RECENT CRITICAL EDITIONS AND TRANSLATIONS OF THE SOPHIST
Greek Text
Platonis Opera - Recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxerunt E. A Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, J. C. G. Strachan - vol. I (Eutyphro, Apologia, Crito, Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Sophista, Politicus) - Oxford, Oxford University Press 1995 (revision of the edition published by John Burnet, 1900-1907).
English Translations
Seth Benardete - Plato's Sophist: part II of The Being of the Beautiful - Translation and commentary - Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986
William S. Cobb - Plato' Sophist - With introduction and notes - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1990
Nicholas P. White - Plato: Sophist - Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993
Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage, and Eric Salem - Plato's Sophist or The Professor of Wisdom - Translation, Introduction, and Glossary - Newburyport: Focus Philosophical Library, 1996
James Duerlinger - Plato's Sophist: a translation with a detailed account of its theses and arguments - Translation and introduction - New York: Peter Lang 2004
French Translations
Parménide, Théétète, Le Sophiste - Traduction de Auguste Diés - Paris: Gallimard 1992
Nestor Cordero - Platon: Le Sophiste - Traduction inédite, introduction et notes - Paris: GF Flammarion 1993
Italian Translations
Giovanni Reale (a cura di) - Platone - Tutti gli scritti - Milano: Bompiani, 2000 (prima edizione Rusconi, 1991) - Il Sofista - Traduzione di Claudio Mazzarelli
Platone - Sofista - A cura di Francesco Fronterotta - Testo greco a fronte - Milano: Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli (BUR), 2007
Platone - Sofista - Testo greco e traduzione italiana a cura
di Bruno Centrone - Torino: Einaudi, 2008
German Translations
Reiner Wiehl - Der Sophist - Griechisch-deutsch. Neu bearbeitet und herausgegeben auf der Grundlage der Übersetzung von Otto Apelt (2. Aufl. 1922) - Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 1967
Helmut Meinhardt - Platon: Der Sophist - Griechisch-deutsch. Mit Einleitung, Übersetzung und Kommentar - Stuttgart: Reclam 1990
Spanish Translations
Platón, Diálogos Parménides, Teeteto, Sofista, Politico - Traducción e introducciones, Maria Isabel Santa Cruz
(Parménides. Político); A. Vallejo Campos (Teeteto); Nestor Luis Cordero (Sofista). - Revisión, C. García Gual y F. García Romero - Madrid: Gredos, 1988 (vol. V).
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Études sur le Sophiste de Platon. Edited by Aubenque Pierre. Napoli:
Bibliopolis 1991.
Les textes de ce volume ont été recueillis par Michel Narcy.
Table des Matières
Pierre Aubenque: Avant-propos p. 11
Première Partie: L'ORDRE DU TEXTE: SOPHISTIQUE, ONTOLOGIE, COSMOLOGIE
Francis Wolff: Le chasseur chassé. Les définitions du sophiste p. 17; Maria
Villela-Petit: La question de l'image artistique dans le Sophiste p. 53;
Nestor-Luis Cordero: L'invention de l'école éléatique: Platon, Sophiste,
242D p. 91; Jean Frère: Platon, lecteur de Parménide dans le Sophiste p.
125; Michel Fattal: Le Sophiste: logos de la synthèse ou logos
de la division? p. 145; Monique Dixsaut: La négation, le non-être et l'autre
dans le Sophiste p. 165; Antonia Soulez: Le travail de la négation:
l'interprétation du Sophiste par Gilbert Ryle p. 215; Monique Lassègue:
L'imitation dans le Sophiste de Platon p. 247; Rémi Brague: La cosmologie
finale du Sophiste (265 B4 - E6) p. 267;
Deuxième Partie: VUES PERSPECTIVES
Barbara Cassin: Les Muses et la philosophie. Élements pour une histoire du
pseudos p. 291; Denis O'Brien: Le non-être dans la philosophie grecque:
Parménide, Platon, Plotin p. 317; Pierre Aubenque: Une occasion manquée: la
genèse avortée de la distinction entre l'"étant" et le "quelque chose" p. 365;
Troisième Partie: LA TRADITION DU SOPHISTE
Pierre Pellegrin: Le Sophiste ou de la division. Aristote-Platon-Aristote
p. 389; Michel Narcy: La lecture aristotélicienne du Sophiste et ses
effets p. 417; Luc Brisson: De quelle façon Plotin interprète-t-il le cinq
genres di Sophiste? (Ennéades VI 2 [43] 8) p. 449; Annick Charles-Saget:
Lire Proclus, lecteur du Sophiste (ave un appendice par Christian Guérard:
Les citations du Sophiste dans les oeuvres de Proclus) p. 475; Françoise
Caujolle-Zaslawsky: Note sur l' epagogé dans le Sophiste. A propos
de Diogène Laërce III 53-55 p. 509; Alain Boutot: L'interprétation
heideggerienne du Sophiste de Platon p. 535;
INDEX
Index de citations de Platon: I Index des citations du Sophiste p. 563;
II Idex des citations d'autres dialogues p. 567; Index des citations d'auteurs
anciens (Platon excepté) p. 571; Index des noms d'auteurs modernes p. 582.
Platone e l'ontologia. Il Parmenide e il Sofista. Edited by
Bianchetti Matteo and Storace Erasmo. Milano: Albo Versorio 2004.
Ackrill John, "Symplokê eidôn," Bulletin of the Institute of
Classical Studies 2: 31-35 (1955).
Reprinted in: R. E. Allen - Studies in Plato's metaphysics - London,
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965 pp. 199-206 and in: G. Vlastos (ed.) - Plato. A
collection of critical essays Vol. I: Metaphysics and epistemology -
Garden City, N. Y., Anchor Books 1971.
Ackrill John, "Plato and the copula: Sophist 251-9," Journal of
Hellenic Studies 77: 1-6 (1957).
Reprinted in: R. E. Allen - Studies in Plato's metaphysics - London,
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965 pp. 207-218, in: G. Vlastos (ed.) - Plato. A
collection of critical essays. I: metaphysics and epistemology - Notre Dame,
Indiana University Press, 1971 and in: J. Ackrill - Essays on Plato and
Aristotle - Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997.
Aguirre Jorge Francisco, "La ontologìa de los géneros supremos I,"
Analogía 15,1: 127-171 (2001).
Aguirre Jorge Francisco, "La ontologìa de los géneros supremos II,"
Analogía 15,2: 121-156 (2001).
Alves dos Santos Maria Carolina, "A demarcação platônica de novas fronteiras
epistêmicas para o discurso filosófico: un estudo sobre o Sofista,"
Trans/Form/Acao.Revista de Filosofia 24: 273-299 (2001).
"In the Sophist, through the circuits of the ontological-binary procedure
of the dialectical divisions, Plato tries to arrive not only at the truth of the
things in themselves, but also rigorous methodic
treatment, which minimizes its limitations and inadvertences, and locates it in
a transcendent dimension, among the types of Being, secures to it the status of
philosophical discourse, capable of saying that which is, as it is."
Ambuel David. On what is not: Eleatic paradox in the Parmenides and
the Sophist. In Plato's Parmenides. Proceedings of the Fourth
Symposium Platonicum Pragense. Edited by Havlícek Ales and Karfík Filip.
Prague: Oikoimené 2005. pp. 200-215
Ambuel David. Image and paradigm in Plato's Sophist. La Vegas:
Parmenides Publishing Company 2007.
Aubenque Pierre. Une occasion manquée: la genèse avortée de la distinction
entre l' "étant" et le "quelque chose". In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon.
Edited by Aubenque Pierre. Napoli: Bibliopolis 1991. pp. 365-387
Réimprimé dans: P. Aubenque - Problèmes aristotéliciens. I. Philosophie
théorique - Paris, Vrin 2009 pp. 307-320
Belardi Walter, "Dal "non essere" parmenideo all' "alterità" platonica: un
caso di paralogismo verbale," Atti della Accademia Nazionale dei
Lincei.Rendiconti Classe di Scienze Morali Storiche e Filologiche 8: 633-647
(1997).
"Plato, in his dialogue The Sophist, tried to disprove the thesis of Parmenides,
according to which the contrary of the einai would be the nonexistent
me einai. Plato maintained instead that epsna is not the contrary of
einai but its otherness (to eteron). Plato's argument has seemed
impeccable and constructive, and has had notable resonance and a sound approval
through the history of the philosophy. Really, the deep structure of Parmenides'
nominalized me einai was a predicate. Plato replaced the universal notion
of "being" (einai) with an epsnai assumed as a determined "thing.
Besides he transformed the negative meaning of me into the arithmetic
meaning of less". So that me slum --> einai, and the wholeness of the
"things", from which einai was subtracted, became the wholeness less to
be, viz. the. Such an argument is actually a paralogism, according to Aristotle
who says exactly: "it is not the same thing to affirm not to be absolutely and
to affirm not to be in a determinated sense and about a determined thing (Soph.
elench. 167 a 4). Then, Plato simply committed the well known paralogism
which consists in changing a statement "a dicto simpliciter ad dictum
secundum quid"."
Benardete Seth, "Plato Sophist 223b1-7," Phronesis.A Journal for
Ancient Philosophy 5: 129-139 (1960).
Benardete Seth, "The Right, the True, and the Beautiful," Glotta 41:
54-62 (1963).
Benardete Seth. Plato's Sophist: Part II of 'The Being of the beautiful'.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1986.
Benardete Seth, "On Plato's Sophist," Review of Metaphysics
46: 747-780 (1993).
Reprinted in: S. Benardete - The Argument of the Action: Essays on Greek
Poetry and Philosophy - Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2000, pp.
323-353.
"In the first part, it is argued that the Stranger has employed in his divisions
both eikastic and phantastic speech, and that the issue of being
arises because Theaetetus fails to recognize Socrates as the philosopher. In the
second part, it is argued that phantastic speech as the experience of
eikastic speech is false opinion, and that the double account of logos, as
the weaving together of species and of agent and action, corresponds
respectively to that which makes speech possible, the other, and that which
determines truth and falsehood in terms of whether the agent is other than the
action."
Berman Scott, "Plato's explanation of false belief in the Sophist,"
Apeiron 29: 19-46 (1996).
"Plato's explanation of false belief is reconstructed from his Sophist
and defended against the principal contemporary account. Since Frege, the
received view in analytic philosophy of mind and language is that human
cognition of the world is always mediated through some sort of intensional
object whose identity conditions are such that the object is ontologically
independent of the world. It is argued that Plato's theory of human cognition,
which makes no reference to intensional objects of that kind, is a better
explanation insofar as it commits itself to a smaller ontology and succeeds in
explaining what we want explained."
Bluck Richard Stanley, "False statement in the "Sophist"," Journal of
Hellenic Studies 77: 181-186 (1957).
Bluck Richard Stanley. Plato's Sophist. A commentary. Manchester:
Manchester University Press 1975.
Edited by Gordon Neal.
Bolton Robert, "Plato's distinction between Being and Becoming," Review
of Metaphysics 29: 66-95 (1975).
Reprinted in: N. D. Smith (ed.) - Plato. Critical assessments - Vol. II:
Plato's middle period: metaphysics and epistemology - Lond, Routledge, 1998
pp. 116-141.
"This paper argues that important changes in Plato's conceptions of being (ousia)
and becoming (genesis) occur over the dialogues, but that the final
version of the distinction between the two remains strong enough to sustain the
essentials of the theory of degrees of reality which the distinction was
originally devised to expound. This position is an alternative to the
predominant prevailing positions -- that Plato's views underwent no significant
change, or that there was a change so radical as to force the abandonment of
Plato's middle-period metaphysics. Relevant passages in the "Phaedo",
"Republic", "Theaetetus", "Sophist" and "Philebus" are fully discussed."
Bondeson William, "Plato's "Sophist": falsehoods and images," Apeiron
6: 1-6 (1972).
"The paper is an attempt to show how the problem of the nature and possibility
of falsehood arises in the early parts of Plato's "Sophist". I argue that the
participants in the dialogue operate with two related analogies, one which
considers spoken images to be fundamentally like seen images, and another
analogy which considers the objects of stating or believing to be like the
objects of perceiving. (The second analogy has parallels in "Theaetetus"
188c-189b). These analogies lead to confusions which Plato attempts to dispel in
the later portions of the "Sophist"."
Bondeson William, "Non-being and the One: some connections between Plato's
"Sophist" and "Parmenides"," Apeiron 7: 13-21 (1973).
"The purpose of the paper is to analyze Plato's arguments in the "Sophist"
concerning 'absolute' non-being and to show that these arguments, once the
notion of 'absolute' non-being is interpreted, have implications for (a) Plato's
notion of being, (b) his views about the conditions for something to be a
subject of discourse, and (c) the first and sixth hypothesis of the
"Parmenides"."
Bondeson William, "Some problems about being and predication in Plato's
Sophist 242-249," Journal of The History of Philosophy 14: 1-10
(1976).
Bordt Michael, "Der Seinsbegriff in Platons Sophistes'," Theologie und
Philosophie 66: 493-529 (1991).
"The article provides, first, a survey of the scholarly debate about the meaning
of 'to be' in Plato's Sophist, starting from Cornford, centering on
Michael Frede and Owen, and leading up to the present day discussion. Then,
Plato's criticism of dualism, monism, idealism, materialism (Soph. 242b6-249d5)
is given detailed analysis. The scope of this analysis is to substantiate the
hypothesis that Plato distinguishes two types of propositions in Sophist,
i.e., those of predication and a particular kind of identity. Each type uses
'is' differently. However, even when criticizing traditional ontologies, Plato
does not use 'is' to mean 'exists'."
Bostock David, "Plato on 'is not' (Sophist, 254-9)," Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2: 89-119 (1984).
"According to the received doctrine, which I do not question, the uses of the
Greek verb 'to be' may first be distinguished into those that are complete and
those that are incomplete. In its incomplete uses the verb requires a complement
of some kind (which may be left unexpressed), while in its complete uses there
is no complement, and it may be translated as 'to exist' or 'to be real' or 'to
be true' or something of the kind. What role the complete uses of the verb have
to play in the Sophist as a whole is a vexed question, and one that I shall not
discuss. For I think it will be generally agreed, at least since Owen's
important article of 1971, (1) that in our central section of the Sophist it is
the incomplete uses that are the centre of Plato's attention. Anyway, I shall
confine my own attention to these uses, and accordingly my project is to
elucidate and evaluate Plato's account of 'is not' where the 'is' is incomplete.
I might also add here that, for the purposes of the Sophist as a whole, I am in
agreement with Owen's view that what Plato himself took to be crucial was the
account of 'not', and what he has to say about 'is' is, in his own eyes, merely
ancillary to this. But I do not argue that point, partly because Owen has
already done so, and partly because it is not needed for my main contentions. As
we shall see, one cannot in fact understand what Plato does say about `not'
without first considering his views on the incomplete 'is'.
Reverting to the received doctrine once more, the incomplete uses of 'is' may be
divided into two. In one sense the verb functions as an identity sign, and means
the same as 'is the same as', while in the other it functions merely as a sign
of predication, coupling subject to predicate, and cannot be thus paraphrased.
The vast majority of commentators on the Sophist seem agreed that Plato means to
distinguish, and succeeds in distinguishing, these two different senses of the
verb. This I shall deny. In fact I shall argue not only that Plato failed to see
the distinction, but also that his failure, together with another ambiguity that
he fails to see, wholly vitiates his account of the word 'not'. The central
section of the Sophist is therefore one grand logical mistake."
(1) Plato on Not-Being in Plato I, ed. G. Vlastos (New York,
1971), 223-267. (A note omitted).
Brach Markus Joachim. Heidegger--Platon. Vom Neukantilismus zur
existentiellen Interpretation des "Sophistes". Würzburg: Königshausen und
Neumann 1996.
Brague Rémi. La cosmologie finale du Sophiste (263b4-e6). In
Introduction au monde grec: études d'histoire de la philosophie. Chatou: Les
Éditions de la Transparence 2005. pp. 195-218
Brisson Luc, "Participation et prédication chez Platon," Revue
Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger 116: 557-569 (1991).
Brown Lesley, "Being in the Sophist: a syntactical enquiry,"
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 4: 49-70 (1986).
"Plato's Sophist presents a tantalizing challenge to the modern student of
philosophy. In its central section we find a Plato whose interests and methods
seem at once close to and yet remote from our own. John Ackrill's seminal papers
on the Sophist, (1) published in the fifties, emphasized the closeness, and in
optimistic vein credited Plato with several successes in conceptual analysis.
These articles combine boldness of 'argument with exceptional clarity and
economy of expression, and though subsequent writers have cast doubt on some of
Ackrill's claims for the Sophist the articles remain essential reading for all
students of the dialogue. I am happy to contribute an essay on the Sophist to
this volume dedicated to John Ackrill.
Among the most disputed questions in the interpretation of the Sophist is that
of whether Plato therein marks off different uses of the verb einai , 'to be'.
This paper addresses one issue under that heading, that of the distinction
between the 'complete' and 'incomplete' uses of `to be', which has usually been
associated with the distinction between the 'is' that means 'exists' and the
'is' of predication, that is, the copula."
(1) Symploke Eidon (1955) and Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-59
(1957), both reprinted in Plato I, ed G. Vlastos (New York, 1971), 201-9
and 210-22.
Brown Lesley. The verb 'to be' in Greek philosophy: some remarks. In
Language. Edited by Everson Stephen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1994. pp. 212-236
"I examine key uses of 'to be' in Parmenides, Plato (especially Republic V
and Sophist) and Aristotle. I argue against imposing modern distinctions
(into predicative, existential or identity uses) on to the texts, showing that
while Greek uses of einai may be partitioned into syntactically complete
and incomplete (noted by Aristotle and perhaps at Sophist 255cd) the
distinction was neither clear-cut nor perceived as philosophically important. I
examine how these authors treated the inference from 'X is F' to 'X is' (compare
that from 'X teaches French' to 'X teaches') and, more problematically (as Plato
Sophist saw, correcting Parmenides and Republic V) from 'X is not F'
to 'X is not'. "
Brown Lesley. The Sophist on statements, predication, and falsehood.
In The Oxford Handbook of Plato. Edited by Fine Gail. New York: Oxford
University Press 2008. pp. 383-410
"This essay focuses on two key problems discussed and solved in the Middle Part:
the Late-learners problem (the denial of predication), and the problem of false
statement. I look at how each is, in a way, a problem about correct speaking;
how each gave rise to serious philosophical difficulty, as well as being a
source of eristic troublemaking; and how the ES offers a definitive solution to
both. As I said above, the Sophist displays an unusually didactic
approach: Plato makes it clear that he has important matter to impart, and he
does so with a firm hand, especially on the two issues I've selected."
Brumbaugh Robert Sherrick. Diction and dialectic. The language of Plato's
Stranger from Elea. In Language and thought in early Greek philosophy.
Edited by Cobb Kevin. La Salle: Hegeler Institute 1983. pp. 266-276
Reprinted with the title "Diction and dialectic: a note on the Sophist"
and a new final pragraph as Chapter 7 in. R. S. Brumbaugh - Platonic studies
of Greek philosophy: Form, Arts, Gadgets, and Hemlock - Albany, State
University of New York press, 1989, pp. 103-111.
Brzoska Andreas. Absolutes Sein. Parmenides' Lehrgedicht und seine
Spiegelung im Sophistes. Münster : Lit 1992.
Carchia Gianni. La favola dell'essere. Commento al Sofista. Macerata:
Qidlibet 1997.
Con il Sofista di Platone nella traduzione di Ermidio Martini
Cherubin Rose. What is Eleatic about the Eleatic Stranger? In Plato's
dialogues: new studies and interpretations. Edited by Press Gerald A.
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 1993. pp. 215-236
"In Plato's Sophist the mathematician Theodorus introduces to Socrates a
man Theodorus says is a philosopher from Elea and a companion of the followers
of Parmenides and Zeno. This Eleatic
stranger, whose name is neither given nor asked for in the dialogue, is asked by
Socrates to tell whether his compatriots thought of sophist, statesman, and
philosopher as three classes or as fewer, and what names they used for such a
class or classes.
In this paper I would like to pose and to explore the following questions: Why
is there an Eleatic Stranger in Plato's Sophist? What if anything does
this character say or imply or do that only a
"companion of those around Parmenides and Zeno" (216a) would? I would also like
to propose that central to these concerns is the question of how Plato read
Parmenides' poem. Did Plato take the daimon's speech as a direct and
literal statement of Parmenides' views? What we can discover about this issue
could be instructive in our considerations of how we might best read
Parmenides." p. 215
Chu Antonio. Plato, Frege and the possibility of false judgment. In
Desire, identity, and existence. Essays in honor of T. M. Penner. Edited by
Reshokto Naomi. Kelowna (Canada): Academic printing and publishing 2004. pp.
225-249
Cordero Nestor-Luis. L'invention de l'école éléatique: Platon, Sophiste,
242D. In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon. Edited by Aubenque Pierre.
Napoli: Bibliopolis 1991. pp. 91-124
Cordero Nestor-Luis. La participation comme être de la forme dans le
Sophiste de Platon. In Ontologie et dialogue. Mélanges en hommage à
Pierre Aubenque avec sa collaboration à l'occasion de son 70e anniversaire.
Edited by Cordero Nestor-Luis. Paris: Vrin 2000. pp. 33-46
Cordero Nestor-Luis. Aristotele critico spietato ma erede furtivo del
Sofista Platone. In Gigantomachia. Vonvergenze e divergenze tra Platone e
Aristotele. Edited by Migliori Maurizio. Brescia: Morcelliana 2002. pp.
205-219
Cordero Nestor-Luis, "Du non-être à l'autre: la découverte de l'altérité
dans le Sophiste de Platon," Revue Philosophique de la France et de
l'Étranger 195: 175-189 (2005).
"When Plato, in the Sophist, tries to turn down Parmenides' argumentation
about the existence of non-being, he reaches a most unexpected conclusion: i.e.,
the Greek language, identifying "what is" to "the beings", makes it impossible
to express what is not. Now, since the false discourse, proper to Sophists,
supposes that "that which is not" exists, Plato examines the theories of the
philosophers who came before him and discovers that, apart from the absolute
nothingness on which he shares Parmenides's judgment, some kind of a non-being
is possible, i.e., that of predication. True to his philosophy. Plato suggests a
Form as warrant of such a "relative" non-being: the different (alterity,
otherness). This Form, with its complementary Form, the identity, guarantees the
definition of every reality."
Cordero Nestor-Luis, "Il faut rétablir la version originale de Sophiste
240 B 7-9," Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico 28 (403): 413
(2007).
Crivelli Paolo. Il 'Sofista' di Platone. Non essere, negazione e falsità. In
Atti e Memorie dell'Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere "La Colombaria" -
Vol. 55. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki 1990. pp. 11-104
"Introduzione. Dopo sei tentativi insoddisfacenti di definire il sofista con il
metodo diairetico, nella settima classificazione dicotomica Platone lo descrive
come `produttore di immagini'. Tale caratterizzazione si scontra con le
difficoltà sollevate dal `paradosso del falso', l'argomentazione che cerca di
provare l'inesistenza del falso. L'ampio excursus centrale del Sofista
(236d5-264d9) affronta e risolve una delle versioni del paradosso del falso.
Platone riconduce la fallacia dell'argomentazione a un'errata valutazione dei
rapporti tra negazione ed esistenza, e corregge lo sbaglio mediante una
minuziosa analisi del significato della particella 'non'.
La versione del paradosso del falso studiata nel Sofista può essere
presentata, a meno di qualche inessenziale semplificazione, come
un'argomentazione che esclude la falsità degli enunciati singolari affermativi:
perché un enunciato singolare affermativo sia falso, bisogna che ciò che
non è P sia detto essere P (`P' termine generale arbitrario), e quindi
bisogna parlare di ciò che non esiste; ma è impossibile parlare di ciò
che non esiste; di conseguenza, un enunciato singolare affermativo non può
essere falso. Il passaggio critico di questa argomentazione si fonda
sull'assunzione che la negazione predicativa implichi l'inesistenza: se x
non è P, allora x non esiste.
Platone ritiene (giustamente) che tale assunzione sia errata, e adotta la
strategia di svelare, e quindi confutare, il ragionamento sofistico che sta a
fondamento di essa. A suo avviso, tale ragionamento muove dal presupposto che la
particella `non' indichi contrarietà: dato che la copula ha portata
esistenziale, la verità di un predicato nominale `è P' rispetto a un oggetto x
richiede (tra l'altro) l'esistenza di x; se il `non' indica contrarietà, la
verità rispetto a x del predicato nominale negativo `non è P' richiede la
soddisfazione di condizioni contrarie (ossia antitetiche, il più possibile
lontane) rispetto a quelle che garantiscono la verità di `è P', e quindi
richiede (tra l'altro) l'inesistenza di x. Pertanto `non è P' è vero solo di ciò
che non esiste, e la negazione predicativa implica l'inesistenza.
Platone demolisce tale ragionamento attaccandone il presupposto: il `non' non
indica contrarietà, ma solo diversità. Più precisamente: la verità del predicato
nominale negativo `non è P' rispetto a un oggetto x richiede `solo' che
x sia diverso da ciascuno degli oggetti dei quali è vero il predicato
nominale `è P', ossia (poiché la predicazione ha portata esistenziale) che x sia
diverso da ciascuno degli oggetti che esistono e partecipano della proprietà
significata dal termine generale `P'.
Ora, però, niente vieta che tra gli oggetti diversi da tutti quelli che esistono
e partecipano della proprietà significata da `P' ve ne siano di esistenti.
Pertanto `non è P' può essere vero anche di ciò che esiste, e la negazione
predicativa non implica l'inesistenza. L'assunzione sulla quale si fonda il
paradosso del falso è confutata.
Platone non si limita a demolire il paradosso del falso, ma propone anche
un'analisi della falsità degli enunciati singolari nella quale mette a frutto i
risultati dello studio della negazione: `s è P' è falso quando s (l'oggetto del
quale `s è P' parla) non è P, ossia quando s è diverso da ciascuno degli oggetti
che esistono e partecipano della proprietà significata dal termine generale P.
La versione del paradosso del falso studiata nel Sofista non dipende da uno
scambio tra gli usi `esistenziale' e `predicativo' del verbo 'einai' ('essere'),
ma da un errore nel modo d'intendere il 'non'. Ciò spiega perché la soluzione
suggerita da Platone non si concentri sulla distinzione tra gli usi
`esistenziale' e 'predicativo' di `einai' (un fatto, questo, che mette in crisi
varie accreditate interpretazioni del dialogo): la distinzione tra gli usi di
'einai' non avrebbe colpito l'errore che sta alla radice del paradosso esaminato
da Platone. Il problema logico più profondo studiato dal Sofista non riguarda i
sensi o usi di 'einai', ma i rapporti fra negazione ed esistenza." pp. 11-12.
Crivelli Paolo, "Plato's Sophist and semantic fragmentation,"
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 75: 71-74 (1993).
"In this journal, Band 71, Heft 3, pp. 257-282, Michael T. Ferejohn proposed to
apply to the interpretation of certain parts of Plato's Sophist a
methodological principle which I shall call 'principle of joint explanation':
given the close relationship between Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, in
particular circumstances it's possible to use Aristotelian texts to interpret
obscure or vague Platonic passages. In this paper I shall criticize Ferejohn's
application of the 'principle of joint explanation' to the Sophist and
his interpretation of Plato's analysis of negation and of its philosophical
aims."
Crombie Ian MacHattie. An examination of Plato's doctrines. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul 1963.
Vol. I: Plato on man and society; vol. II: An examination of Plato's doctrines
Dancy Russell M., "The Categories of Being in Plato's Sophist
255c-e," Ancient Philosophy 19: 45-72 (1999).
"Sophist 255c-e contains a division of beings into two categories rather
than a distinction between the "is" of identity, existence, and/or predication;
this emerges from an analysis of the argument that employs the division. The
resulting division is the same as that ascribed to Plato in the indirect
tradition among the so-called "unwritten doctrines"; there the two categories
are attached to the One and the Indefinite Dyad."
"Conclusion. Perhaps it is not so bad if the later Plato sounds more like
Aristotle. But there remains an enormous difference of ontology between Plato
and Aristotle, if any of the reports of Plato's 'unwritten doctrines' can be
believed.
We have already noticed that Plato thinks the distinction between beings
and others can be put by saying that while beings partake of both
the Forms Standalone and Relative, others partake only of the Form
Relative. The partition of beings into Standalone ones and Relative ones,
as I have construed it, is a categorial scheme: the scheme of Old Academic
Categories adverted to in the introductory section of this article. Hermodorus
(or whoever) was there quoted as saying that Plato says 'of the beings, some are
by virtue of themselves, and some are relative to something'; that much we have
the Eleatic Stranger saying in 255c13-14. But Hermodorus gives us examples,
where the Stranger does not: a man and a horse are by virtue of themselves;
large and small [things] are relative to things. If we unpack these examples, we
presumably find ourselves saying: Bucephalus is a horse by virtue of himself; it
is because he is Bucephalus that he is a horse, or, perhaps better, it is not
because of some other thing that Bucephalus counts as a horse, whereas the fact
that Bucephalus is large is something whose explanation requires us to introduce
other, relatively smaller, horses which are the norm for horses as far as size
goes. This then leads to categorizations of the terms man and horse
under the heading Standalone and large, small, good, and bad under
the heading Relative. And it seems a sound conjecture that where I am speaking
of 'terms', Plato would speak of 'forms': the division is a division of forms,
if that is right.
But that is not the end of the story. The Hermodorus text, along with other
texts, (1) would have us believe that Plato rooted the two categories Standalone
and Relative in two super-Forms that stood above all the others: the mysterious
entities known as the One and the Indefinite Dyad, from which the more ordinary
Forms derived as numbers. I think this, too, should be taken seriously. But that
is a large undertaking, not to be entered on here." pp. 69-70
(1) Including, besides the others quoted in I, many in Aristotle, and also the
rather strange and somewhat garbled stretch of text in Sextus Empiricus,
Adversus Mathematicos x 257-276 purporting to report on the views of 'Pythagoras
and his circle'.
De Petris Alfonso. Del vero e del falso nel Sofista di Platone. Con un
saggio sul Cratilo. Firenze: Olschki 2005.
De Rijk Lambertus Marie, "On ancient and mediaeval semantics and
metaphysics. Part V. Plato's semantics in his critical period (Second part),"
Vivarium 19: 81-125 (1981). 5. Plato's semantics in his critical period (Continuation); 5.6.2. The
problem of giving several names and the Communion of Kinds; 5.6.2.1. On the
'trivial' question of 'one individual -- many names'; 5.6.2.2. Giving several
names and the Communion of Kinds; "5.6.3. Dialectic and the Communion of Forms In order to clarify the Communion of Kinds an analogy is drawn between the
vowels which `form a sort of bond running through the whole system (253 A 4-5)
and certain Forms that are `running through all' (253 C 1). Just as without the
help of vowels it is impossible for one of the other letters to fit in with any
other (A 5-6), similarly it is the special Forms that make possible Communion
and are responsible for Division (C 2-3). It seems to be useful to have a look
at the impact of this analogy." p. 95 5.6.3.1. The precise impact of the wovel-analogy; 5.6.3.2. The proper task of
Dialectic; 5.6.3.3. The description of the dialectician's practice; 5.6.4. On
the Communion of Forms as occurring in particulars; 5.6.5. The question of 'what
is not' reduced into a problem of name-giving; 5.6.6. Four antinomies concerning
the Five Kinds raised and solved (254D-255E); 5.6.6.1. The first round: on the
relations of Being, Rest and Change; 5..6.6.2. The second round: on the
relations of Change, Rest, Same and Other; 5.6.6.3. The third round: 'What is'
and 'the Same' disentangled; 5.6.6.4. The fourth round: 'What is' and 'the
Other' disentangled; 5.6.6.5. On the different uses of kath' hauto; 5.6.6.6.
'What is' and 'the Other' disentangled. Continuation; 5.6.6.6. 'What is' and
'Other' disentangled. Continuation.
De Rijk Lambertus Marie, "On ancient and mediaeval semantics and
metaphysics. Part VI. Plato's semantics in his critical period (Third part),"
Vivarium 20: 97-127 (1982). 5.6.7. How the diverse Kinds have communion with one another; 5.7. The
reinstatement of 'What is not' (256d-259D); 5.7.1. Forms being and Forms not
being: 5.7.2. The not-being of 'What is'; 5.7.3. The being of what is not';
5.7.4. Are there Forms corresponding to negative expressions?; 5.7.5. The
Parmenidean dogma refuted. Summary;
"5. 8 Conclusion. From our analysis of Soph., 216 A-259 D it may be
concluded that Plato did certainly not abandon his theory of Forms. We may try
to answer, now, the main questions scholarship is so sharply divided about (see
Guthrie [A History of Greek Philosophy] V, 143ff.). They are, in
Guthrie's formulation: (1) does Plato mean to attribute Change to the Forms
themselves, or simply to enlarge the realm of Being to include life and
intelligence which are not Forms?, and (2) is he going even further in dissent
from the friends of Forms and admitting what they called Becoming --changing and
perishable objects of the physical world -- as part of the realm of True Being?
The first question should be answered in the negative. Indeed, Plato is
defending a certain Communion of Forms, but this regards their immanent
status and, accordingly, the physical world primarily, rather than the `Forms
themselves' (or: `in their exalted status' as Guthrie has it, p. 159). As to the
second question, to Guthrie's mind Plato's language makes it almost if not quite
insoluble. I think that if one pays Plato's expositions the patient attention he
asks for 'at 259 C-D and follows his analysis stage by stage, the exact
sense and the precise respect in which he makes his statements (cf. 259 D 1-2:
ekeinêi kai kat' ekeino ho physi) about Being and Not-being, Sameness and
Otherness, and so on will appear. It will be easily seen, then, that there is no
recantation at all in Plato's development. He still maintains, as he will
maintain in his later works (e.g. Philebus, 14 D ff.) the Transcendent
Forms as what in the last analysis are the only True Being. But Plato succeeds
in giving a fuller sense to the old notions of `sharing' and `presence in'
without detracting the `paradigm' function of the Forms in any respect. Matter,
Change and Becoming is given a better position in the Theory of Forms in that
their immanent status has been brought into the focus of Plato's interest. From
his Parmenides onwards Plato has been searching for the solution of his
metaphysical problems and has actually found it in the Sophist in a new
view of participation. Forms in their exalted status are just a too eminent
cause for the existence of the world of Becoming. But their being shared in,
i.e. their immanent status, make them so to speak `operable' and yet preserve
their dignity of being paradeigmatic standards. What makes something to be a
horse is, no doubt, the Transcendent Form, HORSENESS, but it only can partake
of that Form and possess it as an immanent form. So the Highness of the Form
and the unworthy matter can come together as matter 'informed', that is,
affected by an immanent form.
Plato never was unfaithful to his original view about Forms as the only True
Being. In our dialogue, too, he brings the eminence of True Being (taken, of
course, as a Transcendent Form) into relief by saying (254 A) that the
true philosopher, through his devotion to the Form, `What is' ('Being'), dwells
in the brightness of the divine, and the task of Dialectic, accordingly, is
described from that very perspective (see Part (5), 96ff.). Focussing on the
immanence of the Forms does not detract anything from their `exalted status',
since immanent forms are nothing else but the Transcendent Forms as partaken of
by particulars.(...)
In his critical period Plato never ceased to believe in the Transcendent World.
The important development occurring there consists in his taking more seriously
than before their presence in matter and their activities as immanent
forms. In the Sophist he uses all his ingenuity to show that a correct
understanding of the Forms may safeguard us from all extremist views on being
and not-being and zealous exaggerations of the Friends of Forms as well." pp.
125-127.
De Rijk Lambertus Marie. Plato's Sophist. A philosophical commentary.
Amsterdam: North-Holland 1986.
Contents. Preface 9; Preliminary: Plato's Sophist to be reconsidered? 11;
Introduction 13; Chapter 1. The dispute about interpreting Plato 22; Chapter 2.
The evolution of the doctrine of Eidos 30; Reconsidering Plato's
Sophist 69; Chapter 3. The dialogue's main theme and procedure 71; Chapter
4. On current views about 'what is not' 82; Chapter 5. On current views about
'what is' 93; Chapter 6. Plato's novel metaphysical position 103; Chapter 7. The
variety of names and the communion of kinds 110; Chapter 8. An important
digression on dialectic 126; Chapter 9. The communion of kinds; Chapter 10. How
the five kinds combine 159; Chapter 11. The reinstatement of 'what is not'
(256d-259d) 164; Chapter 12. On philosophic and sophistic discourse 186; The
framework: semantics and philosophy in Plato; Chapter 13. Plato's semantics in
the Cratylus 217; Chapter 14. Naming and representing 254; Chapter 15.
Language and knowing 277; Chapter 16. Semantics and metaphysics 327;
Bibliography 355; Index of passages quoted or referred to 365; Index of proper
names 377; Index of terms and topics 383-394.
"The way in which Plato announces (Sophist, 249C-D) his novel metaphysics
has been puzzling modern scholars for a long time: 'What is and the All consist
of what is changeless and what is in change, both together'. Did Plato
really introduce Change into the Transcendent World and thus abandon his theory
of Unchangeable Forms?
Many of Plato's commentators have claimed that the use of modern techniques of
logico-semantical analysis can be a valuable aid in unraveling this problem and
other difficulties Plato raised and attempted to solve. However, not all modern
distinctions and tools can be applied without reservation; for many of these are
entirely alien to Plato's thought. Interpreters of Plato must also resist the
temptation of applying methods as disjointing the dialogue and selecting
specific passages only, in their eagerness to prove that Plato was explicitly
interested in (their own favourite) problems of 'identity and predication' (not
to mention such oddities as the `self-predication of Forms'), or the
distinctions between different senses (or applications) of 'is'. The present author has tried to understand Plato by a close reading of the
complete dialogue and to relate the doctrinal outcome of the Sophist to
Plato's general development. Close reading Plato involves following him in his
own logico-semantical approach to the metaphysical problems, an approach which
shows his deep interest in the manifold ways to 'name' (or to 'introduce into
the universe of discourse') 'what is' (or the 'things there are').
The reader may be sure that my indebtedness to other authors on this subject is
far greater than it may appear from my text. Also many of those who have gone in
quite different directions than mine have been of great importance to me in
sharpening my own views and formulations. Two authors should be mentioned
nominatim: Gerold Prauss and the late Richard Bluck; two scholars, whose
invaluable works deserve far more attention than they have received so far.
I owe my translations of the Greek to predecessors. Where I have not followed
them, my rendering is no doubt often painfully (and perhaps barbariously)
literal: I do not wish to incur the suspicion of trying to improve Plato by
modernising him." (from the Preface)
De Vries William, "On Sophist 255b-e," History of Philosophy
Quarterly 5: 385-394 (1988).
"At Sophist 255b7-e the Eleatic Stranger distinguishes both being and
identity and being and difference. I argue that the two apparently different
arguments given are in fact intrinsically related. Both ultimately turn upon the
distinction between absolute and relative uses of "being," which I argue does
not involve either the "is" of existence or the "is" of identity, but rather the
distinction between monadic and relational predication. "
Denyer Nicholas. Language, thought and falsehood in ancient Greek
philosophy. London: Routledge 1991.
Diés Auguste. La définition de l'être et la nature des idées dans le
Sophiste de Platon. Vrin: Paris 1963.
Reprint of the oririginal edition published in 1903
Dixsaut Monique. La négation, le non-être et l'Autre dans le Sophiste.
In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon. Edited by Aubenque Pierre. Napoli:
Bibliopolis 1991. pp. 165-213
Dorter Kenneth, "Diairesis and the tripartite soul in the Sophist,"
Ancient Philosophy 10: 41-61 (1990).
"The Republic and its predecessors interpret sophistry as the employment
of reason in the service of the appetites (or spiritedness). But although the
Sophist defines sophistry in several ways, none of which is entirely
satisfactory, it never discusses this earlier approach. It proceeds entirely in
terms of material products rather than value-laden goals. The tripartite soul is
not mentioned, and attentiveness to difference of value is actively discouraged.
At the same time, however, the dialogue abounds with allusions to the tripartite
soul and value. My essay explores this tension and suggests a resolution that
also explains the six preliminary definitions and the purpose of the trilogy as
a whole."
Duerlinger James, "The ontology of Plato Sophist: the problems of
falsehood, non-being and being," Classical Quarterly 65: 151-169 (1988).
"A new, unifying account of Plato's discussion of the problems is introduced
that places it squarely within the framework of his theory of Forms as it was
understood by Aristotle and the ancient Platonists, instead of the linguistic
frameworks in which it has been placed by modern scholars. The account takes the
form of a continuous analytical summary of, and commentary on, the "Sophist",
236d9-259d8."
Duerlinger James, "The ontology of Plato Sophist: the solutions to
the problems of falsehood, non-being and being," Classical Quarterly 65:
170-184 (1988).
Dürr Karl, "Moderne Darstellung der platonischen Logik. Ein Beitrag zur
Erklärung des Dialoges Sophistes," Museum Helveticum 2: 166-194
(1945).
Ebert Theodor. Wer sind die Ideenfreunde in Platons Sophistes? In
Amicus Plato magis amica veritas. Festschrift Wolfgang Wieland zum 65.
Geburtstag. Edited by Enskat Rainer. Berlin: de Gruyter 1998. pp. 82-100
"In this paper I try to support the position (held by Proklos, Mallet, Burnet,
and A. Taylor) that the "friends of the Forms" in Plato's Sophist (248a
ff.) are Pythagorean philosophers. My main argument for this claim is the term 'synetheia'
as used by the Eleatic Stranger at Sophist 248b8: as the passage Meno
76c-d (not taken into consideration by Ross in Plato's Theory of Forms p.
105) shows, this term may well denote acquaintance with persons, not only
habituation. Hence, Plato has the Eleatic Stranger refer to philosophers with
whom he, because of his Italian background, is well acquainted. For these
philosophers, there are no other likely candidates than the Pythagoreans."
Eck Job van, "Falsity without negative predication: on Sophistes
255e-263d," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 40: 20-47 (1995).
Eck Job van, "Plato's logical insights: on Sophist 254d-257a,"
Ancient Philosophy 20: 53-79 (2000).
"Plato has often been censured for a serious lack of important logical insights.
Especially his theory of not being and falsity and its preliminaries, as
presented in Sophistes 254d-263d, has evoked many grave criticisms in
point, particularly section 254d-257a, which contains the fundament of the
results in the following one. Those parts of the text are discussed that have
given rise to these criticisms, which are shown to be all mistaken. In fact
there is only one marginal slip in an otherwise impeccable series of arguments,
leading to a highly adequate analysis of not being and falsity."
Eck Job van, "Non-being and difference: on Plato's Sophist
256d5-258e3," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 23: 63-84 (2002).
Ellis John, ""Dunamis" and Being: Heidegger on Plato's Sophist
247d8-e4," Epoché.A Journal for the History of Philosophy 3: 43-78
(1995).
Esposti Ongaro Michele, "Analisi nominale e analisi verbale nel Sofista
di Platone," Giornale Critico di Filosofia Italiana 87: 240-254 (2008).
Fattal Michel. Le Sophiste: logos de la synthèse ou
logos de la division? In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon.
Edited by Aubenque Pierre. Napoli: Bibliopolis 1991. pp. 145-163
Réimprimé dans: M. Fattal - Logos. Pensée et vérité dans la philosophie
grecque - Paris: l'Harmattan 2001, 161-80
Ferejohn Michael T., "Plato and Aristotle on negative predication and
semantic fragmentation," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 71:
257-282 (1989).
Ferg Stephen, "Plato on false statement: relative being, a part of being,
and not-being in the Sophist," Journal of The History of Philosophy
14: 336-342 (1976).
"The Stranger in the Sophist is careful to distinguish false statements from
elliptical relational assertions which sometimes appear to resemble them."
Figal Gunter. Refraining from dialectic: Heidegger's interpretation of Plato
in the Sophist Lectures (1924/25). In Interrogating the Tradition.
Hermeneutics and the history of philosophy. Edited by Scott Charles E. and
Sallis John. Albany: State University of New York Press 2000. pp. 95-109
Flower Robert, "G. E. L. Owen, Plato and the verb to be," Apeiron
14: 87-95 (1980).
"In defining what Being is in the Sophist, Plato uses the verb to be in
one sense only, that of participation. There is neither an "is" of existence nor
one of identity."
Frede Michael. Prädikation und Existenzaussage. Platons Gebrauch von
'...ist' und '...ist nicht...' in Sophistes. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht 1967.
Frede Michael. Plato's Sophist on false statements. In The
Cambridge companion to Plato. Edited by Kraut Richard. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1992. pp. 397-424
Frede Michael. The literary form of the Sophist. In Form and argument in
late Plato. Edited by Gill Christopher and McCabe Mary Margaret. Oxford:
Oxford University Press 1996. pp. 135-152
Fronterotta Francesco, "L'être et la participation de l'autre, une nouvelle
ontologie dans le Sophiste," Études Philosophiques: 311-353
(1995).
Gavray Marc-Antoine, "La dunamis dans le Sophiste,"
Philosophie Antique.Problèmes, Renaissance, Usagess 6: 29-57 (2006).
"In Sophist 247d8-e4, the Eleatic Stranger presents an bows of Being as
dunamis tou poiein kai tou pathein. This paper aims to investigate the
meaning of this horos and to establish the value set on dunamis. A
comparison with other Platonic passages where the formula occurs (Phaedrus
and Theaetetus) reveals that the Sophist provides a double change:
on the one hand, the dunamis moves to the field of Being in an
unprecedented way, on the other hand the formula is not ascribed to Hippocrates
or Protagoras anymore, but it is introduced by a protagonist who intends to
defend it. A reading of the previous and following arguments shows that the
horos can thoroughly help to understand the dialogue's structure and
argumentation. Not only useful for defining Being, it also permits to explain
the koinonia of the Kinds and to lay the foundation for the theory of
non-being. Finally, it proves an efficient mean of definitely going beyond
sophistry by replacing it with a real and philosophical ontology."
Gavray Marc-Antoine. Simplicius lecteur du Sophiste. Contribution à
l'étude de l'exégèse néoplatonicienne tardive. Paris: Klincksieck 2007.
Gerson Lloyd, "A distinction in Plato's Sophist," Classical
Quarterly 63: 251-266 (1986).
Reprinted in: Nicholas D. Smith (ed.) - Plato. Critical Assessments - Plato's
later works - vol. IV - London, Routledge, 1998 - pp. 125-141.
"The fundamental objection to the theory of Forms, as recognized both by
Aristotle and Plato himself in the "Parmenides", is that Forms need to be
separate from the sensible world and yet in some way present in it. This appears
to be impossible. In the "Sophist" Plato begins to formulate an answer to this
objection which consists in a distinction of a Form and its nature, the latter
bearing a strong resemblance to what later came to be called a 'common nature'."
Gerson Lloyd, "The 'Holy Solemnity' of Forms and the Platonic Interpretation
of Sophist," Ancient Philosophy 26: 291-304 (2006).
"In the famous passage Sophist 248E6-249A2, the Eleatic Stranger suggests
that "real being" is somehow inseparable from intellect or "intellectual
motion." Modern interpretations of this passage either hold that Plato wants to
redefine real reality to include all things that are in motion or that he wants
to include one type of motion within the really real. Both of these
interpretations have serious difficulties. According to the older Platonic
interpretation of the passage which I shall defend, Plato wants to claim that
the inseparability of intellect and real reality means that eternal objects of
thinking could not exist without their being eternally thought."
Glasmeyer Christian. Platons Sophistes: zur Überwindung der Sophistik.
Heidelberg: Winter 2003.
Gomez-Lobo Alfonso, "Plato description of dialectic in the Sophist
253d1-e2," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 22: 29-47 (1977).
Gonzalez Francisco J. Confronting Heidegger on Logos and Being in Plato's
Sophist. In Platon und Aristoteles - sub ratione veritatis. Festschrift
für Wolfgang Wieland zum 70. Geburstag. Edited by Damschen Gregor, Enskat
Rainer, and Vigo Alejandro. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & ruprecht 2003. pp. 102-133
Griswold Charles, "Logic and metaphysics in Plato's Sophist,"
Giornale di Metafisica 6: 555-570 (1977).
"In part one of this essay I defend the thesis that the "greatest genera" of the
"Sophist" are not the metaphysical ideas of the earlier dialogues, and that the
"participation" of these genera in each other is to be understood from a
linguistic or logical, rather than metaphysical, perspective. The genera are
like concepts, not essences. In part two I argue that the Stranger's doctrine of
the genera means that they cannot be unified, self-predicative, separable, and
stable; the doctrine deteriorates for reasons internal to itself. I suggest
throughout that the Stranger's philosophical orientation is more
"subjectivistic" than that of (Plato's) Socrates; unlike the ideas, the genera
are subject to the soul's intellectual motion and productive capacity. finally,
I suggest that there is no convincing reason for holding that the Stranger's
views are superior to those of Socrates."
Heidegger Martin. Plato's Sophist. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press 1997.
Heidegger's lecture course at the University of Marburg in the Winter Semester
of 1924-25.
Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer.
Original German edition: Platon, Sophistes - Frankfurt am Main:
Klostermann, 1992, edited by Ingeborg Schüssler (Gesamtausgabe, II, 19)
Heinaman Robert, "Being in the Sophist," Archiv für Geschichte der
Philosophie 65: 1-17 (1981).
"There is an influential view, developed during the last fifteen years,
concerning the relationship between the concept of existence and the
notion of Being in Plato's Sophist. (a)
Three distinguishable claims are involved in this account:
(1) Plato does not wish to isolate the existential use of `to be' from its other
uses.
(2) Plato's discussion of being concerns syntactically incomplete uses of `to
be,' not syntactically complete uses of the verb. (b)
(3) The concept of existence plays no role in the philosophical problems
discussed or their solutions. Plato operates with a "scheme of concepts which
lacks or ignores an expression for `exist.' (c)
I have no quarrel with (1). But (1) must be clearly distinguished from (3) since
Plato may have failed to mark out the existential use of `to be' while
nevertheless using the word to mean existence with this latter concept
playing an important role in the argument. In this paper I will try to show that
there are no good reasons to accept (2) or (3). Although I shall deal with
points raised by John Malcolm and Michael Frede, the focus will be on Professor
Owen's paper. The first section will argue that Owen's interpretation of the
Sophist is untenable and the second section will show that his arguments for
(2) and (3) are unsuccessful. Finally, the third section explains how the
position I defend is compatible with Plato's employment of negative
existentials.
The position I defend is that the concept of existence does not monopolize but
is part of the notion of Being in the Sophist." pp. 1-2
(a) G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," in G. Vlastos (ed.) Plato I (New
York, 1971), pp. 223-67; Michael Frede, Prädikation und Existenzaussage
(Göttingen, 1967); J. Malcolm, "Plato's Analysis of tò ón and tò me ón in the
Sophist," Phronesis (1967), pp. 130-46. Also cf. W. Bondeson, "Some Problems
about Being and Predication in the Sophist," Journal of the History of
Philosophy (1976), p.7, n. 15; A. P. D. Mourelatos, "`Nothing' as
'Not-Being'," in G. Bowersock, W. Burkert, M. Putnam (eds.) Arktouros
(New York, 1979), pp. 319-29.
(b) Owen, pp. 225, 236, 240-41. Frede makes the still stronger claim that
every use of 'to be' in the Sophist is incomplete (Frede, pp. 37, 40,
51). Idiscuss Frede's interpretation in an appendix.
(c) Owen, p. 263.
Heinaman Robert, "Self-predication in the Sophist," Phronesis.A
Journal for Ancient Philosophy 26: 55-66 (1981).
Heinaman Robert, "Once more: Being in the Sophist," Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie 68: 121-125 (1986).
"According to what I will call the 'new' interpretation, the meaning of `being'
which plays an important role in the philosophical argument of the Sophist is
not `existence' but `being such and such,' what is expressed by syntactically
incomplete uses of 'to be. (a) In an earlier paper I claimed, to the contrary,
that `being' is used to mean existence in the Sophist's argument, although its
meaning corresponds to the other uses of the verb as well. (b) Against the new
interpretation I argued as follows:
(1) The aporiai of 237-41 are solved in 251-59 by rejecting 237-41's assumption
that 'not-being' means `contrary to being' and claiming that 'not-being' instead
means `different from being.'
(2) On the new interpretation, `the contrary of being' means `what is
(predicatively) nothing.'
(3) The aporia of 240c-241b cannot be given a coherent interpretation if
'not-being', as there used, is understood to mean `what is (predicatively)
nothing.'
(4) Hence the meaning of 'not-being' required by the new interpretation is
unacceptable, and the new interpretation should be rejected.
In a recent note John Malcolm has replied to this argument and raised some other
objections to my paper. (c) Here, I will limit myself to explaining why
Malcolm's objections have no force, and why his reply to my argument. simply
exchanges one absurdity for others." p. 121
(a) Its main proponents are G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," in G. Vlastos
(ed.) Plato I (New York, 1971), pp. 223-67); Michael Frede, Prädikation und
Existenzaussage (Göttingen, 1967); J. Malcolm, "Plato's Analysis of tò on
and tò mé on in the Sophist," Phronesis (1967), pp. 130-46.
(b) "Being in the Sophist," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (1983), pp.
1-17.
(c) "Remarks on an Incomplete Rendering of Being in the Sophist," Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie (1985), pp. 162-65. Ensuing references to Malcolm
will be to this paper.
Heinaman Robert E., "Communion of Forms," Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 83: 175-190 (1983).
"I argue that the notion of 'communion of Forms' in Plato's "Sophist" is
intended to account for the truth and not for the meaningfulness of statements;
and that the relation of communion which holds between Forms is identical with
the relation of participation which connects individuals to Forms, and that no
other relations constitute communion."
Hestir Blake E., "A conception of truth in Plato's Sophist,"
Journal of The History of Philosophy 41: 1-24 (2003).
" Plato's solution to the problem of falsehood carries a notorious reputation
which sometimes overshadows a variety of interesting developments in Plato's
philosophy. One of the less-noted developments in the Sophist is a
nascent conception of truth which casts truth as a particular relation between
language and the world. Cornford and others take Plato's account of truth to
involve something like correspondence; some find the origin of Aristotle's
"correspondence" account of truth in Plato's Sophist. But all this
assumes a lot about Plato, much less Aristotle. For one, it assumes that to
claim that the statement 'Theaetetus is sitting' is true is to claim that it is
true because it corresponds with the fact that Theaetetus is sitting. Other
scholars have been reluctant to accept Cornford's view, but few offer any
explanation of what sort of account of truth we might ascribe to Plato by the
end of the Sophist. Tarski has argued that truth is a simpler notion than
that of correspondence. In fact, he claims his own "conception" of truth is
similar to the classical conception we find in Aristotle's Metaphysics --
a conception of truth formulated in Greek in much the same way Plato formulates
it in the Sophist. Unfortunately, Tarski never sufficiently explains what
it is about the classical conception that makes it closer to his own. I argue
that Tarski is generally right about the ancient conception of truth, but this
is not to claim that Tarski's own conception is in Plato. By interpreting
Plato's solution to the paradox of not-being and his solution to the problem of
falsehood, I argue that Plato's account of truth implies a simpler notion of
truth than correspondence. I outline various types of correspondence theory and
show that none of these fits what Plato says about truth, syntax, and meaning in
the Sophist."
Johnson Patricia Ann, "Keyt on "eteron" in the Sophist,"
Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 23: 151-157 (1978).
Jordan Robert William, "Plato's task in the Sophist," Classical
Quarterly 34: 113-129 (1984).
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