Varzi Achille. Parts and places. The structures of spatial representation. Cambridge: The MIT Press 1999.
With Roberto Casat
Articles
Varzi Achille. Truth, falsehood and beyond. In Topics in philosophy and artificial intelligence. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana and Poli Roberto.
Bozen: Istituto Mitteleuropeo di Cultura 1991. pp. 39-50
Papers from the International Summer Schools in Bozen - 1989-1990.
"1. Introduction
Always in the background and sometimes in the foreground of any
semantic approach to cognitive reasoning is a straight, twofold
assumption on the admissible state representations:
[1] Every sentence must be either true or false
[2] No sentence can be both true and false.
Arguably, such a standard course is intuitively well-grounded, and the
resulting accounts have generally proved to be not only simple, but
formally powerful as well. As things are, however, some concern arises
in connection with their range of application. For on the one hand, it
appears that any but the most artificial set-ups may violate [1], while
on the other hand, any but the most simplistic situations are liable to
violate [2]. In fact, even if we assume that the purpose of
a language's sentences is to be always true or false, there is no a
priori reason to suppose that the underlying conditions will be always completely fulfilled
(for instance, ordinary language sentences may involve expressions
whose intended reference is only partially defined, or vaguely defined,
or not defined at all). And since there is no general syntactic
criterion for incompleteness, there is no general way that
incompletenesses can be ruled out without ruling out a variety of
unproblematic cases as well. Conversely, even if we assume that the intention of
a language's sentences is never to be true and false, there is in fact
no a priori guarantee that the underlying conditions can be always consistently fulfilled
(for example, ordinary language sentences may, in unfavourable
circumstances, turn out to be self-referential, thus leading to such
well-known troubles as the liar paradox). And again, since there is no
general decision procedure for inconsistency, there is no general and
effective way that inconsistencies can be ruled out without rendering a
great deal of perfectly unproblematic reasoning impossible.
For these reasons, a more general semantic framework, where representational gaps and/or gluts are admitted bona fide, is
arguably desirable. Of course the task is by no means straightforward.
Dropping [1] and [2] from the foundations of semantics is a true
"revolution", and it might be difficult to keep it under logical
control. Nevertheless it can be done. My purpose here is to outline a
concrete proposal in this direction."
Varzi Achille, "Inconsistency without contradiction," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38: 621-639 (1997).
Westerhoff Jan. Ontological categories. Their nature and significance. New York: Oxford University Press 2005.
Articles
Westerhoff Jan, "Defining "ontological category"," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102: 287-293 (2002).
Abstract: "Although a considerable degree of precision has been
introduced both into the formulation and the discussion of ontological
theories by the use of formal methods there is still a remarkable
indefiniteness about foundational issues. In particular it is not clear
what an ontological category is and why
we regard something as an ontological category. This is amazing given
that the notion of ontological category is in fact the most basic of
the whole of ontology: it is what this discipline is about."
Westerhoff Jan, "The construction of ontological categories," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82: 595-620 (2004).
Yablo Stephen, "Does ontology rest on a mistake? (First Part)," Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society 72: 229-262 (1998).
Abstract: "The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external
distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'.
But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction
between statements made within make-believe games and those made
outside them-or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be
called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers
figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To
determine our ontological commitments, we have to ferret out all traces
of non-literality in our assertions; if there is no sensible project of
doing that, there is no sensible project of Quinean ontology."
Yablo Stephen. A paradox of existence. In Empty names, fiction, and the puzzles of non-existence. Edited by Everett Anthony and Hofweber Thomas.
Stanford: CSLI Publications 2000. pp. 275-312
Yablo Stephen. Abstract objects. A case study. In Individuals, essence, and identity. Themes of analytic metaphysics.
Edited by Bottani Andrea, Carrara Massimiliano, and Giaretta Pierdaniele. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002. pp. 189-206
Zalta Edward. Abstract objects. An introduction to axiomatic metaphysics. Dordrecht: Reidel 1983.
Zalta Edward. Intentional logic and the metaphysics of intentionality. Cambridge: The MIT Press 1988.
Articles
Zalta Edward and McMichael Alan, "An alternative theory of nonexistent objects," Journal of Philosophical Logic 9: 297-313 (1980).
Zalta Edward, "Lambert, Mally and the Principle of Independence," Grazer Philosophische Studien 25/26: 447-460 (1986).
"In a recent book [Meinong and the Principle of Independence, Cambridge
1983], K. Lambert argues that philosophers should adopt Mally's
Principle of Independence (the principle that an object can have
properties even though it lacks being of any kind) by abandoning a
constraint on true predications, namely, that all of the singular terms
in a true predication denote objects which have being. The constraint
may be abandoned either by supposing there is a true predication in
which one of the terms denotes
a beingless object (Meinong) or by supposing there is a true
predication in which one of the terms denotes nothing at all (free
logic). However, Lambert's conclusions can be undermined by showing
that the data he produces in support of his position can be explained
by either of two recent theories of abstract and nonexistent objects,
both of which are couched in languages which conform to the traditional
constraint."
Zalta Edward, "A comparison of two intensional logics," Linguistics and Philosophy 11: 59-89 (1988).
Zalta Edward, "On Mally's alleged heresy: a reply," History and Philosophy of Logic 13: 59-68 (1992).
Zalta Edward, "Twenty-five basic theorems in situation and world theory," Journal of Philosophical Logic 22: 385-428 (1993).
Zalta Edward and Linsky Bernard, "Naturalized Platonism versus Platonized naturalism," Journal of Philosophy 92: 525-555 (1995)
Zalta Edward, "Two (related) world views," Noûs 29: 189-211 (1995).
Zalta Edward and Linsky Leonard, "In defense of the contingently nonconcrete," Philosophical Studies 84: 283-294 (1996).
Zalta Edward, "A classically-based theory of impossible worlds," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38: 640-660 (1997).
Zalta Edward. Mallys' determinates and Husserl's noemata. In Ernst Mally - Versuch einer Neubewertung. Edited by Hieke Alexander.
Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 1998. pp. 9-28
Zalta Edward, "A common ground and some surprising connections," Southern Journal of Philosophy, 40: 1-25 (2002).
"This paper serves as a field guide to certain passages in the
literature which bear upon the foundational theory of objects I have
developed over the years. The foundational theory assimilates ideas
from key philosophers in both the analytical and phenomenological
traditions. The ideas of Plato, Leibniz, Frege, Russell, Gödel and even
Kripke become connected through those of Brentano, Meinong, Husserl,
and Mally. The foundational theory thereby serves as a common ground
where analytic and phenomenological concerns meet. It is couched in a
precise logic and systematizes a well-known phenomenological kind of
entity, one which has played an important role in analytic philosophy."
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