Plato's Cratylus and the problem of the "correctness of names"
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Raven John Earle. Pythagoreans and Eleatics. An account of the
interaction between the two opposed schools during the fifth and early fourth
centuries B.C. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1948.
Contents: Preface VII-VIII; Part I. I. Introduction 1; II. Aristotle's evidence
9; III. Parmenides 21; IV: Pythagoreanism before Parmenides 43; V. Zeno of Elea
66; VI. Melissus 78; Part II. VII. Post-Zenonian Pythagoreanism 93; VIII. The
nature of matter 101; IX. The One 112; X: The One and numbers 126; XI. Cosmology
(a) Analysis 146; (b) Synthesis 164; XII: Conclusion 175; Appendix 188; Index
195-196.
"As Dr C. M. Bowra has pointed out in a paper in Classical Philology (XXXII
[1937], p. 106), 'it is clear that this Proem is intended to have the importance
and seriousness of a religious revelation'. Not only the passage from darkness
into light but many minor details throughout the poem suggest that Parmenides
desired, particularly in the Proem, to arm himself in advance, by stressing the
religious and ethical nature of his revelation, with an answer to his potential
critics. There seems no reason to doubt Dr Bowra's assumption (loc. cit. p. 108)
that these potential critics were 'his fellow-Pythagoreans'.
Parmenides is indeed, in Cornford's phrase, 'a curious blend of prophet and
logician'. The Proem, though its details are of no importance to our present
inquiry, at least serves the useful purpose of stressing the prophetic strain.
The Way of Truth, on the other hand, is an entirely unprecedented exercise of
the logical faculty, and as such it is usually and naturally taken to be devoid
of any emotion. In its outward form it certainly is so; but it must be
remembered that the concept on which Parmenides' logic is at work is that of
unity, and there is no reason to suppose that the concept of unity is incapable
of arousing emotion. If two of the conclusions that I have already reached are
justified, that Parmenides was a dissident Pythagorean, and that in the
Pythagoreanism from which he was seceding there was a fundamental dualism
between the principle of unity and goodness and another and eternally opposed
principle, then is it not permissible to imagine that Parmenides, swayed perhaps
by a deeper respect for the good principle than his 'fellow-Pythagoreans'
revealed, may have been driven along the road from darkness into light by a
basically religious desire to vindicate the good principle against the bad? Such
a supposition would help to explain the fervour that almost succeeds in
illuminating the uninspired poetry of the Proem; and the ultimate triumph of his
logical faculty over his emotion should not blind us to the possibility that an
emotional impulse underlay his unemotional reasoning.
But the only convincing test of such a hypothesis must obviously be sought in
the poem itself. I propose to examine the Way of Truth in considerable detail,
adopting for the purpose the method employed by Cornford in his chapter on the
same subject. Indeed, on occasions I shall be merely paraphrasing that chapter;
but a measure of such repetition is inevitable for the sake of continuity." pp.
23-24).
Reilly Thomas J., "Parmenides fragment 8,4: a correction," Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie 58: 57 (1976).
Reinhardt Karl. Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen
Philosophie. Frankfurt: Klostermann 1916.
Contents: Einleitung 1; I. Parmenides 5; II. Xenophanes 89; III. Heraklit 155;
IV. Schulzusammenhänge 231; V. Logik und Mystik 250; Register 259.
Reprinted 1959 and 1985.
Partial translation under the title: The relation between the two parts of
Parmenides in: Alexander P. D. Mourelatos (ed.) - The Presocratics. A
collection of critical essays - New York, 1974, pp. 293-311 of the following
pages: 18-23, 29-32, 64-71, 74-82, 88 with omissions as indicated. (Translation
by Matthew E. Cosgrove with A. P. D. Mourelatos).
"Whoever takes the trouble to understand Parmenides in all his boldness as well
as in his restraint, and at the same time in terms of his historical situation,
must first of all realize that the one great defect from which the "Doxa"
suffers in our eyes-namely, that it is unable to take hold of the knowing
subject and must turn for help to the things themselves-was not very perceptible
to Parmenides, and was perhaps not perceived by him at all. He understood the
proposition that like can only be known by like so literally, so close to the
level of visual imagery, that he could not but think that the organ of
perception and its object were made up of the same constituents, and were even
subject to the same forms and laws. Thought processes in the soul appeared to
him not as corresponding with, but as exactly repeating the external world. What
was a law for thought had to have unqualified validity for things also. If
nature were shown contradicting the principle of non-contradiction itself, then
nature was ipso facto false and precisely not existent: "For you could not come
to know that which is not (for it is not feasible), nor could you declare it;
for it is the same to think and to be" (B2.7-8, B3). Conversely, every character
of the external world led directly to a conclusion concerning human knowledge.
No matter how hard one looks, one will not find the slightest hint of a
separation between thinking and being (or representation and appearance) in the
fragments. Parmenides begins the "Doxa" by relating (B8.53) that men have agreed
to designate a twofold form with names, but he does not elaborate, as one would
expect, on how they fashioned their world-picture from both forms. Instead, the
object of their thought straightaway achieves an independent life: Dark and
light unite and produce the world; and to our surprise a cosmogony springs from
the epistemology. What had been no more than a name, a convention, an onoma,
enters into physical combinations, and finally generates even man himself and
his cognitive states. To our way of thinking, that is certainly hard to take.
Our only recourse, if we are to grasp it, is to recite to ourselves once again
the rule that was the lifeblood of Parmenidean conviction: "For it is the same
to think and to be" (B3). Because this world is composed throughout of light and
darkness, and is pervasively the same and then again not the same (B8.58, B6.8),
because contradiction is the essence of all doxa, this entire world must be
false, that is to say, subjective, or as the Greeks would have said, it can only
exist nomoi, "by convention," and not physei, "in reality."
To be sure, this conclusion is not repeated in every sentence. Now and then it
even seems as though the critic and nay-sayer had let himself be carried along
for a while on the broad stream of human opinions; indeed, as though his
critique were itself the repository of discoveries in which he took pride. For
since appearance by no means lacks all reason and consistency, it can actually
be explored. Yet its character as appearance does not mitigate its contradicting
the highest law of thought, the sole guarantee of truth. This is said twice,
briefly but sharply, at decisive points: the beginning and the end of the second
part. Whether between these passages there were originally additional reminders
of the same fundamental idea, we do not know. The two that we do know are
sufficiently complete. As though separated from the rest by a thick tallying
stroke, at the conclusion of the whole stand the words that give the sum of all
that has been said (B19):
And so, according to appearances (kata doxan) these things came to be,
and now are, and later than now will come to an end, having matured; and to
these things did men attach a name, a mark to each." (pp. 295-297)
Rijk Lambertus Marie de. Did Parmenides reject the sensible world? In
Graceful reason: essays in ancient and medieval philosophy presented to Joseph
Owens, CSSR on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday and the fiftieth
anniversary of his ordination. Edited by Gerson Lloyd. Toronto: Pontifical
Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1983. pp. 29-53
"Two camps of scholars interpreting Parmenides' poem have recently been
distinguished and labeled as the Majority and the Minority. The former holds
that, unlike the Alêtheia part, the Doxa part presents an altogether untrue
account of things that properly speaking have no real existence. According to
the Minority, however, the Doxa was put forward as possessing some kind or
degree of cognitive validity. I shall try to show that both these two positions
are ambiguous and accordingly fail in giving a clear insight into what
Parmenides intends to tell us. They both seem to need correction to the extent
that Parmenides does distinguish the Alêtheia route from the Doxa route(s),
but there is nothing in the text to tell us that he makes a distinction between
two separate domains. one true and the other untrue. As any genuine
philosopher he was concerned about the sensible world, our world and it
was that which he wanted to truly understand." pp. 29-30
(...)
One cannot deny that Heraclitus faced the primitive approach of the physicists
in a radical way. So Parmenides in defending another steady inner nature
('Be-ing') sees in him his most dangerous rival. No wonder that his offences
against Heraclitus are the most bitter. And indeed he tries to bring Heraclitus
into the company of those who, two-headed as they are, are not able to make the
great decision.
Subsequent thinkers had to take into account Parmenides' doctrine and in fact
could not help digesting its rigidity. Plato was the first to take the big
decision so seriously that he left the idea of one world as approached by
mortals along two different Routes and settled on the assumption of two separate
worlds, one of Unshakable Being, the other of Unreliable Becoming. Aristotle,
for his part, thought it possible to dispose of Plato's chorismos and
find the inner nature of things right in themselves. No doubt it is Parmenides,
cited by Fr. Owens as 'one of the truly great philosophic geniuses in the
history of Western thought,' (*) who was the catalyst of all subsequent
metaphysics" p. 53
J. Owens, A history of ancient western philosophy (New York 1959) p. 76
Robbiano Chiara. Becoming Being. On Parmenides' transformative
philosophy. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2006.
Text and translation of the Poem pp. 212-223.
"The aim of this study is the investigation of Parmenides' method in guiding a
human being towards understanding. Parmenides' words operate as a travel guide
that leads the audience on a journey that will educate them, transform them, and
make them philosophically mature. I will analyse various literary, rhetorical,
polemical, and argumentative features of Parmenides' Poem which, I submit, bring
the audience a step further towards the kind(s) of knowledge that Parmenides has
in store for them.
Many scholars have concentrated on the arguments of fragment B8,3 and on their
conclusions -- that Being is without birth, undifferentiated, changeless and
complete.
In general, one may be inclined to think that, once a goal has been reached, the
journey that brought one there is not relevant anymore. Accordingly, the student
of Parmenides' Poem may be tempted to concentrate his or her interpretative
energy on Being: the goal of the journey made under the guidance of the goddess
of whom the Poem tells us. The scholar who is looking for the philosophical
message of the Poem may try to reduce all the questions, pieces of advice and
encouragements of the speech of the goddess (B1,24 onwards) to a description
of Being: the true and knowable reality.
But it may be asked whether this approach, which looks only for a description of
Being in the fragments, does not neglect the complex journey that the mind has
to make through myths, images, encouragements and warnings, before it will be
able to grasp Being: the philosophical itinerary through which Parmenides guides
his audience throughout the Poem. The question how, according to
Parmenides, we can achieve insight into Being seems no less important for a
better understanding of the Poem than the content of this insight. The doubt
about traditional certainties, the rejection of certain mental behaviours and
the process of building new perspectives significantly precede the search
for the characteristics of Being.
Once we resist the temptation of detaching a description of Being from the
conditions for the achievement of understanding that the goddess sets out, and
from the human being who attempts to understand Being, we will become sensitive
to the fact that the Poem works upon its audience and helps them to achieve
understanding. I will try to analyse the progress towards understanding from the
very beginning. The study of this progress, which, I believe, constitutes the
main subject matter of Parmenides' Poem, will turn out to be fundamental to the
study of Parmenides' philosophy.
A study of a philosopher's method will have to concentrate not only on the words
and phrases that the philosopher uses to describe the right method, but
also on the words and phrases that the philosopher uses in order to
transform his or her audience: i.e. to persuade them to adopt a new way of
looking that will change them.
This will be a systematic study of the rhetorical and linguistic features of
Parmenides' Poem that hopes to shed light on his philosophy. Such a study will
have to pay attention to the effect of such features on the audience who
is gradually guided towards insight. Only by looking at the transformative
effect of such features of our Poem on the audience will we be able to give a
coherent interpretation of the fragments.
We will find their coherence by studying the goal they have in common: to help
the audience to acquire insight into Being.
What happens when one's journey towards Being is accomplished? Is there room for
a differentiation between oneself and one's goal in a monistic reality? In order
to answer these questions, we will look at the hints the goddess gives about the
effects of the journey on the way of Truth, i.e. the hints about the
transformation of the knowing subject when the journey has reached its goal. We
will also be able to find out more about Parmenides' monism by investigating the
place of the knowing subject in a monistic reality. I will argue that there are
hints throughout the Poem that it is possible for the knowing subject to leave
one's status of mortal who can have only opinions, and become one with Being."
pp. 9-10 (notes omitted)
Robinson Thomas M., "Parmenides on the ascertainment of the real,"
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4: 623-633 (1975).
"Examines Parmenides' views of the relationship between Being or the real and
thought, particular as these views are manifested in his use of the verb
noein, a verb which expresses the idea of 'getting to know'. Concludes that
the relationship in question is not one of identity. Argues that contrary to
what is often said, the Parmenidean position seeks to establish a link between
metaphysics and epistemology, and that there is a necessary connection according
to Parmenides between a particular state of knowledge and its formulation as a
true proposition. Discerns in his philosophy the basis of a well developed
theory of knowledge and the elements of propositional logic." [N.]]
Robinson Thomas M., "Parmenides on the real in its totality," Monist
62: 54-60 (1979).
"Contends that the subject of Parmenides' poem is the real in its totality as
the actual object of knowledge ("all that is collectively real"), and that
opinion arises according to Parmenides when the real is described obliquely and
not in its totality. Observes that in his description of the real, Parmenides
approached clearly the conception of atemporality. Stresses the significance of
Parmenides' realization of the value of contraposition and exclusive
disjunction, and of his understanding of the difference between the logic of
wholes and logic of parts." [N.]
Robinson Thomas M., "Parmenides and Heraclitus on what can be known,"
Revue de Philosophie Ancienne 7: 157-167 (1989).
Rocca-Serra Guillaume. Parménide chez Diogène Laërce. In Études sur
Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation. Edited by Aubenque Pierre.
Paris: Vrin 1987. pp. 254-273
"Nous avons choisi d'organiser notre recherche autour de la notice consacrée à
Parménide par Diogène Laèrce. Une autre méthode eût consisté dans une
présentation qui aurait suivi un ordre chronologique, mais une telle procédure
supposait résolu un problème qui tourmente, au moins depuis Nietzsche,
philologues et philosophes, celui des sources de Diogène Laèrce. Au contraire,
partir de cet auteur et revenir en arrière nous évitait de prendre des positions
trop tranchées à la fois sur ses informateurs immédiats et sur les sources de
ces informateurs eux-mêmes.
L'oeuvre de Diogène constitue, on le sait, une sorte de synthèse, maladroite et
parfois mal intentionnée, de ce que l'érudition hellénistique avait rassemblé
sur le thème des «Vies et doctrines des philosophes célèbres». Sa méthode de
travail, son esprit superficiel lui ont attiré des critiques méritées, mais il
nous a conservé une masse d'informations qui font de son livre un ouvrage
indispensable. Ajoutons qu'une partie des absurdités qu'on lui attribue pourrait
parfaitement provenir de la maladresse des scribes médiévaux." p. 254
"Cet examen, bien que partiel, de la tradition biographique et doxographique
nous aura persuadés, semble-t-il, d'abord, que les restes de cette tradition ne
représentent qu'une infime partie d'une littérature jadis très importante. C'est
ainsi que la modeste notice de Diogène nous fait entrevoir les travaux de
l'école d'Aristote, de l'érudition alexandrine, de la doxographie sceptique.
Ensuite et surtout, on peut mettre en évidence la valeur de certaines des
indications qu'elle nous transmet. Elle nous fournit le canevas vraisemblable de
la biographie de Parménide, d'abord héritier d'une grande famille et voué
probablement à une activité politique et législatrice, puis se tournant vers la
philosophie, sans toutefois que la fine pointe de sa pensée soit mise en
évidence, et c'est là une des lacunes de la tradition. Pourtant, bien avant K.
Reinhardt 1°2, Sotion puis Diogène ont dissocié Xénophane et Parménide,
pressentant ainsi l'originalité de ce dernier. La tradition, enfin, a retenu
plus volontiers le monde de l'apparence que le poème. C'est surtout grâce à elle
que nous reconstruisons la doxa parménidéenne, sur laquelle les parties
conservées du Poème nous renseignent guère. Elle a donc sa place dans l'approche
d'un Parménide dans sa totalité." p. 273 (notes omises)
Rosen Stanley, "Commentary on Long [Parmenides on thinking Being],"
Proceedings of the Boston Area colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 12: 152-160
(1996).
Ruggiu Luigi. Parmenide. Venezia: Marsilio 1975.
Ruggiu Luigi, "Unità e molteplicità in Parmenide," Parola del Passato
43: 347-372 (1988).
Ruggiu Luigi. Heidegger e Parmenide. In Heidegger e la metafisica.
Edited by Ruggenini Mario. Genova: Marietti 1991. pp. 49-81
Sainati Vittorio, "Tra Parmenide e Protagora (Le premesse stoiriche della
logica greca)," Filosofia 16: 49-110 (1965).
Sanders K.R., "Much ado about 'Nothing': meden and to me eon
in Parmenides," Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 35:
87-104 (2002).
"It has been a universally accepted assumption among commentators on Parmenides
that mêden, "nothing," and to mê eon, "what-is-not," are for him
synonymous. This paper focuses primarily on the role this supposed semantic
equivalence plays in arguments supporting a popular emendation in fragment
B8.12. After a brief survey of the principal difficulties in interpreting this
and the surrounding lines and a review of the reasons traditionally proffered in
support of the emendation, the author argues that the best sense for Parmenides'
arguments results by retaining the manuscript reading and recognizing the
fundamental difference in meaning between "nothing" and "what-is-not"."
Santillana Giorgio de. Prologue to Parmenides. In Reflections of men and
ideas. Cambridge: M.I.T. University Press 1970. pp. 82-119
Originally published in Lectures in memory of Louise Taft Semple -
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964.
"Proposes a new interpretation of Parmenides' philosophy, an interpretation
which is free from the misconceptions and superimpositions of ancient
commentators and modern scholars, and which avoids the error of seeing in his
philosophical system an ontological or metaphysical construction, or a
logico-linguistic exercise. Insists on integrating the details of Parmenides'
cosmology and astronomy with the principles developed in the first section of
his poem. Concludes that the originality of Parmenides' thought, as well as his
most significant contribution to the development of ideas, should be recognized
in the fact that he "made of geometry the core of reality in an entirely
different way from his predecessors" (p. 119): Parmenidean Being reveals itself
as "three-dimensional extension pure and absolute" (ibid.), which was conceived
as the ultimate substratum of all things." [N.]
Sasso Gennaro, "L'esegesi parmenidea di Guido Calogero," La Cultura
26: 189-285 (1988).
Schlüter Jochen. Heidegger und Parmenides. Ein Beitrag zu Heideggers
Parmenidesauslegung und zur Vorsokratiker-Forschung, zur Formung des
parmenideischen Prooimions (28B1). Bonn: Bouvier Verlag 1979.
Schmitz Hermann. Der Ursprung des Gegenstandes. Bonn: Bouvier 1988.
Schofield Malcolm, "Did Parmenides discover eternity?," Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie: 113-135 (1970).
Schofield Malcolm, "Coxon's Parmenides," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient
Philosophy 32: 349-359 (1987).
Schürmann Reiner, "Le différend hénologique. La loi de l'Un, et la loi des
contraires," Parola del Passato 43: 397-419 (1988).
Translated in English as: The law of the One and the law of contraries in
Parmenides in: Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal vol. 13, 1, 1988, pp.
3-20
Schürmann Reiner. Broken hegemonies. Bloomington : Indiana University
Press 2003.
Translated by Reginald Lilly from the French: Des Hégémonies brisées -
Mauvenzin, Trans Europe Repress, 1996.
See Part One: In the name of the One. The Greek hegemonic fantasm. I:
Its institution: The One that holds together (Parmenides) pp. 51-135
Schwabl Hans, "Sein und Doxa bei Parmenides," Wiener Studien 66:
50-75 (1953).
Reprinted in: H. G. Gadamer (ed.) - Um die Begriffswelt der Vorsokratiker
- Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968, pp. 391-422.
"Discusses the relationship between the realm of Being and the world of opinion
in the philosophy of Parmenides. Emphasizes the fact that even though the
sensible world stands in radical opposition to Being, both are ultimately the
complementary polarities of one philosophical vision which remains coherent and
consistent within itself. Offers comments on the impact of Milesian and
Pythagorean ideas on the formation of Parmenidean thought."
Schwabl Hans, "Hesiod und Parmenides: zur Formung des parmenideischen
Prooimions (28B1)," Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 106: 134-142
(1963).
Scuto Giuseppe. Parmenides' Weg. Vom Wahr-Scheinenden zum Wahr-Seienden:
mit einer Untersuchung zur Beziehung des parmenideischen zum indischen Denken.
Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2005.
Sedley David. Parmenides and Melissus. In The Cambridge Companion to
early Greek philosophers. Edited by Long Anthony Arthur. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1999. pp. 113-133
Sellmer Sven. Argumentationsstrukturen bei Parmenide: zur Methode des
Lehrgedichts und ihren Grundlagen. New York: Peter Lang 1998.
Sider David, "Textual notes on Parmenides' Poem," Hermes.Zeitschrift für
Klassische Philologie 113: 362-366 (1985).
Skirry Justin, "The numerical monist interpretation of Parmenides,"
Southern Journal of Philosophy 39: 403-417 (2001).
"The doctrine of numerical monism as it is traditionally attributed to
Parmenides is the claim that there is only one thing that is genuinely or truly
real; that is, is not generated, not perishable, immutable, indivisible, whole,
complete and continuous. In this paper, I argue that this interpretation is
mistaken, because it entails a claim that Parmenides does not accept, namely
that Being and not-Being are both the same and not the same. I conclude that
numerical monism is not a doctrine that should be attributed to Parmenides, and
that it should be rejected in favor of some alternative interpretation."
Solana José, "Generación y tiempo en el Poema de Parménides,"
Méthexis.International Journal for Ancient Philosophy 16: 7-22 (2003).
"The object of this paper is to analyze the questions related to two ontological
predicates of the eon, ungenerated and imperishable, and the proof for
them developed along B8.5-21. The article tries to demonstrate that, to refute
the generation and corruption, it is not enough to resort on non-Being. It is
necessary also to exclude the time, because the time introduces the difference
and, supposed the difference, the generation is possible. Denied the possibility
of the difference, the generation would be possible only introducing the
non-Being."
Solmsen Friedrich, "Light from Aristotle's Physics on the text of Parmenides
B 8 D-K," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 22: 10-12 (1977).
"Endeavors to elucidate the precise meaning of Parmenides' Frag. 8, in which it
is categorically affirmed that neither can anything come from nothing, nor can
something come from something, and that, consequently, there is no becoming.
Appeals to Aristotle's Physics 191a23-33, a passage which it regards as
referring specifically to Parmenides." [N.]
Somville Pierre. Parménide d'Elée: son temps et le nôtre. Un chapitre
d'histoire des idées. Paris: Vrin 1976.
Spangler G.A., "Aristotle's criticism of Parmenides in Physics I,"
Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 13: 92-103 (1979).
"Discusses Aristotle's account and critique of Parmenidean philosophy in Physics
184bff, specifically his rejection of monism and Parmenides' rejection of the
reality of motion. Observes that in developing his own position, Aristotle was
still willing to accept the Parmenidean principle that what is cannot originate
from what is not." [N.]
Sprague Rosamond Kent, "Parmenides: a suggested rearrangement of fragments
in the 'Way of Truth'," Classical Philology 50: 124-126 (1955).
"Suggests that Frag 7.1 should be placed after Frag. 6.2 and Frag 7.3 after
Frag. 6.9. Notes that Frag. 7.2 is only a variation of Frag. 6.3" [N.]
Stannard Jerry, "Parmenidean logic," Philosophical Review 69: 526-533
(1960).
"Criticizes the ordinary interpretation of Parmenides' Frag. 5, and maintains
that every attempt to elucidate the doctrines of Parmenides must take into
account the logical structure on which they rest. Reviews various endeavors to
clarify the precise sense of those doctrines, noting that in each case their
sense depends on the meaning attached to what is meant by 'logic'. Observes in
its conclusion that "Parmenides was involved in a philosophical activity whose
center lay in the attempt to supply reasons for his catalogue of the
characteristics of Being" (p. 533)." [N.]
Stein Howard, "Comments on 'The thesis of Parmenides'," Review of
Metaphysics 22: 725-734 (1969).
About the paper by Charles Kahn (1969).
"I want to suggest that the conclusions of your beautiful paper on the Greek
verb "to be," which you apply in what seems to me a very convincing way to the
analysis of Parmenides, can be exploited further than you have done, with a gain
of coherence for the doctrine. I offer my suggestions diffidently: they are
rather speculative, and I have no scholarship in the language and little in the
period.
The principal question I want to raise is that of the interpretation of what you
call Parmenides' "wildly paradoxical conclusions about the impossibility of
plurality and change." An argument that leads to a truly paradoxical conclusion
is always open (if it escapes conviction for fallacy) to construction as a
reductio ad absurdum. And the (meager) biographical tradition represents
Parmenides - quite unlike Heraclitus, Heraclitus, for instance - as a reasonable
and even practically effective man, not at all a fanatic. It therefore seems
natural to ask, if he maintained a paradoxical doctrine, whether it did not
possess for him (and perhaps for his successors who took him seriously) an
interpretation that made some sense. Further, setting aside this not very
weighty prima facie argument, I think the search for plausible interpretations
is worthwhile in any case: for (1) to make a rational assessment of the
historical evidence one needs the widest possible survey of hypotheses to choose
among; (2) since conclusions in such matters are always uncertain, a list of
possibilities may retain a kind of permanent (not just heuristic) value, as the
best we can do; and (3) readings which are even dismissed as unsound on adequate
critical grounds may still be of interest, both for the understanding of
historical influence - I have in mind in the present case especially Parmenides'
influence on Plato-and for our own philosophical edification.
Now, accepting your explication of Parmenides' words, his conclusion about
change can be formulated as: "what is does not change"; or: "what can be known
does not change"; or: "truth does not change." But the third formulation isn't
paradoxical: I think it's what we ordinarily suppose about truth; it is
certainly what conventional logic presupposes; and when a sentence like "It is
now six seconds past three o'clock" is used as an example of "now true, now
false," it is this that seems a paradox - or a sophistry, based upon a continual
change of the sentence's meaning, rather than a change of truth-value of any one
meaning. To express this construction of Parmenides' thesis of unity and
immutability in the "formal mode," but somewhat picturesquely, we may imagine a
Book of the World, or Bible, in which everything true is written (Die Welt
ist alles, was der Fall ist): anyone, anywhere, at any time, may consult
this book; and what he finds will always be the same (there is no supplementary
year-book: all years are included in the main work).
Of course this notion becomes entangled in the whole cluster of traditional
questions about necessity or determinism versus freedom or accident or
spontaneity or emergence-strengthening Parmenides' claim to be the initiator of
metaphysics. But what I'm mainly concerned to emphasize is that his position on
these issues is not at all clearly more paradoxical than the contrary position.
I have argued elsewhere against the claim that the theory of relativity requires
a Parmenidean view of "changeless Being"; but it is undeniable that this
theory-and equally, for that matter, classical physics-lends itself naturally to
such a view. Quantum physics, on the other hand, seems in a certain sense to be
anti-Parmenidean (namely, to involve a notion of truth as essentially changing)
; and this is one of the most paradoxical aspects of the subject, which I think
is far from having been fully appreciated from a philosophical point of view."
These remarks are a revised verssion of comments made in correspondence
concerning an earlier redaction of Kahn's paper. It has seemed, on the whole,
least stilted to retain the informality of second person address. I wish to
record my gratitude to Kahn for suggesting that these comments be published with
his paper.
Stekeler-Weithofer Pirmin. The way of truth. Parmenides' seminal reflections
on logic, semantics and methodology of science. In Audiator vox sapientiae.
Studia grammatica. Edited by Féry Caroline and Sternefeld Wolfgang. Berlin:
Akademie Verlag 2001. pp. 450-472
The volume is a Festschrift for Arnim von Stechow
Stekeler-Weithofer Pirmin. Plato and Parmenides on ideal truth, invariant
meaning, and participation. In Ideal and culture of knowledge in Plato. Akten
der IV. Tagung der Karl-und-Gertrud-Abel-Stiftung vom 1-3 September 2000 in
Frankfurt. Edited by Detel Wolfgang, Becker Alexander, and Scholz Peter.
Stuttgart: F. Steiner 2003. pp. 115-132
Stemich Martina. Parmenides' Einübung in die Seinserkenntnis.
Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2008.
Stevens Annick. Posterité de l'être. Simplicius interprète de Parménide.
Bruxelles: Ousia 1990.
Tabe des matières: Introduction 5; Chapitre I: L'Alétheia 11; Chapitre II: La
Doxa 53; Conclusion 80; Appendice: Traduction 83; Bibliographie 143; Index des
Fragments de Parménide cités par Simplicius 147.
"La plupart des fragments que nous connaissons de Parménide nous sont parvenus
par l'intermédiaire de Simplicius, philosophe néoplatonicien du Vlème siècle de
notre ère, grâce aux multiples citations et références étayant son commentaire à
la Physique et au De Caelo d'Aristote. Or, ce commentateur ne
s'est pas contenté de citer, mais a apporté bien des explications aux apories
suscitées depuis vingt-cinq siècles par l'obscurité du poème parménidien. En
effet, le contexte dans lequel apparaissent les citations permet souvent de
situer plus exactement leur objet, et par là leur signification précise.
(...)
Par conséquent, mon travail suppose une connaissance préalable des doctrines
platonicienne et néoplatonicienne, particulièrement en ce qui concerne la notion
de l'Un dans son rapport avec l'être. Bien que j'aborde le problème au chapitre
1,B, cependant, j'évite de concentrer mon étude sur ces théories, au risque de
perdre l'essentiel. Je ne fournirai pas davantage un travail exhaustif sur la
pensée parménidienne, quoique, pour des raisons de clarté, j'étudierai et
comparerai, sur les points les plus controversés, les explications de plusieurs
interprètes modernes, en vue de proposer, quand cela est possible, mon propre
point de vue. A ce propos, je voudrais signaler qu'il existe deux études
récentes traitant spécifiquement de l'exégèse de Simplicius; il s'agit de
"Simplicius as a source for and an interpreter of Parmenides" de Bruce M. Perry,
et de "The Interpretation of Parmenides by the Neoplatonist Simplicius" de Karl
Bormann. On peut leur faire le reproche commun d'être davantage des paraphrases
que des tentatives d'explication, et de ne pas exploiter ce nouveau champ
herméneutique, cette richesse nouvelle d'interprétations possibles, que nous
ouvre la lecture de Simplicius pour celle de Parménide. Néanmoins, la
dissertation doctorale de Perry a le mérite d'exposer le commentaire de façon
très systématique, paragraphe par paragraphe, en l'accompagnant d'index, de
remarques philologiques, d'une bonne critique des sources et des manuscrits, et
de nombreuses références aux commentateurs antérieurs qui ont pu influencer
Simplicius. Quant à l'article de Bormann, s'il relève certains passages où le
néoplatonicien sort de l'aporie les interprétations traditionnelles sur quelques
conceptions obscures de Parménide, il n'en donne aucun commentaire ni ne cherche
à voir ce qui motive l'interprète, d'où s'inspire sa conception de l'Étant, et
dans quelle mesure elle déforme celle de l'Éléate lui-même.
(...)
J'espère avoir montré, par ces quelques observations, qu'une étude attentive de
Simplicius n'est ni superflue ni aisée.
Mon intention étant de suivre les questions posées comme essentielles par
Simplicius lui-même, je n'envisagerai que les fragments transmis grâce à lui,
laissant de côté une partie importante du poème. Le fait de suivre le
commentaire m'oblige également à voyager constamment d'une page à l'autre en
faisant bon nombre de comparaisons, d'anticipations et de rappels, ce dont le
lecteur voudra bien m'excuser, puisque Simplicius, suivant lui-même l'ordre de
oeuvre d'Aristote, et passant, selon le besoin, d'un Présocratique à l'autre,
présente une explication tout à fait disparate et en rien systématique.
Néanmoins, j'essaierai de structurer mon étude de la manière la plus claire
possible, envisageant, selon la méthode classique, chacune des deux parties du
poème, divisées elles-mêmes en questions principales.
Une traduction des passages de Simplicius concernant la pensée éléatique figure
en appendice; j'invite le lecteur à la consulter fréquemment, car elle sert de
support à tous mes développements.
Enfin, ce travail étant achevé en 1988, je n'ai pas tenu compte des études qui
ont paru à partir de cette date." (Introduction, pp. 5-9)
Stewart Donald, "Contradiction and the ways of Truth and Seeming,"
Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 14: 1-14 (1980).
"Studies the ways in which Parmenides and Heraclitus dealt with the issue of
contradiction, specifically Heraclitus' acceptance of the meaningfulness of
contradictory statements and Parmenides' categorical rejection of them.
Maintains that their approaches and solutions to this issue are fundamentally
flawed by their failure to develop a cogent ontology of individuation, that is,
a theory of forms and substances." [N.]
Stewart Robert Scott, "Say no more: the relationship between Parmenides'
Ways of Truth and seeming," Eidos.Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy
4: 167-186 (1985).
"Examines the relationship between Parmenides' Way of Truth and Way of Opinion,
as well as between the two fundamental concepts which underlie the two parts of
this treatise. Reviews various modern attempts to clarify their relationship,
and argues that they must inevitably fail as long as they ignore the literary
and historical frame of reference in which Parmenides composed his poem.
Contends that the needs and capabilities of his readers compelled Parmenides to
appeal to the medium of epic poetry, and that the literary conventions of that
medium explain why the Way of Opinion was added as a second part of the poem."
[N.]
Stokes Michael. One and Many in Presocratic philosophy. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press 1971.
Preface V-VI; Contents: I. Aristotle and the analysis of unity and plurality 1;
II. The Milesians 24; III. Xenophanes 66; IV. Heraclitus 86; V. Parmenides and
Melissus 109; VI. Empedocles 153; VII: Zeno of Elea 175; VIII. One-many problem
in Atomism 218; IX. Miscellaneous presocratic contexts 237; X. Conclusion 249;
Appendix: Parmenides B8.7-12 253; Abbreviations 258; Bibliography 259;
Notes 267; Index of passages 341; General index 347-355.
"The purposes of this book are explained in the first chapter, but a word is
necessary about its scope. By "Presocratic" is meant no narrow chronological
classification, for I have included Democritus, probably younger than Socrates
but a continuator of the Presocratic tradition. By "philosophy" is meant the
work of the "physicists," not excepting the denial of physics by the Eleatics. I
have excluded from my purview -- this work is long enough -- the writings of
Gorgias (with one short exception) and the other Sophists and have not discussed
the famous argument that one thing, by virtue of possessing many attributes, is
many things, an argument I am inclined to believe is sophistic in origin. I do
not imply thus any definition of "philosophy," which is here merely the most
convenient term to include both the Ionians and the Eleatics. The Pythagoreans
are treated only so far as they seem to me relevant to the central themes of the
book.
I do not claim to have read nearly all that other scholars have written on
Presocratic philosophy; even if the spirit were willing, the flesh would not
bear that burden. I hope (but hardly believe) that I have missed nothing of high
importance prior to the autumn of 1967, since when I have made only minor
additions to the bibliography. It may be observed that I have not mentioned in
my notes everything I have read; nor, unfortunately, can I make the proud claim
of A. E. Taylor ("with certain obvious exceptions") to have read from cover to
cover every work to which I refer. My bibliography is designed solely to
facilitate reference." (from the Preface)
"This work has two main themes: the precise place of the antithesis between
"one" and "many" in early Greek (especially Ionian and Eleatic) thought, and the
degree to which the early philosophers failed to recognize the distinctions
between different kinds of unity and plurality. Both lead naturally to the
examination of a number of fundamental doctrines and lines of argument, to see
if they raise such questions as arise from one thing either being or becoming
many and if they were affected by failure to perceive this particular kind of
distinction. It would not be surprising if such a deficiency were the
explanation of some mistakes of the Presocratics. It is not only the analytic
school of the twentieth century which has accused its philosophical predecessors
of ignoring important verbal distinctions; in this habit they were preceded by
Plato and especially by Aristotle." p. 1
Stough Charlotte, "Parmenides Way of Truth B8, 12-13," Phronesis.A
Journal for Ancient Philosophy 13: 91-107 (1968).
"Suggests that the text of Parmenides' Frag. 8, lines 12-13, should be left
intact, and that the idea manifested here, namely, that "thus it must Be
absolutefy, or not at all" (an idea which negates all sorts of becoming), is
expressed in a complete way and is logically well refated to the rest of the
fragment." [N.]
Swindler James Kenneth, "Parmenides' paradox. Negative reference and
negative existentials," Review of Metaphysics 33: 727-744 (1980).
"This paper presents a survey of the Russellian, Strawsonian, and Donnellanian
solutions to the paradox of referring to what does not exist, Parmenides'
paradox, and criticizes these for commitment to uninstantiated properties as the
referents of general terms. The paper then shows that this difficulty is avoided
by Plato's solution (in the Sophist), which rests on the definition of
nonbeing as difference. Plato's solution preserves the referential function of
subjects in negative existentials, it avoids uninstantiated properties, and it
avoids all equivocal concepts of being."
Tallis Raymond. The enduring significance of Parmenides. Unthinkable
thought. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group 2007.
Contents: Autobiographical Prelude IX; Preface: The once and future philosopher
XII-XVI; Chapter 1. The strange dawn of Western thought 1; Chapter 2. The
existence of What-Is-Not 27; Chapter 3. Propositional awareness encounters
itself 50; Chapter 4. Why Parmenides happened 88; Chapter 5. Parmenides'
footnotes: Plato and Aristotle 130; Chapter 6. Parmenides today 158; Works cited
189; Notes 195; Index 230-240.
"In Chapter 2, I shall examine Parmenides' central claim - that what-is-not is
not - and discuss how what-is-not comes to have such a pervasive presence in the
human world. The key to this, I shall argue, is possibility - which may or may
not be actualized, as a result of which what-is exists explicitly and
corresponds to 'truth', and what-is-not can be individuated and be an explicit
falsehood. Chapter 3 looks further into the origin of negation and possibility,
finding it in the Propositional Awareness (knowledge, thought and discourse)
that characterizes distinctively human consciousness. Parmenides' poem, I shall
argue, is the first fully fledged encounter of Propositional Awareness with
itself. Chapter 4 examines in what sense Parmenides was unique among the
Presocratic thinkers and then why he and, indeed, Presocratic thought arose when
they did. It is obvious that philosophy must have had non-philosophical origins.
I try to dig deeper than the usual explanations and in doing so examine many
factors - politics, trade, exile, the alphabet, different linguistic codes -
that made seventh-century Greeks conscious of their consciousness in a way that
had no precedent in the hundreds of thousands of years of human consciousness
prior to this. Parmenides may be seen as the resultant of the factors that led
to Presocratic thought plus his reaction to his predecessors. Chapter 5 examines
the most important response to Parmenides - Plato's Parmenides - which did more
than any other post-Parmenidean event to amplify Parmenides' influence kind, at
the same time, to conceal him behind the Platonic ideas he is supposed to have
provoked. I examine not only Plato's response to Parmenides but also Aristotle's
response to Plato.
In the final chapter, I look at the possible meaning that Parmenides might have
today. His present relevance resides in the fact that we may have reached the
end of the cognitive road upon which he, pre-eminent amongst the early Greek
philosophers, set mankind. Parmenides dismissed ordinary wakefulness as if it
were a kind of sleep, in the hope of goading us to another kind of wakefulness.
While the present book cannot match that ambition, I would very much hope that,
by returning to the philosophical and historical hinterland of Parmenides'
cataclysmic idea, I might start the process by which we return to the place from
which Parmenides set out and journey in another direction in a world
unimaginably different from his." pp. 25-26
Tarán Leonardo. Parmenides. Princeton: Princeton University Press
1965.
A text with translation, commentary and critical essays.
Contents: Foreword VII; List of bibliographical abbreviations X-XIV; Part I:
Parmenides' life 1; Fragments I-XIX: Text, translations, and commentary 7; Part
II: Critical essays 173; Chapter One: Parmenides' concept of Being 175; Chapter
Two: Aletheia and Doxa 202; Chapter Three: The world of appearance
described in the Doxa 231; Chapter Four: Parmenides in the ancient
philosophical tradition 269; Appendix I 296; Appendix II 299; Index 303-314.
"Parmenides' doctrine represents a turning-point in Greek philosophy, one that
can truly be said to determine the course of Greek thought until the time of
Aristotle. Not only Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists but also Plato and
Aristotle tried to answer the dilemma put forward by Parmenides, namely, that
since any difference from Being is absolute non-Being, and as such unthinkable,
no account of the world of difference and change can be valid. But this doctrine
not only invalidates any explanation of the sensible world, it asserts that this
world insofar as it is different from Being is non-existent. Because it seems of
fundamental importance for the understanding of Greek philosophy to determine
exactly what Parmenides thought, I decided to study all available evidence about
his work. My decision was based on the conviction that only such a study can be
of value today, for Parmenides' philosophy is one in which all is in all
and any interpretation of part of it risks, by not taking into consideration
other aspects of his thought, being contradicted by the results of another
partial study.
I have devoted the first part of the book to a line by line commentary on the
fragments. I have edited the text only to facilitate reference and to complete
in part the critical apparatus given by Diels-Kranz. I have made use of the best
available editions of the ancient authors who quote Parmenides' text. A fresh
study of the manuscripts of Simplicius' commentaries to Aristotle's Physics
and De Caelo may still add to our knowledge, but I am convinced that even
such a study would not drastically change the status of the text of Parmenides.
The variant readings given in the critical apparatus and sometimes in the
commentary are selective and are especially meant to illustrate the places where
a variant reading may be of importance for the interpretation of the text.
The translation has no pretension to literary value and has been added as a
complement to the commentary, to reduce as much as possible the number of
ambiguities in the construction of the Greek. Each fragment is followed by its
commentary, but in a few places discussion of the text is postponed till the
second part of the book to preserve the unity of the first three chapters. These
chapters deal with more general aspects of Parmenides' thought: his notion of
Being, the relation of Aletheia to Doxa, and the content of the
second part of the poem. The fourth chapter attempts to determine what the
ancients took Parmenides' philosophy to be and what value this testimony has for
the historical reconstruction of Parmenides' thought." (From the Foreword)
Tarán Leonardo, "Proclus In Parm. 1152.33 (Cousin) and Parmenides 28
B 3 (Diels-Kranz)," Classical Philology 62: 194-195 (1967).
Reprinted in L. Tarán - Collected papers (1962-1999) - Leiden, Brill,
2001, pp. 623-624.
"Takes issue with the objection raised by J. Mansfeld (Die Offenbarung des
Parmenides, Assen, 1964, pp. 69, 73, and 79ff.) concerning the failure in
the Diels-Kranz edition of the fragments of the Presocratics to mention Proclus
In Parm 1152.33 as a source for Parmenides' Frag. 3. Suggests that Proclus'
passage should be viewed more as a paraphrase of parts of Parmenides' Frag. 8
rather than as an imperfect quotation of Frag. 3." [N.]
Tarán Leonardo, "Concerning a new interpretation of Parmenides," Gnomon
49: 651-666 (1977).
Critical review of A. P. D. Mourelatos - The route of Parmenides (1970).
Reprinted in: L. Tarán - Collected papers (1962-1999) - Leiden, Brill, 2001, pp.
171-192.
Tarán Leonardo, "Perpetual duration and atemporal eternity in Parmenides and
Plato," Monist 62: 43-53 (1979).
Reprinted in L. Tarán - Collected papers (1962-1999) - Leiden, Brill,
2001, pp.204-217.
"The purpose of this paper is less ambitious than its title might suggest, since
it does not deal with everything that Plato has said on time and on eternity.
Rather, it attempts to clarify some issues which have arisen in the controversy
as to whether Parmenides or Plato was the first Western philosopher to grasp the
notion of atemporal eternity. It is particularly concerned with some
publications on the subject that have appeared within the last twelve years or
so. G.E.L. Owen, in a paper published in this journal, has defended his earlier
interpretation that Parmenides discovered the notion of atemporal eternity. (1)
J. Whittaker for his part has contended that both Parmenides and Plato failed to
grasp it, and would ascribe its discovery to some later thinker. (2) Yet another
scholar, G. Reale, (3) believes that there is no essential difference between
the position of Parmenides as reconstructed by Owen and others and that of
Melissus. For Reale maintains that Melissus' formula "it is and always was and
always will be" does not exclude atemporality, that it means the same thing as
the alleged tenseless "is" predicated of Parmenicles' Being.
Most scholars, however, do agree -- and rightly so, I believe -- that in the
Timaeus Plato has clearly grasped the notion of atemporal eternity. It is
therefore best to begin the discussion with him, since it will then become
apparent what an ancient philosopher meant by atemporal eternity and by the
tenseless "is" that expresses it." pp. 43-44
(1) "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present," The Monist 50 (1966), pp.
317-40. For references to earlier scholars who have defended this interpretation
cf. my Parmenides (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965), p. 175, n. 1.
(2) "The 'Eternity' of the Platonic Forms," Phronesis 13, (1968), 131-44 and
God Time Being (Oslo 1970, Symbolae Osloenses. Fasc. Supplet. 23.
(3) Melisso. Testimonianze e frammenti (Firenze: La Nuova Italia Editrice,
1970), PP. 45-59, esp. 56-57 and 58-59.
(4) Cf. Melissus 30 B 2. The fragments of the presocratics are cited from H.
Diels-W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin: Weidmannsche
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1951-52).
Tarrant Harold, "The conclusion of Parmenides' poem," Apeiron.A Journal
for Ancient Philosophy and Science 17: 73-84 (1983).
"The paper explores the possibility that Parmenides concluded his Poem with a
final coda after B19, perhaps including B4, B16, and Cornford's fragment, all of
which relate being to appearances. Doubts are cast on the authenticity of
B1.31-32 and B5, and on the text at B8.54. This enables a new interpretation of
the "doxa" to be given."
Tegtmeier Erwin, "Meixner über Parmenides (Zu Uwe Meixner: Parmenides und
die Logik der Existenz) "Grazer Philosophische Studien" 47, (1994)," Grazer
Philosophische Studien 51: 253-257 (1996).
"Meixner argues that Parmenides' refutation of becoming is logically defective,
that the term "being" occurs in two senses in his inference, synonymously with
"actual" and in a wider sense. This interpretation is rejected. In addition, it
is pointed out that Meixner's concepts of actuality and potentiality are not
relevant referring to facts rather than to things. Finally, Meixner's disproof
of what he calls "actualism" is refuted. "
Tegtmeier Erwin. Zeit und Existenz: parmenideische Meditationen.
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1997.
Tegtmeier Erwin, "Parmenides' problem of becoming and its solution,"
Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 2: 51-65 (1999).
Thanassas Panagiotis, "How many Doxai are there in Parmenides?,"
Rhizai.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 3: 199-218 (2006).
"Against the traditional interpretation of Doxa as intrinsically and
thoroughly deceiving and untrustworthy, the present essay examines the passages
which follow the self-characterization of the goddess' speech as 'deceitful'.
The traits of an extensive cosmogony and cosmology open up the possibility for
discerning (at least) two aspects of Doxa: first, a presentation of mortal
erroneous opinions, but then also their correction within the framework of the
'appropriate world-arrangement' presented by the goddess."
Thanassas Panagiotis. Parmenides, cosmos, and being: a philosophical
interpretation. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 2008.
Contents: Acknowledgments 6; 1. The Poem and its legacy 9; 2. The Heart of Truth
23; 3. Esti, Being and Thinking 31; 4. The signs of Being 43; 5. Doxa:
mixture vs. partition 61; 6. Aletheia and Doxa: the human and the
divine 77; Appendix: translation of the Fragments 89; Selected bibliography 99:
Index of names 107; Index topics 109.
Thom Paul, "A Lesniewskian reading of ancient ontology: Parmenides to
Democritus," History and Philosophy of Logic 7: 155-166 (1986).
"Parmenides formulated a formal ontology, to which various additions and
alternatives were proposed by Melissus, Gorgias, Leucippus and Democritus. These
systems are here interpreted as modifications of a minimal Lesniewskian
ontology."
Thom Paul, "The principle of non-contradiction in early Greek philosophy,"
Apeiron.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 32: 153-170 (1999).
Thom Paul. On the pervasiveness of Being. In Presocratic philosophy.
Essays in honour of Alexander Mourelatos. Edited by Caston Victor and Graham
Daniel W. Aldershot: Ashgate 2002. pp. 293-301
"The pervasiveness of being is the thesis that everything is. Parmenides
accepted this thesis (using the verb 'is' in a special sense). By contrast,
Gorgias maintained that nothing is. Plato (in the
Sophist and the Parmenides) argued that while in a certain sense everything is,
in another sense everything is-not, so that both Being and Not-being are
pervasive. Aristotle argued, in contradistinction to all of the above, that
neither Being nor Not-being is pervasive: some things are and some things are
not."
Traglia Antonio. Per la storia dei termini onoma e rhema e sul
valore di onoma, logos ed epos in Eraclito e in Parmenide. In
Contributi dell'Istituto di Storia della Filosofia dell'Università di Bari.
Trani: Vecchi & C. Editori 1955. pp. 147-161
Tugendhat Ernst. Das Sein und das Nichts. In Durchblicke. Festschrift für
Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburstag. Frankfurt: Klostermann 1970. pp. 132-161
Reprinted in: E. Tugendhat - Philosophische Aufsätze - Frankfurt,
Suhrkamp, 1992 pp. 36-66.
Untersteiner Mario, "L'essere di Parmenide è oúlon non hen,"
Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia 10: 5-23 (1955).
Reprinted as first chapter of: M. Untersteiner - Parmenide. Testimonianze e
frammenti - Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1958.
Verdenius Willem Jacob. Parmenides. Some comments on his Poem.
Groningen: J. B. Wolters 1942.
Reprinted: Amsterdam, A. M. Hakkert, 1964.
Contents: Preface (to the reprint) III-IV; Introduction 1; Chapter I. The
doctrine of knowing 5; Chapter II. The doctrine of being 31; Chapter I. The
doctrine of opinion 45; Appendices 64; Bibliography 79; English index 81; Greek
index 82; Index of quotations 83-88.
"Expounding an ancient philosophy is only possible with the aid of modern
notions, which have a more limited sense than the material to which they are to
be applied. Hence the difficulty of ascertaining the differences between ancient
and modern abstractions and the danger of misconceiving an idea through
attaching a too specific meaning to one or other particular expression. It will
now be understood how in the course of time Parmenides has come to be classed
with the most divergent philosophical systems. An attempt might be made to
classify and analyse all these various interpretations. This would, however, not
be the most expedient way to arrive at the real meaning of the poem. It stands
to reason that our conclusions should be constantly reviewed and tested in the
light of current opinion, but the more our considerations are bound up with the
criticism of other interpreters, the greater will be the difficulty in evolving
a coherent system of interpretation.
So I will attempt to follow a more positive method by considering in detail
three fundamental problems of Parmenides' philosophy, viz. 'Knowing', 'Being',
and 'Opinion'. If it proves to be possible to arrive at definite conclusions in
this respect, the road will probably be clear for a better understanding of the
thoughts associated with these principles.
With regard to the method adopted in my interpretation I may conclude with the
following remark. I have pointed out already that Parmenides stands out from his
predecessors by the application of a deductive method and the building up of a
coherent argument. The methodical way of reasoning characterizes his work so
much that even in ancient times he was classed by some critics among the
dialecticians. In fact, his syllogisms, the distinction made between the three
'ways of inquiring', and also his way of putting questions foreshadow
dialectical methods. This is not surprising since the whole trend of his thought
aims at valid arguments, cogent conclusions, and complete evidence'. It seems
advisable, then, to give more attention to the logical form in which Parmenides
exposes his views than has been done hitherto. When the goddess of Truth
counsels him not to trust to the senses but to judge by reasoning, we might
accept her words as a suggestion to base our interpretation on the logical
context of the argument in accordance with Parmenides' own intention.
It may be objected that a criterium for such a logical context is hard to find
since in a pre-Aristotelian philosopher we cannot expect a method of reasoning
which may be formulated in syllogisms. From the logical point of view
Parmenides' argument undeniably does not always comply with scientific
standards, but this does not imply that the form of the syllogism is not
applicable to his thought. This form is not an invention of Aristotle kept alive
by convention, but it is at the root of all reasoning. Parmenides may not have
been aware of the syllogistic form as a general mode of arguing, but he uses it,
it may be unconsciously and not always accurately, yet, generally speaking,
'guided by truth itself'.
I have undertaken the following inquiries in the belief that such a 'truth'
exists, and that the principles of logic are no mere arbitrary grammatical
phenomena as moderns would have
us believe, but the universal foundation which underlies all science, including
the science of interpretation." pp. 3-4 (notes omitted).
Verdenius Willem Jacob, "Der Logosbegriff bei Heraklit und Parmenides [First
part]," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 11: 81-98 (1966).
Verdenius Willem Jacob, "Der Logosbegriff bei Heraklit und Parmenides
[Second part]," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 12: 99-117
(1967).
Vick George R., "Heidegger's linguistic rehabilitation of Parmenides'
'Being'," American Philosophical Quarterly 8: 139-150 (1971).
Reprinted in: Michael Murray (ed.) - Heidegger and modern philosophy -
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1978 pp. 204-221.
"The strategy of Heidegger's complex semantic and etymological arguments for the
meaningfulness of the word 'being' is unknown to the great majority of
philosophers in Britain and America - and indeed, virtually unnoted even within
the Phenomenological-Existential School. Also, the fact that he has corrected
what is ordinarily taken to be an essential part of Parmenides' theory of being
has not been pointed out (even by Heidegger). Nor has anyone noted the way in
which Heidegger's correction makes Parmenides' theory more defensible. In this
essay, Heidegger's strategy is set forth and explained; his defenses are related
to the Hegelian, empiricist, and Eussellian attacks on 'Being'; and the way in
which his correction of Parmenides' theory strengthens its claim to being true,
is shown."
Villani Arnaud, "La tenue ontologique dans le Poème de Parménide," Revue
de Métaphysique et de Morale 93: 291-315 (1988).
Viola Coloman, "Á propos d'un fragment du Poème de Parménide cité par
Clément d'Alexandrie (V Stromate c. IX, 59, 6)," Bulletin de la
Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale 26: 90-92
(1984).
"Les Fragmente der Vorsokratiker Griechisch und Deutsch édités par H.
Diels (réédités en 1934 par W. Franz) omettent une référence incluse dans le V
Stromate de Clément d'Alexandrie (écrivant entre 193 et 211) concernant un
fragment du Poème de Parménide. Cette référence, que rapportera
Simplicius quatre siècles plus tard, comporte des variantes importantes par
rapport au texte transmis par Simplicius."
Viola Coloman. Aux origines de la gnoséologie: réflexion sur le sens dur fr.
IV du Poème de Parménide. In Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes
d'interprétation. Edited by Aubenque Pierre. Paris: Vrin 1987. pp. 69-101
"Le fr. IV du Poème de Parménide est sans aucun doute un des fragments les plus
difficiles à interpréter: certains commentateurs sont allés jusqu'à mettre en
doute son intelligibilité. (...)
La solution ne consistera pas nécessairement en une option pure et simple pour
l'une des hypothèses en excluant d'une manière absolue l'autre. Les difficultés
du fragment ont amené certains à proposer des corrections du texte en supposant
soit que Clément d'Alexandrie s'était trompé en le transcrivant soit que le
texte de Clément lui-même nous est parvenu sous une forme corrompue. Ces
problèmes grammaticaux et textuels difficiles à résoudre doivent inspirer une
grande prudence en ce qui concerne l'interprétation du fragment. Ces difficultés
combinées aux difficultés d'une méthodologie en général - dont un Hölscher (2) a
déjà fait état -- mettent à une sérieuse épreuve quiconque se promettrait de
trouver la solution idéale du fragment.
Les cadres de cet essai ne rendent pas possible l'examen même superficiel de
tous les problèmes qui ont été déjà soulevés au sujet de ce fragment. Je propose
avant tout d'examiner le contexte originel dans les Stromates de Clément
d'Alexandrie qui nous ont conservé le fragment pour y chercher et trouver
éventuellement la solution de certains problèmes inhérents au fragment. D'autre
part, pour éclaircir davantage le sens des termes, nous allons faire appel à la
philologie comparée ce qui nous permettra d'esquisser quelques principes
d'interprétation qui, à notre avis, devraient guider toute recherche concernant
le sens du fragment." pp. 69-70 (notes omises)
(2) Cf. U. Hölscher, Anfângliches Fragen. Studien zur frühen griechischen
Philosophie, Göttingen, p.90.
Vlastos Gregory, "Parmenides' theory of knowledge," Transactions and
Proceedings of the American Philological Association 77: 66-77 (1946).
Reprinted in: G. Vlastos - Studies in Greek Philosophy, Volume I: The
Presocratics - Edited by Baneil W. Graham - Princeton, Princetion University
Press, 1995, pp. 153-163.
"Parmenides' frag. 16 has been taken for a general statement of his theory of
knowledge. I argue that it is no more than his doctrine of sense-perception,
since it views thought as a passive record of the "much-wandering" ratio of
light to darkness in the frame. Theophrastus' report that Parmenides explains
"better and purer" thinking by the preponderance of light must refer to the
active phases of thought, memory and judgment. When these are perfect the ratio
of light to darkness must be one to zero, and the knowledge of Being must
represent a state of unmixed light." p. 66
White Harvey. What is what-is? A study of Parmenides' poem. New York:
Peter Lang 2005.
Wiesner Jürgen, "Die Negation der Entstehung des Seienden. Studien zu
Parmenides B 8,5 - 21," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 52: 1-34
(1970).
Wiesner Jürgen. Überlegungen zu Parmenides, fr. VIII, 34. In Études sur
Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation. Edited by Aubenque Pierre.
Paris: Vrin 1987. pp. 170-191
"Sur le lien dans le Fr. 8 entre "nous " et "eon", les raisons
pour lesquelles l'être est accessible à la cognition."
Wiesner Jürgen. Parmenides. Der Beginn der Aletheia. Untersuchungen zu B2
- B3 - B6. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1996.
Inhaltsverzeichnis: Vorwort V-VI; Einleitung 1; 1, Kapitel: Antithesen 4; 2.
Kapitel: Argumentation 84; Text und Übersetzung B2 - 8,2 251; Bibliographie 255;
Indizes 262-280
Woodbury Leonard, "Parmenides on names," Harvard Studies in Classical
Philology: 145-160 (1958).
Reprinted in: J. P. Anton and George L. Kustas (eds.) - Essays in Ancient
Greek philosophy (Volume One) - Albany, State University of New York Press,
1972, pp. 145-162.
Woodbury Leonard, "Parmenides on naming by mortal men: fr. B8:53-56,"
Ancient Philosophy 6: 1-13 (1986).
Wyatt William F., "The root of Parmenides," Harvard Studies in Classical
Philology 94: 113-120 (1992).
Young Tyler, "Perceiving Parmenides: a reading of Parmenides of Elea's
philosophy by way of the Proem," Dionysius 24: 21-44 (2006).
Zeller Eduard and Mondolfo Rodolfo. La filosofia dei Greci nel suo
sviluppo storico. Parte I. I Presocratici. Volume III. Eleati. Edited by
Reale Giovanni. Firenze: La Nuova Italia 1967.
Updated translation of the classical work by E. Zeller (1856).
The chapter on Parmenides (pp. 165-335) contains a thorough examination by
Giovanni Reale of the critical literature up to 1965.
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