Saul Kripke. Chesham: Acumen 2004.
Links
Professor, Emeritus, University of Fribourg
Books
Küng Guido. Ontology and the logistic analysis of language. An enquiry into the contemporary views on universals. Dordrecht : Reidel 1967.
English translation by E. C. M. Mays revised by the author, of: Ontologie und logistiche Analyse der Sprache. Eine Untersuchung zur zeitgenössischen Universaliendiskussion - Wien, Springer, 1963.
Articles
Küng Guido, "The world as noema and as referent," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 3: 15-26 (1972).
"A major stumbling block in the way of a dialogue between phenomenology
and logistic philosophy is the fact that the semantical terminology of
the two movements has developed in opposite directions. In logistic
philosophy Frege's 3-levelled semantics of sign, sense and referent
soon gave way to Russell's 2-levelled semantics of sign and referent.
In Husserlian phenomenology, on the other hand, the notion of sense was
not abandoned but broadened, especially through the elaboration of the
notion of the noema. A closer look at the contemporary discussions in
logistic philosophy shows however that the 3-levelled semantical
framework is reappearing in a new form. The straightforward realism of
Russell has given way to a more Kantian position where the universe of
discourse is no longer simply identified with absolute reality. This
means' that the logistic philosophers are discovering the noematic
character of their universes of discourse.
This new logistic distinction between universes of discourse and
absolute reality, which parallels the phenomenological distinction
between the world as noema and the absolute real world (if there is
any), brings with it a distinction between ontology and metaphysics:
the description of different universes of discourse, respectively of
different noematic worlds, can be called the ontological task, and the
question as to which universe of discourse, respectively which noematic
world (if any), is the best map of absolute reality is the concern of
metaphysics.
The parallelism between the semantics of contemporary logistic
philosophy and phenomenology is obscured by a terminological
discrepancy due to the above mentioned divergent historical
development: in logistic philosophy the signs are said to refer to the
entities in the universe of discourse, whereas in phenomenology the
noemata are not properly speaking the referents of noetic acts, but are
said to belong on the level of sense. However, the phenomenological way
of distinguishing noematic world and absolute reality in terms of sense
and referent is very important, because it provides the most adequate
way of conceiving the puzzling relationship between appearance and
reality, and avoids the shortcomings of the causal and the picture
theory, the identity theory and the adverbial theory."
Küng Guido, "The difficulty with the well-formedness of ontological statements," Topoi.An International Journal of Philosophy 2: 111-119 (1983).
Links
Research Professor of Logic and the Philosophy of Science, University of California, Irvine
Books
Lambert Karel and Van Fraassen Bas. Derivation and counterexample. An introduction to philosophical logic. Encino: Dickenson 1972.
Lambert Karel and Ulrich William. The nature of argument. New York: Macmillan 1980.
Lambert Karel. Meinong and the principle of independence: its place in Meinong's theory of objects and its significance in contemporary philosophical logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983.
Philosophical applications of free logic. Edited by Lambert Karel. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1991.
Lambert Karel. Free logics: their foundations, character, and some applications thereof. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 1997.
Lambert Karel. Free logic. Selected essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Articles
Lambert Karel, "Free logic and the concept of existence," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 8: 133-144 (1967).
Lambert Karel, "Russell's theory of definite descriptions," Dialectica 44: 137-152 (1970).
Lambert Karel. Being and Being So. In Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 37-46
Lambert Karel, "Impossible objects," Inquiry 17: 303-314 (1974).
"This paper deals with the Meinong-Russell controversy on nonsubsistent
objects. The first part notes the similarity of certain contemporary
semantical developments to Meinong's theory of nonsubsistent objects.
Then it lays out the major features of Meinong's famous theory,
considers Russell's objections to same and Meinong's counter-objections
to Russell, and argues that Russell's well-known argument fails.
However, it is possible to augment Russell's argument against Meinong
with sound Russellian principles in such a way that it presents at
least a strong inclining reason against Meinong's theory of impossible
objects."
Lambert Karel, "Predication and extensionality," Journal of Philosophical Logic 3: 255-264 (1974).
"Predication, writes W. V. Quine, "joins a general term and a singular
term to form a sentence that is true or false according as the general
term is true or false of the object, if any, to which the singular term
refers". (1) The view of predication expressed by Quine in the quoted
passage is not restricted to Quine; P. F. Strawson, for example, though
perhaps not a rabid supporter of Quine's choice of words, is on record
as finding the theory congenial with his own views. (2)
Quine has also written that "so long merely as the predicated general
term is true of the object named by the singular term... the
substitution of a new singular term that names the same object leaves
the predication true." (3) Nevertheless, most of my efforts will be
directed at establishing that the theory of predication expressed in
Quine's words is nonextensional.
To be precise about my quite limited objective, I need Quine's help
just once more. He writes that "in an opaque construction you also
cannot in general supplant a general term by a coextensive term (one
true of the same objects)... without disturbing the truth value of the
containing sentence. Such a failure is one of the failures of
extensionality." (4) The theory of predication under consideration is,
I claim, non-extensional in the sense that it does not satisfy the
extensionality principle that coextensive general terms substitute for
each other salva veritate; proof of this claim is my major objective.
My secondary objective is to elicit some of the implications of the
claim that the theory of predication under discussion is
nonextensional."
(1) W. V. Quine, Word and object, Wiley, New York, 1960, p. 96
(2) P. F. Strawson, "Singular terms and predication", The Journal of Philosophy, 58 (1961).
(3) Op. cit. Word and object, pp. 142-143.
(4) Ibid., p. 151.
Lambert Karel, "On "The durability of impossible objects"," Inquiry 19: 251-253 (1976).
Lambert Karel, "On the philosophical foundations of free logic," Inquiry 24: 147-203 (1981).
"The essay outlines the character of free logic, and motivation for its
construction and development. It details some technical achievements of
high philosophical interest, hut urges that the role of existence
assumptions in logic is still not fully understood, that unresolved old
problems, both technical and philosophical, abound, and presents some
new problems of considerable philosophical import in free logic."
Lambert Karel, "Nonexistent objects: why theories about them are important," Grazer Philosophische Studien 25/26: 439-446 (1986).
"This essay argues for the importance of developing theories of
nonexistent objects. The grounds are utility and smoothness of logical
theory. In the latter case a parallel with the theory of negative and
imaginary numbers is exploited. The, essay concludes with a
counterexample to a general argument against the enterprise of
developing theories of nonexistent objects, and outlining the foremost
problem an adequate theory of nonexistent objects must solve."
Lambert Karel, "On the philosophical foundations of free description theory," History and Philosophy of Logic 8: 57-66 (1987).
Lambert Karel, "Russell's version of the theory of definite descriptions," Philosophical Studies 65: 153-167 (1992).
Lambert Karel, "Substitution and the expansion of the world," Grazer Philosophische Studien 49: 129-143 (1995).
"The major goal of this paper is to argue that a well known argument to
overturn the principle that coextensive predicates substitute in any
statement without alteration of truth value can be avoided - even in
the simplest of languages. Apparently this can be clone nonartificially
only by expanding the universe with nonexisting objects. It is not
proved that the principle of substitution salva veritate
holds in Meinongian model structures, but in fact it does - as any
completeness proof of free logics based on inner domain-outer domain
semantics will show. If - as some have suggested - Meinong's views are
compatible with the attitudes of a complete extensionalist, and he
subscribed to the outlined modern theory of predication, there is no
escape from Aussersein. That may seem terribly obvious, but in
the light of the development of free logics, more than mere conviction
is needed. This dogmatic intuition is supplanted with some strong
inclining reasons."
Lambert Karel, "Set theory and definite descriptions. Four solutions in search of a common problem," Grazer Philosophische Studien 60: 1-12 (2000).
Links
Professor of Philosophy, Queen's University in Kingston, Canada
Laycock Henry. Words without objects. Semantics, ontology, and logic for non-singularity. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006.
"The book seeks to resolve the so-called 'problem of mass nouns' - a
problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a conventional system
of logic. It is not, for instance, possible to explicate assertions of
the existence of air, oil, or water through the use of quantifiers and
variables which take objectual values. The difficulty is attributable
to the semantically distinctive status of non-count nouns - nouns
which, although not plural, are nonetheless akin to plural nouns in
being semantically non-singular. Such are the semantics of a
non-singular noun, that there can be no such single thing or object as
the thing of which the noun is true. However, standard approaches to
understanding non-singular nouns tend to be reductive, construing them
as singular expressions - expressions which, in the case of non-count
nouns, are true of 'parcels' or 'quantities' of stuff, and in the case
of plural nouns, are true of 'plural entities' or 'sets'. It is argued
that both approaches are equally misguided, that there are no
distinctive objects in the extensions of non-singular nouns. With
plural nouns, their extensions are identical with those of the
corresponding singular expressions. With non-count nouns, because they
are not plural, there can be no corresponding singular expressions. In
consequence, there are no objects in the extensions of non-count nouns
at all. In short, there are no such things as instances of stuff: the
world of space and time contains not merely large numbers of discrete
concrete things or individuals of diverse kinds, but also large amounts
of sheer undifferentiated concrete stuff. Metaphysically, non-singular
reference in general is an arbitrary modality of reference, ungrounded
in the realities to which it is non-ideally or intransparently
correlated."
Articles
Laycock Henry, "Some questions of ontology," Philosophical Review 81: 3-42 (1972).
Laycock Henry, "Theories of matter," Synthese 31: 411-442 (1975).
Laycock Henry. Variables, generality and existence: considerations on the notion of a concept-script. In Topics on general and formal ontology. Edited by Valore Paolo. Milano: Polimetrica Publisher 2006. pp. 27-52
Links
Professor, Emeritus, of Philosophy, University of Chicago
Books
Linsky Leonard. Referring. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press 1967.
Linsky Leonard. Names and descriptions. Chicago : The University of Chicago Press 1977.
Linsky Leonard. Oblique contexts. Chicago: Chicago University Press 1983.
Articles
Links
Professor of Philosophy, Durham University
Books
Lowe Jonathan E. Kinds of Being. A study of individuation, identity and the logic of sortal terms. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1989.
Lowe Jonathan E. The possibility of metaphysics. Substance,identity, and time. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998.
Lowe Jonathan E. A survey of metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002.
Lowe Jonathan E. The four-category ontology. A metaphysical foundation for natural science. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006.
Articles
Lowe Jonathan E., "Primitive substances," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 531-551 (1994).
Lowe Jonathan E., "Why is there anything at all?," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70: 111-120 (1996).
Lowe Jonathan E., "Ontological categories and natural kinds," Philosophical Papers 26: 29-46 (1997).
Lowe Jonathan E., "Entity, identity and unity," Erkenntnis 48: 191-208 (1998).
Lowe Jonathan E., "Form without matter," Ratio 11: 214-234 (1998).
Abstract: "Three different concepts of matter are identified: matter as
what a thing is immediately made of, matter as stuff of a certain kind,
and matter in the (dubious) sense of material 'substratum'. The
doctrine of hylomorphism, which regards every individual concrete thing
as being 'combination' of matter and form, is challenged. Instead it is
urged that we do well to identify
an individual concrete thing with its own particular 'substantial
form'. The notions of form and matter, far from being correlative, are
relatively independent. There is nothing absurd in the notion of form without matter.
Matter provides neither a principle of individuation nor a criterion of
identity for individual concrete things: their form alone provides
both. Finally, a substance ontology which admits also the existence of
particular qualities, or tropes, is to be preferred both to a substance
ontology which denies the existence of tropes and to a pure trope
ontology."
Links
E. Jonathan Lowe (Durham University)
The New Ontology of Mental Causation Debate
Last modified: Tuesday, March 09, 2010