Annotated bibliography on Plato's Sophist. Second Part: K - Z
Plato's Cratylus and the problem of the "correctness of names"
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kahn Charles, "Some philosophical uses of 'to be' in Plato," Phronesis.A
Journal for Ancient Philosophy 26: 105-134 (1981).
Kahn Charles, "Being in Parmenides and Plato," Parola del Passato 43:
237-261 (1988).
Kahn Charles, "Why is the Sophist a sequel to the Theaetetus?,"
Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 52: 33-57 (2007).
"Interprets the Theaetetus and the Sophist as Plato's first move
in the project of reshaping his metaphysics, with the double aim of avoiding
problems raised in the Parmenides and applying his general theory to the
philosophy of nature. The classical doctrine of Forms is subject to revision,
but Plato's fundamental metaphysics is preserved in the Philebus as well
as in the Timaeus. The most important change is the explicit enlargement
of the notion of Being to include the nature of things that change. This
reshaping of the metaphysics is prepared in the Theaetetus and Sophist
by an analysis of sensory phenomena in the former and, in the latter, a new
account of Forms as a network of mutual connections and exclusions. The
Theaetetus deals with becoming and flux but not with being; that topic is
reserved for Eleatic treatment in the Sophist. But the problems of
falsity and Not-Being, formulated in the first dialogue, cannot be resolved
without the considerations of truth and Being, reserved for the later dialogue.
That is why there must be a sequel to the Theaetetus."
Kamlah Wilhelm. Platons Selbstkritik im Sophistes. München: C. H.
Beck 1963.
Kerferd George, "Plato's noble art of sophistry (Sophist 226a-231b),"
Classical Quarterly 4: 84-90 (1954).
Ketchum Richard. Truth and being in Plato's Sophist. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press 1971.
Ketchum Richard, "Participation and Predication in the Sophist
251-260," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 23: 42-62 (1978).
Keyt David, "Plato's paradox that the immutable is unknowable,"
Philosophical Quarterly 19: 1-14 (1969).
"One of the great questions that Plato considers in the Sophist is that
of the number and nature of real things (242C5-6). The protagonist of the
dialogue, an Eleatic stranger, raises problems for both the pluralist
(243D6-244B5) and the monist (244B6-246E5) without resolving them and then turns
to the battle of gods and giants, the battle between those who hold that "body
and being are the same" (246B1) and those who hold that "true being is certain
intelligible and bodiless Forms" (246B7-8). What the one holds is the logical
contrary, not the contradictory, of what the other holds; so it is possible that
they are both wrong. This seems in fact to be the Eleatic's conclusion
(249C10-D4), although by the time he gets to the friends of the Forms the
property under examination has shifted from corporeality to mutability. The
Eleatic stranger presents the friends of the Forms with an interesting paradox
(248D1-E5). This is my subject. The friends of the Forms hold that real being "
is always invariable and constant " (248A11-12). But being is known (248D2). And
on the hypothesis that to know is to act on something, that which is known is
acted upon (248D10-E1). Further, to be acted upon is to be changed (248E3-4).
Therefore, since being is known, it is changed (248E3-4). But this conclusion
contradicts their original contention." p. 1
Keyt David, "Plato on falsity: Sophist 263B," Phronesis.A Journal
for Ancient Philosophy: 285-305 (1973).
Supplementary vol. I: Exegesis and argument. Studies in Greek philosophy
presented to Gregory Vlastos - Edited by E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M.
Rorty - Assen, Van Gorcum
Kolb Peter. Platons Sophistes. Theorie des Logos und Dialektik.
Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 1997.
Kostman James. False Logos and Not-Being in Plato's Sophist. In
Patterns in Plato's thought. Papers arising out of the 1971 West Coast Greek
philosophy Conference. Edited by Moravcsik Julius. Dordrecht: Reidel 1973.
pp. 192-212
Kostman James, "The ambiguity of 'partaking' in Plato's Sophist,"
Journal of The History of Philosophy 27: 343-363 (1989).
"In his An ambiguity in the "Sophist," Gregory Vlastos showed that
statements about Forms in the central section of the "Sophist" may be either
'ordinary' or 'Pauline' predications. This paper refutes Vlastos's claim that
Plato was "utterly unaware" of this ambiguity. 255c-e is taken to be the crucial
passage here. This paper adapts the interpretation given by Michael Frede of
this passage and shows that the sense of Plato's partaking-terms (which are used
to analyze statements about Forms) switches from a 'Pauline' to an 'ordinary'
usage at a definite point in the text which falls at the end of the crucial
passage. The context and content of the passage determine that the switch is
deliberate on Plato's part. An analysis of an earlier passage, 250a-e, confirms
this point."
Krohs Ulrich, "Platons Dialektik im Sophistes vor dem Hintergrund des
Parmenides," Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 52: 237-256
(1998).
"In the Sophist, Plato demonstrates the application of two different
types of dialectics: diairesis and the method to investigate the megista gene.
The aim of this paper is to reveal the methodological unity behind this
pronounced duality. The common origin of both methods can be found in the
aporetic part of the Parmenides. The application of that type of
dialectics is restricted in the Sophist to its adequate field and -- in
the middle part of the dialogue-- a variation introduced to solve the paradoxes
of the Paramides. Meinwald's non-aporetic interpretation of the
Parmenides is discussed but rejected."
Lacey Alan Robert, "Plato's Sophist and the Forms," Classical
Quarterly 9: 43-52 (1959).
Lafrance Yvon, "Sur une lecture analytique des arguments concernant le
non-être (Sophiste 237b10 - 239a12)," Revue de Philosophie Ancienne
2: 41-76 (1984).
Lanigan Richard L., "Semiotic phenomenology in Plato's Sophist,"
Semiotica 41: 221-246 (1982).
Reprinted in: John Deely (ed.) - Frontiers in semiotics - Bloomington,
Indiana University Press, 1986, pp. 199-216
Lee Edward N., "Plato on negation and non-being in the Sophist,"
Philosophical Review 81: 267-304 (1966).
"(I) A close analysis of "Sophist" 257-259 yields a new interpretation for
Plato's doctrine of the "parts of otherness" there. I show how it defines a
sense of non-being different from, and stronger than, that earlier defined by
otherness itself (in "Sophist" 251-257), and I claim that this explains why
Plato twice specifies this doctrine, rather than that, as the explanation of
non-being he needs to refute Parmenides (258b and 258e). Next I explore the
philosophical force of this doctrine of "parts of otherness". First (II) I show
its logical role in analyzing the sense of negative predication statements,
using comparisons with Wittgenstein's early analysis of negation. Then (III) I
treat its metaphysical role, defining that element of negativity in becoming
that corresponds to Aristotle's principle of "privation" ("Physics" I). A brief
addendum argues that Plotinus read Plato's doctrine of the "parts" in the same
way as developed here."
Leigh Fiona, "The copula and semantic continuity in Plato's Sophist,"
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 34: 105-121 (2008).
Lema Hincapié Andrés, "¿Qué es el no-ser? La respuesta de Platón y de
Parménides," Praxis Filosófica 8-9: 247-279 (1999).
"Firstly, this article presents through a minute analysis Parmenides'
ontological doctrine on not-being taken from his Poem. Moreover, it handles with
a period in Plato's thought that could be adequately qualified as a Parmenidean
period of his not-being ontology.
Nevertheless, Plato, in his search for a precise and true definition of the
sophist, is forced to abandon his former way of thinking about not-being. That
is the main content of his dialogue entitled The Sophist. This dialogue
defends another meaning of not-being. For Parmenides not-being just meant
nothing. Besides not-being as nothing, now for Plato there is a positive sense
of not-being, which is the different or the other."
Lentz William, "The problem of motion in the Sophist," Apeiron
30: 89-108 (1997).
Lewis Frank A., "Did Plato discover the estin of identity?,"
California Studies in Classical Antiquity 8: 113-143 (1976).
Lewis Frank A., "Plato on "not"," California Studies in Classical
Antiquity 9: 89-115 (1976).
"The general analysis of negation in the Sophist and a detailed
examination of Sophist 257b3-c3 show that Plato distinguished sentences
that assert non-identity, e.g. "Motion is not identical" with assorted other
Forms, from sentences of negative predication proper, e.g. "Helen is not wise".
Plato is not concerned either with truth-conditions of negative sentences or
with supplying the details that would give a materially adequate account of such
sentences. Instead, he is concerned almost exclusively with stating what is
required if we are to understand a negative predicate and if the negative
predicate is to have a determinate meaning."
Li Volsi Rocco, "Il Sofista di Platone," Giornale di Metafisica
24: 177-234 (2002).
Malatesta Michele, "On one instance of the Chrysippean syllogism of the dog
in Plato's Sophista 252e1-8," Metalogicon 11: 1-16 (1998).
Malcolm John, "Plato's analysis of to on and to me on in the
Sophist," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 12: 130-146
(1967).
Malcolm John, "Does Plato revise his ontology in Sophist 246c-249d?,"
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 65: 115-127 (1983).
"The best way to read the passage in question is not to assume that Plato is
here categorically affirming metaphysical truths which he endorses, be they at
the expense of his earlier views or otherwise. One cannot plausibly regard it as
a source of any new commitments on his part as to the nature of the real."
Malcolm John, "Remarks on an incomplete rendering of Being in the Sophist,"
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 67: 162-165 (1985).
Malcolm John, "On 'what is not in any way' in the Sophist,"
Classical Quarterly 35: 520-523 (1985).
Malcolm John, "A way back for Sophist 255c12-13," Ancient
Philosophy 26: 275-289 (2006).
"At Sophist 255c12-13 'being' and 'difference' are distinguished on the
grounds that some things are what they are in themselves (kath'hauta -
KH), others with reference to something else (pros alla - PA). Since
'difference' only obtains in this second way of being, it is distinct from
'being'. Recently scholars have challenged the traditional reading
(non-relative/relative) of the KH/PA dichotomy on the grounds that it puts
'sameness' under "with reference to something else." I argue (1) that there are
serious difficulties with their alternatives and (2) that something close to the
traditional version may be adopted if we do not take the KH/PA division as
exhaustive."
Marcos de Pinotti Graciela E., "Aporias del no-ser y aporias de lo falso en
"Sofista" 237b-239c," Revista Latino-Americana de Filosofia 17: 259-274
(1991).
In Sophist 237b-239c Plato presents three puzzles designed to show that
nothing can be thought or said about the not-being: what is not in any way ("to
medamos on") cannot even be unthinkable or unsayable. This paper argues that
these puzzles involving the not-being are parallel to those raised with respect
to falsehood, which are exploited by Plato in order to prove that false
statement is possible. While "what is not in any way" cannot be denied, because
this negation forces us precisely to what we are trying to deny-the being of
not-being, in denying the falsehood, the Sophist is bound to accept that the
false in some respect is ("einai pos").
Marcos de Pinotti Graciela E., "Discurso y no ser en Platón (Sofista
260a-263d)," Synthesis 4: 61-83 (1997).
Marcos de Pinotti Graciela E. Filosofía versus sofistica en el
Sofista de Platón. In Diálogo con los Griegos. Estudios sobre Platón,
Aristóteles y Plotino. Edited by Santa Cruz Maria Isabel, Di Camillo
Silvana, and Marcos de Pinotti Graciela E. Buenos Aires: Colihue Universidad
2004. pp. 77-92
Marten Rainer. Der Logos der Dialektik: eine Theorie zu Platon Sophistes.
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1965.
Mattéi Jean-François. L'Étranger et le Simulacre. Essai sur la fondation
de l'ontologie platonicienne. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1983.
Mattéi Jean-François, "Les genres de l'être chez Platon et le système
aristotélicien des quatre causes," Cahiers de Philosophie Ancienne 19:
228-251 (2004).
Mattéi Jean-François. L'origine platonicienne de la métaphysique: la
communauté des genres de l'être. In Y a-t-il une histoire de la métaphysique?
Edited by Zarka Yves Charles and Pinchard Bruno. Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France 2005. pp. 27-44
Mattéi Jean-François. Les genres de l'être chez Platon et le système
aristotélicien des quatre causes. In Cosmos et psychè. Mélanges offerts à
Jean Frère. Edited by Vegleris Eugénie. Hildesheim: Georg Olms 2005. pp.
183-202
Matthen Mohan, "Greek ontology and the 'is' of truth," Phronesis.A
Journal for Ancient Philosophy 28: 113-135 (1983).
Másmela Arroyave Carlos, "Copia y simulacro en el Sofista de Platon,"
Tópicos.Revista de Filosofia: 163-173 (1997).
"Within the Sophist, Plato establishes a clear distinction between two
types of mimetic art: the copy and the simulacrum.
Such a distinction avoids reducing the image to the faithful reproduction of a
sensitive model. The present article aims at making visible the fact that the
phantasma (simulacrum), and not the copy, constitutes the starting point
of artistic creation."
Másmela Arroyave Carlos. Dialéctica de la imagen: una interpretación del
"Sofista" de Platón. Rubí: Anthropos 2006.
McDowell John. Falsehood and not-being in Plato's Sophist. In
Language and Logos. Studies in ancient Greek philosophy presented to G. E. L.
Owen. Edited by Schofield Malcolm and Nussbaum Martha. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1982. pp. 115-134
"For me, G. E. L. Owen's 'Plato on Not-Being' (1971) radically improved the
prospects for a confident overall view of its topic. Hitherto, passage after
passage had generated reasonable disagreement over Plato's intentions, and the
disputes were not subject to control by a satisfying picture of his large-scale
strategy; so that the general impression, as one read the Sophist, was one of
diffuseness and unclarity of purpose. By focusing discussion on the distinction
between otherness and contrariety (257B1-C4), Owen showed how, at a stroke, a
mass of confusing exegetical alternatives could be swept away, and the
dialogue's treatment of not-being revealed as a sustained and tightly organised
assault on a single error. In what follows, I take Owen's focusing of the issue
for granted, and I accept many of his detailed conclusions. Where I diverge from
Owen - in particular over the nature of the difficulty about falsehood that
Plato tackles in the Sophist (§§5 and 6 below) -it is mainly to press further in
the direction he indicated, in the interest of a conviction that the focus can
and should be made even sharper." p. 115
McPherran Mark L., "Plato's reply to the 'worst difficulty' argument of the
Parmenides: Sophist 248a- 249d," Archiv für Geschichte der
Philosophie 68: 233-252 (1986).
"This paper offers an interpretation of the 'worst difficulty' argument of the
Parmenides (133a-135a) that allows it -- contrary to other popular accounts
-- to live up to Plato's suggestion that it constitutes a significant challenge
to the early theory of Forms (concluding, as it does, that knowledge of the
Forms is impossible). In light of Plato's hint that the argument is nonetheless
flawed (133b), the paper surveys various plausible rebuttals, and then contends
that Plato recognizes the best one available to him in the Sophist
(248a-249d). finally, the author examines the problem of actually attributing
that solution to him."
Meinhardt Helmut. Teilhabe bei Platon: ein Beitrag zum verständnis
platonischen Prinzipiendenkens ünter besönderer Berucksichtigung des Sophistes.
München: Alber 1968.
Migliori Maurizio, "Verso il Filosofo: Dialettica e ontologia nel
Sofista Platone," Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 91: 171-204
(1999).
Migliori Maurizio. Plato's Sophist: value and limitation on ontology.
Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2007.
Five lessons followed by a discussion with Bruno Centrone, Arianna Fermani,
Lucia Palpacelli, Diana Quarantotto.
Original Italian edition: Il Sofista di Platone. Valore e limiti
dell'ontologia - Brescia, Morcelliana, 2006.
Mignucci Mario, "Platone e i relativi," Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul
Pensiero Antico 9: 259-294 (1988).
Mignucci Mario, "Esistenza e verità nel Sofista di Platone," Atti della
Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche di Napoli 100: 267-281 (1989).
Miller Dana, "Fast and loose about Being: criticism of competing ontologies
in Plato's Sophist," Ancient Philosophy 24: 339-363 (2004).
"This paper examines Plato's arguments against competing ontologies in the
Sophist (242b6-250e4). It argues that the purpose of these arguments is
largely to expose a muddle about being. This muddle reifies being. But this
conception of being produces a puzzle, namely, that being seems not to be
anything. Therefore, some other conception of being must be sought."
Mojsisch Burkhard. Platons Sprachphilosophie im 'Sophistes'. In
Sprachphilosophie in Antike und Mittelalter. Edited by Mojsisch Burkhard.
Amsterdam: Verlag B. R. Grüner 1986. pp. 35-62
Bochumer Kolloquium, 2-4 Juni 1982
Mojsisch Burkhard, "Logos and Episteme. The constitutive role of language in
Plato's theory of knowledge," Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike
und Mittelalter 3: 19-28 (1998).
"This essay first differentiates the various meanings of the term logos
as it appears in Plato's dialogues Theaetetus and The Sophist.
These are: the colloque of the soul with itself, a single sentence, a proposing
aloud, the enumeration of the constitutive elements of a whole and the giving of
a specific difference; further, opinion and imagination. These meanings are then
related to Plato's determination of knowledge (episteme) and therewith
truth and falsity. One can be said to possess knowledge only when the universal
contents of thought -- dialogical thought -- are set in relation to the
perceivable, imagination or opinion. Reflections on the principle significance
of possibility as such -- a thematic not addressed by Plato -- conclude the
essay."
Mojsisch Burkhard. Das Verschiedene als Nicht-Seiendes in Platons
Sophistes. In Umbrüche: Historische Wendepunkte der Philosophie von der
Antike bis zur Neuzeit. Edited by Kahnert Klaus and Mojsisch Burkhard.
Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner 2001. pp. 1-9
"Plato's dialogue The Sophist highlights the commonality of the most
important genera: rest, being, identity, difference and dialogical
thinking are necessarily implicated in movement. This essay
explores how difference combines as not-being with these other genera.
It concludes that not-being makes possible the commonality of the genera
in the first place, that dialogical thinking alone justifies the thought of
motive not-being and, finally, that not-being allows of conceiving the idea of
being as also not-being, as in motion and as mediated through language. In sum:
In Plato's late philosophy, not-being is the most important of the most
important genera.
"
Moravcsik Julius, "Being and meaning in the Sophist," Acta
Philosophica Fennica 14: 23-78 (1962).
From the Conclusion: "Communion and interweaving are the key concepts of the
Sophist. They are used on two levels; the ontological and the semantic. The two
are not sharply separated, and each helps to explain the other. The Communion of
the Forms parallels the interwovenness of words, and thus 253-256 parallells
260-262. A similar parallel and relations of dependence are presented between
the discussions of Not-being and falsehood. Thus 257-258 and 263 go together.
This interrelatedness not only brings out the nature of Plato's philosophizing
in this period, but it also presents the interpreter with the task of working
out the whole passage as a unit, for the interpretations of the parts are
interdependent. This justifies and necessitates my lengthy analysis.
Plato's arguments show that truth and falsehood are not matters of mental sight
or blindness. Thus one should not conceive of the objects of knowledge as
self-sufficient atomic units. Philosophical atomism is denied on all levels. The
paradigm-case of how not to read Plato therefore is: "each element in the
statement has now a meaning; and so the statement as a whole has meaning". (1)
The notion of Communion and the analogy with vowels lead to the conception of
the Forms as functions, as something incomplete, something which need arguments
in order really to express something. At least some of the Forms are shown to be
like functions in this dialogue. If we are willing to pursue Plato's line of
thought beyond the point to which it is carried in the dialogue, we see that
what Plato says leads to construing all Forms as functions. For what we know are
truths and falsehoods, and these are complexes which contain Forms. The
constituents of these complexes are not 'simples', or metaphysical atoms of some
sort. In order to understand them we have to know into what complexes they fit.
We do not grasp them prior to all completions.
It is small wonder that modern commentators of this dialogue have not made much
progress with it. They approach it with the 'part-sum, division-collection,
genus-species' distinctions in mind. Merely because one aspect of dialectic is
said to be the method of division they identify all of Plato's methodology with
this notion, and seek to explain the middle part of the Sophist within
this framework. But these are the wrong tools and the wrong questions. When seen
in proper light, the suggestions of the Sophist present themselves as
topics the further exploration of which is one of the more important
philosophical tasks today." p. 77-78.
(1) F. M. Cornford, op. cit. p. 315.
Morgenstern Amy S., "Leaving the verb 'to be' behind: an alternative reading
of Plato's Sophist," Dionysius 19: 27-50 (2001).
Mourelatos Alexander. 'Nothing' as 'Not-Being': some literary contexts that
bear on Plato. In Arktouros. Hellenic studies presented to Bernard M. W. Knox
on the occasion of his 65th birthday. Edited by Glen Bowersock, Burkert
Walter, and Michael Putnam. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1979. pp. 319-329
Reprinted in: J. P. Anton, A. Preus (eds.) - Essays in ancient Greek
philosophy (Volume Two) - Albany, State University of New York Press, 1983,
pp. 59-69.
Movia Giancarlo. Apparenza essere e verità. Commentario
storico-filosofico al Sofista di Platone. Milano: Vita e Pensiero 1991.
Movia Giancarlo. Il "Sofista" e le dottrine non scritte di Platone.
Napoli: Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa 1991.
Muckelbauer John, "Sophistic travel: inheriting the simulacrum through
Plato's The Sophist," Philosophy and Rhetoric 34: 225-244 (2001).
Naas Michael, "For the name's sake," Epoché.A Journal for the History of
Philosophy 7: 199-221 (2003).
"In Plato's later dialogues, and particularly in the Sophist, there is a
general reinterpretation and rehabilitation of the name (onoma) in
philosophy. No longer understood rather vaguely as
one of potentially dangerous and deceptive elements of everyday language or of
poetic language, the world onoma is recast in the Sophist and
related dialogues into one of the essential elements
of a philosophical language that aims to make claims or propositions about the
way things are. Onoma, now understood as name, is thus coupled with
rhema, or verb, to form the two essential elements of any logos, that
is, any claim, statements, or proposition.
This paper follows Plato's gradual rehabilitation and reinscription of the name
from early dialogues through late ones in order to demonstrate the new role
Plato fashions for language in these later
works."
Nehamas Alexander, "Participation and predication in Plato's later thought,"
Review of Metaphysics 36: 343-374 (1982).
Reprinted in: A. Nehamas - Virtues of authenticity. Essays on Plato and
Socrates - Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 196-223.
"In the later dialogues, especially the Sophist, Plato develops the idea
that forms are capable of participating in one another and in themselves, and
that to have a characteristic is not an imperfect way of being that
characteristic. Plato thus offers the first solid understanding of the
metaphysics of predication in Western philosophy."
Notomi Noburu. The unity of Plato's Sophist. Between the Sophist and the
Philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999.
Notomi Noburu. Aristotle's De Interpretatione 8 is about ambiguity.
In Maieusis. Essays in ancient philosophy in honour of Myles Burnyeat.
Edited by Scott Dominic. New York: Oxford University Press 2007. pp. 254-275
Notomi Noburu. Plato on what is not. In Maieusis. Essays on ancient
philosophy in honour of Myles Burnyeat. Edited by Scott Dominic. New York:
Oxford University Press 2007. pp. 254-275
Notomi Noburu. Plato against Parmenides: Sophist 236D-242B. In
Reading ancient texts: Vol. I: Presocratics and Plato. Essays in honour of Denis
O'Brien. Edited by Stern-Gillet Suzanne and Corrigan Kevin. Leiden: Brill
2008. pp. 167-187
O'Brien Denis. Le non-être dans la philosophie grecque: Parménide, Platon,
Plotin. In Études sur le Sophiste de Platon. Edited by Aubenque Pierre.
Napoli: Bibliopolis 1991. pp. 317-364
O'Brien Denis, "Il non-essere e la diversità nel Sofista di Platone,"
Atti della Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche di Napoli 102: 271-328
(1992).
O'Brien Denis. Le non être. Deux études sur le Sophiste de Platon.
Sankt Augustin: Akademia Verlag 1995.
Brings together two studies, Le non-être dan la philosophie grecque and
Le non-être et l'altérité dans le 'Sophiste' de Platon", both published
separately in 1991 (English summary pp. 167-181)
O'Brien Denis, "Á propos du Sophiste de Platon," Études
Philosophiques: 375-380 (1996).
O'Brien Denis. Théories de la proposition dans le Sophiste de Platon.
In Théories de la phrase et de la proposition. De Platon à Averroès.
Edited by Büttgen Philippe, Diebler Stéphane, and Rashed Marwan. Paris: Éditions
Rue d'Ulm 1999. pp. 21-41
O'Brien Denis. Parmenides and Plato on What is Not. In The winged
chariot: collected essays on Plato and platonism in honour of L.M. de Rijk.
Edited by Kardaun Maria and Spruyt Joke. Leiden: Brill 2000. pp. 19-104
O'Brien Denis. La forma del non essere nel Sofista di Platone. In
Eidos - Idea. Platone, Aristotele e la tradizione platonica. Edited by
Fronterotta Francesco and Leszl Walter. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2005.
pp. 115-159
O'Rourke Fran, "Plato's approach to Being in the Theaetetus and
Sophist, and Heidegger's attribution of Aristotelian influence,"
Diotima.Review of Philosophical Research 31: 47-58 (2003).
"Despite the state priority of the 'Good', Plato's thought is marked by a
profound zeal for Being as the object and goal of all authentic thought and
endeavor. Being is the most fundamental and universal concept, further
articulated in the definition of being as 'Power'.
The limits of this definition are clarified in light of the distinction between
potentia activa and potentia passiva.
Heidegger's suggestion that Plato was inspired by Aristotle is shown to be
incorrect through analysis of dialogues written before Aristotle's arrival in
Athens."
Oscanyan Frederick S., "On six definitions of the sophist: Sophist
221c-231e," Philosophical Forum 4: 241-259 (1973).
"The paper shows that the definitions of the sophist on 221c-231e refer to
specific contemporaries of Socrates: Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus,
Euthydemus and Thrasymachus. Produced by the method of divisions, each
definition consists of a nesting class of attributes. An examination of the
Platonic corpus reveals that these same characteristics are used to satirically
describe the sophists listed above. As the final definition equally describes
Thrasymachus and Socrates, it is shown why Plato viewed the method of divisions
as inadequate for obtaining the proper definition of sophistry: a good Platonic
definition must have ostensive truth as well as essential validity."
Owen Gwilym Ellis Lane, "Plato and Parmenides on the timeless present,"
Monist: 317-340 (1966).
Reprinted in: Alexander Mourelatos (ed.) - The Pre-Socratics; a collection of
critical essays - Garden City, Anchor Press, 1974 and in: G. E. L.Owen -
Logic, science, and dialectic. Collected papers in Greek philosophy -
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1986 pp. 27-44.
Some statements couched in the present tense have no reference to time. They
are, if you like, grammatically tensed but logically tenseless. Mathematical
statements such as "twice two is four" or "there is a prime number between 125
and 128" are of this sort. So is the statement I have just made. To ask in good
faith whether there is still the prime number there used to be between 125 and
128 would be to show that one did not understand the use of such statements, and
so would any attempt to answer the question. It is tempting to take another step
and talk of such timeless statements as statements about timeless entities. If
the number 4 neither continues nor ceases to be twice two, this is, surely,
because the number 4 has no history of any kind, not even the being a day older
today than yesterday. Other timeless statements might shake our confidence in
this inference: "Clocks are devices for measuring time" is a timeless statement,
but it is not about a class of timeless clocks. But, given a preoccupation with
a favored set of examples and a stage of thought at which men did not
distinguish the properties of statements from the properties of the things they
are about, we can expect timeless entities to appear as the natural proxies of
timeless statements.
Now the fact that a grammatical tense can be detached from its
tense-affiliations and put to a tenseless use is something that must be
discovered at some time by somebody or some set of people. So far as I know it
was discovered by the Greeks. It is commonly credited to one Greek in
particular, a pioneer from whose arguments most subsequent Greek troubles over
time were to flow: Parmenides the Eleatic. Sometimes it is suggested that
Parmenides took a hint from his alleged mentors, the Pythagoreans. "We may
assume" says one writer "that he knew of the timeless present in mathematical
statements." 2 But what Aristotle tells us of Pythagorean mathematics is enough
to undermine this assumption. According to him (esp. Metaph. 1091a12-22) they
confused the construction of the series of natural numbers with the generation
of the world. So Parmenides is our earliest candidate. His claim too has been
disputed, and I shall try to clear up this dispute as I go, but not before I
have done what I can to sharpen it and widen the issues at stake." pp. 317-318.
Owen Gwilym Ellis Lane. Plato on Not-Being. In Plato. A collection of
critical essays. I: metaphysics and epistemology. Edited by Vlastos Gregory.
Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press 1971. pp. 104-137
Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen - Logic, science, and dialectic: collected papers in
Greek philosophy - edited by Martha Nussbaum - London, Duckworth (1986).
Pacitti Domenico. The nature of the negative. Towards an understanding of
negation and negativity. Pisa: Gardini 1991.
Painter Corinne, "In defense of Socrates: The Stranger's role in Plato's
Sophist," Epoché.A Journal for the History of Philosophy 9: 317-333
(2005).
"In this essay I argue that the Stranger's interest in keeping the Philosopher
and the Sophist distinct is connected, primarily, to his assessment of the
charges of Sophistry advanced against Socrates, which compels him to defend
Socrates from these unduly advanced accusations. On this basis, I establish that
the Stranger's task in the Sophist, namely to keep philosophy distinct
from sophistry, is intimately tied to the project of securing justice and is
therefore not merely of theoretical importance but is also -- and essentially -
of political and ethical significance."
Palumbo Lidia. Il non essere e l'apparenza. Sul Sofista di Platone.
Napoli: Loffredo Editore 1994.
Palumbo Lidia. Hegel interprete del Sofista nelle Lezione sulla
storia della filosofia. In Hegel e Platone. Edited by Movia
Giancarlo. Cagliari: Edizioni AV 2002. pp. 225-249
Papadis Dimitris, "The concept of truth in Parmenides," Revue de
Philosophie Ancienne 23: 77-96 (2005).
Partenie Catalin. Imprint: Heidegger interpretation of Platonic dialectic in
the Sophist lectures (1924-25). In Heidegger and Plato: toward
dialogue. Edited by Partenie Catalin and Rockmore Tom. Evanston:
Northwestern University Press 2004. pp. 42-71
Peck Arthur Leslie, "Plato and the megista genê of the Sophist.
A Reinterpretation," Classical Quarterly 2: 32-56 (1952).
Peck Arthur Leslie, "Plato's Sophist. The symplokê tôn eidôn,"
Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 7: 46-66 (1962).
Pelletier Francis Jeffry, "'Incompatibility' in Plato's Sophist,"
Dialogue 14: 143-146 (1975).
"Contrary to the claims of Owen (1970), Frede (1967), and many other Platonic
scholars, there is a straight forward way to explicate Plato's "Sophist" as
having 'heteron' first be understood as "non-identical" and after 257b or
so (transition area) be understood as "incompatible." This should encourage
scholars who prefer the "incompatibility" reading but don't see how to get the
required change of meaning. (Ackrill 1955, 1957; Wiggins 1970; Lorenz &
Mittlestrauss 1966)."
Pelletier Francis Jeffry, "Plato on Not-Being: some interpreations of the
symploke eidon (259E) and their relation to Parmenides problem," Midwest
Studies in Philosophy 8: 35-65 (1983).
Pelletier Francis Jeffry. Parmenides, Plato and the semantics of
not-being. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1990.
Peron Barbara. Mit Aristoteles zu Platon. Heideggers ontologische
Ausdeutung der Dialektik im "Sophistes". Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang 2008.
Philip J.A., "The megista gene of the Sophistes," Phoenix
23: 89-103 (1969).
Pino Posada Juan Pablo, "La caza del filósofo: Comentarios al Sofista
de Platón," Estudios de Filosofia 33: 123-141 (2006).
"The following passage illustrates the theme of this paper: "Or, perhaps, have
we fallen inadvertently, by Zeus, in the science of free men, and, searching for
the Sophist, run the risk of having found the philosopher first?" (253c5-10).
The fact that the stranger from Elea surprisingly finds himself with the
Philosopher in a conversation that pretends to offer a definition of the
Sophist, makes one think how little unheeded the closeness between the "free
man" and his imitator was for Plato. In the Sophist, the Platonic interest in
centered in evincing this closeness and, at the same time, in defining the
boundaries among them, making the first a hunter of the second. The present
paper explores the sense of the hunt attending the following singularities: (1)
the formal procedure that it follows; (2) the question that guides it; (3) the
quality of spirit that asks; (4) the words with which the interlocutors name it;
and (5) the "noble" game he finds at last."
Pippin Robert B., "Negation and not-being in Wittgenstein's Tractatus
and Plato's Sophist," Kant Studien 70: 179-196 (1979).
Pirocacos Elly. False belief and the Meno paradox. Alddershot:
Ashgate 1998.
"The philosophical concern of this book is epistemological in kind. It involves
understanding the Socratic elentic method and how its structure introduces an
important epistemological problem which is first raised in the Meno
dialogue as a paradox. This paradox, named the Meno paradox, raises the problem
of falsehood. Specifically the impossibility of falsehood. The Theaetetus
dialogue is then analyzed in terms of how falsehood is there set up as a clearly
epistemological problem. The Sophist dialogue is in turn discussed as
offering a response to the problem of falsehood by revising it as a problem for
semantics."
Politis Vasilis. The argument for the reality of change and changelessness
in Plato's Sophist (248e7-249d5). In New essays on Plato: language and
thought in Fourth-century Greek philosophy. Edited by Herrmann Fritz-Gregor.
Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales 2006. pp. 149-175
Prior William, "Plato's analysis of Being and Not-Being in the Sophist,"
Southern Journal of Philosophy 18: 199-211 (1980).
"In this paper I argue that Plato does not, as most scholars believe,
distinguish different senses or uses of the verb 'to be' in the "Sophist". He
succeeds in differentiating existential statements from statements of identity
and predications, but with the aid of a verb 'to be' which he takes to be
univocal and to be equivalent to 'to participate in'. I offer an analysis of
"Sophist" 251a-257c, and focus in particular on 255e-256e. This passage displays
numerous parallels with the middle dialogues, and it is misleading to treat it
as indicative of a change in Plato's metaphysics."
Przelecki Marian, "On what there is not," Dialectics and Humanism 8:
123-129 (1981).
"The paper refers to the famous discussion of the problems of falsehood and
non-being contained in Plato's "Sophist" and tries to show that the difficulties
which Plato is coping with and the solutions proposed by him have their close
counterparts in modern logical semantics. The main outcome of the analysis is an
explication of the concept of falsehood which does not resort to any kind of
non-existent entities."
Ray Chadwick. For images: an interpretation of Plato's Sophist.
Lanham: University Press of America 1984.
Roberts Jean, "The problem about Being in the Sophist," History of
Philosophy Quarterly 3: 229-243 (1986).
Reprinted in: Nicholas D. Smith (ed.) - Plato. Critical Assessments - Plato's
later works - vol. IV - London, Routledge, 1998 - pp. 142-157
Robinson David B., "The phantom of the Sophist: to ouk ontos ouk
on (240 A-C)," Classical Quarterly 51: 435-457 (2001).
Rosen Stanley. Plato's Sophist. The drama of the original and image.
New Haven: Yale University Press 1983.
Rosen Stanley. Remarks on Heidegger's Plato. In Heidegger and Plato:
toward dialogue. Edited by Partenie Catalin and Rockmore Tom. Evanston:
Northwestern University Press 2004. pp. 178-191
Rossitto Cristina. La dialettica platonica nel Sofista: elenchos
o diairesis? In Platone e la dialettica. Edited by Di Giovanni
Piero. Bari: Laterza 1995. pp. 39-57
Ristampato in: C. Rossitto - Studi sulla dialettica in Aristotele -
Napoli, Bibliopolis, 2000, pp. 327-346
Rousset Emmanuelle. Les intermittences de l'être. Lecture du Sophiste de
Platon. Lagrasse: Verdier 2009.
Rudebusch George, "Does Plato think false speech is speech?," Noûs
24: 599-609 (1990).
"There is an unsolved puzzle about Plato's Theaetetus and Sophist
which has been too little noticed. The Sophist develops and accepts an
account of false speech and belief as saying what is "other." But the
Theaetetus rejects such accounts. The standard solution is that the
Sophist is somehow meant to overcome or avoid the problems seen as
overwhelming in the Theaetetus. I argue that such a solution fails."
Runciman Walter. Plato's later epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1962.
Contents: Preface VII-VIII; 1. Introduction 1; 2. The 'Theaetetus': logic and
knowledge 6; 3. The 'Sophist': ontology and logic 59; 4. Conclusion 127,
Selected bibliography 134; Index 137.
Sallis John. Being and Logos. The way of Platonic dialogue. Atlantic
Highlands: Humanities Press International 1975.
Second edition withe a new preface 1986; Third edition titled: Being and
Logos. Reading the Platonic dialogues - Bloomington, Indiana University
Press, 1996.
Chapter VI. The Way of Logos: Sophist - pp. 456-532.
Sasso Gennaro. L'essere e le differenze. Sul Sofista di Platone.
Bologna: Il Mulino 1991.
Sayre Kenneth, "Falsehood, forms and participation in the Sophist.,"
Noûs 4: 81-91 (1970).
"Recapitulating what he takes to be Plato's analysis of true and false discourse
in the 'Sophist', the author compares the conception of forms behind this
analysis with that operating in the 'Phaedo' and the 'Republic'. On the basis of
this comparison he then attempts to reconstruct the theory of participation
which seems to be implicit in this later dialogue. In place of the earlier
notion of resemblance between form and particular, participation in the
'Sophist' appears to be the relation by which an individual meets the criteria
for being a thing of some given kind. These criteria are illustrated in the
definitions of the angler and of the authentic Sophist, each of which gives
necessary and sufficient conditions for being an instance of that specific
kind."
Sayre Kenneth, "Sophist 263b revisited," Mind 85: 581-586
(1976).
"According to the interpretation of "Sophist" 263b in "Plato's analytic method",
judgments of the forms 'X is a' and 'X is not a' are true and false respectively
if and only if all forms in which X participates combine with a, false and true
respectively if and only if all such forms combine with not-a. If not-a
comprises all forms other than a, as is usually assumed, this definition leads
to paradox. On the basis of Plato's use of heteron and enantion,
it is shown that not-a instead comprises only forms in which X cannot
participate while participating in a, in which case no paradox arises."
Sayre Kenneth. Plato's late ontology: a riddle resolved. Princeton:
Princeton University Press 1983.
Second edition: Parmenides Publishing, 2005 with a new introduction and the
essay "Excess and deficiency at Statesman 283C-285C.
Schipper Edith Watson, "The meaning of existence in Plato's Sophist,"
Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 9: 38-44 (1964).
Schüssler Ingeborg. Le Sophiste de Platon dans l'interprétation de
Heidegger. In Heidegger 1919-1929. De l'herméneutique de la facticité à la
métaphysique du Dasein. Edited by Courtine Jean-François. Paris: Vrin 1996.
pp. 91-111
Actes du colloque organisé par Jean-François Marquet (Université de
Paris-Sorbonne, novembre 1994).
Reprinted in: Ada Neschke-Hentschke (ed.) - Images de Platon et lectures de
ses oeuvres: les interprétations de Platon à travers les siècles -
Louvain-la-Neuve, Éditions Peeters, 1997, pp. 395-415.
Seligman Paul. Being and not-being. An introduction to Plato's Sophist.
The Hague: Martinus Nujhoff 1974.
Serra Mauro. Lectures du Sophiste analytiques et continentaux. In
Actualité des anciens sur la théorie du langage. Edited by Petrilli
Raffaella and Gambarara Daniele. Münster: Nodus Publikationen 2004. pp. 97-109
Silverman Allan. The dialectic of essence. A study of Plato's
metaphysics. Princeton: Princeton University Press 2002.
See in particular Chapter Five: Forms and Language pp. 137-181 and Chapter Six:
Not-beings pp. 182-217
Simon Derek, "The Sophist, 246a-259e: Ousia and to on
in Plato's ontologies," De Philosophia 12: 155-177 (1996).
Soulez Antonia, "Aux sources grecques de la tradition sémantique: le thème
platonicien des "liaisons premieres"," Archives de Philosophie 50:
371-401 (1987).
"The aim in this paper is to follow the conceptual thread which leads from the
early forerunners of the semantic tradition to Bolzano. Plato's "Sophist" could
be seen as a semantic study of the sentence. When the meaning of false sentences
is scrutinized, it becomes clear that the negation functor makes it possible to
bring up the syntactical and semantical puzzle of the unity of complexes as
constituted of parts."
Soulez Antonia. La grammaire philosophique chez Platon. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France 1991.
Starr David E., "The sixth Sophist: comments on Frederick S. Oscanyan's "On
six definitions of the Sophist: Sophist 221e-231e"," Philosophical Forum
5: 486-492 (1974).
""The sixth Sophist" attacks Oscanyan's identification of the last-defined
Sophist in "Sophist" 221e-231e as Thrasymachus. It contends that the sixth
Sophist is Socrates, citing parallels in other dialogues to the numerical
structure of the passage, as well as the content of the definition, to show that
such an identification is both characteristic of Plato and significant."
Stough Charlotte, "Two kinds of naming in the Sophist," Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 20: 355-381 (1990).
Stygermeer Moth. Während Sokrates schweigt. Der zweite Anfang der
Philosophie in Platons Dialog Sophistes. Berlin : Tenea 2005.
Swiggers Pierre, "Théorie grammaticale et définition du discours dans le
Sophiste de Platon," Études Classiques 52: 15-17 (1984).
Swindler James Kenneth. Plato's Sophist and contemporary analytic
ontology. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press 1978.
Swindler James Kenneth, "Parmenide's paradox," Review of Metaphysics
33: 727-744 (1980).
"This paper presents a survey of the Russellian, Strawsonian, and Donnellanian
solutions to the paradox of referring to what does not exist, Parmenides'
paradox, and criticizes these for committment to uninstantiated properties as
the referents of general terms. The paper then shows that this difficulty is
avoided by Plato's solution (in the Sophist), which rests on the
definition of nonbeing as difference. Plato's solution preserves the referential
function of subjects in negative existentials, it avoids uninstantiated
properties, and it avoids all equivocal concepts of being."
Thom Paul, "Critical notice of F. J. Pelletier's Parmenides, Plato, and
the semantics of Not-Being," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22:
573-586 (1992).
"Parmenides was an Object-Monist (not a Fact-Monist), relying on an Argument by
Ellipsis from "a" is not "b" to "a" is not; Plato's Sophist so interprets
him. Both Parmenides and Plato aimed to forge a Philosopher's Language which
does not recognize negative realities. They differed in that Parmenides accepted
the Principle of Non-Contradiction while Plato rejected it as conflicting with
the requirements of the Argument by Ellipsis; further, Plato's (but not
Parmenides') Language of Inquiry allowed for "relative" statements of
non-being."
Thorp John, "Forms, concepts and to me on," Revue de Philosophie
Ancienne 2: 77-92 (1984).
Trevaskis J.R., "The Sophistry of noble lineage ("Sophist" 230a5-232b9),"
Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 2: 36-49 (1955).
Trevaskis J.R., "The megista genê and the vowel analogy of Plato,
Sophist 253," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 11: 99-116
(1966).
Turnbull Robert G., "The argument of the "Sophist"," Philosophical
Quarterly 14: 23-34 (1964).
Van Fraassen Bas C., "Logical structure in Plato's Sophist,"
Review of Metaphysics 22: 482-498 (1969).
"In view of much recent discussion of the passage in the Sophist in which
Plato discusses the relations among the forms, (*) it may not be inappropriate
to examine this passage from the point of view of modern logical theory. There
is indeed already one such study by Karl Dürr, (**) who attempts to represent
the relations among the forms within the framework of classes in Principia
Mathematica. Since we consider some of these relations to be modal in
character, we cannot accept the adequacy of this framework for this purpose.
In what follows we shall examine the connection between relations among the
forms and the relation of participation between forms and individuals (section
2) , the peculiar character of forms corresponding to relative terms (section
3), and finally the formal representation of the described logical structures
(section 4). The main point which emerges is that the problems discussed by
Plato are closely related to difficult problems in current logical theory." p.
482
(*) 251A-259D. See for example J. B. Trevaskis, "The megista genê and the
vowel analogy of Plato, Sophist 253," Phronesis 11 (1966), pp.
99-116, and the references therein.
(**) "Moderne Darstellung der platonischen Logik. Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung des
Dialoges Sophistes," Museum Helveticum 2 (1945), pp. 166-194.
Vasiliu Anca. Dire et voir. La parole visible du Sophiste. Paris:
Vrin 2008.
Vlastos Gregory. An ambiguity in the Sophist. In Platonic studies.
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1973. pp. 270-322
Waletzki W., "Platons Ideenlehre und Dialektik im Sophistes 253d,"
Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 24: 241-252 (1979).
Webb David, "Continuity and difference in Heidegger's Sophist,"
Southern Journal of Philosophy 38: 145-169 (2000).
Wedin Michael V., "Plato on what "being" is not," Philosophia 10-11:
265-295 (1981).
"Three puzzles are raised at "Sophist" 243b-245e concerning theories that make
claims about the number of things that are. I argue that they are preliminary to
and reflect Plato's positive theory of being, in particular they indicate that
it is a mistake to regard being as a standard first-order predicate and so
support the thesis that for Plato being is a second-order or formal concept."
Wiggins David. Sentence meaning, negation, and Plato's problem of non-being.
In Plato. A collection of critical essays. I: metaphysics and epistemology.
Edited by Vlastos Gregory. Notre Dame: Indiana University Press 1971. pp.
268-303
Wiles Anne M. Forms and predication in the later Dialogies. In Plato and
Platonism. Edited by Van Ophuijsen Johannes M. Washington: Catholic
University of America Press 1999. pp. 179-197
Xenakis Jason, "Plato on statement and truth-value," Mind 66: 165-172
(1957).
"In this article the author analyses 'true', 'false', and 'statements' in
Plato's "Sophist" 261e-3b. it is the author's thesis that this reference in
Plato does not exemplify the theory of forms nor does it present the theory of
forms as meanings. The analysis proceeds through a refutation of Crnford's
thesis of the theory of forms, and the author offers alternative interpretations
to the notions of true, false, and statements in Plato."
Xenakis Jason, "Plato's Sophist: a defense of negative expressions
and a doctrine of sense and of truth," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient
Philosophy 4: 29-43 (1959).
Zadro Attilio. Ricerche sul linguaggio e sulla logica del Sofista.
Padova: Antenore 1961.
Ziermann Christoph. Platons negative Dialektik. Eine Untersuchung der
Dialoge "Sophistes" und "Parmenides". Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 2004.
Zuckert Catherine H., "Who's a Philosopher? Who's a Sophist? The Stranger v.
Socrates," Review of Metaphysics 54: 65-97 (2000).
"Many readers have taken the Eleatic Stranger to represent a later stage of
Plato's philosophical development because the arguments or doctrines the
Stranger presents in the Sophist appear to be better than those Socrates
articulates in earlier dialogues. When we examine the definition of the sophist
to which the Stranger comes at the end of the dialogue, however, we find reasons
to question the adequacy of his teaching and, consequently, his superiority to
Socrates. Each or both might appear to be a pretender or sophist; each might
also be seeking knowledge through dialectical sorting or a philosopher."
Zupi Massimiliano. Incanto e incantesimo del dire. Logica e/o mistica
nella filosofia del linguaggio di Platone (Cratilo e Sofista) e Gregorio di
Nissa (Contro Eunomio). Roma: Pontificio Ateneo S. Anselmo 2007.
(click on the image to see the PDF file)