Living
Ontologists (a list of authors with an interest in ontology, with
synthetic bibliographies)
INTRODUCTION
"Reinach's importance for the development of early phenomenology is particularly remarkable considering the brief life span of 34 years granted him for the development of his ideas and his influence. It was his death in action in 1917 rather than Husserl's going to Freiburg which cut short not only his own promise but that of the Gottingen phenomenological Circle. It is therefore not surprising that Reinach never found the time to formulate a comprehensive plan of
a philosophy in which the place of phenomenology
was clearly defined." One can only extrapolate such a plan from his essays and fragments - for he never published a book. His conception would have incorporated a formal and material ontology on realistic lines.
(...)
His examples of the new method, which ranged all the way from mathematics to psychological science, displayed the following major features:I. The phenomenological method is to teach us how to see things which we have a tendency to overlook in our everyday practical attitude, and to see them in their unique whatness or essence without the customary attempts to reduce them to the smallest possible number, an attempt which can lead only to impoverishment and falsification
of the phenomena. The prime objective
of phenomenology is thus to lead us toward the phenomena and to clarify our conceptions of them.
II. Phenomenology does not restrict itself to making inventories of facts. It wants to explore their essences while disregarding their existence. This actually involves two attitudes, actually not yet sharply distinguished by Reinach: (a) disinterest in reality in the sense of independence of the observer, in contrast to the approach of a natural science, like physics; in Reinach's version this change in attitude did not require the adoption of a special method after
the manner of Husserl's phenomenological
reduction; (b) interest in pure models, as in geometry, which considers merely ideal types, even where no example can be produced in actual experience; this involves a theoretical idealization, though not Husserl's ideating abstraction or 'eidetic reduction,' which Reinach does not mention in this context.
III. Besides the intuiting of the phenomena and their essences, Reinach stressed one additional step: the study of the essential connections among these phenomena (Wesenszusammenhänge) and their laws (Wesensgesetze). These relations among the phenomena are determined by their essential nature and are expressed, for instance, in such phrases as 'it lies in the nature of movement to have a substratum,' 'it follows from its very nature.' According
to Reinach, such essential connections
occur not only among the formal structures of logic and general ontology, but also in the structures of concrete 'material' phenomena, for instance among colors in their similarities. They are of two basic types: essential necessities and essential possibilities. To be sure, these are usually so obvious that no one pays attention to them. But it is precisely these neglected 'trivialities' to which phenomenology has to give their due.
In this connection Reinach developed his theory of the phenomenological a priori, which was perhaps the most characteristic feature in his philosophizing. It differed radically from earlier conceptions of the a priori. To begin with, Reinach's a priori was not a property of propositions or acts of judging or knowing, but of states of affairs (Sachverhalte) judged or recognized. It is these ontological states of affairs or, more properly speaking, the connections between
the elements of these states of affairs
(the object judged about and its property judged), which by virtue of these connections are the carriers of the a priori property. 35 The a priori is thus primarily an ontological, not an epistemological category.
But what does it mean that a state of affairs is a priori? Obviously not that we have an innate idea about it. In fact, Reinach agreed with the Kantian conception of the a priori to the extent of interpreting it as knowledge not grounded in experience, but not as knowledge without experience either. He also concurred with Kant that necessity and universality are important aspects of the a priori: A priori states of affairs are universal for all possible examples, and
they are necessary in the sense that the
a priori property contained in the Sachverhalt belongs to its carrier by an essential necessity. However, any implication that this necessity is really only a necessity of thought to be derived from the organization of our understanding must be avoided. This, to Reinach, would have meant sheer psychologism. His necessity was an ontological necessity grounded in the things, not an epistemological one based on our reason. Universality and necessity were for Reinach only secondary characteristics of the a priori;
they followed from the more basic fact that there are essential connections (Wesenszusammenhänge) which are immediately intuitable and which can be given with complete adequacy. Thus 'a priori' means at bottom nothing but the fact that a certain property is necessarily entailed by the essential structure of an object and can hence be understood as such.
"From: Herbert Spiegelberg - The Phenomenological Movement. A historical introduction - Martinus Nijhoff - The Hague, 1963 (third edition). pp. 192 and 193-194.
"Only one of Reinach's treatises is historical in character: "Kant's Understanding of the Humean Problem" (Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 141; 1908). It deserves the most careful attention. Reinach's insights into "relations of ideas" and his discovery that Kant wrongly interpreted these as analytical judgments, were, as I studied them at the time, of decisive importance for me on the way to pure phenomenology. Reinach for
his part, as an accomplished phenomenologist turning to the study of Kant, detected Kant's misunderstanding and treated of it in a rich and instructive article.
The first of Reinach's systematic-phenomenological essays, "Towards the Philosophy of the Negative Judgment" (in the Festschrift for his earlier teacher in philosophy, "Munchener philosophische Abhandlungen. Th. Lipps zu seinem 60. Geburtstage gewidmet von fruheren Schulern," Leipzig, 1911) deals in an extraordinarily penetrating way with difficult questions belonging to the general theory of the judgment. It is original in attempting
to develop a phenomenological difference between "conviction" and "assertion" and in this way to enrich the theory of the negative judgment by making various phenomenological distinctions. Very important but apparently neglected is Reinach's study, "Deliberation in Its Ethical and Legal Significance" (Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 148 and 149; 1912, § 13). The pure phenomenological analysis of the essence of theoretical ("intellectual")
and practical ("voluntary") deliberation leads Reinach to fine and significant distinctions in the area of intellectual and practical-emotional acts and states of mind; he then applies his results to questions of ethics and penal law. The most significant and the longest work of Reinach's is also a mature and thoroughly finished work, "On the Apriori Foundations of Civil Law," which appeared in the first volume (1913) of my Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische
Forschung, of which Reinach was a co-editor. This work attempts something completely new with respect to all present and past philosophies of law: on the basis of pure phenomenology it attempts to develop the idea, long held in suspicion, of an apriori theory of right. With inimitable analytic power Reinach brings to light a whole array of "apriori" truths which underlies any real or possible legal code; and these truths, as he shows, are apriori in exactly the sense of the basic axioms of arithmetic
and logic, that is, they are truths which are grasped in intellectual insight as being valid without any possible exception, and they are prior to all experience. These apriori truths in the sphere of right, such as that a claim is dissolved by its being fulfilled, or that property, through the act of transfer, passes from one person to another, have nothing to do with the "enactments" (arbitrary determinations that something ought to be) of the positive law. For all positive enactments presuppose concepts
such as claim, obligation, property, transfer, etc.; these concepts are thus apriori with respect to positive law. Reinach's apriori principles are simply expressions of absolutely valid truths which are grounded in the essential meaning of these concepts. What is utterly original in this essay of Reinach's, which is in every respect masterful, is the idea that we have to distinguish this apriori, which belongs to the proper nature of any legal order, from the other apriori which is related to positive law as
something normative and as a principle of evaluation: for all law can and must be subjected to the idea of "right law"— "right" from the point of view of morality or of some objective purpose. The development of this idea would lead to a completely different apriori discipline, which however does not, just as Reinach's apriori theory of right does not, go in the direction of realizing the fundamentally mistaken idea of a "natural law." For this apriori discipline (of "right
law") can only bring out formal norms of right, and from these one can no more extract a positive law than one can get definite truths in the natural sciences out of formal logic. No one who is interested in a strictly scientific philosophy of right, in a definitive clarification of the basic concepts which are constitutive for the idea of any possible positive law (a clarification which, it is clear, can be achieved only by phenomenologically penetrating into the pure essence of our consciousness of right)
can afford to overlook this work of Reinach's which breaks so much new ground. It is for me beyond any doubt that it will secure for its author a permanent place in the history of the philosophy of right."
From: Edmund Husserl - Obituary notice - Kant-Studien, 13 1919, pp. 147-149. - Translated by John F. Crosby - Aletheia. An International Journal of Philosophy - 3, 1983, pp. XI-XIII.
"It is characteristic for Reinach that in each of these studies, even if they treat of rather particular problems, Reinach achieves and formulates, often for the first time, general foundational insights. And these insights are at the same time in most instances so precisely formulated that nothing more is needed for us to build on them. Thus the short study entitled, "The Most General Principles of the Inference according to Kant," which is on one level
only a critical study of Kant, clarifies one of the basic problems of logic, the problem of the so-called general object, by distinguishing between essence and the indeterminate individual object which participates in the essence. In the same way his paper, "Kant's Understanding of Hume's Problem," in its aim apparently so very specialized, clarifies the nature of authentic causality by distinguishing between modal and material necessity. And in the same way his paper, "Towards the Theory of the
Negative Judgment," clarifies the nature of presentation (Vorstellung) and intuition (Anschauung), and makes the foundational distinction within the sphere of theoretical acts between acts in which a position or stance is taken, and acts in which something is grasped or apprehended. This distinction, made in connection with the distinction between presentation and judgment (both in the sense of conviction as well as of assertion), has a fundamental importance which not only far surpasses the
sphere of the negative judgment, the subject of this paper, but also surpasses the sphere of the judgment in general and is fundamental for every ontology of acts of the person. This characteristic of Reinach's mind comes out most clearly in his most perfect work, "The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law." His theme here is one belonging to the philosophy of law, but what he deals with is not just anyone but rather the problem of legal philosophy. The so ambiguous concept of the apriori finds here
its definite and classical formulation. The idea of the social acts, with their characteristic need of being heard by the addressee, or of the constitutive importance of certain acts through the performance of which are constituted real, objectively valid relations, withdrawn from our arbitrariness, all this and other ideas as well have an importance which goes far beyond the scope of Reinach's legal theme. We have here insights which are fundamental for the whole ontology of the sphere of personal acts as well
as of the sphere of those objectively valid structures which are constituted by the performance of certain acts."
From: Dietrich von Hillebrand - (Written as an Introduction to Reinach' Gesammelte Schriften (1921), but not published) - Translated by John F. Crosby - Aletheia. An International Journal of Philosophy - 3, 1983, pp. XX-XXI.
EXCERPTS FROM HIS WORKS (in preparation)
PUBLICATIONS IN GERMAN (GS = Gesammelte Schriften; SW = Sämtliche Werke)
Über den Ursachenbegriff im geltenden Strafrecht. Leipzig: J. A.
Barth 1905.
(SW pp. 1-43).
"Psychology, Reinach argues, is capable of assisting in the clarification of
the legal meaning of the concept of cause via appeal to the notion of a
psychic regularity. This same notion can help also in the clarification
of the probable intent of specific laws. From the point of view of Reinach's
later philosophy, the work may be seen as a study of the legal
determinations [Bestimmungen] of positive law and of the development
of aids for their practical interpretation. There is as yet however no
suggestion of his doctrine of the a priori structures underlying
legal formations."
Barry Smith - An annotated bibliography - p. 300.
"William James und der Pragmatismus," Welt und Wissen.Hannoversche
Blätter für Kunst, Literatur und Leben (1910).
(SW pp. 45-50)
"Die obersten Regeln der Vernunftschlüsse bei Kant," Kant Studien
16: 214-233 (1911).
(GS pp. 36-55; SW pp. 51-65)
"Kants Auffassung des Humeschen Problems," Zeitschrift für
Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 141: 176-209 (1911).
(GS pp. 1-35; SW pp. 67-93)
Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils. In Münchener Philosophische
Abhandlungen. Festschrift für Theodor Lipps. Edited by Pfänder
Alexander. Leipzig: J. A. Barth 1911. pp. 196-254
(GS pp. 56-116; SW pp. 95-140).
Revised edition in: Metaphysica. International Journal for Ontology and
Metaphysics, Vol. 0, no. 0, pp. 37-103, April 1999.
"Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechtes," Jahrbuch für
Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung 1: 685-847 (1913).
New edition with the title "Zur Phänomenologie des Rechts. Die
apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechts" and a preface by Anna
Reinach, München, Kösel, 1953.
(GS pp. 166-350; SW pp. 141-278)
"Die Überlegung: ihre ethische und rechtliche Bedeutung," Zeitschrift
für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik (1913).
First part Vol. 148 (1912) pp. 181-196; second part Vol. 149 (1913) pp.
30-58.
(GS pp. 121-165; SW pp. 279-311)
"Paul Natorps 'Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode',"
Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen 4: 193-214 (1914).
(GS pp. 351-376; SW pp. 313-331).
"Natorp had claimed that the I can never be an object of consciousness and
thus it cannot form part of the subject-matter of psychology. The latter is
restricted to the contents of consciousness, i.e. to all of that of which
one is conscious. Reinach argues that it is grounded in the essence of
cogitationes that they can exist only as experiences of an I. Thus he
defends the Cartesian view according to which the cogito is the
starting poing of our knowing, and he insists that the I is present in each
and every experience. However, the pure I - as distinct from the empirical
person - is not a thing with characteristics; Natorp may therefore be
correct in his view that it 'does not admit of any explanation'. But this
does not rule out the clarification of the ways in which it interrelates
with other elements in essential structures.
In grasping itself the I is both bearer and end-point of a grasping act.
Unlike Natorp, who insisted that each relation must have two terms, Reinach
sees no difficulty here, since intentionality is not a relation in the usual
sense."
Barry Smith - An annotated bibliography - p. 300-301.
Gesammelte Schriften. Halle: Max Niemeyer 1921.
Edited from his students. With a preface by Hedwig Conrad-Martius (XXVI+461
ppages).
(This edition is now superseded by Sämtliche Werke).
Über das Wesen der Bewegung. In Gesammelte Schriften. Halle: Max
Niemeyer 1921. pp. 406-461
Prepared by Edith Stein fromseminar notes in Reinach's Nachlass.
(SW pp. 551-588).
"Contains an analysis of continuity and of the essence of traversing of
space, the results of which are then applied to Zeno's paradoxes. A
motion is a continuous process, it should not be thought of as a series of
single part-processes somehow combined together.
Reinach asserts that it is self-evident that all real motion requires a
bearer, but denies that this implies that all perception of motion involves
the perception of a bearer. I can speak of motion and intend motion without
at the same intending something that moves."
Barry Smith - An annotated bibliography - p. 301.
Was ist Phänomenologie? München: Kõsel 1951.
With a preface by Hedwig Conrad-Martius
Lesson held at Marburg in 1914 with the title Über Phänomenologie and
first published in GS pp. 379-405 (SW pp. 531-550).
Sämtliche Werke: Textkritische Ausgabe in 2 Bänden. Mûnchen:
Philosophia Verlag 1989.
Critical edition by Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith in two volumes.
Band I. Die Werke
I. Teil
Kritische Neausgabe (1905-1914)
Geleitwort von Eberhard Avé-Lallement XI; Vorwort der Herausgegeber
XIV-XVIII;
1. (1905) 1-43; 2. William James und der Pragmatismus (1910) 45-50; 3. Die
obersten Regeln der Vernunftschlüsse bei Kant (1911) 51-65; 4. Kants
Auffassung des Humeschen Problems (1911) 67-93; 5. Zur Theorie des negativen
Urteils (1911) 95-140; 6. Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen
Rechtes (1913) 141-278; 7. Die Überlegung: ihre ethische und rechtliche
Bedeutung (1912/13) 279-311; 8. Paul Natorps "Allgemeine Psychologie nach
kritischer Methode" (1914) 313-331;
II. Teil
Nachgelassene Texte (1906-1917)
9. Die Grundbegriffe der Ethik (1906) 335-337; 10. Wesen und Systematik des
Urteils (1908) 339-345; 11. Über impersonale Urteile (1908?) 347-350; 12.
Notwendigkeit und Allgemeinheit im Sachverhalt (1910) 351-354; 13.
Nichtsoziale und Soziale Akte (1911) 355-360; 14. Die Vieldeutigkeit des
Wesensbegriffs (1912) 361-363; 15. Über Dingfarbe und Dingfärbung (1913)
365-367; 16. Einleitung in die Philosophie (1913) 369-513; 17. Zum Begriff
der Zahl (1913/1914) 515-529; Über Phänomenologie (1914) 531-550; Über das
Wesen der Bewegung (1914) 551-588; Aufzeichnungen (1916/17): A. Zur
Phänomenologie der Ahnungen 589-591; B. Notizen auf losen Zetteln 592-604;
C. Bruchstück einer religionsphilosophischen Ausführung 605-611.
Band. II Kommentar und Textkritik
Einleitung: Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) 613
Zu Band I, I. Teil
Allgemeine Vorbemerkung 629; Über den Ursachenbegriff im geltenden
Strafrecht 631; William James und der Pragmatismus 639; Die obersten Regeln
der Vernunftschlüsse bei Kant 643; Kants Auffassung des Humeschen Problems
649; Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils 657; Die apriorischen Grundlagen des
bürgerlichen Rechtes 665; Die Überlegung: ihre ethische und rechtliche
Bedeutung 689; Paul Natorps "Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode"
697;
Zu Band I, II. Teil
Die Grundbegriffe der Ethik 705; Wesen und Systematik des Urteils 709; Über
impersonale Urteile 719; Notwendigkeit und Allgemeinheit im Sachverhalt 725;
Nichtsoziale und Soziale Akte 729; Die Vieldeutigkeit des Wesensbegriffs
733; Über Dingfarbe und Dingfärbung 737; Einleitung in die Philosophie 741;
Zum Begriff der Zahl 759; Über Phänomenologie 767; Über das Wesen der
Bewegung 775; Aufzeichnungen 787; Literaturverzeichnis 813; Sachverzeichnis
831; Personenverzeichnis 845.
Platons Philosophie [Vorlesung] Summer Semester 1910. In Josef
Seifert. Ritornare a Platone. La fenomenologia realista come riforma critica
della dottrina platonica delle idee. In appendice un testo inedito su
Platone di Adolf Reinach. Milano: Vita e Pensiero 2000. pp. 224-237
German text and Italian translation by Giuseppe Girgenti.
ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS
"What is phenomenology," The Philosophical Forum 1: 231-256 (1968).
Translation and introduction by Derek Kelly.
"Reinach's essay is a brief introduction to applied phenomenology. The first part of the essay is exegetical: Reinachexplains the philosophic limitations and problems of the sciences of psychology and of mathematics, and discusses in particular the work of Hilbert and Kronecker. In the second part of the paper, Reinach develops ths concept of the 'a priori.' He rejects both the positivist conception of solely analytic 'a priori,' and also the Kantian notion of necessary conditions for thought. Reinach argues that the 'a priori' is legitimately seen not as subjective or as necessary for thought, but as a necessity of being."
"Concerning phenomenology," The Personalist 50: 194-221 (1969).
Translation by Dallas Willard.
"This paper attempts to illustrate how phenomenological research is done. For Reinach, phenomenology is an attitude or way of seeing, not a set of truths. It is the examination of essences, or universals, and their interconnections. Reinach discusses and illustrates how such examination is required in descriptive psychology, and how it is essentially dispensed with in mathematics, as understood by Hilbert. There follows a critique of Frege's view of number, and a phenomenological elucidation of the distinction between cardinal and ordinal numbers. Reinach's final remarks are devoted to misinterpretations of the "a priori" and to its correct analysis."
Kant's interpretation of Hume's problem. In David Hume. Many-sided genius. Edited by Merrill Kenneth and Shahan Robert. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press 1976. pp. 161-168
Translated by Jitendra Nath Mohanty.
Published also in: Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 7 (1976), pp. 161-188.
"A contribution toward the theory of the negative judgement," Aletheia 2: 15-64 (1981).
Translated by Don Ferrari
On the theory of the negative judgment. In Parts and moments: studies in logic and formal ontology. Edited by Smith Barry. München: Philosophia Verlag 1982. pp. 315-377
Translated by Barry Smith
"The apriori foundations of the Civil Law," Aletheia 3: 1-142 (1983).
William James and pragmatism. In Speech Act and Sachverhalt. Reinach and the foundations of realist phenomenology. Edited by Mulligan Kevin. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1987. pp. 291-298
Translated by Barry Smith
"The supreme rules of rational inference according to Kant," Aletheia 6: 81-97 (1994).
Translated by James Dubois
ITALIAN TRANSLATIONS
I fondamenti a priori del diritto civile. Milano: Giuffré 1990.
Traduzione di Daniela Falcioni, presentazione di Bruno Romano.
Platons Philosophie [Vorlesung] Sommer Semester 1910 - La filosofia di Platone (Lezioni del semestre estivo 1910). In Ritornare a Platone. La fenomenologia realista come riforma critica della dottrina platonica delle idee. Edited by Seifert Josef. Milano: Vita e Pensiero 2000. pp. 224-237
Appendice al volume di Seifert. Appunti delle lezioni raccolti da Alexandre Koyré.
La visione delle idee. Macerata : Quodlibet 2008.
A cura di Alessandro Besoli e Stefano Salice.
Sommario: Introduzione di Stefano Besoli; Profilo della vita e delle opere; 1. William James e il pragmatismo; 2. Le regole supreme delle inferenze razionali in Kant; 3. L'interpretazione kantiana del problema di Hume; 4. Sulla teoria del giudizio negativo; 5. La riflessione: il suo significato etico e giuridico; 6. Sull'Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode di Paul Natorp; 7. Sulla fenomenologia; Agganciarsi a un'anima. Il domandare e i vissuti sociali della coscienza in Adolf Reinach di Alessandro Salice; Nota terminologica; Indice degli argomenti; Indice dei nomi.
FRENCH TRANSLATIONS
"Théorie du jugement négatif," Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale: 384-436 (1996).
Traduction et présentation de Marc B. de Launay.
Les fondements à priori du droit civil. Paris: Vrin 2004.
Traduction de Ronan de Calan..
STUDIES ABOUT HIS WORK
Speech Act and Sachverhalt. Reinach and the foundations of realist phenomenology. Edited by Mulligan Kevin. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987.
Contents: Preface VII; Abbreviations employed in the text XIII; Adolf Reinach: an intellectual biography by Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith 3; Promisings and other social acts: their constituents and structure by Kevin Mulligan 29; Reinach and Searle on promising. A comparison by Klaus Hoffmann 91; Adolf Reinach and the analytic foundations of social acts by Jean-Louis Gardies 107; Reinach on representative acts by James Brown 119; Demystifying Reinach's legal theory by Stanley L. Paulson 133; Verpflichtung und Verbindlichkeit. Ethische Aspekte in der Rechtphilosophie Adolf Reinachs by Armin Burkhardt 155; The intentionality of thinking: the difference between State of Affairs and Propositional Matter by Wolfgang Künne 175; On the cognition of Sates of Affairs by Barry Smith 189; Johannes Daubert Kritik der "Theorie des negativen Urteils" von Adolf Reinach by Karl Schuhmann 227; Husserl und Reinach by Karl Schuhmann 239; Husserl and Reinach on Hume's "Treatise" 257; Adolf Reinachs Vortrag über die Grundbegriffe der Ethik by Karl Schuhmann 275; William James and Pragmatism by Adolf Reinach 291; Adolf Reinach: an annotated bibliography by Barry Smith 299-332; Index 333-344.
From the Preface: "Phenomenology as practised by Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) in his all too brief philosophical career exemplifies all the virtues of Husserl's Logical Investigations. It is sober, concerned to be clear and deals with specific problems. It is therefore understandable that, in a philosophical climate in which Husserl's masterpiece has come to be regarded as a mere stepping stone on the way to his later Phenomenology, or even to the writings of a Heidegger, Reinach's contributions to exact philosophy have been all but totally forgotten. The topics on which Reinach wrote most illuminatingly, speech acts (which he called 'social acts') and states of affairs (Sachverhalte), as well as his realism about the external world, have come to be regarded as the preserve of other traditions of exact philosophy. Like my fellow-contributors, I hope that the present volume will go some way towards correcting this unfortunate historical accident.
Reinach's account of judgements and states of affairs, an account that precedes those of Russell and Wittgenstein, his 1913 treatment of speech acts, his reinterpretation of Hume and aspects of his legal philosophy are the main philosophical topics dealt with in what follows. But his analysis of deliberation as well as his work on movement and Zeno's paradoxes get only a passing mention."
Adolf Reinach: philosophie du langage, droit, ontologie. Les Études Philosophiques 2005.
Contents: Jocelyn Benoist: Reinach: philosophie du langage, droit, ontologie (avant-propos) 1; Philipp Mayrhofer: Réalisme et fondation chez Adolf Reinach 3; Jocelyn Benoist: Reinach et la visée (das Meinen): décliner l'intentionalité 19; Ronan de Calan: Causalité et nécessité matérielle: Reinach lecteur de Hume 39; Bruno Ambroise: Le problème de l'ontologie des actes sociaux: Searle héritier de Reinach? 55; Sandra Laugier: Actes de langage et états de choses: Austin et Reinach 73; Julien Cantegreil: D'une voie phénoménologique en théorie du droit. Remarques sur le réalisme d'Adolf Reinach 99-112.
Adolf Reinach, entre droit et phénoménologie. De l'ontologie normative à la théorie du droit. Edited by Benoist Jocelyn and Kervégan Jean-François. Paris: CNRS Éditions 2008.
Ales Bello Angela, "The controversy about the existence of the world in Edmund Husserl's phenomenological School A. Reinach, R. Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, E. Stein," Analecta Husserliana.The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research 79: 97-116 (2004).
"The aim of the essay consists in analyzing one of the most important points of discussion among some of Husserl's disciples: A. Reinach, R. Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, E. Stein, that is the existence of the world and the way to prove it. The research leads to two consequences: to pinpoint Husserl's particular and original interpretation regarding "existence" that concludes to the acceptance of it and the difference between his transcendental phenomenology and that one sustained by his disciples that can be called a realistic phenomenology. In this contest E. Stein assumed a peculiar position that to some extend combines the two attitudes."
Ambroise Bruno, "Le problème de l'ontologie des actes sociaux: Searle héritier de Reinach?," Les Études Philosophiques: 55-72 (2005).
Benoist Jocelyn, "Reinach et la visée (das Meinen): décliner l'intentionalité," Les Études Philosophiques: 19-37 (2005).
Brown James. Reinach on representative acts. In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the foundations of realist phenomenology. Edited by Mulligan Kevin. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987. pp. 119-131
"Austin is certainly the founding father of speech act theory as we have known it in recent decades, and one reason why Reinach's views on social acts are worthy of attention is the extent of their anticipation of Austin's work and their contribution to the understanding of human communicative action. Mother is their bearing on the thesis that fundamental concepts of civil law are found, and not introduced, by positive law. A further reason is that, apart from anticipating the work of others, Reinach explores a kind of social act which appears to have been neglected by subsequent speech act theorists. I refer to representative acts, where one person acts for or on behalf of or in the name of another! I shall first try to set out Reinach's views (sections 1 and 2), and then discuss some issues which they raise, in particular that of sincerity (sections 3 and 4) then that of prior empowerment for representative acts (section 5)." (p. 119)
Burkhardt Armin. Soziale Akte, Sprechakte und Textillokutionen: A. Reinachs Rechtsphilosophie und die moderne Linguistik. Tübingen: Niemeyer 1986.
"A detailed comparison of Reinach on social acts with the accounts of Searle and Austin who are criticized for committing the 'ontological fallacy': they find forces in utterances."
Barry Smith - An annotated bibliography - p. 307.
Burkhardt Armin, "Il filosofo del diritto Adolf Reinach, lo sconosciuto fondatore della teoria degli atti linguistici," Teoria.Rivista di Filosofia 6: 45-62 (1986).
Burkhardt Armin. Verplflichtung und Verbindlichkeit. Ethische Aspekte in der Rechtphilosophie Adolf Reinachs. In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the foundations of realist phenomenology. Edited by Mulligan Kevin. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987. pp. 155-174
Cantegreil Julien, "D'une voie phénoménologique en théorie du droit. Remarques sur le réalisme d'Adolf Reinach," Les Études Philosophiques: 99-112 (2005).
"Écartant les questions traditionnelles de savoir comment il s'est singularisé dans l'histoire de la doctrine allemande du droit et les raisons qui font de lui l'un des précurseurs de la théorie des actes de langages, la présente étude évalue l'intérêt juridique de l'approche « intuitionniste » de Reinach. L'utilisation conjointe de sa définition de la promesse et des travaux de Jean-Louis Gardies devraient montrer l'impasse théorique et le faible intérêt pratique de son intuitionnisme, et ce faisant contribuer à diriger les recherches phénoménologiques en théorie du droit vers les travaux du Husserl des Idées directrices."
Cantegreil Julien, "Adolf Reinach théoricien du droit: sur la causalité," Archives de Philosophie du Droit 49: 401-416 (2006).
"Bien qu'il ait été commenté par les plus illustres (Husserl, Kantorowicz, Radbruch, Villey...) et que l'on ait récemment pris la mesure de son importance en philosophie, Reinach n'a toujours pas su trouver sa place en théorie du droit. Comprendre l'impasse théorique et le faible intérét pratique de son approche intuitionniste avait seulement suggéré de rediriger les recherches phénoménologiques en droit vers les oeuvres tardives de Husserl. La présente analyse propose de relire Reinach à partir d'un texte de jeunesse quasi inconnu, sa Dissertation de 1905 Sur le Concept de cause en droit pénal. Reinach y apparait alors non seulement un représentant exemplaire des contradictions du positivisme de la fin du XIXe siècle, mais aussi une aide précieuse pour conceptualiser la cause en droit. Précurseur en ce qui concerne les actes de langages, Reinach l'est aussi en ce qui concerne le concept de causalité. Reinach théoricien du droit gagne ainsi pertinence, profondeur et actualité.
Crosby John, "Reinach's discovery of the social acts," Aletheia 3: 143-194 (1983).
Contents: 1. The significance of Reinach's monograph; 2. Reinach as phenomenologist; 3. Reinach's discovery of the "social acts"; 4. Reinach in dialogue with the speech act philosophers: promising as a social act; 5. Continuation of the dialogue between Reinach and the speech act philosophers: the uninventable essence of promising; 6. Towards developing and deepening Reinach's analysis of the social acts; Reinach and Wojtyla; Reinach and Husserl; 7. Reinach's apriori sphere of right and the natural moral law; 8. Legal obligation and moral duty; 9. Some consequences of Reinach's discovery for political, legal, and moral philosophy; conclusion of the dialogue with the speech act philosophers.
Davie George. Husserl and Reinach on Hume's "Treatise". In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the foundations of realist phenomenology. Edited by Mulligan Kevin. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987. pp. 257-274
"In 1929 Husserl wrote that Hume's real greatness was still unrecognised in its most important aspect. Now I believe that the contribution to Hume studies by Husserl - as conveyed by Jean Laporte in France and Kemp Smith in Britain - and by his pupil Reinach, have gone a long way towards changing this state of affairs, because of a new way of reading Hume's Treatise that they introduced. I first set out Husserl's early views on Hume and then turn to Reinach's paper on Hume, which builds on this work, but also goes a long way beyond it and isolates the most important aspect of Hume's achievement." (p. 257)
de Calan Ronan, "Causalité et nécessité matérielle: Reinach lecteur de Hume," Les Études Philosophiques: 39-54 (2005).
DuBois James, "An introduction to Adolf Reinach's 'The supreme rules of rational inference according to Kant'," Aletheia 6: 70-80 (1994).
"In 1911, the same year that he published his work On the theory of the negative judgment, Adolf Reinach published two articles on Kant's philosophy: Kant's understanding of the humean problem and The supreme rules of rational inference according to Kant. More than mere historical studies, these articles extend Reinach's contribution to the fields of ontology and what might be broadly construed as the field of logic."
DuBois James. Judgment and Sachverhalt. An introduction to Adolf Reinach's phenomenological realism. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1995.
Contents: Acknowledgements VII; Introduction 1; 1. Judgments and states of affairs 7; 2. Negation and correspondence 47; 3. Insight and the a priori 77; 4. Logic and arithmetic 115; 5. The discovery of social acts 129; 6. Reinach as phenomenologist 145; Bibliography 159; Index 167-168.
"The outline of our study is as follows.
Chapter One explores Reinach's conception of the judgment in terms of a state of belief, an act of assertion, and an ideal meaning-unit. We examine his understanding of states of affairs, the objectual-correlates to judgments of all kinds. We further investigate how it is that the mind becomes directed towards states of affairs, and this involves us in a study of Reinach's understanding of the relationships between intentionality, presentation, and intuitive fullness. Particularly here we see Reinach's indebtedness to Husserl. Towards the end of the chapter we consider briefly the concepts of evidence and knowledge -- for a judgment cannot be considered rational unless it is somehow related to objective being through evidence or direct knowledge.
In Chapter Two, we examine Reinach's claim that negative states of affairs subsist or obtain just as do positive states of affairs. Here a confrontation with Ingarden's ontological investigations is particularly helpful, and something of a compromise position is defended. Reinach's discussion of negation provides us with the opportunity to better understand the nature of concepts and properties, and the peculiar sort of existence espoused by these. Chisholm's view of negative properties and states of affairs is compared to Reinach's, and here too we argue for modifications of both views.
In Chapter Three we examine how Reinach's ontology of states of affairs is seen to lie at the basis of most traditional epistemological distinctions. Thus, distinctions between states of affairs give rise to the differences between necessary and contingent, synthetic and analytic, and formal and material judgments. We investigate further why philosophical insight is possible with regard to the states of affairs grounded in some essences, but not others. At this point we turn to the work of Reinach's student, Dietrich von Hildebrand, where he distinguishes between accidental essential unities, morphic essential unities, and necessary essential unities, only the last of which can be known through insight or essential intuition. We close the chapter with a defense of insight, and a discussion of its place in philosophical argumentation.
By the time we reach Chapter Four, we have already investigated the nature of many logically relevant concepts, such as proposition, truth and falsity, implication, ontological modality, analycity and syntheticity. However, it seems worthwhile to present Reinach's overall conception of logic, a conception which is at the same time classical and original. In connection with his work on logic we discuss briefly Reinach's conception of numbers. Interestingly, Reinach rejects the existence of ordinal numbers, and he argues that cardinal numbers cannot be predicated. As one might expect, his explanation of the ontological correlates to the truths of arithmetic involves a fascinating application of his philosophy of states of affairs.
In Chapter Five we examine his "Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law". Particularly here we are forced to prescind from many interesting and worthwhile ideas. Our interest in this work is restricted to his discovery of social acts (better known today as speech acts), and in particular the nonasserting or nonjudging character of these acts. These acts are neither correct nor incorrect, for they are not "conforming" acts, or acts of "fit". They are rather "grounded" or "ungrounded" and "effective" or "ineffective". A confrontation of his analysis of promising with that of Searle allows us to test the soundness of Reinach's ontology of essences and his recognition of synthetic a priori states of affairs and truths. Finally, we examine Reinach's claim that he has discovered a new sort of object: real, temporal objects, which are neither physical nor mental.
In Chapter Six, our concluding chapter, we look at Reinach as a phenomenologist. By the time we reach this last chapter, many will understand why we call Reinach a realist, but they will wonder what characterizes him as a phenomenologist. We present a few key ideas from his lecture "Concerning Phenomenology" and defend an interpretation of the phenomenological attitude as characterized above all by a rigorous fidelity to what is given. While we refuse to take up a confrontation of Reinach's phenomenological realism with the motives for Husserl's transcendental idealism, we do briefly suggest some philosophical reasons which make intelligible Reinach's unwillingness to espouse the "new developments". We conclude the book by suggesting one sense in which Reinach's analysis of human acts stands in need of a "subjective" grounding, though not of the sort Husserl suggests." (pp. 3-5).
DuBois James. Adolf Reinach's contributions to meta-ethics and the philosophy of law. In The phenomenological tradition in moral philosophy. Edited by Embree Lester and Drummond John. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002. pp. 327-346
Falcioni Daniela. Le Regole della relazionalità: una interpretazione della fenomenologia di Adolf Reinach. Milano: Giuffré Editore 1991.
Falcioni Daniela, "Immanuel Kant und Adolf Reinach: Zwei Linien des Widerstandes im Vergleich," Kant-Studien.Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft 93: 351-370 (2002).
Gardies Jean-Louis. Adolf reinach and the analytic foundations of social acts. In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the foundations of realist phenomenology. Edited by Mulligan Kevin. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987. pp. 107-117
"One of the most interesting contributions to philosophy in Adolf Reinach's work The A Priori Foundations of Civil Law is the analysis the author puts forward of what he generally calls social acts. This analysis is extended to deal with such specific types of social acts as promises, orders, prayers, requests, communications (mitteilen), questions, the particulars of which are all gone into by Reinach.
When, much later, Anglo-Saxon authors such as Austin and Searle discovered the quite special character of speech-acts it is almost certain that Reinach could have had no influence on them, for they knew nothing of his work. Even if they had had some indirect acquaintance with the work it is by no means certain that they could have profited from its analyses. The intuitionist style that marks the work, which appeared in 1913 as part of the first large wave of the phenomenological movement removes it almost totally from the purview of the analytic approach of the Anglo-Saxon tradition within which the new theory of speech-acts was to find its natural home. Since the two philosophies use quite different languages it would have been difficult to see that there was a shared subject matter and that some at least of the conclusions were the same." (p. 107)
(...)
"Reinach's merit is to have given superb demonstrations of the a priori character of the pure science of law. He has annihilated psychologism, sociologism andhistoricism in the legal sphere as surely as Frege had annihilated them in the realm of mathematics. It remains to provide each of his remarkable analyses with its theoretical explanation in order to establish that, in the last instance, the a priori judgements whose existence at the basis of civil law he has revealed, are themselves analytic." (p. 117).
Habbel Irmingard. Die Sachverhaltsproblematik in der Phänomenologie und bei Thomas von Aquin. Regensburg: Josef Habbel 1959.
Hillebrand Dietrich von. Die rechtliche und sittliche Sphäre in ihrem Eigenwert und in ihrem Zusammenhang. In Die Menschheit am Scheideweg. Gesammelte Abhandlungen und Vorträge. Regensburg: Josef Habbel 1955. pp. 86-106
"Contains an exposition and development of Reinach's philosophy of law."
Barry Smith - An annotated bibliography - p. 313.
Hoffmann Klaus. Reinach and Searle in promising. A comparison. In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the foundations of realist phenomenology. Edited by Mulligan Kevin. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987. pp. 91-106
"If one is to believe Mephistopheles, even the devil seems to be bound to keep a promise and the explanation of this state of affairs requires more than just a few words.
In the twentieth century various well-known philosophers have gone into great detail in order to clear up the question why promises can give rise to obligations. The works of Adolf Reinach and John Searle are two outstanding examples of attempts to analyse promising. In what follows I shall compare their accounts as precisely as possible in order to provide arguments for and against the view that the famous analysis by John Searle was already anticipated by Adolf Reinach in 1913.
I begin with an examination of the relation between Reinach's (category of) social acts and Searle's (category of) speech acts in which I concentrate on the relations between entities and laws on the one hand and institutional facts and rules on the other. Finally, I scrutinize the different conception of 'obligation' in the two accounts." (p. 91)
Husserl Edmund, "Adolf Reinach (In memoriam)," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35: 571-574 (1975).
Originally published in Kantstudien, 23, 1919 pp. 147-149.
Hübener Wolfgang. Die Logik der Negation als ontologisches Erkenntnismaterial. In Positionen der Negativität. Edited by Weinrich Harald. Munich: Fink 1975. pp. 105-140
"pp. 134f. is a discussion of reinach and Sigwart pn the locus of negation."
Barry Smith - An annotated bibliography - p. 314.
Ingarden Roman. Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt. Tübingen: Niemeyer 1964.
"See esp. chapter XI of vol. II/1, Die Form des Sachverhalts. Sachverhalt und Gegenstand (includes extensive critique of Reinach Zur Theorie des Negativen Urteils) and § 62 of vol. II/2, which contains a criticism of Reinach on movement."
Barry Smith - An annotated bibliography - p. 316.
Kujundzic Nebojsa, "Reinach, material necessity, and free variation," Dialogue 36: 721-739 (1997).
Künne Wolfgang. The intentionality of thinking: the difference between State of Affairs and Propositional Matter. In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the foundations of realist phenomenology. Edited by Mulligan Kevin. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987. pp. 175-187
"For Reinach as for Russell, the state of affairs called "the being snub-nosed of Socrates" contains as "objectual elements" (gegenstiindliche Elemente, gegenstandliche Glieder)
37 a "real" as well as an "ideal object"," Socrates and the property of being snub-nosed. Reinach clearly recognizes, what some analytical philosophers do not, that "states of
affairs cannot be simply stuck together (zusammengestoppelt), as it were, out of arbitrary elements"? Only if somebody (rightly or wrongly) can judge or believe that a is P, is
there such a thing as the (obtaining or not obtaining) state of affairs, the being P of a (See § 3 above).Reflecting on attributes like possibility and necessity, Reinach stresses "that
it is ... states of affairs and only states of affairs, which can adopt such modalities". I shall try now to clarify the relevance of this Reinachian observation in the final section of this
paper." (p. 185 - notes omitted).
Laugier Sandra, "Actes de langage et états de choses: Austin et Reinach," Les Études Philosophiques: 73-98 (2005).
Lohmar Dieter, "Beiträge zu einer phänomenologischen Theorie des negativen Urteils," Husserl Studies 8: 173-204 (1992).
Mayrhofer Philipp, "Réalisme et fondation chez Adolf Reinach," Les Études Philosophiques: 3-18 (2005).
Mulligan Kevin. Promising and other social acts: their constituents and structure. In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the foundations of realist phenomenology. Edited by Mulligan Kevin. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987. pp. 29-90
"The discovery of what Reinach called social acts (in 1913) and Austin speech acts (in 1962) was first and foremost the discovery of a type of linguistic action which, Reinach and Austin are convinced, had simply not been noticed hitherto. It is true that both authors present their discovery within a theoretical framework and that they hoped that their accounts of the phenomenon discovered would be taken as representative of new ways of doing philosophy. It is also true that there are great differences between the frameworks and the hopes of the two philosophers. But both are emphatic that their primary objective is to bring into focus, and fully describe, a phenomenon of which promising is their favourite example. Other social acts dealt with in some detail by Reinach are requesting, questioning, ordering, imparting information, accepting a promise and legal enactment, which - except for the last two - are all at least touched on by Austin. (*)" (p. 29)
(*) Reinach's theory is set out in his monograph The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law, in particular in § 2 Claim and Obligation, § 3 The Social Acts, § 4 The Act of Promising as the Origin of Claim and Obligation, § 7 Representation, § 8 Enactments and the Propositions which Express Enactments.
Paulson Stanley L. Demystifying Reinach's legal theory. In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the foundations of realist phenomenology. Edited by Mulligan Kevin. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987. pp. 133-154
Schuhmann Karl. Johannes Dauberts Kritik der "Theorie des negativen Urteils". In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the foundations of realist phenomenology. Edited by Mulligan Kevin. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987. pp. 227-238
Schuhmann Karl. Hussserl und Reinach. In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the foundations of realist phenomenology. Edited by Mulligan Kevin. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987. pp. 239-256
Schuhmann Karl. Adolf Reinachs Vortrag über die Grundbegriffe der Ethik. In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the foundations of realist phenomenology. Edited by Mulligan Kevin. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987. pp. 275-289
Schuhmann Karl, "Elements of speech act theory in the work of Thomas Reid," History of Philosophy Quarterly 7: 47-66 (1990).
"The account of social acts sketched by Thomas Reid is shown to constitute an anticipation of the theory of speech acts standardly associated with Austin and Searle. Reid's ideas are compared also with that other (and in many ways more important) pre-Austinian speech act theory worked out by the phenomenologist Adolf Reinach in his monograph on the act of promising of 1913."
Schuhmann Karl. Edith stein und Adolf Reinach. In Studien zur Philosophie von Edith Stein.Internationales Edith Stein-Symposion Eichstätt 1991. Edited by Fetz Reto Luzius, Rath Matthias, and Schulz Peter. München: K. Alber 1993. pp. 53-88
Reprinted in: K. Schuhmann - Selected papers on phenomenology - Dordrecht, Springer, , 2004, pp. 163-184
Seifert Josef, "Is Reinach's "Apriorische Rechtslehre" more important for positive law than Reinach himself thinks," Aletheia 3: 197-230 (1983).
Seifert Josef, "Die Philosophie Adolf Reinachs: bemerkungen anl?sslich der Veroffentlichung einer neuen kritischen Ausgabe der Schriften Reinachs," Aletheia.An International Yearbook of Philosophy 5: 432-438 (1992).
Smith Barry. Wittgenstein and the background of Austrian philosophy. In Wittgenstein and his impact on contemporary thought. Proceedings of the Second International Wittgenstein Symposium. Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1978. pp. 31-35
"On early Sachverhalt ontologies."
Smith Barry, "An essay in formal ontology," Grazer Philosophische Studien 6: 39-62 (1978).
"On the controversy between Reinach and Ingarden concerning negative states of affairs."
Barry Smith - An annotated bibliography - p. 328.
Smith Barry, "Law and eschatology in Wittgenstein's early thought," Inquiry.An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 21: 425-441 (1978).
"The paper investigates the role played by ethical deliberation and ethical judgment in Wittgenstein's early thought in the light of twentieth-century German legal philosophy. In particular the theories of the phenomenologists Adolf Reinach, Wilhelm Schapp, and Gerhart Husserl are singled out, as resting on ontologies which are structurally similar to that of the Tractatus: in each case it is actual and possible Sachverhalte which constitute the prime ontological category. The study of the relationship between the States of Affairs depicted, e.g., in the sentences of a legal trial and prior fact-complexes to which these may correspond suggests one possible connecting link between the logical and ontological sections of the Tractatus and the ethical reflections appearing at the end. It is argued that the latter can best be understood in terms of the idea of a "Last judgment" (with its associated ethical rewards and punishments) which would relate to the world as a whole as a penal trial relates to individual complexes of facts."
Smith Barry. Introduction to Adolf Reinach 'On the theory of negative judgment'. In Parts and moments: studies in logic and formal ontology. Edited by Smith Barry. München: Philosophia Verlag 1982. pp. 289-314
Smith Barry and Schuhmann Karl. Adolf Reinach: an intellectual biography. In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the foundations of realist phenomenology. Edited by Mulligan Kevin. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987. pp. 1-27
Smith Barry. On the cognition of State of Affairs. In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the foundations of realist phenomenology. Edited by Mulligan Kevin. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987. pp. 189-225
Smith Barry. Adolf Reinach: an annotated bibliography. In Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the foundations of realist phenomenology. Edited by Mulligan Kevin. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987. pp. 299-332
"When the present volume was first conceived, it was confidently believed that a survey of the literature on Reinach's thought could be kept within comfortable limits. It rapidly became clear, however, that this was not the case. Reinach's discoveries in the sphere of speech act theory have, it is true, gone almost unnoticed. Reinach has nevertheless enjoyed an enduring notoriety among those working in the philosophy of law, and ever since its appearance in 1913, Reinach's work on "Die apriorischen Grundlagen des burgerlichen Rechtes" has served as the principal representative of phenomenological, aprioristic and ontological/realist approaches in this discipline. His name accordingly appears in the majority of the more substantial general treatises in the discipline (or at least in those treatises and reference works published in countries whose law and philosophy have been influenced by the Germanic tradition: Edwards' great Encyclopedia of Philosophy does not contain even a mention of Reinach).
The goal of completeness has therefore been abandoned in what follows, and items containing merely passing references to Reinach's work have been listed only where they are of particular historical importance or bear evidence of some more substantial influence. The list has been compiled with the assistance of N. Bokhove, A.G. Conte and M.-E. Conte, J. Crosby, N. Duxbury, J. Joerden, S. Paulson, H. Spiegelberg and the indefatigable librarians of the University of Erlangen."
Smith Barry, "Logic and the Sachverhalt," The Monist 72: 52-69 (1989).
"Logic is often conceived as a science of propositions, or of relations between propositions. There is an alternativeview, however, defended by Meinong, Pfänder, Reinach and others, which sees logic as a science of Sachverhalte or States of Affairs. A consideration of this view, which was defended especially by thinkers within the tradition of Brentano, throws new light on the problems of intentionality and of mental content. It throws light also on the development of logic in Poland. Here the influence of Brentano's student Kasimir Twardowski is especially important, and the paper concludes with a new interpretation of Tarski's work on truth against the background of Twardowski's thinking."
Smith Barry, "An essay on material necessity," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18: 301-322 (1993).
Supplementary volume.
Spiegelberg Herbert. The phenomenological movement. A historical introduction.1982.
Third revised edition (First edition 1960).
About Reinach see pp. 191-200.
Stella Giuliana, "L' "a priori" della promessa in Adolf Reinach," Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto 63: 392-408 (1986).
Zelaniec Wojciech, "Fathers, kings, and promises: Husserl and Reinach on the a priori," Husserl Studies 9: 147-177 (1992).
"The author examines several examples (given by Husserl and his pupil, Adolf Reinach, and pertaining mainly to the social sphere) of allegedly analytic and synthetic a priori propositions. In a detailed line of argument -- drawing among others on the theory of speech acts -- the author shows difficulties with classifying some of those examples as analytic."
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