Plato's Cratylus and the problem of the "correctness of names"
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Lafrance Yves, "Les multiples lectures du Poème de Parménide," Dialogue
32: 117-127 (1993).
"Following the publication of Études sur Parmenide, (edited by Pierre
Aubenque), this study is concerned with the analytical interpretation of the
Parmenides' Poem by G. E. L. Owen as well as the conventional interpretation by
P. Aubenque. In both cases, the author shows that there is a failure in the
historical reconstruction of the context of the Poem. Theses interpreters
haven't forgotten the cosmological context of the Presocratic thought. A longer
version of this study was published in Spanish in the review Methexis (5,
1992)."
Lafrance Yves, "Le sujet du Poème de Parménide: l'être ou l'univers?,"
Elenchos: 265-308 (1999).
Lesher James H., "Parmenides' critique of thinking: the poludêris
elenchos of fragment 7," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2: 1-30
(1984).
"Examines the content of Parmenides' Frag. 7, and concludes that it offers an
interpretation of the concept of elenchos in a new philosophical sense.
Subjects to a detailed analysis the meanings attached to elenchos in
various sources (e.g., Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, Herodotus, Plato). and focuses on
the meaning of this term in Parmenides' poem. Suggests that the Parmenidean
elenchos should be understood as "a testing of the available options for
enquiry" (p. 17): "At the heart of Parmenides' account of thinking was an
elenchos or testing of the various ways in which mortals might think of what
exists. By adapting an older idea of a testing of thing's or person's qualities
to a philosophical use, by conducting a serial review of the merits of each of
the ways available for thinking, he succeeded in mounting a defense of his
philosophy, even in the face of opposition and well-entrenched common sense" (p.
30). Parmenides expresses a view in favor of the capabilities for independent
thought among human beings." [N.]
Lesher James H., "The significance of kata pant' a<s>tê in
Parmenides fr. 1.3," Ancient Philosophy 14: 1-20 (1994).
"I argue that the phrase kata pant' a<s>tê ('down all cities') can be
defended as an emendation to the text of Parmenides' Fr 1. After criticizing
recent accounts given by Coxon and Renehan I defend the appositeness of the
phrase in connection with traditional references to the powers of inspiration
invoked by the Greek lyric poet. After demonstrating how virtually every feature
in the first five lines of Fr 1 contributes to this objective I argue that
Parmenides could have consistently invoked the muses while embracing a view of
knowledge as grounded in well- reasoned argument."
Lesher James H. Parmenidean Elenchos. In Does Socrates have a
method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato's Dialogues and beyond. Edited by
Scott Gary Alan. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 2002. pp.
19-35
This paper is a revised version of [Lesher 1984]
"The present account differs from the 1984 paper in (1) omitting any
discussion of the novelty of Parmenides' view of thought as subject to the
control of the individual and (2) offering a different analysis of the structure
of Parmenides' main argument. My view of the development of the meaning of
elenchos from Homer to the fourth century and its meaning in Parmenides'
poem remains unchanged. In the sixteen years since to oxford Studies
paper appeared, the has been relatively little discussion of the meaning of
elenchos in Parmenides' proem (and a great deal about the Socratic
elenchus), but the view of elenchos as a "test" or "examination" has been
endorsed in several accounts: Coxon (1986)David J. Furley, Cosmic problems:
essays in Geek and Roman philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1989) and Patricia Curd (1998)."
Leszl Walter, "Un approccio 'epistemologico' all'ontologia parmenidea,"
Parola del Passato 43: 281-311 (1988).
"Maintains that an epistemological approach to Parmenides' metaphysics can yield
more meaningful results than a strictly semantical interpretation of the
language of his poem. Explores various themes related to Parmenides' ontology:
the relationship between language, thought, and reality; the eternity of Being;
and the epistemological conditions which render knowledge true and genuine."
[N.]
Lewis Frank A., "Parmenides' modal fallacy," Phronesis.A Journal for
Ancient Philosophy 54: 1-8 (2009).
"In his great poem, Parmenides uses an argument by elimination to select the
correct "way of inquiry" from a pool of two, the ways of is and of is not,
joined later by a third, "mixed" way of is and is not. Parmenides' first two
ways are soon given modal upgrades - is becomes cannot not be, and is not
becomes necessarily is not (B2, 3-6) - and these are no longer contradictories
of one another. And is the common view right, that Parmenides rejects the
"mixed" way because it is a contradiction? I argue that the modal upgrades are
the product of an illicit modal shift. This same shift, built into two Exclusion
Arguments, gives Parmenides a novel argument to show that the "mixed" way fails.
Given the independent failure of the way of is not, Parmenides' argument by
elimination is complete."
Loenen Johannes Hubertus. Parmenides, Melissus, Gorgias. A
reinterpretation of eleatic philosophy. Assen: Van Gorcum 1959.
Reprinted New York, Humanities Press, 1961.
"Presents a comprehensive review of Eleatic philosophy as developed by
Parmenides and Melissus, and as interpreted by Gorgias. identifies the ideas
which are common in Parmenides' and Melissus' philosophical positions, as well
as the themes (which are deemed substantial) that separate them. Observes that
Gorgias' attack of Eleatic ideas must be understood from the point of view given
to those ideas by Melissus. Speaks of Eleatic philosophy as a metaphysics of
absolute reality, in which dualism (rather than monism) and epistemological
rationalism are the fundamental ideas. Observes that Parmenides "must not be
looked upon as the father either of materialism or of idealism, but that he may
indeed be considered the first representative of dualistic metaphysics and a
realistic form of epistemological realism" (p. 5)." [N.]
Long Anthony Arthur, "The principles of Parmenides' cosmogony,"
Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 8: 90-107 (1963).
Reprinted in: D. J. Furley and R. E. Allen (eds.) - Studies in Presocratic
philosophy. Vol. II: The Eleatic and the Pluralists - London,
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975, pp. 82-101.
"The significance claimed by Parmenides for the cosmogony which forms the second
half of his poem continues to be highly controversial. The interpretations
offered by Owen and Chalmers, to name two recent criticisms, are so widely
divergent that one might despair of arriving at any measure of agreement. (2)
But since the significance of The Way of Truth must itself remain in some doubt
until the status of the cosmogony is determined, further examinations of the
evidence are justified. The purpose of this article is to discuss the passages
throughout the poem which are concerned with mortal beliefs, and to suggest an
interpretation of the fundamental lines 50-61 of B 8. (3) In this way the
function of the cosmogony may, I believe, become clearer.
Of the solutions to the problem suggested by ancient and modern critics, four
main trends can be discerned:
I. The cosmogony is not Parmenides' own but a systematized account of
contemporary beliefs.
2. The cosmogony is an extension of The Way of Truth.
3. The cosmogony has relative validity as a second-best explanation of the
world.
4. Parmenides claims no truth for the cosmogony.
The first view, canvassed by Zeller and modified by Burnet to a 'sketch of
contemporary Pythagorean cosmology', finds few adherents among modern scholars.
(4) It has never been explained, on this interpretation, why the goddess should
be made to expound in detail a critique of fallacious theories. Bowra (5) has
taught us to see the poem as demonstrably apocalyptic, and Parmenides
needed no goddess's patronage to set forth his contemporaries' cosmological
systems. Moreover, there is nothing in the later part of the poem which can be
explicitly attributed to any attested philosopher. The doxographers in general,
from Aristotle, assign the cosmogony to Parmenides himself.
The second and third views above have received much support. It is argued,
following Aristotle, (6) that Parmenides cannot have countenanced absolute
denial of phenomena. Such an explanation, however, fails entirely to account for
the later activity of the Eleatics, and is quite at variance with the evidence
of the poem. It belittles the achievement of Parmenides, and fails to take into
account the evidence in favour of 4., even when this is equivocal. I shall argue
that the cosmogony gives a totally false picture of reality; that it is the
detailed exposition of the false way mentioned in The Way of Truth (B 6.4-9) and
promised by the goddess in the proem (B 1. 30-32); that it takes its starting
point from the premise of that false way, the admission of Not-being alongside
Being, not from the introduction of two opposites, Fire and Night; and finally,
that its function is entirely ancillary to the Way of Truth, in the sense of
offering the exemplar, par excellence, of all erroneous systems, as a criterion
for future measurement."
(2) G. E. L. Owen, 'Eleatic Questions', Classical Quarterly NS X (1960),
pp. 84-102, above, pp. 48-81; W. R. Chalmers, 'Parmenides and the Beliefs of
Mortals', Phronesis V (1960), pp. 5-22.
(3) All fragments of Parmenides are quoted from Diels-Kranz, Fragmente der
Vorsokratiker (Berlin 1951).
(4) J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (London 1930), p. 185.
(5) C. M. Bowra, 'The Proem of Parmenides', Classical Philology XXXII, 2
(1937), pp. 97-112.
(6) Cf. Aristotle, Met. A5 986 b 18.
Long Anthony Arthur, "Parmenides on thinking Being," Proceedings of the
Boston Area colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 12: 125-151 (1996).
Reprinted in: G. Reschnauer (ed.) - Frügriechisches Denken - Göttingen,
Vandenhoeck & Rprecht, 2005, pp. 227-251.
"This paper challenges the standard opinion that Parmenides posits being as
simply the object of veridical thought. Evidence from within and outside
Parmenides' fragments indicates his concern to endow being itself with mind or
thinking. His poem is an investigation of the subject as well as the object of
veridical thought. Parmenides argues that being and thinking are "identical," in
the sense that they are coextensive. Were he to withhold thinking from being
(which includes all that there is), thinking could not exist. Parmenides
situates thinking in a realm whence not-being is firmly excluded because it is
the same thing to think and to be."
Lowit Alexandre, "Le principe de la lecture heideggerienne de Parménide,"
Revue de Philosophie Ancienne 4: 163-210 (1986).
MacKenzie Mary Margaret, "Parmenides' dilemma," Phronesis.A Journal for
Ancient Philosophy 27: 1-12 (1982).
"Emphasizes the dialectical elements of Parmenides' poem, elements which
manifest the tension inherent in the necessity to having to choose either the
Way of Truth or the Way of Opinion. Observes that either alternative entails
tremendous philosophical difficulties which cannot be easily overcome: the Way
of Truth seems to deny the very reality of our human existence which is
unavoidably laden with contradictions and shortcomings, and the Way of Opinion
appears to destine us to be forever barred from grasping and understanding true
Being." [N.]
Malcolm John, "On avoiding the void," Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy 19: 75-94 (1991).
Several prominent scholars have maintained that a denial of empty space, or the
void, is crucial to Parmenides' rejection of plurality and locomotion.'
Plurality, for example, implies divisibility but there is no what is not
(or void) to separate one supposed portion of what is from another. Hence
what is is one. Locomotion, also, might well appear to need some (empty)
room for manoeuvre, but such is precluded by the proclaimed 'fullness' of
what is.
Recently, however, interpreters of Parmenides have not been convinced that an
appeal to the non-existence of a void plays a role in his denial of locomotion
and plurality. The void is in fact never explicitly mentioned in his poem. More
importantly, to introduce the void weakens Parmenides' position, for a plenum
may he regarded as permitting both locomotion and plurality -- a situation
adopted by his successors Empedocles and Anaxagoras. Moreover, at B 8. 22
Parmenides asserts that there cannot be any distinctions within what is
and this principle is strong enough to preclude any locomotion or
plurality. This renders an appeal to the absence of the void unnecessary as well
as insufficient.
Let me expand on this latter point with regard to both locomotion and plurality.
In so doing I shall accept certain assumptions which shall require (and receive)
subsequent identification and defence." pp. 75-76 (notes omitted)
Malcolm John, "Some cautionary remarks on the 'is'/'teaches' analogy,"
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 31: 281-296 (2006).
"Lesley Brown suggests that Parmenides and Plato were not guilty of an
oft-alleged existence/predication confusion since the relevant Greek verb, when
used as a copula, had a built-in existential connotation, just as the same use
of "teaches" can be understood both completely and incompletely. I challenge
this approach on the grounds that it implies that the ancient Greeks were in the
impossible position of not being able unproblematically to attribute properties
to subjects recognized not to exist. I attempt to show that the evidence Brown
presents for her thesis from Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle is inconclusive."
Maly Kenneth, "Parmenides: circle of disclosure, circle of possibility,"
Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien 1: 5-23 (1985).
"This essay attempts to present Heidegger's reading of Parmenides, focusing on
the lecture course of 1942-43, the lecture The end of philosophy and the task
of thinking (1966), and the Zahringen Seminar (1973). It shows (a)
Heidegger's dealing seriously with the texts of Greek philosophy, (b) his
grappling with the issue of metaphysics, (c) the new possibility for
philosophical thinking that his reading of the Greeks offers, and (d) his
engagement in the difficult task of dismantling the history of Western thought
(i.e., metaphysics) towards a new possibility for thinking. In dismantling the
philosophy of Parmenides, Heidegger's work takes Parmenides' text deeper than
the simplistic issue of "static being" over against "becoming"."
Manchester Peter B., "Parmenides and the need for eternity," Monist
62: 81-106 (1979).
"Analyzes the structure and content of Parmenides' Frag. 8, attempting thereby
to resolve the issue as to whether the Parmenidean metaphysics advanced in it
implies the concept of eternity as a non-durational or non-temporal reality, or
whether it allows for time as a component of eternity. Observes the difficulties
in resolving the issue, difficulties which arise in part from the defective
condition of the text. Advances a textual reinterpretation of the fragment's
opening lines in order to render the body of Parmenides' statements more
readable, and in order to shed light on his impact on the development of later
attempts to understand the nature of time." [N.]
Mansfeld Jaap. Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt.
Assen: Van Gorcum 1964.
"Mansfeld has given us one of the most penetrating and original discussions of
Parmenides' poem since Fränkel's Parmenidesstudien in 1930. The book
consists of four chapters, each one of which might stand alone as an independent
essay, but which together aim at a unified view of Parmenides' thought. Mansfeld
develops his interpretation with a wealth of detail, a careful, nearly complete,
and on the whole judicious discussion of other views, which makes his book at
once a commentary on the poem and a valuable survey of earlier scholarship.
Chapter I ('Die Vorgeschichte des dritten Wegs') is a brilliant study of
the literary and historical background of fragment 6, designed to clarify the
question whether or not Parmenides is referring to Heraclitus in his polemic
against ignorant mortals (...). Mansfeld's answer to this question is, I think,
the correct one: the evidence of fragment 6 and of the poem generally is
compatible with a reference to Heraclitus but does not require it
(pp. 41 and 204-208). The parallels are perfectly intelligible without the
assumption that Parmenides has Heraclitus in mind. Since there is no relevant
external evidence, we are faced with a question of historical fact which we have
no historical means of deciding. What we can say is that if Parmenides
was familiar with Heraclitus' work, he may have seen in it simply "die modernste
Formulierung der archaischen Bestimmungen des Menschen" (41), and thus made use
of Heraclitean terms in fr. 6 to characterize human folly as such.
Certainly fr. 6 does not refer uniquely or primarily to the folly of Heraclitus.
(...)
Chapter II ('Die Logik des Parmenides: Disjunktion und Implikation') is a
stimulating but on the whole unsatisfactory analysis of the argument in the
section on Truth. Mansfeld here attempts to identify Parmenides as the
originator of the Megaric-Stoic tradition of ancient propositional logic, in
contrast with the Aristotelian logic of terms. Mansfeld is certainly correct in
insisting upon the careful structure of Parmenides' argument and upon the
logical character of the fundamental krisis as an exclusive disjunction.
This disjunction, éstin mé ouk éstin, is in fact a compressed statement
of the law of contradiction and the law of excluded middle at once. But Mansfeld
is much less successful in his reconstruction of various syllogisms of the Stoic
type in fr. 2 (pp. 56-62). And in presenting Parmenides and Zeno as 'logicians'
he fails to distinguish between skill in constructing particular arguments,
which the two Eleatics exhibit to a remarkable degree, and the analysis of
forms of valid argument, which is the proper achievement of the logician and
of which there is really no evidence before Aristotle, except for a few remarks
in the Platonic dialogues. Mansfeld also fails to distinguish between
implication understood as a conditional proposition ('If p, then q')
and implication as entailment between propositions ('p. Therefore q').
(For Mansfeld's use of implication in the former sense, see e. g. pp. 100. 102 ;
for the latter, confusedly, pp. 59. 68. Thus the arrow, which symbolizes
inference to a conclusion on p. 59 is used to represent the propositional
connective 'if ... then. . on p. 108.)"
From: Charles H. Kahn - Review of the book in: Gnomon. Kritische Zeitschrift für
die Gesamte Klassische Altertumwissenschaft - 42, 1970, pp. 113-118
Mansfeld Jaap, "Hesiod and Parmenides in Nag Hammadi," Vigiliae
Christianae 35: 174-182 (1981).
Mansfeld Jaap. The rhetoric in the P<r>oem of Parmenides. In Filosofia,
politica, retorica. Intersezioni possibili. Edited by Bertelli Lucio and
Donini Pierluigi. Milano: Franco Angeli 1994. pp. 1-11
Mansfeld Jaap, "Parménide et Héraclite avaient-ils une théore de la
perception?," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 44: 326-346
(1999).
Mansfeld Jaap, "Minima Parmenidea," Mnemosyne 58: 554-560 (2005).
Critical and exegetical notes on Fragments B 1.22-3a, B 2.1-5, B 6.3, B 8.38-41
(DK).
Marsoner Agostino, "La struttura del Proemio di Parmenide," Annali
dell'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici 5: 127-181 (1978).
"Il fr. 1 di Parmenide, trascurato da Zeller, ma rimesso successivamente in luce
da ulteriori studi, appare meritevole di attenzione particolare in quanto sembra
racchiudere in forma metaforica l'enunciazione dei principi dottrinari del
sistema parmenideo. La corretta esegesi del frammento deve tuttavia scaturire da
un esame preliminare riguardante la struttura secondo la quale viene
allegoricamente espressa la concezione metafisica esposta nel prosieguo del
poema. Una prima analisi rivela una composizione 'ad anello' che abbraccia quasi
l'intero proemio." p. 127.
(...)
"A base della struttura del proemio è dunque posta una concezione triadica, che
scaturisce dalla dialettica della antitesi fondamentale tra essere e non essere.
Da un'indistinta molteplicità iniziale, simboleggiata nel primo anello dal
numero imprecisato delle cavalle, si passa, nel secondo anello, ad un primo
riconoscimento della natura dell'essere in quanto eterna extratemporalità. Il
terzo anello rappresenta la sistematica classificazione delle antitesi, metodo
che conduce ad una precisa definizione del non essere, tema del quarto anello.
Nel quinto anello si riconosce la suprema antitesi metafisica essere-non essere,
mediante la quale si giunge, nel centro, all'affermazione definitiva della
realtà assoluta dell'Essere, del quale sono predicabili soltanto talune
determinazioni." p. 179.
(Note omesse).
Martineau Emmanuel, "Le 'coeur' de l' alétheia," Revue de
Philosophie Ancienne 4: 33-86 (1986).
Mason Richard, "Parmenides and language," Ancient Philosophy 8:
149-166 (1988).
"Parmenides says very little about language. Yet what he says is important, both
in the interpretation of his philosophy and more widely. This paper will aim to
fit together a coherent understanding and to explain why his views have a wider
interest. Four themes will be considered: the nature and extent of his critique
of the use of language by mortals; his alleged position as a primordial
philosopher of reference; the status of the utterances he puts into the mouth of
his Goddess; and his apparent identification of speaking with existing or
being."
Matthen Mohan, "Greek ontology and the 'Is' of truth," Phronesis.A
Journal for Ancient Philosophy 28: 113-135 (1983).
Matthen Mohan, "A note on Parmenides' denial of past and future,"
Dialogue 25: 553-557 (1986).
"Parmenides bans non-being and construes non-being so widely that change, and
the past and future are banned too. This note complains about careless ways of
construing the scope of the Parmenidean conception of non-being." Reply to L.
Groarke's Parmenides' timeless universe
Mckirahan Richard. Philosophy before Socrates. An introduction with texts
and commentary. Indianapolis: Hackett 1994.
See Chapter 11 - Parmenides of Elea - pp. 151-178.
Mckirahan Richard. Signs and arguments in Parmenides B8. In The Oxford
handbook of Presocratic philosophy. Edited by Curd Patricia and Graham
Daniel W. New York: Oxford University Press 2008. pp. 189-229
"David Sedley recently complained (1) that despite the enormous amount of work
on Parmenides in the past generation, the details of Parmenides' arguments have
received insufficient attention. (2) It is universally recognized that
Parmenides' introduction of argument into philosophy was a move of paramount
importance. It is also recognized that the arguments of fragment B8 are closely
related. At the beginning of B8, Parmenides asserts that what-is (3) has several
attributes; he offers a series of proofs that what-is indeed has those
attributes. Some (4) hold that the proofs form a deductive chain in which the
conclusion of one argument or series of arguments forms a premise of the next.
Others (5) hold that the series of inferences is so tightly connected that their
conclusions are logically equivalent, a feature supposedly announced in B5: "For
me it is the same where I am to begin from: for that is where I will arrive back
again." In act, close study of the fragments reveals that neither claim is
correct. Here I offer a new translation of B8, lines 2-51, with an analysis of
the arguments, their structure, their success, and their importance.(6)
I begin with a caution. Many of Parmenides' arguments are hard to make out: even
on the best arrangement of the available sentences and clauses they are
incomplete. Since Parmenides lived before canons of deductive inference had been
formalized, he may not have thought that there is need to supply what we regard
as missing premises. The interpreter's job is not to aim for formal validity,
but to attempt a reconstruction of Parmenides' train of thought, showing how he
might have supposed that the conclusion follows from premises he gives. This is
a matter of sensitivity and sympathy as much as of logic, depending on how we
understand other arguments of his as well, and requires willingness to give him
the benefit of the doubt -- up to a certain point." p. 189
(1) Sedley, "Parmenides and Melissus," 113. Sedley's complaint applies to
antiquity as well.
(2) Jonathan Barnes is a notable exception to this tendency. I am indebted to
his analysis in Presocratic Philosophers, chaps. 9-11.
(3) So far as possible, I translate to eon by "what-is"; I avoid "being." The
expression denotes anything that is (see note 18 here).
(4) Notably Kirk & Raven 268
(5) Owen, "Eleatic Questions."
(6) In some places my discussion depends on interpretations of B2, B6, and B7
that are not presented here for want of space. I sketch my justification for
controversial views in the notes.
(18) Parmenides argues here that the second road of investigation, "is not,"
cannot be pursued, on the grounds that you cannot succeed in knowing or
declaring what-is-not. The minimal complete thought characteristic of the first
road is eon (or to eon) estin ("what-is is"), with "what-is" being
a blank subject with no definite reference: anything that is, whatever it may
turn out to be and however it may be appropriate to describe it or refer to it.
Likewise for the second road: the blank subject of ouk estin ("is not")
is to me eon (or mé eon) ("what-is-not"), and the minimal complete
thought characteristic of the second road is to me eon ouk estin
("what-is-not is not"). The argument is not a refutation of "is not" as such.
Nor is it a refutation of "what-is-not is not" in the sense of proving that that
claim or thought is false. Instead Parmenides undermines "what-is-not is not" as
a possible claim or thought. Since what-is-not cannot be known or declared, then
a fortiori no claim about what-is-not can be known or declared (for
instance, that it is not). Therefore, not even the theoretically minimum thought
or assertion about the second road is coherent; no one can manage to think (much
less know) it or declare it. On Owen's view ("Eleatic Questions"), the second
road is eliminated not at 2.7-8 but at 6.1-2, which establishes the subject of
"is" to be not the blank subject I am proposing but whatever can be spoken and
thought of. In my view, the second part of 6.1 (esti gar einai: "for it
is the case that it is," which Owen translates "for it is possible for it to
be") repeats the content of the first road (2.3), while the first part of 6.2 (meden
d' ouk estin: "but nothing is not," which Owen translates "but it is not
possible for nothing to be") repeats the content of the second road (2.5). with
the appropriate "minimal" subjects supplied. Given these premises, it follows
that it is false (and therefore not right) to think that what-is-not is or that
what-is is not, but true (right) to do what the first part of line 6.1 says: "it
is right both to say and to think that it [namely, the subject of "is"I is
what-is." The importance of 6.1-2 thus consists in the introduction of minimal
subjects for "is" and "is not" together with the associated truisms that what-is
is and what-is-not (namely, nothing) is not. This prepares the way for the
discussion of the first road in B8, exploring the nature of what-is.
Meijer Pieter Ane. Parmenides beyond the gates: the divine revelation on
being, thinking and the doxa. Amsterdam: Gieben 1997.
Contents: Part I: Being and Thinking; Chapter I. The relation of Being and
Thinking 3; Chapter II. Being and temporality 15; Chapter III. Being and
spatiality 29; Chapter IV. Being and Matter 44; Chapter V. Tensions of a spatial
and material Being and of Thinking within the identity of Being and Thinking 47;
Chapter IV. Fragment 4 of the identity of Being and Thinking 54; Appendix:
Parmenides and the previous history of the concept of Being 85; Part II. Being
and Logic; Chapter I. The logical circle:98; Chapter II. The subject of estin
114; Chapter III. The logical procedure again 123; Part III. Doxa and
Mortals; Chapter I. Ways and 'Doxa? 144; Chapter II. Scholarly views of the
'Doxa' 166; Chapter III. The basic error of fr. 8, 53,54 190; Chapter IV.
Negative qualifications of the Doxa 208; Chapter V. A plea for the existence of
the Doxa 217; Part IV. A panoramic survey of results 234; Bibliography 252-257;
Indices 258-274.
"In Part I of this book the problems which arise from the identification of
Being and thinking are examined. In Part II it is the issue of the relation of
logic and Being that comes to the fore. In Part III I attempt to catalogue and
assess the scholarly explanations given of the Doxa sofar in order to clarify
the problems and arrive at a view of my own. Many publications in this field are
lacking in confrontation with other already existing opinions. In presenting my
own views I confront the views of other scholars. Therefore, a panoramic survey
of my results may facilitate the reading of this book. This is the reason why I
added Part IV to provide a summary of my views and conclusions."
Meixner Uwe, "Parmenides und die Logik der Existenz," Grazer
Philosophische Studien 47: 59-75 (1994).
Merlan Philip, "Neues Licht auf Parmenides," Archiv für Geschichte der
Philosophie: 267-276 (1966).
"Comments on one of the inscriptions found at Velia, an inscription which
establishes a relationship between Parmenides and the cult of Apollo the Healer.
Discusses the text of Diogenes Laertius IX,22) in which the medical aspects of
Parmenides' philosophy appear to be underlined, and concludes that if the
healing or medical components of Parmenides' activities are kept in mind, it is
possible to cast a new light on his relationship with the Pythagoreans." [N.]
Messina Gaetano. Index Parmenideus. Auctore qui Parmenidis fragment
tradunt. Fontium conceptus. Index verborum. Genova: Bozzi Editore 1987.
Provides the Greek text of the Parmenidean fragments and testimonies (based on
the Diels-Kranz edition), an account of the sources, and an exhaustive textual
index.
Miller Mitchell H., "Parmenides and the disclosure of Being," Apeiron.A
Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 13: 12-35 (1979).
"The key to interpretation of Parmenides' "esti" ("... is") is recovery of its
specific context. This essay focuses on the imagery of the Proem, especially as
its conceptual content is suggested by parallels with the closing doxa
fragments, in order to show how Parmenides discovers and discloses "being". In
sum, as "nothing" ("meden") lies hidden as the grounding contrary for the
contraries asserted in traditional dualism, so the "being" of the latter lies
hidden as the grounding contrary for the contraries asserted in traditional
dualism, so the "being" of the latter lies hidden as the grounding contrary for
"nothing." On this view, Parmenides' final judgment of dualism is much more
complex than is usually thought: by thinking to its ground, he reveals both its
partial truth and ultimate limitation together."
Miller Mitchell H., "Ambiguity and transport: reflections on the Proem to
Parmenides' Poem," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 30: 1-47 (2006).
"In arguably the seminal thought of the history of philosophy, Parmenides
brings being into focus for philosophical reflection. He does this by
reversing the orders of the conspicuous and the inconspicuous in fr. 2, dropping
the subject and perhaps the predicate in order to give us the bare "is" and "is
not" of the two ways of inquiry. But this ellipsis is itself conspicuous,
challenging us to retrieve the context that the "is" transcends. And in the
proem's figures of the traveler's arrival at and passage through "the gates of
the ways of night and day," Parmenides also gives us the resources for this
retrieval. In this essay Miller explores (1) the Hesiodic and Anaximandran
resonances of Parmenides' image of the gateway, "much-punishing justice," and
the "yawning chasm" made by the gates' opening, (2) the correlation of his
depiction of the passage to and through the gateway with the "opinions of
mortals" in the Doxa section of the poem, and (3) three pointed and
irresolvable ambiguities in Parmenides' language: whether the journey is a
descent to the gates of a Tartaran underworld or an ascent to the upper bounds
of sky and the world-"embracing" Apeiron, whether the "chasm" made by the
opening of the gates is "yawning" or "unyawning," and whether the "chasm" is
formed by the gates swinging back together or opening in opposite directions,
one swinging forward while the other swings back and vice versa. Holding these
ambiguities firmly in mind while granting the gateway and the "chasm" the
thought-content suggested by their resonance and correlation with the "opinions
of mortals," Miller seeks to show, is the key to letting the proem serve its
purpose of transporting thought to the "... is ...."."
Morgan Kathryn. Myth and philosophy from Presocratics to Plato.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000.
On Parmenides see pp. 67-87.
"A study of the fragments of Parmenides' philosophical poem concerning the
possible types of human enquiry provides an opportunity for an in-depth analysis
of one suggestive use of myth in Presocratic philosophy. We have argued that
Xenophanes defined his philosophical aspirations by excluding
poetic/mythological practice. Herakleitos appropriated and transformed
mythological elements in order to draw attention to the failings of traditional
myth as an adequate system of signification. Both philosophers are concerned
with the problematic relationship of language and reality. Yet in both cases
poetry and mythology, although important, even crucial targets, are not
structuring principles in their philosophy. When one moves to the fragments
of Parmenides, one is in a different world. Although Parmenides' mythology is
non-traditional, his search for knowledge is communicated to the reader through
familiar motifs of quest and revelation and is attended by divine mythological
beings. His wisdom is expressed in epic hexameters, which, although commonly
stigmatised as clumsy and pedestrian, transport us back to the poetic and
mythological realm of Homer and Hesiod. (1) What on earth was Parmenides about?
In this section, I shall characterise the ways in which Parmenides chooses to
talk about his insight into the problems of being. Treatments of Parmenides
sometimes imply that the mythological framework of the poem is a veneer that can
be stripped away to reveal pure philosophical argument. On the contrary,
mythological elements are integrated into the argument, and interpreting their
status is one of the crucial philosophical problems in the poem. Separating
Parmenides' mythos from logos he speaks the same tendency we saw
in the interpretation of Xenophanes' literary ethics and theology: the desire to
tidy up philosophy (separate mythos from logos) so that it
conforms to modern perceptions of its subject matter and method. The idea that
literary presentation might have philosophical import is ignored. There is,
however, no dichotomy between logic on the one hand, and metaphor and myth on
the other. This is to argue in terms which would have been foreign to
Parmenides. Problems of mythological style and philosophical content are not
only parallel, they are expressions of the same difficulty, the relationship
between thought and its expression. Here Parmenides follows in the footsteps of
his predecessors as he focuses on the problems of myth as a way of symbolising
the difficulties inherent in all language.
Parmenides wishes to make his audience aware of the non-referentiality of
what-is-not. He does this through logical argument and by developing
mythological figures of presentation that transgress the conclusions of his
argument. Both argument and literary presentation problematise the status of the
audience; there is a paradoxical incoherence between the world in which we live
and the uniqueness and homogeneity of what-is. These difficulties are mirrored
in the uncertain relationship of the narrator of the poem (the kouros),
Parmenides the author, and the goddess who reveals the truth. The goddess
replaces the Muse, but the source of inspiration is uncertain. Let us first
survey the main features of the revelation, emphasising the dose connection
between thought and being, along with the key themes of narrative persuasion and
conviction. We will then engage in a dose reading of the mythological framework
of the proem to show how it structures and elaborates the key themes of the rest
of the poem. Finally we shall consider the poem as a series of nested fictions
that draw attention to problems in the relationship of language and reality,
problems of which the mythological framework is paradigmatic." pp. 67-68
(1) Parmenides may also have included Orphic elements, which would again
contribute to a sense of comfortable orientation in a tradition (Mourelatos
1970: 42). For a recent, but unconvincing, attempt to find Orphism in
Parmenides, see Böhme 1986.
Morrison J.S., "Parmenides and Er," Journal of Hellenic Studies 75:
59-68 (1955).
"Discusses the relationship between certain aspects of the Platonic myth of Er
and Parmenides' philosophy. Questions the justifiability of attributing to
Parmenides the idea of the sphericity of the earth." [N.]
Mourelatos Alexander, "Comments on 'The thesis of Parmenides'," Review of
Metaphysics 22: 735-744 (1969).
About the paper by Charles Kahn (1969).
"The first of the two routes outlined by the Parmenidean goddess in fr. 2 is
given this interpretive formulation in Kahn's paper: "It (whatever we can know,
or whatever there is to be known) is a definite fact, an actual state of
affairs." (1) Kahn explains that Parmenides intends to assert "not only the
reality but the determinate being-so of the knowable object," in other words,
that he posits existence both "for the subject entity" and "for the fact or
situation which characterizes this entity in a determinate way" (pp. 712-713) .
As indicated by Kahn's use of the pronoun "whatever," the thesis has the force
of universality. (2) Let me condense the formulation into a single proposition:
(1) For all p, if p is known, then p is true iff (3) there actually exists a
certain F and a certain x such that Fx.
What should count as the denial of (1) P Presumably either:
(2) It is not the case that for all p, etc. [as in (1)];
or, more explicitly,
(3) There is a p such that: p is known, and p is true even though a certain x
does not exist, or a certain F does not obtain.
If (1) is an adequate formulation of Parmenides' first route (which according to
Kahn it is), then (3) ought to be the correct formulation of the second route.
But Kahn's own formulation is significantly different. The first of the two
"partial aspects" he distinguishes, the aspect of nonexistence of the subject,
he formulates as the claim "that an object for cognition does not exist, that
there is no real entity for us to know, describe, or refer to." The second
aspect, nonexistence of a certain state of affairs, he expresses as the claim
"that there is . . . no fact given as object for knowledge and true statement:
whatever we might wish to cognize or describe is simply not the case" (p. 713).
Either aspect could be condensed in either of the following formulations:
(4) There is no p such that: p is known, and p is true iff there actually exists
a certain F and a certain x such that Fx.
(5) For all p, if p is known, then p is true if a certain x does not exist or a
certain F does not obtain.
It should be noticed immediately that (4) and (5) arc alternative formulations
not of the contradictory of (1) but of its contrary. If anything is clear about
the argument in Parmenides' poem, it is that he intends the two routes as
exclusive alternatives, the one a contradiction of the other.' Kahn's analysis
thus appears to involve an imprecise formulation of the opposition between the
two Parmenidean routes."
(1) Charles H. Kahn, "The Thesis of Parmenides," pp. 711-712. References to the
paper will hereafter be given mostly in the text and by page number only.
(2) The formulation of p. 714 has similar scope: "esti" claims only that
something must he the case in the world for there to be any knowledge or any
truth." The deflating expressions "only" and "something" should not mislead; the
governing universal quantifier is in the pronoun "any."
(3) The usual abbreviation for "if and only if."
(4) But Kahn says (p. 713) that Parmenides' second route "would deny both
assertions" (i.e., both the ascription of existence to x and the ascription of
actuality to F). The "both" seems to be an over-statement not required by Kahn's
interpretation.
(5) Kahn recognizes this (p. 706). The point I am making has nothing to do with
the fact. that. the modal clauses in the two routes of fr. 2 are related as
contraries. Propositions (1)-(5) are formulations of the nonmodal clauses of the
routes.
Mourelatos Alexander. The route of Parmenides: a study of word, image,
and argument in the Fragments. New Haven: Yale University Press 1970.
New, revised edition including a new introduction, three additional essays and a
previously unpublished paper by Gregory Vlastos Names of Being in Parmenides
- Las Vegas, Parmenides Publishing, 2008.
Contents: Returning to Elea: Preface and Afterword to the revised and expanded
edition (2008) XI-L; Part I. The route of Parmenides: a study of word, image,
and argument in the Fragments: Use of Greek and treatment of philological and
specialized topics LIII; Abbreviations used in Part I LVII-LIX; 1. Epic form 1;
2. Cognitive quest and the Route 47; 3. The vagueness of What-is-not 74; 4.
Signposts 94; 5. The bound of reality 115; 6. Persuasion and fidelity 136; 7.
Mind's commitment to reality 164; 8. Doxa as acceptance 194; 9. Deceptive words
222; Appendix I. Parmenides' hexameter 264; Appendix II. Interpretations of the
Subjectless esti 269; Appendix III. The meaning of kré and
cognates 277; Appendix IV. Text of the Fragments 279; Supplementary list of
works cited in Part I. 285; Part II. Thee supplemental essays; Abbreviations
used in Part II 297; 10. Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the naive metaphysics of
things 299; 11. Determinacy and indeterminacy, Being and Non-Being in the
Fragments of Parmenides 333; 12. Some alternatives in interpreting Parmenides
350; Part III. The scope of naming: Gregory Vlastos (1907-1991) on B.38 and
related issues (Essay not previously published; "Names" if being in Parmenides,
by Gregory Vlastos 367; Indexes to Parts I-III 391-408.
"In the nearly four decades that have passed since the Yale University Press
edition, the volume of literature on Parmenides, both books and essays, has
exploded. Accordingly, a thorough and fully updated revision is out of the
question. It could only be a total re-writing of the book.
Let me, then, clarify at the outset the scope of "revised and expanded." On its
subject, The Route of Parmenides inevitably reflects the status
quaestionis of the mid- and late-1960s. The revisions in the present reissue
of the Yale Press book (Part I of this volume) are modest: mostly corrections of
misprints; altering or adjusting some misleading formulations; editing some
egregiously dated phrases, such as "X has recently argued," or "in this century
[meaning 'in the twentieth']"; and the like. All this was done with care not to
change the arabic-number pagination (except for the Indexes) of the Yale Press
edition; for it was my concern not only to keep costs of production low but also
to ward off the emergence of inconsistencies in citations of the book in the
literature. (...)
If the revisions are delicate and unobtrusive, the expansion is substantial and
obvious. Part II reprints three essays of mine, composed in the mid- and late-
1970s, in which I sought to supplement, to strengthen, and in some respects also
to modify theses that were advanced in the original edition of the book (theses
that are still represented here in Part I). As in the case of the text in Part
I, slight adjustments and corrections have been made for the reprinting of the
three essays. But the type-setting and pagination in Part II are, of course,
new. Part III consists of a previously unpublished essay by Gregory Vlastos. The
rationale of publishing posthumously this essay by Vlastos, as well as that of
reprinting my own three previously published essays, is perhaps best given in
the course of a narrative, which immediately follows here, of my engagement with
the thought of Parmenides over the years. Additional comments and afterthoughts,
ones that reflect my present views on crucial points of interpretation, will be
presented in the course of the narrative and in the closing sections of this
Preface."
Mourelatos Alexander. Mind's commitment to the real Parmenides. In Essays
in ancient Greek philosophy. Vol. I. Edited by Anton John P. and Kustas
George L. Albany: State University of New York Press 1971. pp. 59-80
Mourelatos Alexander, "Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the naive metaphysics of
Being," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy: 16-48 (1973).
Supplementary vol. I: Exegesis and argument. Studies in Greek philosophy
presented to Gregory Vlastos - Edited by E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M.
Rorty - Assen, Van Gorcum
Mourelatos Alexander. Determinacy and indeterminacy: being and non-being in
the fragments of Parmenides. In New essays on Plato and the Pre-Socratics.
Edited by Shiner Roger and King-Farlow John. Guelph: Canadian Association for
Publishing in Philosophy 1976. pp. 45-60
Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Supplementary volume 2).
"The argument in the "truth" part of Parmenides' cosmological Poem relies not on
an assumption that negative statements fail to refer to actual entities or to
actual states of affairs (as in the interpretations by Owen, Furth, Kahn, and
Furley), but on an assumption that statements of the form "x is not f" are
incorrigibly vague or indeterminate. The latter assumption reflects a "naive
metaphysics of things" dominant in early Greek philosophy. the article develops
further, and in certain respects modifies, an interpretation offered by the
author in The route of Parmenides (1970)."
Mourelatos Alexander. 'Nothing' as 'not-Being': some literary contexts that
bear to Plato. In Arktouros. Hellenic studies presented to Bernard M. W. Knox
on the occasion of his 65th birthday. Edited by Bowersock Glen W., Burkert
Walter, and Putnam Michael C.J. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1979. pp. 319-329
Reprinted in: John P. Anton, Anthony Preus (eds.) - Essays in Ancient Greek
Philosophy. Vol. II: Plato - Albany, State University of New York Press,
1983, pp. 59-69.
Mourelatos Alexander, "Some alternatives in interpreting Parmenides,"
Monist 62: 3-14 (1979).
"Influential studies find the basis of Parmenides' argument in a fusion of
copulative and existential uses of "einai", "to be." As an alternative to this
line of interpretation, the article continues and buttresses the author's thesis
("The route of Parmenides", 1970) that the various forms of "einai" are
copulative in all key passages. Parmenides' argument is, in effect, a critique
of the "is" statements that are constitutive of the "doxa": "... is light," "...
is night," "... is light and night." Parmenides' monistic conclusion is based on
a rejection of contrariety. Dialectical connections with Heraclitus and
Anaximander are briefly explored."
Mourelatos Alexander, "Pre-socratic origins of the principle that there are
no origins from nothing," Journal of Philosophy 78: 649-665 (1981).
Mourelatos Alexander, "Parmenides and the Pluralists," Apeiron.A Journal
for Ancient Philosophy and Science 32: 117-129 (1999).
"The article discusses -- both appreciatively and critically -- Patricia Curd's
The Legacy of Parmenides (1998). Among the interpretive claims I dispute is
that Parmenides advocates "Predicational monism," the thesis that the reality of
things cannot be constituted by complementary opposites; also that Parmenides'
metaphysics is largely compatible with the pluralist cosmologies of his
successors. I differentiate her position from that developed in my own
Parmenides studies of the 1970s; I offer a new translation for B1.31-32; I
conjecture "eirgon" for the lacuna at B6.3; and I correct a frequent
error in translations of B42-43."
Muller Robert. Euclide de Mégare et Parménide. In Études sur Parménide.
Tome II. Problèmes d'interprétation. Edited by Aubenque Pierre. Paris: Vrin
1987. pp. 274-276
"Pour être bref (...) l'élement le plus propre à justifier le rapprochement avec
les Éleates nous paraît être le refus mégarique de ce non-être relatif qu'est
l'alterité (cfr. [Die Megariker] fr. 27 [ed. Döring], et par suite de la
relation en général."
Nehamas Alexander, "On Parmenides three ways of inquiry," Deucalion
33/34: 97-111 (1981).
Reprinted in: A. Nehamas - Virtues of authenticity. Essays on Plato and
Socrates - Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 125-137.
"We often take Parmenides to distinguish three "ways of inquiry" in his poem:
the way of being, that of not being, and the way which combines being and not
being; and to hold that of these only the first is to be followed.
This approach, originating in Reinhardt, (1) is now canonical (2). G.E.L. Owen,
for example, writes that Parmenides aims
to rule out two wrong roads which, together with the remaining right road, make
up an exhaustive set of possible answers to the question estin e ouk estin;...
The right path is an unqualified yes. The first wrong path is an equally
unqualified no... There is no suggestion that anyone ever takes the first wrong
road... It is the second, the blind alley described in... B6, that is followed
by 'mortals'. . To take this well-trodden path... is to say, very naturally,
that the question estin e ouk estin; can be answered either yes or no
(3).
The text of B6. 1-5 (...) can be translated as:
What is for saying and for thinking must be; (4) for it can be,
while nothing cannot; I ask you to consider this.
For, first, I hold you back from this way of inquiry,
and then again from that, on which mortals, knowing nothing, wander aimlessly,
two headed...
Simplicius' manuscript, where this fragment is found, contains a lacuna after
dizesis in line 3. Diels supplied eirgo and took lines 4ff. to follow
directly afterwards. (5) Thus, the goddess scents to proscribe two ways of
inquiring into being. This text, however, exhibits certain peculiarities which
suggest that this view awes serious difficulties. The purpose of this paper is
to present these peculiarities, discuss the difficulties, and to suggest, if
cautiously, an alternative to the text and to the view it engenders."
(1) Karl Reinhardt, Parmenides and die Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie,
(reps. Frankfurt A.M., 1959) pp. 18-32.
(2) David J. Furley, "Notes on Parmenides", in E.M. Lee et al., Exegesis and
Argument: Studies in. Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos (Assen,
1973), pp. 1 - 15; W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. II
(Cambridge, 1965); G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers
(Cambridge, 1957); A.P.D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides (New Haven,
1970); G.E.L. Owen, "Eleatic Oiteslions", Classical Quarterly, N.S. vol. 10
(1960), pp. 85 - 102; Michael C. Stokes, One and Many in Presocratic
Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass., I 971.
(3) Owen, pp. 90-91.
(4) For this construction, see Furley, p. 11.
(5) See Diels' comment in his apparatus to the Prussian Academy edition of
Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Physics (Berlin, 1882), p. 117.
Nehamas Alexander. Parmenidean Being / Heraclitean Fire. In Presocratic
philosophy. Essays in honour of Alexander Mourelatos. Edited by Caston
Victor and Graham Daniel W. Aldershot: Ashgate 2002. pp. 45-64
"The facts are these.
Parmenides and Heraclitus lived at about the same time, at opposite ends of the
Greek- speaking world. Parmenides constructed a rigorously abstract logical
argument in vivid verse. Heraclitus composed a series of striking paradoxes in
obscure prose. They are both difficult to understand. They are both arrogantly
contemptuous of their predecessors as well as their contemporaries, to whom they
usually refer as 'the many' or 'mortals.(1) They have been taken to stand at
opposite philosophical extremes: Parmenides is the philosopher of unchanging
stability; Heraclitus, the philosopher of unceasing change.
The rest is speculation.
That is not a criticism. Most of the speculation is not idle: it is
interpretation, based partly on the texts and partly on a general sense of the
development of early Greek philosophy. But interpretation it is and, as such,
each of its aspects affects and is, in turn, affected by every other. One of
these is the idea that, though close contemporaries, Heraclitus and Parmenides
wrote successively and that whoever wrote later criticizes the other: either
Heraclitus denounces Parmenides (2) or Parmenides attacks Heraclitus.(3)
Testimony to the continuing influence of the ancient diadoche-writers, that
assumption bears directly on the interpretation of both philosophers. In
particular, if, as most people today believe, Parmenides is answering
Heraclitus, we need to find in Heraclitus views that Parmenides, in turn,
explicitly rejects in his poem.(4)
I want to question this assumption - not necessarily to reject it, but to show
exactly how it affects our interpretation of both Parmenides and Heraclitus.(5)
I would also like to outline, in barest form, an alternative understanding of
their thought which takes them to write in parallel and not in reaction to one
another. (6)"
(1) Heraclitus also names some of the targets of his criticisms (for example, B
40, B 42, B 56, B 57, B 81, B 106, B 129).
(2) That is the view of Reinhardt, 1916.
(3) A notable exception is Stokes, 1971, pp. 109-23, who believes that each can
be understood quite independently of the other. For full references to the
debate, see Daniel W. Graham, 'Heraclitus and Parmenides' (in this
volume, pp. 27-44). Graham offers a strong defense of Patin's thesis to the
effect that Parmenides is directly concerned with criticizing Heraclitus in his
poem.
(4) More cautiously, we need to assume that Heraclitus must at least have
appeared to have held views which Parmenides rejects in his poem.
(5) It is an assumption that is important to two of the best recent studies of
Parmenides and Heraclitus: Curd, 1998 and Graham, 1997, as well as to the
latter's 'Heraclitus and Parmenides.' Both, not incidentally, are as deeply
indebted to A. P. D. Mourelatos as I am in my own inadequate celebration of his
work, which this essay constitutes.
6 My view of the relationship between Parmenides and Heraclitus is similar to
that of Stokes 1971, though the implication I draw from it for my interpretation
of their views differ from his in many ways.
Neumann Gunther. Der Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie. Eine
vergleichende Untersuchung zu den Parmenides-Auslegungen von Emil Angehrn,
Günter Dux, Klaus Held und dem frühen Martin Heidegger. Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot 2006.
Neumann Gunther. Sein und Logos. Heideggers frühe Auseinandersetzung mit
Parmenides. In Heidegger und die Logik. Edited by Denker Alfred and
Zaborowski Holger. Amsterdam: Rodopi 2006. pp. 65-87
O'Brien Denis, "Temps et intemporalité chez Parménide," Études
Philosophiques 35: 257-272 (1980).
O'Brien Denis. L'être et l'éternité. In Études sur Parménide. Tome II.
Problèmes d'interprétation. Edited by Aubenque Pierre. Paris: Vrin 1987. pp.
135-164
"Sommaire: I. Le problème de l'intemporalité; II. «Il n'est pas» III. «Il ne
sera pas»; IV. «Il n'était pas»; V. L'inengendré; VI. L'impérissable; VII. La
preuve de l'immortalité; VIII Les deux emplois du «maintenant»; IX. L'éternel
(1)
LE PROBLÈME DE L'INTEMPORALITÉ
Le sens d'« éternité»
Au fr. VIII, l-2, la déesse déclare: «Il ne reste plus qu'une seule parole,
celle de la voie énonçant: 'est'». Elle désigne ainsi la Voie de l'existence,
annoncée au fr. II, 3. Cette Voie est «chemin de persuasion, car la persuasion
accompagne la vérité» (fr. II, 4). C'est donc au fr. VIII que la déesse
accomplira la promesse faite dans le prologue (fr. I, 29): le disciple
s'instruira du «coeur de la vérité persuasive ...» (2).
Quelle est cette «vérité», exposée dans la Voie de l'existence?
En ouvrant cette Voie, la déesse affirme que l'objet de son discours est
«inengendré» et «impérissable» (fr. VIII, 3). Elle précise, deux vers plus loin
(v. 5): «II n'était pas à un moment, ni ne sera <à un moment>, puisqu'il est
maintenant». Pour la majorité des exégètes, Parménide aurait évoqué dans ce
dernier vers, pour la première fois dans l'histoire de l'Occident, le concept
d'éternité. Mais de quelle «éternité» s'agit-il? En quel sens prend-on ici ce
terme? Le plus souvent, les formules adoptées par les commentateurs laissent
perplexe." pp. 135-136)
(1) Le chapitre que l'on va lire repose sur les conclusions dégagées dans le
premier tome de cet ouvrage (Éludes I, Essai critique: Introduclion à la
lecture de Parménide) ainsi que sur mes recherches antérieures, que je
reprends ici, en les approfondissant et en les corrigeant. Quelques précisions
de terminologie s'imposent, ici comme dans mon Essai critique (cf. p. 140 n. 3):
je parlerai indifféremment de «genèse» et de «naissance», de «disparition» et de
«mort»; en employant ces termes «naissance» et «mort», je n'ai point voulu
imposer au lecteur une représentation de l'«être» de Parménide comme d'un être
animé/vivant. Dans ce que j'appelle la «preuve de l'immortalité» (voir surtout
pp. 157-158 infra), la déesse vise à montrer non seulement que l'être est
immortel (absence de «mort» ou de «destruction»; sur la possibiflté d'une
distinction implicite entre ces deux termes, voir p.155 infra), mais encore
qu'il est inengendré (absence de «genèse» ou de «naissance»).
(2) Sur l'articulation du poème, voir mon Essai critique, chap. XI
(Études 1, pp. 239 sqq.)
O'Brien Denis. Problèmes d'établissement du texte: la transmission du Poème
dans l'Antiquité. In Études sur Parménide. Tome II. Problèmes
d'interprétation. Edited by Aubenque Pierre. Paris: Vrin 1987. pp. 314-350
Sommaire: I. L'édition des textes et l'histoire de la philosophie; II. Fr.I, 29:
«vérité» et «persuasion»; III. Fr. VIII, 4: «entier en sa membrure»; IV.
Immortalité et indivisibilité: la thèse de G. E. L. Owen; V. Immortalité et
immobilité: la citation de Plutarque; VI. Fr. VIII, 4: «unique» et «inengendré»;
VII. Fr. VIII, 4: l'histoire de la transmission du texte; VIII Fr. VIII, 5: «il
est maintenant»; IX. Fr. VIII, 6: la «continuité» du temps; X. La tradition
manuscrite du poème; XI. Fr. VIII, 12: une naissance à partir de l'être; XII.
Les éditeurs de la fin de l'Antiquité.
"Le texte de Parménide commenté dans un chapitre précédent de cet ouvrage (fr.
VIII, l-21: la première partie du discours sur la vérité) est émaillé de
variantes; je reprendrai, dans ce chapitre, celles qui touchent de près à mon
analyse.
Le texte du poème, on le sait, n'est pas attesté en tradition directe; il n'est
conservé que dans les manuscrits d'une trentaine d'auteurs anciens qui en ont
cité des extraits. Dans ces manuscrits, comme pour tous les textes qui nous sont
venus de l'Antiquité, des erreurs de copistes se sont accumulées; à l'éditeur de
rectifier ces erreurs, en tirant parti de ses connaissances codicologiques ou
philologiques.
La science du codicologue ou du philologue risque cependant de s'avérer
insuffisante, lorsqu'il s'agit d'une difficulté relevant d'un domaine qui n'est
pas le sien: celui de l'histoire de la philosophie. Les fragments de Parménide,
tels qu'ils ont été conservés dans les manuscrits, ne présentent pas seulement
en effet des variantes imputables à l'inadvertance ou à l'ignorance des
copistes; on peut aussi subodorer ici et là, sous certaines variantes, les
traces de manipulations tendancieuses du poème.
À y regarder de plus près, il devient en effet évident que des copistes savants,
imbus de platonisme et de néoplatonisme, ont pris à coeur de «normaliser» la
pensée de Parménide, en l'intégrant, de gré ou de force, dans leur vision
idéaliste de la philosophie des anciens. Pour ce faire, ils ont gommé, dans le
texte du poème qui leur était transmis, les discordances, réelles ou supposées,
avec les dialogues de Platon ou les Ennéades de Plotin.
Les «corrections» ainsi infligées au texte primitif du poème, si elles ont été
faites avec suffisamment d'habileté, ne violentent ni la grammaire ni la
métrique. Elles risqueront par conséquent de passer inaperçues tant que
l'éditeur moderne n'aura pas pris conscience des considérations proprement
philosophiques qui peuvent avoir influé sur la transmission des fragments." pp.
314-315
O'Brien Denis. Le non-être dans la philosophie grecque: Parménide, Platon,
Plotin. In Études sur le Sophiste. Edited by Aubenque Pierre. Napoli:
Bibliopolis 1991. pp. 317-364
Translated in English as: Non-being in Parmenides, Plato and Plotinus -
in: Robert W. Sharples (ed.) - Modern thinkers and ancient thinkers -
Boulder, Westview Press, 1993 pp. 1-26.
O'Brien Denis. Non-being in Parmenides, Plato and Plotinus: a prospectus for
the study of Ancient Greek philosophy. In Modern thinkers and Ancient
thinkers. Edited by Sharples Robert W. London: University College London
Press 1993. pp. 1-26
O'Brien Denis. Parmenides and Plato on What is Not. In The winged
chariot: collected essays on Plato and platonism in honour of L.M. de Rijk.
Edited by Kardaun Maria and Spruyt Joke. Leiden: Brill 2000. pp. 19-104
Owen Gwilym Ellis Lane, "Eleatic questions," Classical Quarterly:
84-102 (1960).
Reprinted with additions in: D. J. Furley and R. E. Allen - Studies in
presocratic philosophy. Vol. II: The Eleatics and Pluralists -
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975 pp. 48-81 and in: G. E. L. Owen -
Logic, science, and dialectic. Collected papers in Greek philosophy -
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1986 pp. 3-26.
"The following suggestions for the interpretation of Parmenides and Melissus can
be grouped for convenience about one problem. This is the problem whether, as
Aristotle thought and as most commentators still assume, Parmenides wrote his
poem in the broad tradition of Ionian and Italian cosmology. The details of
Aristotle's interpretation have been challenged over and again, but those who
agree with his general assumptions take comfort from some or all of the
following major arguments. First, the cosmogony which formed the last part of
Parmenides' poem is expressly claimed by the goddess who expounds it to have
some measure of truth or reliability in its own right, and indeed the very
greatest measure possible for such an attempt. Second, the earlier arguments of
the goddess prepare the ground for such a cosmogony in two ways. For in the
first place these arguments themselves start from assumptions derived from
earlier cosmologists, and are concerned merely to work out the implications of
this traditional material. And, in the second place, they end by establishing
the existence of a spherical universe: the framework of the physical world can
be secured by logic even if the subsequent introduction of sensible qualities or
'powers' into this world marks some decline in logical rigour.
These views seem to me demonstrably false. As long as they are allowed to stand
they obscure the structure and the originality of Parmenides' argument." p. 84
Owen Gwilym Ellis Lane, "Plato and Parmenides on the timeless present,"
Monist: 317-340 (1966).
Reprinted in: Alexander Mourelatos (ed.) - The Pre-Socratics; a collection of
critical essays - Garden City, Anchor Press, 1974 and in: G. E. L.Owen -
Logic, science, and dialectic. Collected papers in Greek philosophy -
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1986 pp. 27-44.
Some statements couched in the present tense have no reference to time. They
are, if you like, grammatically tensed but logically tenseless. Mathematical
statements such as "twice two is four" or "there is a prime number between 125
and 128" are of this sort. So is the statement I have just made. To ask in good
faith whether there is still the prime number there used to be between 125 and
128 would be to show that one did not understand the use of such statements, and
so would any attempt to answer the question. It is tempting to take another step
and talk of such timeless statements as statements about timeless entities. If
the number 4 neither continues nor ceases to be twice two, this is, surely,
because the number 4 has no history of any kind, not even the being a day older
today than yesterday. Other timeless statements might shake our confidence in
this inference: "Clocks are devices for measuring time" is a timeless statement,
but it is not about a class of timeless clocks. But, given a preoccupation with
a favored set of examples and a stage of thought at which men did not
distinguish the properties of statements from the properties of the things they
are about, we can expect timeless entities to appear as the natural proxies of
timeless statements.
Now the fact that a grammatical tense can be detached from its
tense-affiliations and put to a tenseless use is something that must be
discovered at some time by somebody or some set of people. So far as I know it
was discovered by the Greeks. It is commonly credited to one Greek in
particular, a pioneer from whose arguments most subsequent Greek troubles over
time were to flow: Parmenides the Eleatic. Sometimes it is suggested that
Parmenides took a hint from his alleged mentors, the Pythagoreans. "We may
assume" says one writer "that he knew of the timeless present in mathematical
statements." 2 But what Aristotle tells us of Pythagorean mathematics is enough
to undermine this assumption. According to him (esp. Metaph. 1091a12-22) they
confused the construction of the series of natural numbers with the generation
of the world. So Parmenides is our earliest candidate. His claim too has been
disputed, and I shall try to clear up this dispute as I go, but not before I
have done what I can to sharpen it and widen the issues at stake." pp. 317-318.
Owens Joseph. Naming in Parmenides. In Kephalaion: studies in Greek
philosophy and its continuation offered to Professor C. J. de Vogel. Edited
by Mansfeld Jaap and Rijk Lambertus Marie de. Assen: Van Gorcum 1975. pp. 16-25
"Naming for Parmenides, the texts show, is basically the conventional process by
which a word or expression is established to designate a thing. Metaphorically
it is extended, in one reading of Fr. B 8,38, to cover the conventional
establishing of perceptible things as expressions or names for the unique
immobile being. It may be either right or wrong. It is right when, either by
words or by perceptible constructs it designates being, the only thing
positively there to be named. Accordingly the thinking out and writing and
reciting of Parmenides' poem is perfectly legitimate.
Naming, however, has always to be based on a positive characteristic or
distinguishing mark. It is therefore illegitimate when conventionally applied to
not-being. Not-being, having no characteristics at all, cannot be known and
cannot be expressed in speech. But mortals do in fact mistakenly name not-being,
on the basis of the characteristics of night, darkness, ignorance, earth,
thickness, heaviness. They obtain these distinguishing marks by dividing bodily
appearance -- for the corporeal is the only kind of being recognized by
Parmenides -- into these characteristics and their opposites. This whole process
is wrong, for there is no not-being to be named, and the characteristics
assigned to it, though appearing positive, are in reality negations. But with
the second basic form so named and its characteristics so established, and with
equal force given to both, the differentiations and changes in the perceptible
universe may be explained. To understand them and treat of them as in this way
human conventions, is truth. To believe that the differentiations and changes
are the true situation, is the doxa. Naming is accordingly for Parmenides a conventional process throughout which
being remains sole and sovereign both in the perceptible world and in human
thought and speech. Every sensible thing and every human thought and word is
being. To understand that, is to be on the road of the goddess while thinking
and speaking. Recognized clearly as naming the one immobile being, human thought
and language and living are thoroughly legitimate. Parmenides may legitimately
continue in them, even though according to doxa they and all perceptible
things are differentiated and are engendered and perish, and "for they inert
have established a name distinctive of each" (Fr. B 19,3). The important
philosophical consequence is that for Parmenides perceptible things can retain
all the reality and beauty they have in ordinary estimation, and still function
as names for the one whole and unchangeable being." pp. 23-24.
Owens Joseph, "Knowledge and 'katabasis' in Parmenides," Monist
62: 15-29 (1979).
Reviews various interpretations of the opening lines of Parmenides' poem,
focusing on the question as to whether they convey the idea of an ascent or of a
descent or katabasis. Suggests that the proem announces a rejected way
and a mixed way for the commencement of the journey, and eventually postulates
the unmixed inspired path to true Being, through which the soul ascends to the
realm of the truth. Notes that if one insisted on the notion of katabasis,
we would be compelled to conclude that Night or Unknowing is the real source of
knowledge for Parmenides." [N.]
Palmer John Anderson. Plato's Reception of Parmenides. Oxford:
Clarendon Press 1999.
Palmer John Anderson, "Melissus and Parmenides," Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy 26: 19-54 (2004).
"This paper reconsiders Melissus's relation to Parmenides and cautions against
allowing Melissus's deduction to shape our view of Parmenides' philosophy.
Detailed comparison of their conceptions of what is and arguments for its
attributes reveals differences numerous enough to cast serious doubt upon the
traditional view of the relation. The assimilation of their views in antiquity
can be traced back to the late fifth century, when Melissus was a more prominent
representative of Eleaticism in certain circles than Parmenides himself. The
paper closes with a brief examination of Aristotle's efforts to recover from
this inherited assimilation."
Papadis Dimitris, "The concept of truth in Parmenides," Revue de
Philosophie Ancienne 23: 77-96 (2005).
"Studies Parmenides' tripartite cognitive scheme: a) doxa, true or false,
b) ta dokounta = true doxai, primarily of universal reference, and c)
aletheia. Doxa and ta dokounta refer to the perceptible aspect
of the world, whereas aletheia refers to the inner Being of the world.
Although in the Poem access to the truth is reserved to Parmenides, it is
understood that such access is also possible for everyone possessed of
exceptional spirituality."
Pasqua Hervé, "L'unité de l'Être parménidien," Revue Philosophique de
Louvain 90: 143-155 (1992).
"Being exists in an absolute sense, and because it exists it cannot cease to be.
In other words non-being is impossible. This is the central thesis of
Parmenides' poem. The Author aims to show that this thesis can only be justified
in Parmenides' view if Being is considered to be identical with the One. If this
is the case, it has an important effect on the interpretation of the Poem,
namely that the affirmation of Being does not depend on the denial of Non-being,
as many exegetes hold. In this article two recent interpretations are discussed,
namely those of N. L. Cordero and L. Couloubaritsis. The Author aims to inquire
to what extent the true thought of Parmenides does not consist in making the
affirmation of Being depend on that of Non-Being, but rather the contrary, by
basing his argumentation on the reciprocity of Being and the One."
Pelletier Francis. Parmenides, Plato and the semantics of not-being.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1990.
Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction XI-XXI; 1. Methodological
preliminaries 1; 2. Parmenides' problem 8; 3. Plato's problems 22; 4. Some
interpretations of the symploke eidon 45; 5. The Philosopher's language
94; Works cited 149; Index locorum 155; Name index 159; Subject index 163-166.
"As the title indicates, this is a book about Plato's response to Parmenides, as
put forward in Plato's dialogue, the Sophist. But it would be a mistake
to think that the difficulties raised by Parmenides and Plato's response are
merely of antiquarian interest, for many of the same problems emerge in modern
discussions of predication and (especially) of mental representation of
natural-language statements. The intricacies and difficulties involved in giving
a coherent account of Plato's position will be familiar to scholars in the field
of ancient Greek philosophy, as will be the general philosophic difficulty to
which Plato is responding- the Parmenidean problem of not-being.
This introduction is written to show to philosophers interested more in
natural-language understanding and knowledge-representation than in ancient
philosophy that the issues being grappled with by Plato remain crucial to these
modern enterprises, and to show classical philosophers that many of the
interpretive choices they face have modern analogues in the choices that
researchers in cognitive science make in giving an adequate account of the
relations that must hold among language, the mind, and reality." (from the
Introduction).
Pelliccia Hayden, "The text of Parmenides B 1,3 (D-K)," American Journal
of Philology 109: 513-522 (1988).
"Develops an exhaustive analysis of verse 3 of Parmenides' Frag. 1, and
concludes that there is no sufficient basis for a definitive reconstruction of
its original form. Comments on A. H. Coxon's critical observations on this
passage (Classical Quarterly 62, 1968) concerning the advisability of removing
certain word. Argues that in spite of Coxon's conclusion, the accepted text
"remains the best availabfe reading in Parmenides 1.3, on the grounds that it
provides an acceptable sense, while departing only slightly from the true
manuscript readings" (p. 510)." [N.]
Pellikaan-Engel Maja. Hesiod and Parmenides. A new view of their
cosmologies and on Parmenides Proem. Amsterdam: Adolf Hakkert 1974.
Contents: Chapter I: Why an approach to Parmenides from Hesiod 1; Chapter II:
Hesiod's cosmology, Theogony 116-33 11; Chapter III: Hesiod, Theogony
736-66 19; Chapter IV: Hesiod's Truth 39; Chapter V: Some substitutions of
certain Hesiodic concepts in the proem of Parmenides. The route of Parmenides
51; Chapter VI: Excursus of the other interpretations of the route of Parmenides
63; Chapter VII: parmenides's Truth 79; Chapter VIII: Parmenides' cosmology 87;
Summary 101; Bibliography 104; Curriculum vitae 110.
"Summary. Research is made into the texts of Parmenides and Hesiod. Points of
comparison between the proem of Parmenides and Hesiod Theogony 736-66
lead to attach similar meanings to the similar terms "chaos" and "house of
Night" (Chapt. I). An analysis of the contents of the texts leads to the
conclusion that the image in Parmenides' proem with regard to the Heliades, who
have left the house of Night, taking with them the poet as a chosen person, is
parallel to the alternate cyclic journey of the goddesses Day and Night c.s.
from the subterranean house of Night, via the East to the region above the earth
and via the West down and back again to the point of departure, as is written in
Hesiod Theogony 746-66; in this the taking with them of the chosen person
from the earth is parallel to Theogony 765, 6, where Death, son and
companion of Night, takes with him his victims of men (Chapt. III and V).
An analysis of Hesiod's cosmological views leads to the conclusion, that Hesiod
imagined the sky to be a metallic and revolving sphere, the earth at its centre
(Chapt. II) and that he imagined chaos in its first phase to be of
unbounded extension, presumably consisting of air at rest, and later on to be
the region above as well as beneath the earth, limited by the spherical sky,
consisting of air in motion (Chapt. IV).
The result of Chapt. V and an analysis of Parmenides' cosmological views leads
to the conclusion that Parmenides imagined the earth to be a hollow sphere
(Chapt. VII) and that the problem concerning what was in the midst in his
cosmological system, either the goddess or the earth, can be solved by supposing
the goddess to be in the midst in the absolute sense, i.e. at the centre of his
cosmos and the earth to be in the midst in the relative sense, i.e. as a hollow
sphere in the midst between the centre of his cosmos, viz. the goddess, and the
outer limitation of his cosmos, viz. the spherical sky (Chapt. VIII)." p. 101
Perry Bruce Millard, "Simplicius as a source for and an interpreter of
Parmenides", 1983.
Ph. D. Thesis, Washington University (UMI Dissertation Express, Order Number:
8319442)
Perry Bruce Millard, "On the Cornford-fragment (28 B 8,38)," Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie 71: 1-9 (1989).
Perzanowski Jerzy. The Way of Truth. In Formal ontology. Edited by
Poli Roberto and Simons Peter. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1996. pp.
61-130
Contents: Index 61; 1. Introduction 62; 2.Beings, the Being and Being 64; 3.
Ontological connection 65; 4. Towards a theory of ontological connection 67; 5.
Some classical ontological questions 73 ; 6. A linguistic intemezzo 76; 7. An
outline of a Primitve Theory of Being - PTB 86; 8. Towards a Extended Theory of
Being - ETB 102; 9. Parmenidean statements reconsidered and classical questions
answered 122; 10. Summary 127; Acknowldgements 128; References 128-130.
Pfeiffer Horand. Die Stellung des parmenideischen Lehrgedichtes in der
epischen Tradition. Bonn: R. Habelt 1975.
Philips E.D., "Parmenides on thought and being," Philosophical Review
64: 546-560 (1955).
"Professor Erwin Schrödinger, in the second chapter of his recent book, Nature
and the Greeks (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1954) discusses for a few
pages (ibid. 24-28) the Parmenidean doctrine of Being. The whole book is of
peculiar interest because it is the work, not of a professional Hellenist or
even philosopher, but of a famous physicist, who has his own reasons for
studying Greek thought; and this chapter has the added piquancy of presenting a
view of Parmenides which was once respectable but is now widely reprobated. I
propose first to examine this view, as Schrödinger puts it, and then, having
necessarily reached some conclusions of my own about Parmenides, to examine the
Parmenidean doctrine itself, so determined, from the point of view of modern
philosophy, at any rate in the matter of logic. The precise nature of this
amalgam of logical, illogical, and nonlogical thinking may then become clearer
for those who are interested in the history of philosophy and the temperaments
of philosophers." p. 546
Popper Karl Raimund, "How the moon might throw some of her light upon the
two ways of Parmenides," Classical Quarterly 86: 12-19 (1992).
Popper Karl Raimund. The world of Parmenides: essays on the Presocratic
Enlightenment. New York: Routledge 1998.
Prier Raymond. Archaic logic: symbol and structure in Heraclitus,
Parmenides and Empedocles. The Hague: Mouton & Co. 1976.
Pulpito Massimo. Parmenide e la negazione del tempo: interpretazioni e
problemi. Milano: LED Edizioni 2005.
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