Theory and History of Ontology
by Raul Corazzon - e-mail: raul.corazzon[at]formalontology.it
For an overview see the Index of the Pages, the SITE MAP or the Alphabetical Index of the Philosophers: A-F - G-O - P-Z; You can also download this page as 
Table of Contemporary Ontologists 
(click on the image to see the PDF file)
Index of the Section: "Pathways to Western Philosophy"
General and Introductory Works (a selection of reference works on philosophy)
Formal and Descriptive Metaphysics (a brief guide to the introductory literature on metaphysics)
Formal and Descriptive Ontology (a brief guide to the introductory literature on ontology)
Philosophical Logic and the Philosophy of Logic (readings on some selected arguments)
Analytic Philosophy (introductory and historical works)
Phenomenology (introductory and historical works)
INTRODUCTION
A few data about contemporary formal ontologists - by Roberto Poli (Trento University)
"A small dictionary of philosophers who have explicitly dealt with formal ontology would be useful. Two observations are important: (1) in this section the expression "formal ontology" will be used in the broad sense to refer to both the formal ontology and the formalized ontology described in the previous section; (2) the qualification "explicitly" is crucial. In effect, the range of formal ontology (in the sense given sub (1) above) is so broad and so ramified that it is difficult to say who has not dealt with it. But if we employ as our criterion the use of the expression "formal ontology" (or something similar) in a sense consistent with the one specified, we find that the list of authors diminishes considerably.
The point of departure is obviously Husserl's Logical Investigations. The author who more than anyone else has developed the categorial analysis of ontology is Nicolai Hartmann. As regards phenomenologists, the Husserlian who has paid closest attention to the theme is Roman Ingarden, especially in his monumental work Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt. Formal domain ontologies have been developed by Ingarden himself (the domain of artistic phenomena with particular regard to literary works and the domain of values), Hartmann (natural world, social world, art, values), Scheler (values), Reinach (law), Stein (the concept of person), and Plessner (the social world).
Among analytic philosophers, we find a constant interest in the relationships between the dimensions of the formal and of ontology from Carnap onwards. Authors who warrant at least brief mention are certainly Goodman, Prior and Quine. More difficult to classify for various reasons are the theories of Bunge and Sommers.
Johansson has developed an innovative categorical approach which reveals the influence of the Brentanian tradition (Husserl and Marty in particular) as well as the Marxian tradition, especially in his analysis of social action.
Nino Cocchiarella, Kit Fine and Jerzy Perzanowski are perhaps the most notable of philosophers currently conducting explicitly formal analysis. Cocchiarella has worked in particular on problems of predication and nominalization (issues explicitly analyzed by Husserl), systematically reconstructing so-called theories of universals (nominalism, conceptualism and realism, the latter two with important variants) in a formally homogeneous environment. Of Fine' many works, particular mention should be made of those which formally reconstruct various fundamental concepts of the philosophical tradition (the concept of substance among others), often starting from their Aristotelian bases. Perzanowski has developed an innovative account of ontology within a Leibnizian framework. From a formal point of view, a distinctive feature of his position is the idea that there are formal structures which precede the distinction between the propositional and the predicative levels and require particular algebraic codification (Perzanowski, The Way of Truth, in: Roberto Poli & Peter Simons (eds.) - Formal Ontology Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1996). One aspect to be noted is that all three of these philosophers work in explicitly formal terms while simultaneously paying close attention to Husserlian matters (Cocchiarella has analysed the already mentioned problems of predication and nominalization; Fine has developed a sophisticated algebraic reconstruction of the third Logical Investigation; Perzanowski was one of Ingarden' pupils).
In the past twenty years, a group of mainly (but not exclusively) analytic philosophers have drawn on the work of one of Brentano' pupils to develop new formal tools. I am obviously referring to so-called Meinongian semantics, the history of which divides into two main periods. The first was during the mid-1980s and is particularly closely associated with Lambert, Parsons, Rapaport, Sylvan and Zalta.
These are authors whose names establish further connections with free logics, relevant logics and paraconsistent logics. The second, more recent, period is associated especially with the names of Jacquette and Pasniczek.
One author who has engaged in dialogue with those just mentioned, although he developed his own and original point of view, was Hector-Neri Castañeda, whose guise theory proposes a wide series of predicative structures both ontological and cognitive. Castañeda' premature death prevented further development of his theory and it remains incomplete.
Also to be mentioned is a minor, mainly American philosophical tradition which although it lies outside the analytic tradition has nevertheless made a major contribution to formal ontology. I refer to the tradition of "dynamic ontology" developed by Peirce, Whitehead, Buchler and Hartshorne and which a fine book by Rescher has recently revitalized (cfr. Rescher, Process Metaphysics, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1996). Also linked with this tradition is the interesting school of "process theology".
Despite its apparent diversity, the "dynamic" tradition in the English-speaking countries has taken up positions which come significantly close to those developed by the German-speaking sister tradition associated with the names of Brentano, Husserl, Meinong and Hartmann. Thorough comparison between the two traditions has yet to be made (worth mentioning among the few that I know is Mohanty Nicolai Hartmann and Alfred Whitehead, A study in recent Platonism, Calcutta, Progressive Publishers, 1957).
Other areas of inquiry are Perry and Barwise' situation semantics and Suszko' non-Fregean logics. While the work of the former two authors is so well known that it requires no introduction, Suszko' deserves closer analysis. This I shall provide below when discussing the problem of the identity connective.
Lying midway between the analytic and phenomenological traditions are the studies of Barry Smith and Peter Simons, who deal in particular with the theory of parts and the development of a general mereology which, according to Smith, constitutes the fundamental instrument of ontology.
Studies which find inspiration in phenomenology and draw their tools from algebraic topology has been developed by Jean Petitot, who studied under René Thom and has continued his catastrophe theory.
Finally, my own work seeks to overcome the limitations of the two schools of dynamic philosophy (the German "camp" of Brentano and his followers, and the American "camp" of Peirce and Whitehead) by developing a dynamic theory of substances which comprises various interacting sub-theories, principally those of particulars, of the levels of reality, and of wholes (Poli Alwys. Ontology for knowledge engineers, Ph. D. thesis, Utrecht, 2001).
These, therefore, are names of the philosophers currently at the forefront of work in ontology." pp. 186-188.
From: Roberto Poli - Descriptive, formal and formalized ontologies - in: Denis Fisette (ed.) - Husserl's Logical Investigations reconsidered - Dordrecht, Kluwer Academ Publishers, 2003 pp. 183-210. (Available in PDF format, require Acrobat Reader).
SUGGESTED READINGS FOR A FIRST APPROACH TO ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
Jacquette Dale. Ontology. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press 2002
From the Preface: "This book investigates and proposes a theory to solve the most fundamental problems of being. I know how that sounds. But trying to understand the meaning, the undeniable but non-self-explanatory fact and nature of existence, is indispensable to philosophy. Accordingly, we must not shrink from the task, whatever difficulties are entailed. I distinguish between pure philosophical and applied scientific ontology. Pure philosophical ontology deals with such questions as what is meant by the concept of being, why there exists something rather than nothing, and why there exists exactly one logically contingent actual world. Applied scientific ontology advances a preferred existence domain consisting of three categories of existent entities, including existent (we can also say actual) objects, existent states of affairs, and the actual world. The actual world is itself an entity, one that contains all other entities; it contains all and only actual states of affairs, involving all and only existent objects. The entities included in a theoretical ontology are those minimally required for an adequate philosophical semantics, the things to which we must be able to refer in order to make sense of meaningful thought and discourse, especially in the sciences. These are the objects that we say exist, to which we are ontologically committed.
(...)
Pure philosophical ontology, indispensable as groundwork, is only the first major step toward a complete fully integrated ontology. When we know what it means for something to exist, we can then proceed to the details of applied scientific ontology, defending the choice of a particular domain of existent entities. It is in this branch of ontology that we explain the concepts and clarify the existence conditions of physical entities and declare ourselves in favour of or opposed to the existence of numbers, sets, universals, relations, propositions, and abstract objects generally, minds and persons, God as a divine supernatural mind, language, art and other cultural artefacts. The traditional controversies of descriptive and speculative metaphysics are located here, where the stakes are higher than in pure philosophical ontology, in arguments for the existence or nonexistence of specific contested entities.
The two components, pure philosophical and applied scientific ontology, complement one another. No metaphysics of being can claim to be complete if it does not keep each separate and in its proper place while providing satisfactory answers to both specialized sets of problems. It is as much a mistake to investigate only the more tractable problems of applied scientific ontology, say, of whether or not numbers or universals exist, while giving up on pure philosophical ontology, as it would be to devote attention exclusively to the fundamental problems of pure philosophical ontology to the neglect of making substantive commitments to the existence of real entities in applied scientific ontology. We should not try to establish a domain of existent entities that is not guided by a prior clarification of the concept of being; but having addressed the problems of pure philosophical ontology, we must then move on to fill in the details of a preferred existence domain as a contribution to applied scientific ontology."
Content: Preface XI; Acknowledgements XV; Introduction: Being as such 1; First Part: Pure philosophical ontology. 1. What is to be (on Heidegger) 12; 2. Combinatorial ontology 42; 3. Why there is something rather than nothing 89; 4. Why there is only one logically contingent actual world 109; 5. Concepts of existence in philosophical logic and the analysis of being qua being 134;Second Part: Applied ontology and the metaphysics of science. 6. Ontological commitment (on Quine) 156; 7. Appearance, reality, substance, transcendence 182; 8. Physical entities: space, time, matter and causation, physical states of affair and events, natural laws 193; 9. Abstract entities, particular and universal: numbers, sets, properties, qualities, relations, propositions, and possibilities, logical, mathematical and metaphysical laws 206; 10. Subjectivity of mind in the world of objective physical facts 233; 11. God, a divine supernatural mind? 253; 12. Ontology of culture: language, arts and artefacts 265; Conclusion: scientific-philosophical ontology 275; Notes 281; Bibliography 309; Index 329-348.
Grossmann Reinhardt. The existence of the world: an introduction to ontology. London, New York: Routledge 1992.
From Chapter III. The Categories: "Individual things are temporal. They constitute the physical universe. Their properties, as we have seen, are not temporal. Nor are they spatial. The discovery of this monumental fact is the discovery of the world. The world, unlike the universe, consists of individual things and of all other kinds of entity. It consists, therefore, of individual things and of properties. But the realization that there are atemporal things, that there is a world in addition to the physical universe, immediately raises the question of whether or not there are other atemporal things. Does the world consist of a great many kinds of abstract entity? The answer to this question is affirmative: as it turns out, the world is a rather complicated web of individual things and of kinds of abstract thing. There are many more abstract kinds of entity than the first ontologists dreamed of. I shall call these kinds of thing 'categories'. The world consists of individuals and of a number of categories of abstract things. I believe that there are altogether seven categories, namely, individuals, properties, relations, structures, sets, quantifiers, and facts. Of course, there may be more or there may be less. How does one decide? There is no 'decision procedure' that allows us to decide once and for all, by some mechanical method, how many categories there are. Nor are categorial (ontological) inquiries of a more sublime and indubitable nature than ordinary ones, as many philosophers used to think. All we can do is to argue piecemeal that things of a certain kind do not belong to a given category, because things of this kind have properties different from the properties of the things of the category. For example, an individual apple is not a property because properties are exemplified by things, while apples are not.We have argued in great detail, to give another example, that the property of being an apple is not an individual thing because it does not exist in time and space. Thus apples and the property of being an apple must belong to different categories. To sort out the categories is a painstaking chore. As a matter of fact, until little more than a hundred years ago, few categories were known to philosophers. In the main, ontology revolved around the two categories of individual thing and property of individual thing. These two are of course, roughly speaking, the categories of the Greek (Aristotelian and Platonic) tradition." pp. 45-46.
Contents: 1. The discovery of the World: timeless Being 1; 2. The Battle over the world: universals 14; 3. The structure of the World: the categories 46; 4. The substratum of the World: Existence 91; 5. The enigma of the World: Negation 120; Bibliography 134; Index 137-139.
Bar-On Abraham Zvie. Ontological analysis. The classical model. Lanham: University Press of America 1996. Translated from the Hebrew by Lenn J. Schramm.
From the Preface: "The idea behind this volume is that the best way to study ontology is through a close critical analysis of the major ontological problems the 'historical' ones-that is, the problems that gave birth to this field and continue to engage thinkers and scholars to this very day. The totality of Being of Parmenides and the principle of the oneness of being, thought, and language; the debate between idealism and materialism, as illuminated by Plato; the Aristotelian categories and the relationship between the individuum and the collective, or the species and the genus; Anselm's fascinating attempt to prove necessary existence-and that of God, no less-through purely conceptual means; the ontological status of the 'I'; the antinomy of necessity and freedom: these are the issues addressed in this volume. They also demarcate the horizon of present-day ontological discussion."
Contents: Preface XI; 1. The framework of the discussion 1; 2. Ontological reasoning in ancient thought 35; The entity whose existence is supposed to be necessary 83; 4. The ontological status of the Self 129; 5. Necessity, possibility, and freedom in human affairs 165; Notes 209; Bibliography 219; Index 227
Butchvarov Panayot. Being qua Being. A theory of identity, existence, and predication. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1979.
From the Introduction: "The inquiry into being qua being has been identified with metaphysics. But it would be better to use the term 'metaphysics' more broadly, namely, for the branch of philosophy that has as its subject matter the nature of the world, or of reality, rather than the nature of our knowledge, or of our language, or of our sciences about the world. We may then distinguish several levels of metaphysical inquiry. On the least fundamental level metaphysics is concerned with the most general description of the actual world, with the most general kinds of things there are and with the way they fit together. It asks such questions as whether God exists, whether there are both minds and bodies or only minds or only bodies, and if there are both minds and bodies, how they are related. On this level it is closely connected with epistemology, since the main philosophical difficulties such questions pose for us are epistemological in character. On a more fundamental level, presupposed by the first, metaphysics inquires into the nature of all possible, or at least all conceivable, comprehensible worlds, and thus only indirectly into the nature of the actual world. Can there be a world that consists only of individuals and not also of properties and relations? Or a world that consists only of properties and relations? Can there be non-identical but indiscernible things? Questions related to those on the previous level can now be asked in complete independence from the usual epistemological considerations. Can there be a world unless there is God? Can there be a world without bodies? Without minds? On this level metaphysics is closely connected with logic. (Immediately following his introduction of the notion of a science of being qua being Aristotle offers a defense of the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle.) But this connection is no more limited to formal logic than the notion of necessary truth is limited to the truths of formal logic. The criterion of possibility on which it would rely can hardly be mere formal consistency; it must be conceivability or comprehensibility (not of propositions, but of what propositions purport to describe), for, whether we like it or not, we have no other general and ultimate criterion of possibility. This is why, on this level, metaphysics is also connected with phenomenology, i.e., with the philosophical description of the most general character of the objects of consciousness qua objects of consciousness. On the third and most fundamental level metaphysics is concerned with the concepts and principles on the basis of which the questions belonging to the other two levels, i.e., the questions about what things there are or at least there can be, must be answered. Instead of these questions, it asks, what is it for something to be in a world, or for something to be a world? It is on this level, I suggest, that metaphysics is best described as the inquiry into being qua being, or, we might also say, as protometaphysics. Any conception of a world presupposes the conception of what it is for something to exist in that world. Any conception of a thing presupposes the conception of what it is for it to be the subject of predication, both accidental and essential. Any conception of a thing presupposes the conception of what it is for it to be identifiable, not in the sense of being merely singled out but also in the sense of being singled out again or in a different way, of being recognized, of being the subject of a true informative identity judgment. It follows that the concepts of existence, identity, essential predication, and accidental predication cannot be understood as standing for constituents of the world, presumably for certain properties or relations. They are the concepts in terms of which we must understand what it is for something to be in the world, what it is for something to have a property or be related to another thing, and what it is for something to be a property or a relation. Yet they apply to any possible world; indeed nothing would be a world were it not for their applicability to it. We may call such concepts, which apply without standing for anything, transcendental. The inquiry into being qua being, or protometaphysics, may then be called a transcendental inquiry."Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction 1; 1. The apparent distinctness of identicals 9; 2. Objects and entities 39; 3. Indiscernibility 64; 4. Existence 82; 5. Essence 122; 6. Substances 154; 7. Qualities 184; 8. Accidental connections 212; Appendix A. Relations 239; Appendix B. Idealism 248; Notes 256; Index 267-274.
Chisholm Roderick. A realistic theory of categories. An essay on ontology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996.
From the Introduction: "It was Aristotle who first worked out a theory of categories. But the general procedure that I will follow is not the one that Aristotle followed in his treatise on the subject. And the theory that I defend rejects many of the metaphysical views that are generally associated with Aristotle: for example, the doctrine of form and matter, the distinction between substance and accident, and the "moderate realism" according to which the only attributes that exist are those that are exemplified. Nevertheless, I will follow Aristotle and will make use of his insights throughout this book.
The present theory is 'Platonistic': it is a form of extreme realism. There are attributes (properties). Some of them (e.g., being a dog) are exemplified; some of them (e.g., being a unicorn) are unexemplified; and some of them (e.g., being a round square) cannot be exemplified. Classes or sets may be reduced to attributes, and relations may be reduced to classes or sets.
There are substances and there are events. Neither can be defined in terms of the other. Substances are individuals that are not boundaries. Events are contingent states. Material things are substances and persons are substances. But it is problematic whether persons are material things.
What philosophers call times will be shown to be dispensable. There are good reasons for rejecting the view that events are constructs out of attributes and times. Statements such as 'He has done that seven times' are reducible to tensed statements that do not ostensibly refer to times but only to temporal relations.
Places are reducible to the individuals that tray he said to occupy those places. More exactly, statements ostensibly about places may be reduced to statements ostensibly about individual things and the spatial relations that hold among those things.
Appearances, visual and otherwise, are surfaces that give reality a qualitative dimension. (Hence the adverbial theory of appearances is rejected.)Our approach to philosophy is what Charles Sanders Peirce has called 'critical commonsensism.' This approach is based on faith in one's own rationality. Reason, as Peirce put it, not only corrects its premises, 'it also corrects its own conclusions.
'We thus rely, albeit somewhat cautiously, on perception, both inner and outer. I assume that our perception of our own states of mind is a source of certainty and that the deliverances of external perception should be treated as innocent, epistemically, unless we have positive reason to call them into question. We may thus be said to presuppose a realistic theory of knowledge."
Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Part One: The realistic background; 1. Introduction 3; 2. The nature of attributes 11; 3. The existence of attributes 19; 4. Propositions as reducible to attributes 23; 5. The intentional structure of attributes 29; 6. The primacy of the Intentional 35; Part Two. The basic categories; 7. The ontology of the theory of classes 45; 8. The nature of relations 51; 9. Times and the temporal 55; 10. States and events 71; 11. Spatial entities and material substance 85; 12. Persons and their bodies: some unanswared questions 99; Part Three: Homeless objects; 13; Appearances 109; 14. Intentionalia; 15; Fictitious objects 121; Part Four: Application to philosophical theology; 16. Necessary substance 127; Notes 133; Index 145-146.
Armstrong David Malet. Universals: an opinionated introduction. Boulder: Westview Press 1989.
From the Preface: "This book is intended to be intelligible to the advanced undergraduate student and should also be suitable for graduate seminars. However, I hope that it will also be of interest to professional philosophers, particularly those who are sympathetic to the project of an empirical metaphysics. Since the publication of my book Universals and Scientific Realism in 1978, although my views have remained the same in broad outline, I have become aware of various mistakes and omissions in what I said then. The present work, therefore, besides introducing the topic, tries to push the subject further ahead.
I now think that a particular type of moderate Nominalism, moderate because it admits properties and relations, but a Nominalism because it takes the properties and relations to be particulars rather than universals, can be developed as an important and quite plausible rival to a moderate Realism about universals. In the earlier book I gave such a Nominalism only brief consideration. By contrast, in this work a battle between Nominalists and Realists over the status of properties and relations becomes one main theme.
In general, I have largely confined myself to moderate Nominalisms and moderate Realisms. That host of contemporary philosophers who unreflectively substitute classes of particulars for properties and relations I take to be immoderate Nominalists. However, many of the arguments that I bring against the more moderate Natural Class theory are also arguments against this orthodoxy."
Contents: Preface XI; 1. The problem 1; 2. Primitive natural classes 21; 3. Resemblance Nominalism 39; 4. Particulars as bundles of Universals; 5. Universals as attributes 75; 6. Tropes 113; 7. Summing up 135; References 141; Index 145
Moreland James Porter. Universals. Montreal & Kingston: Mc-Gill-Queen's University Press 2001.
From the Preface: "This book is a study in analytic ontology with a focus on issues and options at the core of the problem of universals. The problem of universals is actually a cluster of related issues central to debates among extreme nominalists, moderate nominalists and advocates of various forms of realism about the ontological status of properties. The book is intended to be an introduction to the topic and I have aimed the level of exposition at upper level undergraduates, graduate students and professional philosophers, and I believe the book should be of value to all three groups. Given the intended audience, the book is an introduction, not in the sense of being aimed at beginning students in philosophy, but in the sense of seeking to focus on the most important issues central to the subject matter. Because of this focus and space limitations, I have of necessity refrained from addressing certain topics in the study of universals that have been prominent in the past ten years, specifically: the relationship between higher and lower order universals; the relationship between universals and causation, laws of nature and scientific explanation; the use of moderate (especially trope) nominalism to do work in various areas of philosophy. As interesting as these topics may be, those who study them bring to their reflections positions on the more fundamental topics about universals. And, often, philosophers who discuss these current issues seem unfamiliar with or inadequately appraised of important distinctions and arguments at the core of those more fundamental topics. For these reasons, I have chosen to focus in this book on those subjects that have been of perennial importance to the study of universals. There is a gap in the recent literature in these areas on which I focus, and I have tried to make a contribution to filling that gap."
Contents: Preface and acknowledgements VII; 1. The problem(s) of universals 1; 2. Extreme nominalism and properties 23; 3. Moderate nominalism ands properties 50; 4. Minimalist realism: Wolterstorff's kinds and Armstrong's properties 74; 5. Traditional realism: properties are abstract objects 97; 6. Traditional realism: issues and objections 114; 7. The individuation of particulars 140; Notes 158; Bibliography 170; Index 181.
Divers John. Possible worlds. London: Routledge 2002.
From the Preface: "I set out to write a book about possible worlds which would have a first half devoted to introductory material and a summary of the ins and outs of realism about possible worlds, and a second half devoted to the systematic exposition and evaluation of the antirealist options. I believed, and still believe, that progress in the philosophy of modality is blocked by the absence of a comprehensive discussion of the antirealist options. I was keen to set about that work but I became convinced that the literature on possible worlds as it stood did not offer an appropriate basis on which to proceed. So the work on antirealism was postponed, and the present book emerged in an attempt to clear the ground for that work.
(...)
The quantity and quality of the literature that I found convinced me that there was call for a systematic, book-length and up-to-date treatment of the debate between the two realist camps - especially since a wealth of important work has been published in reaction to the appearance in 1986 of the definitive work in the field, Lewis's On the Plurality of Worlds. Also, in attempting to provide that treatment, my opinions changed. I had previously thought there to be several strong objections against Lewis's genuine realism and that some of these were (all but) decisive. I have come to think that most of these objections are weak or can be rebutted, that those that are any good aren't as good as I had thought or that they survive in only qualified form. In sum, I have come to think that the objections against genuine realism, even taken collectively, are not convincing. Since I had formed fairly negative views of the credibility of actualist realism and these were enhanced in the process of writing, the upshot is that I here take genuine realism to be more credible than actualist realism and I think that genuine realism may be credible tout court."
Contents: Preface XI; Acknowledgements XV; Part I: Introduction 1 1. Where possible-world talk is used; 2. What possible-world talk means 15; 3. Why possible-world talk is used 26; Part II: Genuine realism 41; 4. Genuine realism: exposition and applications 43; 5. Genuine realism: quantification over non-actuals 59; 6. Genuine realism: worlds 86; 7. Genuine realism: unanalysed modality 106; 8. Genuine realism: counterparts 122; 9. Genuine realism: epistemology 149; Part III: Actualist realism 167; 10. Actualist realism: exposition 169; 11. Actualist realism: conceptual applications 181; 12. Actualist realism: ontological applications 196; 13. Actualist realism: semantic applications 210; 14. Actualist realism: safe and sane ontology? 227; 15. Actualist realism: paradox 243; 16. Actualist realism: transworld identity and transworld identification 257; 17. Actualist realism: representation 275; Part IV: Conclusion 293;; 18 Summary and evaluation 295; Notes 298; Extended bibliography 361; Index 373-380.
Vallicella William. A paradigm theory of existence: onto-theology vindicated. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002.
From the Preface: "The heart of philosophy is metaphysics, and at the heart of the heart lie two questions about existence. What is it for any contingent thing to exist? Why does any contingent thing exist? Call these the nature question and the ground question, respectively. The first concerns the nature of the existence of the contingent existent; the second concerns the ground of the contingent existent. Both questions are ancient, and yet perennial in their appeal; both have presided over the burial of so many of their would-be undertakers that it is a good induction that they will continue to do so.
For some time now, the preferred style in addressing such questions has been deflationary when it has not been eliminativist. Ask Willard Quine what existence is, and you will hear that 'Existence is what existential quantification expresses.'(1) Ask Bertrand Russell what it is for an individual to exist, and he will tell you that an individual can no more exist than it can be numerous: there just is no such thing as the existence of individuals.(2) And of course Russell's eliminativist answer implies that one cannot even ask, on pain of succumbing to the fallacy of complex question, why any contingent individual exists: if no individual exists, there can be no question why any individual exists. Not to mention Russell's modal corollary: 'contingent' and 'necessary' can only be said de dicto (of propositions) and not de re (of things). At the source of the Russellian-Quinean stream stands the imposing figure of Frege, perhaps the greatest of logicians, and certainly the greatest since Aristotle. But logic is not metaphysics, and we shall see that existence cannot come into focus through the lenses of logic alone. It is, as Santayana once said, 'odious to the logician.' (3) This is part of its charm, as the resolute reader will no doubt come to appreciate.
The critical task of this book is to put paid to deflationary and eliminativist accounts, thereby restoring existence to its rightful place as one of the deep topics in philosophy, if not the deepest. The constructive task is to defend the thesis that the nature and ground questions admit of a unified answer, and that this answer takes the form of what I call a paradigm theory of existence. The central idea of the paradigm theory is that existence itself is nothing abstract (hence not a property or a concept or a quantifier or anything merely logical or linguistic or representational) but is instead a paradigmatically existent concrete individual. The idea is not merely that existence itself exists -- which would be true if one said that existence is a property and one held a realist theory of properties -- but that existence exists in a plenary concrete sense that it cannot be the business of a preface to explain. But the idea may be limned as follows. Existence itself exists of absolute metaphysical necessity and the contingent existent exists in virtue of its dependence on self-existent existence. I submit that this robust theory of existence can be as rigorously defended as any deflationary theory."
(1) W. V. Quine, "Existence and quantification" in Ontological relativity and other essays New York: Columbia University Press, 1969) p. 97(2) Bertrand Russell, "The philosophy of Logical Atomism" in Logic and knowledge, ed. R. C. Marsh (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956), pp. 232 ff.
(3) George Santayana, Scepticism and animal faith (New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 1955) p. 48.
Contents: Preface XI-XII; 1. The idea of a paradigm theory of existence 1; 2. Is existence a first-level property? 37; 3. The 'no difference' theory 67; 4. Is existence a property of properties? 93; 5. Mondial attribute theories 127; 6. The ontology of the contingent existent 159; 7. The ground of the contingent existent 195; 8. The paradigm existent 249; References 273; Index 279-281.
GENERAL WOKS ON ONTOLOGY
A) DICTIONARIES
Handbook of metaphysics and ontology. Edited by Burkhardt Hans and Smith Barry. Munich, Philadelphia: Philosophia Verlag 1991.
From the Introduction: "The present work seeks to document the most important traditional and contemporary streams in the two overlapping fields of metaphysics and ontology. Both disciplines were, even just a few years ago, seen by many of negligible contemporary interest. The editors, neither of whom had shared this general opinion, were none the less surprised to see how much valuable work had been achieved in these areas not only in the past but also in our own century. The intensity of contemporary work in metaphysics and ontology points indeed to a healthy renewal of these disciplines, the like of which has not been seen, perhaps, since the 13th century".(...) Of the two editors of this Handbook -- who bear equal responsibility for all its parts and moments -- one is and admirer of Leibniz and the 17th-century rationalists and thus finds himself strongly allied to certain modern deductive trends. The other feels more at home in the 13th or 14th centuries and is accordingly critical of the over-enthusiastic and often over-simplistic use of formal logical techniques in contemporary metaphysics. The editors are however equally convinced that it is precisely the tension between the deductive and descriptive approaches to the problems of metaphysics and ontology which will be responsible for the future creative advances in these fields. And they are convinced also that such advances can be furthered by an understanding of the history of metaphysics and ontology., an understanding -- guided by the most sophisticated modern research and by the use of the most sophisticated modern techniques -- of the sort this Handbook has been designed to facilitate."
B) WORKS WITH AN HISTORICAL APPROACH (See also the page Birth of a New Science: the History of Ontology from Suarez to Kant)
Two books on the Greek philosophical vocabulary, particularly useful for historical research on Greek philosophy are:
Peters Francis Edwards - Greek philosophical terms. A Historical lexicon - New York: New York University Press 1967.
From the Introduction: "The glory and the bane of Greek philosophy is its lack of a past. Drawing on nothing more than common speech and the elastic potential of the Greek language the Hellenic philosophers not only formulated a problematic within which all subsequent thinkers cast their own reflections, but devised as well a sophisticated and complex terminology as a vehicle for their thoughts. Both the terms and the concepts they employed have since been overgrown with a millennium and a half of connotation that not even the most determined can completely strip away. The contemporary philosopher or theologian may attempt to rethink the concept, but he is betrayed in the utterance. For what the thinker has striven to clear away the reader or listener supplies anew. 'Soul' and 'God' carry their history heavily with them. (...) It is an obvious necessity to make some sort of attempt at coming to the Greeks on their own terms. This can, I think, best be accomplished not by the usual chronological and historical approach that, for all its divisions into 'schools' and 'successions,' obscures rather than illuminates the evolutions we might otherwise discern in ancient philosophy, but rather from the direction of the problematic as revealed by a consecutive treatment of some of the basic concepts. This can be done in a number of ways and on different scales, but the method and scale adopted in this work is the one most conformable to the needs of what may be termed an 'intermediate student' of the subject, not the beginner who is making his first acquaintance with Greek philosophy and who would be better served by a history of ancient philosophy and, perhaps, a dictionary of basic terms, nor, on the other hand, the professional scholar who would require a treatment both more massive and more nuanced. (...)Each entry is thoroughly cross-referenced, and if these references are pursued there will emerge a fairly complete philosophical context for each term. Every entry will supply some information, but meaning must be sought in the larger complexes. Finally, each entry is designed to be read with the texts of the philosophers themselves, and there are full textual citations at every step of the way. These are the final elements in the construction of a fruitful context where the prior history of the concept will illuminate a philosophical text, while the text will embellish the understanding of the term."
Urmson James Opie - The Greek philosophical vocabulary - London: Duckworth 1990.
From the Introduction: "This book is designed to be an aid to students of ancient Greek philosophy who have some, but not necessarily a profound, knowledge of the Greek language. It contains five or six hundred paragraphs, each aiming at providing useful information about some word used by Greek philosophers. Each paragraph starts with a Greek word, transliterated, in English alphabetical order. Information about each word is given, so far as possible, in quotations from the philosophers, all with a translation added. The translations are all the author's own; they are intended to be helpful rather than literal, and sometimes contain extra, explanatory, matter. These quotations are not merely illustrative; they frequently contain the philosophers' own statements about the meaning and use of the word in question. The statements of Plato or Aristotle, or, indeed, of any philosopher, about the meaning of the words he uses are more valuable than those of others, even though they do not always adhere to their own definitions. The paragraphs are not designed to replace the lexicon, nor to discuss adequately any philosophical theory, but merely to give such basic philological and philosophical information as seems likely to be most useful to most readers."
I don't recommend the only book titled History of ontology, that contains no reference to the primary texts:
Ahumada Rodolfo. A history of western ontology: from Thales to Heidegger. Washington: University Press of America 1978.
From the Introduction: "Although the prime concern of this book is ontology, not all that is discussed in it pertains exclusively to ontology. For instance, theological, epistemological, logical, linguistic, and ethical questions are also included, either to provide the necessary context for the exposition and understanding of certain ontological matters, or because these are judged to have important ontological implications. Because of the close relationship between, for example, epistemology and ontology it has been necessary to expound, though briefly, some of the epistemological doctrines of the philosophers discussed. This is especially the case with modern philosophers; those whose approach to philosophy is primarily epistemological, or a large portion of whose philosophies are epistemology, for example, Locke, Hume, and Kant. Similarly it is impossible to treat of the ontological theories of medieval philosophers independently of certain theological doctrines and logical theory is closely bound up with ontological questions in the philosophies, for example, of Russell and Wittgenstein. These observations are commonplace to those who know philosophy but they may serve nonetheless to emphasize the fact that in many ways the history of ontology is the history of philosophy.
Contents: Introduction; Chapter 1. The concept of Being before Plato; Chapter 2. Plato: the ontology of Ideal Form; Chapter 3. Aristotle: The ontology of substantial Forms; Chapter 4. Ontology in Late Antiquity and in the Early Middle Ages; Chapter 5. Ontology in the Thirteenth Century; Chapter 6. Late Medieval and Renaissance philosophy; Chapter 7. The rebirth of Rationalism in the Seventeenth Century; Chapter 8. Enlightenment and Skepticism in the Eighteenth Century; Chapter 9. The Critical metaphysics of Kant; Chapter 10. Rationalism and Romanticism: Fichte and Schelling; Chapter 11. Hegel's Absolute Idealism; Chapter 12. The revolt against Reason; Chapter 13. Ontologies of Becoming; Chapter 14. Phenomenology; Chapter 15. Analytic philosophy; Chapter 16. Existentialism; Chapter 17. Conclusion: The eclipse of Being in Western Ontology. Bibliography.
More specific and more valuable are the following titles:
Dejnozka Jan. The ontology of the analytic tradition and its origins. Realism and identity in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine. Lanham: Littlefield Adams Books 1996. Paperback edition reprinted with corrections, 2002; reprinted with further corrections, 2003.
From the Preface: "The recent renaissance in Frege-Russell studies, though including some excellent work, has confined its quest for the origins of analytic philosophy to the nineteenth century. My book goes well beyond Frege-Husserl comparisons and historical studies of Russell's idealistic upbringing to give a philosophical evaluation of what the analytic movement really amounts to. My thesis is that a single kind of ontology, 'no entity without identity' ontology, is fundamental to all of Russell's major works from 1900 to 1948, to the work of Frege, Wittgenstein, and Quine -- and also to substance metaphysics, its origin over two thousand years ago. Thus my aim is to show that the analysts, far from ending traditional ontology, at bottom continued and even developed it. I cannot see how our understanding of the pluralistic, diverse analytic movement, not to mention the pluralistic, diverse history of Western philosophy, could be more deeply transformed or unified, if I am right.
My methodology was to read the major books of the analysts, many of their lesser works, and a great deal of the secondary literature, gleaning like Rachel in the field of wheat for anything I could find on 'no entity without identity', then to create from scratch new portraits of Frege and Russell as the true analytic progenitors of this kind of ontology.
The specific thesis of my book is that there is a general kind of ontology, modified realism, which the great analysts share not only with each other, but with most great Western philosophers. Modified realism is the view that in some sense there are both real and rational (or linguistic) identities. In more familiar language, it is roughly the view that there are both real distinctions and distinctions in reason (or in language). More precisely, it is the view that there is at least one real being which is the basis for accommodating possibly huge amounts of conceptual relativity, or objectual identities "shifting" as sortal concepts or sortal terms 'shift.' Therefore I hold that on the fundamental level of ontology, the linguistic turn was not a radical break from traditional substance metaphysics. I also hold that the seeming conflict in the analysts between private language arguments, which imply various sorts of realism, and the conceptual 'shiftability' of objects, which suggests a deep ontological relativity, is best resolved by, and is in fact implicitly resolved by, their respective kinds of modified realism. There are many different sorts of modified realism, but all of them share a common general form."
Contents: Preface XI, 1. Introduction 1; 2. Is Frege a radical relativist? 3. Frege: existence defined as identifiability 103; 4. Russell's robust sense of reality 123; 5. Russell's forty-four 'No-entity without identity theories 149; 6. The ancient realist basis of conceptual relativity 215; 7. The ontology of the analytic tradition 233; Notes 273; Bibliography 305;Index of names 327; Index of subjects 333; About the author 337.
Hill Claire Ortiz. Word and object in Husserl, Frege, and Russell. The roots of twentieth-century philosophy. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press 1991. Reprinted 2001.
From the Introduction: "As a book by the founder of phenomenology that examines Frege's ideas from Brentano's empirical standpoint, Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic is both an early work of phenomenology and of logical empiricism. In it Husserl predicted the failure of Frege's attempt to logicize arithmetic and to mathematize logic two years before the publication of the Basic Laws of Arithmetic in 1893. I hope to show that Husserl did so in terms that would prefigure both the account Frege would give of his error after Russell encountered the paradoxes ten years later and the discussions of Principia Mathematica. Moreover, in locating the source of Frege's difficulties in the ambiguous theory of identity, meaning, and denotation that forms the basis of Frege's logical project and generates Russell's contradictions, Husserl's discussions indicate that these contradictions may have as serious consequences for twentieth century philosophy of language as they have had for the philosophy of mathematics.
This book is about these Austro-German roots of twentieth century philosophy. It is mainly about the origins of analytic philosophy, about the transmission of Frege's thought to the English speaking world, and about the relevance of Husserl's early criticism of Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic to some contemporary issues in philosophy. It is more about Husserl the philosopher of logic and mathematics than it is about Husserl the phenomenologist, and it is principally addressed to those members of the philosophical community who, via Russell, have been affected by Frege's logic.
This makes it very different from work on Husserl and Frege that has focused on the importance of Frege's criticism of Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic and attendant issues. The goal of this book is quite the opposite. It studies the shortcomings in Frege's thought that Husserl flagged and Russell endeavored to overcome. One possible sequel to this book would be a thorough study of Husserl's successes and failures in remedying the philosophical ills he perceived all about him, but that goes beyond the scope of this work, which follows the issues discussed into the work of Russell and his successors." (pp. 3-4)
Contents: Abbreviations IX; Preliminary terminological comments XI; Glossary XIII; Acknowledgments XIV; Introduction 1.
Part One: Logic, realism and the foundations of arithmetic1. The argument that Frege influenced Husserl 7; 2. Husserl, Frege, and psychologism 13; 3. Sense, meaning, and noema; 4. Husserl's 1891 critique of Frege 43; 5. Frege's review and the development of Husserl's thought 57; Conclusion: analyticity 91.
Part Two: Conceptual clarityIntroduction 99; 6. Intensions and extensions 103; 7. Presentation and ideas 125; 8. Function and concept 137; 9. On denoting 147; Conclusion: The way things are 163; Notes 175; Bibliography 191; Index 215.
Hochberg Herbert. Thought, fact and reference. The origins and ontology of Logical Atomism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1978.
From the Introduction: "As with the idealists Moore and Russell opposed, facts have once again become unpopular. In defending the atomist's correspondence theory of truth, I shall consider Frege's early attack on that theory as well as recent criticisms that reproduce, wittingly or unwittingly, the familiar idealistic patterns. In returning to the idealist's arguments, some 'analytic' philosophers echo themes revived by Sartre, without providing the detailed argument of the latter. By contrast, Sellars attacks atomism at a seemingly vulnerable point. He argues that the atomists did not and cannot resolve Bradley's puzzles about predication. This is a dominant theme behind his attempt to defend the current revival of nominalism -- a gambit he shares with Quine. It also reveals a link between the new nominalism and the revival of idealism. Bradley's views thus affect a number of issues discussed, including the connection of Russell's theory of descriptions with questions about concepts, particulars, predication, and judgment. This theory, in turn, provides an obvious link with Russell's critique of Frege, which is explicated and defended. One of the surprising features of recent philosophy has been the unfair, unfounded, and often abusive commentary on Russell's early work and, in particular, his criticism of Frege. Unfortunately, the prevalent assumption that Russell both misunderstood Frege and was guilty of elementary errors has prevented an adequate understanding of the origin of his theory of descriptions and his analysis of judgment. The early critique of Frege helps to clarify basic features of Russell's philosophy and reveals further connections with the views of Bradley and Moore. It is also crucial for the comprehension of Russell's views about names, reference, existence, and truth. These are important for the analysis of intentional contexts presented in this book. The examination of such fundamental aspects of Russell's philosophy naturally involves a consideration of recent criticisms of Russellian themes by Strawson, Sellars, Carnap, Quine, and others.
What is attempted is the resolution of some issues that preoccupied Russell, Wittgenstein, Moore, and their successors, as well as an explication of some links between Logical Atomism and Moore's early assault on idealism. The book is thus a partial study of the ontology and the history of Logical Atomism."
Table of contents: Preface VII; Introduction IX; I. The analysis of perception 3; II. Idealism, realism and common sense 30; III. Thought and belief 53; IV. Moore and Bradley on particulars, predicates and predication 87; V. Names, individual concepts, and ontological reduction 122; VI. Frege's account of reference and thought 147; VII: Russell's critique of Frege and the origins of the theory of descriptions 170; VIII. Descriptions, substitution, and intentional contexts 198; IX. Existence, predicates and properties 231; X. Facts and possibilities 271; XI: Russell's theory of judgment and Sellars' critique of it 309; XII: The structure of thought: Part I 347; XIII: The structure of thought: Part II 380; XIV. Logic fact and belief; XV. Difference, existence and universality 444; Notes 457; Name index 485; Subject index 487-489.
Küng Guido. Ontology and the logistic analysis of language. An enquiry into the contemporary views on Universals. Dordrecht: Reidel 1967. Revised edition (first edition published in German in 1963).
From the Preface: "It is the aim of the present study to introduce the reader to the ways of thinking of those contemporary philosophers who apply the tools of symbolic logic to classical philosophical problems. Unlike the "continental" reader for whom this work was originally written, the English-speaking reader will be more familiar with most of the philosophers discussed in this book, and he will in general not be tempted to dismiss them indiscriminately as 'positivists and 'nominalists'. But the English version of this study may help to redress the balance in another respect. In view of the present emphasis on ordinary language and the widespread tendency to leave the mathematical logicians alone with their technicalities, it seems not without merit to revive the interest in formal ontology and the construction of formal systems.
A closer look at the historical account which will be given here, may convince the reader that there are several points in the historical development whose consequences have not yet been fully assessed: I mention, e.g., the shift from the traditional three-level semantics of sense and denotation to the contemporary two-level semantics of representation; the relation of extensional structure and intensional content in the extensional systems of Wittgenstein and Carnap; the confusing changes in labelling the different kinds of analytic and apriori true sentences; etc. Among the philosophically interesting tools of symbolic logic Lesniewski's calculus of names deserves special attention. Despite the pioneering efforts of Professor C. Lejewski, philosophers still have not caught on to it so far."
Contents: 0. Introduction 1; Part One: The logistic analysis of language and the relation of representation. 1. A philosophical revolution 23; 2. From the theory of knowledge to the logical analysis of language 30; 3. From the psychological concept to the graphical sign 38; 4. The relation of representation 51; Part Two: The relation of representation of predicate signs and contemporary views on universals. 5. Bertrand Russell 66; 6. Ludwig Wittgenstein 80; 7. Rudolf Carnap 86; 8. Stanislaw Lesniewski 102; 8. W. V. Quine and N. Goodman 127; 10. The interpretations of predicate signs 161; 11. Conclusion 180; Bibliography 188; Index of names 201; Index of subjects 204-210.
ANTHOLOGIES
Logic and ontology. Edited by Munitz Milton K. New York: New York University Press 1973.
Foreword by Milton K. Munitz: "The following essays represent the contributions to a seminar on Ontology held under the auspices of the New York University Institute of Philosophy for the year 1970-1971.
The possibility of establishing fruitful links between logic and ontology had already been made evident in earlier work by Frege, Lesniewski, Russell, Quine, and Goodman. More recent investigations have sought to expand and deepen these studies, although by no means always through adhering to paths previously established. Developments in modal logic, model theory, and presupposition-free logics have brought to the fore the need to deal with such central concepts as 'existence,' 'possibility,' 'individuation,' 'identity,' and 'necessity,' among others. The studies here included, by some of the leading investigators in the field, are typical of the most promising and exciting research of recent analytic philosophy. Along with those papers whose orientation to ontology is derived primarily from the preoccupations of logicians, a number of additional studies are included that give testimony to the lively and creative resurgence of interest in ontology in contemporary philosophy."
Contents: Charles H. Kahn: On the theory of the verb 'To be' 1; Joseph Owens: The content of existence 21; Jaakko Hintikka: Quantifiers, language-games and transcendental arguments 37; Alex Orenstein: On explicating existence in terms of quantification 59: Milton K. Munitz: Existence and presupposition 85; Bas . Van Fraassen: extension. intension, and comprehension 101; Nino B. Cocchiarella: Whither Russell's paradox of predication? 133; Fred Sommers: Existence and predication 159; Henry Hiz: On assertions of existence 175; Alvin Plantinga: Transworld identity or worldbound individuals? 193; Nicholas Rescher: The ontology of the possible 213; Stephan Körner: Individuals in possible worlds 229; Hugues Leblanc: On dispensing with things and worlds 241; Richmond H. Thomason: Perception and individuation 261; Peter T. Geach: ontological relativity and relative identity 287-302.
The logic of being: historical studies. Edited by Knuuttila Simo and Hintikka Jaakko. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company 1986.
From the Introduction by Knuuttila and Hintikka: "The last twenty years have seen remarkable developments in our understanding of how the ancient Greek thinkers handled the general concept of being and its several varieties. The most general examination of the meaning of the Greek verb 'esti'' einai'' 'on' both in common usage and in the philosophical literature has been presented by Charles H. Kahn, most extensively in his 1973 book The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek. These discussions are summarized in Kahn's contribution to this volume. By and large, they show that conceptual schemes by means of which philosophers have recently approached Greek thought have not been very well suited to the way the concept of being was actually used by the ancients. For one thing, being in the sense of existence played a very small role in Greek thinking according to Kahn.
Even more importantly, Kahn has argued that Frege and Russell's thesis that verbs for being, such as 'esti', are multiply ambiguous is ill suited for the purpose of appreciating the actual conceptual assumptions of the Greek thinkers. Frege and Russell claimed that a verb like 'is' or' esti' is ambiguous between the 'is' of identity, the 'is' of existence, the copulative 'is', and the generic 'is' (the 'is' of class-inclusion). At least a couple of generations of scholars have relied on this thesis and frequently criticized sundry ancients for confusing these different senses of 'esti' with each other. Others have found the distinction between the different Fregean senses in this or that major Greek philosopher, or otherwise used the distinction as an integral part of their interpretative framework. Kahn's results show that all these lines of argument are highly suspect.
Independently of Kahn, Michael Frede (in his Habilitationsschrift published in 1967 under the title Prädikation and Existenzaussage) reached the conclusion that Plato did not - at least not in the Sophist - accept anything like the Frege-Russell distinction, thus striking another blow against the received views. We hoped to include excerpts of Frede's little classic here. Unfortunately, for reasons beyond our help this turned out to be impossible." p. IX (...)
"All these different investigations naturally raise the question: What is the origin of the Frege - Russell distinction? What is its background? In her paper, 'On Frege's Concept of Being', Leila Haaparanta discusses Frege's treatment of being in its historical setting. One of the crucial ingredients in Frege's treatment of being is his idea that existence is a second-level concept (property of a concept). Haaparanta sees the foundation of this assumption in Frege's ideas about the identification (individuality) and existence of individuals (objects), incorporated in Frege's treatment of the senses by means of which we can grasp an individual object. These were according to her inspired by Kant's ideas, especially by Kant's distinction between the predicative and existential uses of 'is'. Even though Kant did not subscribe to or even anticipate the Frege-Russell distinction, he thus seems to have inspired it." pp. XV-XVI.
Contents: Acknowledgments VII; Introduction IX-XVI; Charles H. Kahn: Retrospect on the verb 'To Be? and the concept of Being 1; Benson Mates: identity and predication in Plato 29; Russell M. Dancy: Aristotle and existence 49; Jaakko Hintikka: The varieties of Being in Aristotle 81; Sten Ebbesen: The Chimera's Diary 115; Klaus Jacobi: Peter Abelard's investigations into the meaning and functions of the speech sign 'Est' 145; Hermann Weidemann: The logic of Being in Thomas Aquinas 181; Simo Knuuttila: Being qua Being in Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus 201; Lilli Alanen: On Descartes's argument for Dualism and the distinction between different kinds of Beings 223; Jaakko Hintikka: Kant on existence, predication, and the Ontological Argument 249; Leila Haaparanta: On Frege's concept of Being 269; Index of names 291; Index of subjects 297-300.
Universals and Particulars. Readings in ontology. Edited by Loux Michael J. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press 1970. Second revised edition 1976.
"Few philosophical issues have proved as persistent as the problem of universals. In virtually every period in the history of philosophy the existence of universals has been a central focus of philosophical concern; and like any recurrent issue, the problem has received different interpretations in different historical contexts. It is, nonetheless, possible to abstract a common theme from the variety of interpretations; for whatever else has been at issue, the concept of a multiply exemplifiable object has always been pivotal in the debate over universals. One party to the dispute (the Platonist or metaphysical realist) contends that our ordinary notions of property, action, relation, and kind all presuppose an ontology of multiply exemplifiable objects. Different objects, realists have claimed, can possess one and the same property; different persons can perform one and the same action; different things can belong to one and the same kind; and different n-tuples (i.e., pairs, triples, etc.) of objects can enter into one and the same relation. According to the realist, their jointly possessing, performing, belonging to, and entering into are all cases of multiple exemplification; and what they jointly possess, perform, belong to, or enter into is a universal.
Nominalists, on the other hand, have denied the possibility of multiple exemplification and with it the reality of universals. Some have agreed that objects can and do possess properties, enter into relations, and perform actions, but have contended that it is impossible for different objects to possess numerically one property, for different persons to perform numerically one action, and for different n-tuples of objects to enter into numerically one relation; whereas, other nominalists have refused to attribute any ontological status whatever to properties, actions, kinds, and relations." pp. 3-4
Contents: UNIVERSALS. The existence of universals by Michael J. Loux 3; The world of universals by Bertrand Russell 25; On what there is by W. V. O. Quine 33; Universals by D. F. Pears 44; Particular and general by P. F. Strawson 59; Qualities by Nicholas Wolterstorff 87; Universals and family resemblances by Renford Bambrough 106; Universals and metaphysical realism by Alan Donagan 125; Abstract entitites by Wilfrid Sellars 156; On the nature of universals by Nicholas Wolterstorff 206; PARTICULARS. Particulars and their individuation by Michael J. Loux 235; The identity of indiscernibles by Max Black 250; The identity of indiscernibles by A. J. Ayer 263; The identity of indiscernibles by D. J. O'Connor 271; Bare particulars by Edwin B. Allaire 281; Particulars re-clothed by V. C. Chappell 291; Another look at bare particulars by Edwin B. Allaire 296; Do relations individuate? by J. W. Melland 304; Particulars and their qualities by D. C. Long 310; Essence and accident by Irving Copi 331; Essence and accident by Hugh S. Chandler 347; World and essence by Alvin Plantinga 353; Bibliography 387-396.
The possible and the actual. Readings in the metaphysics of modality. Edited by Loux Michael J. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press 1979.
From the Preface: "In these days, an anthology on the topic of possible worlds hardly needs justification. No issue has given rise to as much literature in the past couple of decades. It has, of course, been the central focus of discussions in philosophical logic and ontology; but the framework of possible worlds has played a prominent role in other areas of philosophy, such as epistemology, philosophy of religion, philosophy of science, aesthetics, and philosophy of mind. Theorists have insisted that talk of alternative possible worlds illumines philosophical issues as diverse as the nature of belief and knowledge, the ontological argument, the problem of evil, the nature of lawlike statements, the concept of causation, the nature of fictional discourse, and the mind-body problem. Such applications of the framework of possible worlds are of great philosophical interest, but obviously their success hinges on the legitimacy of the framework itself. Consequently, in this anthology, I have included only writings that bear on foundational questions about possible worlds. I have arranged the papers chronologically; and apart from my introductory essay, 'Modality and Metaphysics,' only two of the papers appearing here (David Kaplan's 'Transworld Heir Lines' and William Lycan's 'The Trouble with Possible Worlds') have not been published previously.
(...)
I was unable to obtain permission to publish two papers I had originally intended to include in the anthology, Saul Kripke's 'Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic' and his paper 'Identity and Necessity.' The latter can be found in Stephen P. Schwartz's collection Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds (published by Cornell University Press). The former provides an account of the semantics of modal logic; a slightly different treatment of the same material can be found in Jaakko Hintikka's 'The Modes of Modality,' which appears herein. My introductory essay provides an informal outline of Kripke-type semantics."
Contents: Preface 9; 1. Introduction: modality and metaphysics by Michael J. Loux 15; 2. The modes of modality by Jaakko Hintikka 65; 3. Identity through possible worlds: some questions by Roderick M. Chisholm 80; 4. Transworld heir lines by David Kaplan 88; 5. Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic by David Lewis 110; 6. The world is everything that is the case by M. J. Cresswell 129; 7. Transworld identity or worldbound individuals? by Alvin Plantinga 146; 8. The ontology of the possible by Nicholas Rescher 166; 9. Possible worlds by David Lewis 182; 10. Theories of actuality by Robert Merrihew Adams 190; 11. How to Russell a Frege-Church by David Kaplan 210; 12. Possible worlds by Robert C. Stalnaker 225; 13. Modal realism: the poisoned pawn by Fabrizio Mondadori and Adam Morton 235; 14. Actualism and possible worlds 253; 15. The trouble with possible worlds by William Lycan 274; Bibliography 317; Index 331-334.
Properties. Edited by Mellor D.H. and Oliver Alex. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press 1997.
From the Introduction: "Particular objects have properties, respects in which they may be alike or differ. People running are alike in motion, if not in shape or size, and differ in that respect from people standing still; spheres are alike in shape, not in size or motion, and differ in that respect from cubes; and so on. Similarly with relations. Take Don and his son Bill, and Kim and her daughter Ann. Don's parent -- child relation to Bill holds also between Kim and Ann. In this respect these so-called ordered pairs-written (Don, Bill) (Kim, Ann) -- are like all other parent-child pairs, and differ from any other pair, like (Don, Ann) or the child-parent pair (Bill, Don), whose first member is not a parent of the second.
Similarly with relations of three or more particulars. These are respects which ordered triples, quadruples etc. (n-tuples in general) may be alike or differ. Suppose Don is older than Kim, who is older than Bill, who is older than Ann. Then (Don, Kim, Bill) and (Ann, Bill, Don) are alike in that the middle member of each triple is between the other two in age -- if not perhaps in height or weight -- and differ in this respect from triples, like (Don, Bill, Kim), whose members are not ordered by age. Describing relations in this way, as properties of n-tuples of particulars, if of course artificial, but the artifice has a point. The point is to remind us that properties and relations raise similar questions, about what it is for particulars and groups of particulars to differ or to be alike, questions that are best tackled together. And the answers to these questions matter both themselves and in their implications, e.g. for change: since to change in some respect is just to differ in that respect at different times. Thus a particular that differs in colour but not in shape at different times thereby changes its colour but not its shape, just as Bill's outgrowing his father is (Don, Bill) changing by ceasing to be an instance of the taller than relation. In what follows, we shall usually work with properties for ease of presentation. When what we say about properties does not apply to relations we shall say so and when there is something distinctive to be said about relations we shall say it.
The most important questions about the kinds of sameness, difference and change that properties embody concern their reality and objectivity. Do particulars change or stay the same, resemble or differ from each other, independently of how we think of or describe them? That is, do properties exist in their own right-and if so which? But if these are the important questions about properties, they can hardly be our first ones. For just as we cannot know that unicorns do not exist (but that if they did they would do so independently of our thinking so) without knowing what unicorns are, so we cannot know whether and which properties exist without knowing what properties are. So our first question is this: what sort of entities are properties like running and relations like being taller than? This question involves at least two comparisons. First, how do properties relate to the predicates that apply to the particulars (and n-tuples of particulars) which have those properties: how are running and being taller than related to what 'runs' and 'is taller than' mean? And second, how do properties differ from and relate to the particulars that have them? These questions would be hard enough to answer if everyone agreed on the meanings of predicates, on what fixes their meanings and on the nature of the particulars they apply to. But these too are contentious matters, a fact which complicates our questions by making answers to them parts of semantic and metaphysical package deals, which need to be assessed en bloc. This fact, and the long history of the subject, also makes different writers use different terms for what we are calling 'properties', 'predicates' and 'particulars' -- and also use these terms to mean different things. So to help readers understand the readings that follow and relate them to each other, we shall note in passing some of these other uses."
Contents: Introduction by D. H. Mellor and Alex Oliver 1; I. Function and concept by Gottlob Frege 34; II. The world of Universals by Bertrand Russell 45; III. On our knowledge of Universals by Bertrand Russell 51; IV. Universals by F. P. Ramsey 57; V. On what there is by W. V. Quine 74; VI. Statement about Universals by Frank Jackson 89; VII. 'Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'? by Michael Devitt 93; VIII. Against 'Ostrich' Nominalism: a reply to Michael Devitt by D. M. Armstrong 101; IX: On the elements of Being: I by Donald C. Williams 112; X. The metaphysics of abstract particulars 125; XI. Tropes by Chris Daly 140; XII. Properties by D. M. Armstrong 160; XIII. Modal realism at work: properties 173; XIV. New work for a theory of Universals by David Lewis 188; XV. Causality and properties by Sydney Shoemaker 228; XVI. Properties and predicates by D. H. Mellor 255; Notes on Contributors 268; Select bibliography 270; Index of Names 275-276.
Ontology and the History of Logic
Table of Ontologists (PDF)
Ontologists of the 19th and 20th Centuries
Living Ontologists (a list of authors with an interest in ontology, with synthetic bibliographies)
Last modified: Tuesday, March 09, 2010