Representation and object of thought in Medieval philosophy. Edited by Lagerlund Henrik. Aldershot: Ashgate 2007.
Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à l'âge classique. Edited by Biard Joel. Paris: Vrin 2009.
"La connaissance du monde s'exprime en propositions, que celles-ci soient considérées, selon les théories, comme objets ou comme moyens de la science. Le problème de la relation entre ces entités linguistiques et les représentations mental (intellections, intentions, concepts...) a une longue histoire qui remonte au traité De l'interprétation d'Aristote et aux commentaires de Boèce. Après Guillaume d'Ockham, en effet, l'idée de langage mental est certes une hypothèse qui a acquis force et consistance, mais tous les problèmes liés à la structuration de la pensée et au rapport entre le langage parlé et la pensée ne sont pas résolus. Des questions surgissent sur la structuration même de ce langage.
Le colloque organisé à Tours du 1er au 3 décembre 2005 sous les auspices de la Fondation européenne de la science (European Science Foundation) avait l'ambition de parcourir ces questions en repartant d'Augustin qui est l'initiale médiévale du problème, et en suivant cette histoire jusqu'à l'aube des Temps modernes. Ce parcours historique donc fait une part importante au Moyen Âge tardif, à la Renaissance et au XVIIe siècle. En même temps, notre ambition était aussi d'approfondir certains enjeux proprement philosophiques de ce parcours. L'horizon général est la question : est-il possible de considérer le domaine de la pensée comme étant structuré à la manière d'un langage, et par quels moyens conceptuels penser cela?"
Rise and development of supposition theory. Edited by Bos Egbert Peter. Turnhout: Brepols 2009.
Acts of the 17th European Symposium on mediaeval logic and semantics. Leiden, 3-7 June 2008.
Not yet published.
Adams Marilyn McCord, "What does Ockham means by Supposition?," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 17: 5-37 (1976).
"I focus on William Ockham's general account in "Summa Logicae" I, chapter 63, of what it is for a term to supposit for something in a proposition, and consider two interpretations of it. I first construe Ockham as offering the following nominal definition of 'supposition': (I) "Z" supposits for "X" in "P", if and only if "Z" is a term of "p" and 'this is "a"' (where 'this' indicates "x") is true, where general terms are substituted for '"a"'; names of substitutions for '"A"', for '"Z"'; names of propositions for '"P"'; and proper names for '"X"'. I argue that (I) is inadequate both as a definition of suppositing-in-some-way-or-other for something or of any particular kind of supposition. An alternative interpretation is to take Ockham as giving his general account of supposition when he says it is being posited for something in a proposition. On this interpretation, less problematic definitions of material and simple supposition are available. But the notion of being posited for, which is at least as obscure as the notion of supposition, is left unanalysed. On the first interpretation, this is the analysis that (I) is taken to provide."
Amerini Fabrizio, "Il tractatus De suppositionibus terminorum di Francesco da Prato O.P. Una rilettura della dottrina ockhamista del linguaggio," Medioevo 25: 441-550 (1999).
Apel Karl-Otto. Sprachliche Wahrheit als richtige Representation der Wirklichkeit durch ein Zeichensystem (Ockhams Suppositionstheorie). In Transformation der Philosophie.1973. pp. 112-126
Arens Hans, "Verbum Cordis. Zur Sprachphilosophie des Mittelalters," Historiographia Linguistica 7: 13-25 (1980).
Arnold Erwin, "Zur Geschichte der Suppositiontheorie. Die Wurzeln des modernen Europäischen Subjektivismus," Symposion.Jahrbuch für Philosophie 3: 1-134 (1952).
Ashworth Earline Jennifer, "The doctrine of supposition in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries," Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 51: 260-285 (1969).
"It is often assumed that the logic of terms, including supposition theory, was despised and ignored by the logicians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in spite of the sophistication with which it had been developed during the later middle ages.
(...)
It is perhaps not surprising that when I looked at some eighty textbooks written during the period in question, I discovered that as many as twenty authors not only referred to the doctrine of supposition sympathetically, but usually went on to offer a detailed analysis which is neither a slavish nor an inept echo of what the mediaeval logicians had said." pp. 260-271
Ashworth Earline Jennifer, "Priority of analysis and merely confused supposition," Franciscan Studies 33: 38-41 (1973).
Discussion of: Swiniarski "A new presentation of Ockham's theory of supposition with an evaluation of some contemporary criticism".
"In this paper I criticize the argument put forward by Swiniarski that Ockham should have adopted the priority of analysis rule whereby the subject is analysed before the predicate, and that had he adopted such a rule, merely confused supposition would have become unnecessary. I point out that in later medieval logic explicit priority of analysis rules were adopted, whereby terms with determinate supposition were analysed first, whether they were subject or predicate. I also discuss the use made of merely confused supposition, particularly in the analysis of the relationship between "all A is B" and "only B is A"."
Ashworth Earline Jennifer, "Multiple quantification and the use of special quantifiers in early Sixteenth Century logic," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 19: 599-613 (1978).
"In this paper I discuss two interrelated topics to do with supposition theory and the extensionalist analysis of propositions: 1) the use of 'A' and 'B' as special signs to produce respectively merely confused and determinate supposition in the terms following them; 2) the analysis of such non-standard propositions as 'there are some men all of whose donkeys are running.' In addition, I show how logicians in the medieval tradition handled such invalid inferences as 'every man has a head, therefore there is a head that every man has'."
Ashworth Earline Jennifer, "Mental language and the unity of propositions: a semantic problem discussed by early Sixteenth Century logicians," Franciscan Studies 41: 61-96 (1981).
"In the 14th century Gregory of Rimini argued that (1) there is a mental language separate from spoken language and (2) mental propositions are unified wholes with no discernible parts. This article examines the reactions of later logicians, showing that they accepted the doctrine of mental language; but argued that mental propositions must have a discernible structure, which involves parts."
Ashworth Earline Jennifer, "The structure of mental language: some problems discussed by early Sixteenth Century logicians," Vivarium 20: 59-83 (1982).
Reprinted in: Studies in post-medieval semantics.
"Given their belief in mental language, late medieval logicians felt the need to give some account of its structure. I explore their different views on the part played by syncategorematic terms, impersonal and other verbs, demonstratives, pronouns, case, number and gender. I show that Ockham's views were not universally followed; and I argue that mental language was not necessarily thought of as an ideal logical language."
Baccin Nadia Anna, "Supposizione confusa tantum e descensus," Medioevo 3: 285-300 (1977).
Bazán Bernardo Carlos, "La signification des termes communs et la doctrine de la supposition chez Maitre Siger de Brabant," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 35: 345-372 (1979).
"Having as his principle objective the study of declarative propositions, of the predicative structure, Siger showed that the meaning of the general term is constant because it refers to changing things signified by the intermediary of the consignified concept. The "intelligible unity" of the essence grasped in the concept is the basis for the unity of the meaning relative to the "existential diversity" of things. The analysis of meaning appears insufficient when one takes into consideration the concrete symbolic function of the term at the centre of a given proposition. It is here that the doctrine of the "suppositio" comes into play. Essentially this doctrine distinguishes between the signifying function of the term and its completing function relative to the diversity of the predicates."
Berger Harald. Simple supposition in William of Ockham, John Buridan and Albert of Saxony. In Itinéraires d'Albert de Saxe. Edited by Biard Joel. Paris: Vrin 1991. pp. 31-43
Beuchot Mauricio. La teoría semántica medieval de la suppositio. In Filosofía y cultura medievales. Edited by González Ruiz E. México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México 1988. pp. 42-51
Beuchot Mauricio. Albert de Saxe: la supposition sémantique et les noms vides. In Itinéraires d'Albert de Saxe. Edited by Biard Joel. Paris: Vrin 1991. pp. 111-124
Beuchot Mauricio. La suposición semántica y su actualidad. Desarrollo histórico y actualidad de la teória escólastica de la suposición semántica. In Metafísica, lógica y lenguaje en la filosofía medieval. Barcelona: Promociones y Publicaciones Universitaria, S.A. 1994. pp. 137-143
Biard Joel. Intention et signification chez Guillaume d'Ockham. La critique de l'être intentionnel. In Langages et philosophie. Hommage à Jean Jolivet. Edited by Libera Alain de, Elamrani-Jamal Abdelali, and Galonnier Alain. Paris: Vrin 1997. pp. 201-220
Boehner Philotheus, "Ockham's theory of supposition and the notion of truth," Franciscan Studies 6: 261-292 (1946).
Reprinted in: Collected articles on Ockham (pp.237-267)
Boehner Philotheus, "A medieval theory of supposition," Franciscan Studies 18: 240-289 (1958).
Boh Ivan, "Paul of Pergola on supposition and consequences," Franciscan Studies 25: 30-89 (1965).
Text, translation and commentary
Boh Ivan, "Propositional connectives, supposition and consequence in Paul of Pergola," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 7: 109-128 (1966).
Boler John, "Ockham's mental language (Abstract)," Journal of Philosophy 69: 676 (1972).
Bos Egbert Peter, "Mental verbs in terminist logic (John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen)," Vivarium 16: 56-69 (1978).
Bos Egbert Peter. La théorie de la signification de la vox significativa ad placitum (nomen, verbum, oratio) dans les Introductiones Montane Maiores. In Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains aux origines de la Logica Modernorum. Edited by Jolivet Jean and Libera Alain de. Napoli: Bibliopolis 1987. pp. 73-90
Actes du septième symposium européen d'histoire de la logique et de la sémantique médiévales. Centre d' études supérieures de civilisation médiévale de Poitiers 17 22 Juin 1985.
Bos Egbert Peter, "Speaking about signs. Fourteenth-century views on suppositio materialis," Amsterdamer Beiträge zur älteren Germanistik 48: 71-86 (1997).
"The principal questions in my paper are the following: How did the medieval semanticists indicate the autonymous use of words? Does the subject term in such a proposition express a linguistic item (itself, or its likes) because of the determination by the predicate? Or is it dependent on the will or intention of man, the voluntas utentium, as Ockham calls it?
Or is it a convention that determines the use of terms? Is a signum materialitatis (a sign, or mark, indicating material supposition) necessary? To what extent do the Medievals distinguish the autonymous use of language from other uses? Or is this kind of language meaningless?
There is hardly any secondary literature on this subject. (*)" p. 75
(*) M. Bochenski, Formale Logik (München 1970 (1956). 188-193; CA. Dufour, Die Lehre der Proprietates Terrrunorum. Sinn und Referenz in mittelalterlicher Logik (München/Hamden/Vv'ien 1989). 172-188. (Dufour tries to reconstruct the medieval theory of the properties of terms with the help of modern formal logic. This very interesting study did not obtain the attention it deserves, I feel). E. Karger, 'La supposition matérielle comme supposition significative: Paul de Venise, Paul de Pergola', in English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries. Acts of the 5th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Rome, 10-14 november 1980, ed. by A. Maierù (Napoli). 331-342. In a penetrating analysis, Karger discusses the difficulties arising from the 'mentioning' of terms in relation to the general semantical theory of a philosopher.
Bos Egbert Peter. Die Rezeption der Suppositiones des Marsilius von Inghen in Paris (Johannes Dorp) und Prag (ein anonymer SophistriaTraktat) um 1400. In Philosophie und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters. Marsilius von Inghen und das Denken seiner Zeit. Edited by Hoenen Marten and Bakker Paul. Leiden: Brill 2000. pp. 213-238
Bos Egbert Peter, "Richard Billingham's Speculum puerorum, Some medieval Commentaries and Aristotle," Vivarium 45: 360-373 (2077).
"In the history of medieval semantics, supposition theory is important especially in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In this theory the emphasis is on the term, whose properties one tries to determine. In the fourteenth century the focus is on the proposition, of which a term having supposition is a part. The idea is to analyse propositions in order to determine their truth (probare). The Speculum puerorum written by Richard Billingham was the standard textbook for this approach. It was very influential in Europe. The theory of the probatio propositionis was meant to solve problems both in (empirically oriented) scientific propositions such as used by the Oxford Calculators, and theological propositions, especially those about the Trinity. The book is original, concise, but not clear in every respect. Studying medieval commentaries may help us to understand Richard's book. In the present paper three commentaries are presented. The commentators discussed problems about the status of Richard's book, and about its doctrine: what is the relation between probatio and truth, what is the relation between probatio and supposition, what exactly are mediate and immediate terms (e.g.is the pronoun 'this' mediate or immediate?). The commentators sometimes criticize Richard. For example, one of them argues, against Billingham, that the verb 'can' ampliates its subject term and is therefore mediate."
Bottin Francesco, "Linguaggio mentale e atti di pensiero in Guglielmo di Ockham," Veritas.Revista de Filosofia 45: 349-359 (2000).
"William Ockham developed themes of epistemology which place him in position which can easily be compared to that of modern thinkers. Such is notably the case of his works on mental language, for instance, which bring him closer to certain theories elaborated by Hilary Putnam, especially his theory of representation."
Bottin Francesco. Filosofia medievale della mente. Padova: Il Poligrafo 2005.
Brands H. Die zweifache Einleitung der formalen Supposition bei William of Sherwood. In Knowledge and the sciences in medieval philosophy. Edited by Knuuttila Simo, Tyorinoja R., and Ebbesen Sten.1990. pp. 445-454
Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of medieval philosophy. Helsinki 24-29 August 1987. vol. II
Brown Deborah J., "The puzzle of names in Ockham's theory of mental language," Review of Metaphysics 50: 79-99 (1996).
"In his writings on semantics and logic, William of Ockham combines two very strong claims about mental language: that mental terms are naturally prior to and determinative of the signification of conventional signs and that mental language contains neither synonymous nor equivocal terms. (1) The first claim represents the role mental language has in explaining the origins, structure, and content of thought and language. Ockham was, as many commentators have observed, a conceptual empiricist but it would be a mistake to think that he was primarily concerned with the psychological processes that underlie our representational system. The second claim indicates that the theory of mental language is primarily a theory of signification or a semantics. The notion of a redundancy-free mental language is an idealization crafted for its explanatory role in Ockham's semantics.
The notion of a mental language devoid of synonymous and ambiguous terms raises puzzles which threaten the internal coherence of the project. These puzzles concern a species of categorematic terms in mental language, Ockham's absolute terms, and are not unlike the puzzles about proper names in Kripkean semantics. Although I am skeptical that Ockham's theory is adequate to the dual tasks of being a semantics as well as a psychological thesis, I shall argue that the wrong response to these puzzles is to forfeit the theory's status as a semantic theory by giving up the commitment to parsimony."
(1) Ockham's most sustained development of the theory of mental language is in Summa Logicae I, in Opera Philosophica I, ed. Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gal, Stephen S. Brown (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1974).
Brown Stephen F., "Walter Burleigh's Treatise De Suppositionibus and its influence on William of Ockham," Franciscan Studies 32: 15-64 (1972).
"This early work of Walter Burleigh (written circa 1302), here edited, is one of the sources of Ockham's "Summa logicae". At times it supplies Ockham with material he adopts; at times it shares with the works of others the role of opposition. Also it is one of the sources which Ockham opposes in his 'commentary on the sentences'. In relation to earlier works of the 12th and 13th centuries it shows some technical advances while essentially holding onto the traditional teaching. Burleigh's later treatment of supposition in the 'de puritate' is a restatement of this early treatise in light of Ockham's 'Summa logicae' critique of the 'realist' position."
Brown Stephen F., "Gerard Odon's De Suppositionibus," Franciscan Studies 35: 5-44 (1975).
New edition by L. M. De Rijk as: Liber Secundum: De suppositionibus (pp. 231-292) in: Giraldus Odonis O. F. M. Opera Philosophica - volume one: Logica - Critical editions from the manuscripts - Leiden, Brill, 1997
Brown Stephen F., "Medieval supposition theory in its theological context," Medieval philosophy and theology (3): 121-157 (1993).
In appendix: Walter Chatton: Lectura in I Sent. 4.1.1-2
Brown Stephen F., "Gerald Odonis' Tractatus de suppositionibus: What is suppositio communicabilis?," Vivarium 47: 205-220 (2009).
"The Tractatus de suppositionibus, which is cited by Gerald Odonis in his commentary on the Sentences, probably dates from ca. 1315-25. In the Sentences commentary he refers to his treatment of 'suppositio communicabilis' and its species, indicating a type of supposition whose language seems new. This article attempts to find a source for it in contemporary authors and arrives at the conclusion that 'communicabilis' is simply a synonym for 'personalis', the most common form of supposition according to Odonis."
Bubacz Bruce S., "La teoría de lenguaje interior en san Augustin y en Guillermo de Occam," Augustinus.Revista trimestral publicada por los Agustinos recoletos 30: 383-391 (1985).
Burton Patricia Shelby, ""Suppositio naturalis" and the truth conditions of the propositions of demonstrative science", The University of Texas at Austin, 1990.
UMI Dissertation Express reference number 9105524
Carvalho Mário A.de Santiago, "A teoria da suppositio na semântica ockhamista," Biblos 62: 91-149 (1986).
Chalmers David. Is there synonymy in Ockham's mental language? In The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Edited by Spade Paul Vincent. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999. pp. 76-99
Chiesa Curzio, "Le problème du langage intérieur chez les stoiciens," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 178: 301-321 (1991).
Chiesa Curzio, "Le problème du langage intérieur dans la philosophie antique de Platon à Porphyre," Histoire, Épistémologie, Langage 14: 15-30 (1992).
Cocchiarella Nino, "A logical reconstruction of medieval terminist logic in conceptual realism," Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 4: 35-72 (2001).
"The framework of conceptual realism provides a logically ideal language within which to reconstruct the medieval terminist logic of the 14th century. The terminist notion of a concept, which shifted from Ockham's early view of a concept as an intentional object (the <I>fictum<D> theory) to his later view of a concept as a mental act (the intellectio theory), is reconstructed in this framework in terms of the idea of concepts as unsaturated cognitive structures.
Intentional objects (ficta) are not rejected but are reconstructed as the objectified intentional contents of concepts.
Their reconstruction as intentional objects is an essential part of the theory of predication of conceptual realism. It is by means of this theory that we are able to explain how the identity theory of the copula, which was basic to terminist logic, applies to categorical propositions. Reference in conceptual realism is not the same as supposition in terminist logic. Nevertheless, the various "modes" of personal supposition of terminist logic can be explained and justified in terms of this conceptualist theory of reference."
Corcoran John and Swiniarski John, "Logical structures of Ockham's theory of supposition," Franciscan Studies 38: 161-183 (1978).
"This exposition of Ockham's theory of (common, personal) supposition involves the logical form of the four descent/ascent conditions and the logical relations of these with the three main modes of supposition. Central theses: each condition is a one-way entailment, each mode is a truth-functional combination of conditions, two of the three modes are not even coextensive with the two-way entailments commonly taken as their definitions. Ockham's idea of "the singulars" of a general proposition is vague and problematic and the entailment used in the descent/ascent conditions probably cannot be taken to be logical consequence in any strict sense."
Corti Enrique C., "Significación, suposición y verdad en la Summa logicae de Guillermo de Ockham," Cuadernos del Sur (14): 141-155 (1981).
Courtenay William, "Force of words and figures of speech. The crisis over Virtus Sermonis in the Fourteenth Century," Franciscan Studies 44: 107-128 (1984).
Coxito Amândio. Lógica, semântica e conhecimento na Escolastica Peninsular pré-Renascentista. Coimbra: Biblioteca Geral da Universidade 1981.
See Chapter VI. A teoria da "suppositio" pp. 201-241.
Coxito Amândio, "Las doctrinas de la significatio y de la suppositio en Pedro Hispano," Pensamiento 45: 227-238 (1989).
Coxito Amândio, "Pedro da Fonseca. A teoria da suposição e o seu contexto excolástico," Revista Filosofica de Coimbra 10: 285-311 (2001).
D'Ors Angel. De mixta suppositione. In Meeting on logic and philosophy of science. Madrid 13-15 November 1991. Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach in memoriam. Madrid: Comunicaciones 1991. pp. 73-81
Dinneen Francis P. Suppositio in Petrus Hispanus. Linguistic theories and models. In De Ortu grammaticae. Studies in medieval grammar and linguistics theory in memory of Jan Pinborg. Edited by Bursill-Hall Geoffrey L., Ebbesen Sten, and Koerner Konrad. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company 1990. pp. 69-85
Ducrot Oswald. Quelques implications linguistiques de la théorie médiévale de la supposition. In History of linguistic thought and contemporary linguistics. Edited by Parret Herman. Berlin New York: Walter de Gruyter 1976. pp. 189-227
Dufour Carlos A. Die Lehre der proprietates terminorum. Sinn und Referenz in mittelaterlicher Logik. Munchen, Hamden, Wien: Philosophia Verlag 1989.
"The present volume is a detailed and original study of the traditional, doctrine of terms. It can be regarded as an attempt to tackle the question: ,How would the scholastic philosophers have conceived and defended their doctrine bad they bad at their disposal the methods and techniques of contemporary logic and semantics? The answer provided, a systematic reconstruction of a number of important ideas in the history of logic, is both formally illuminating and entirely faithful to the relevant text.
The work begins with a general exposition of the doctrine of terns oriented around the basic semantic opposition between significatio and suppositio, analogues of the more familiar notions of sense and reference.
As a means of providing a precise and coherent reconstruction of the doctrine the author does not simply provide the predictable translation of the more amenable passages into the language of predicate logic. Rather he develops, on the basis of a careful systematization of the texts themselves, a formalization of his own, incorporating an ontology of substance and accident. The advantages of this approach are revealed in its capacity to provide both a simple reconstruction of syllogistic logic by means of a sequent-calculus and a natural extension of this logic to a theory of supposition.
Taking into consideration the categories of substance and accident in place of the more usual apparatus of set and element allows the author to develop a formalized theory of objects in which the two categories are allowed to yield composite objects of various sorts. This makes possible an illuminating application of the theory of concreta and abstracta (square of permutations) both to the theory of ampliatio and appellatio and to modal syllogistics.
The work concludes with a sketch of possible further developments and an attempted demonstration of the philosophical relevance of the theory in the light of a critical consideration of the relevant secondary literature."
Dutilh Novaes Catarina, "A study of William of Ockham's logic - from suppositio to truth conditions", University of Amsterdam, 2000.
Dutilh Novaes Catarina, "A teoria da suposição de Guilherme de Ockham. Uma reconstrução", 2003.
Master's thesis defended at the University of São Paulo, for the obtention of the MA degree in April 2003.
"This work is the result of my attempts to combine my Philosophy background with the Mathematical Logic inclinations of the institution within which this research was developed. In fact, this twofold character is noticeable in many features thereof; I shall now outline some of them. The project has two main purposes: the less risky one is to provide an account of William of Ockham's logical thinking, with focus on its aspects which bear a relation with the contemporary issues of intensional logics and possible-world semantics. The more risky one consists of investigating the possibilities of developing a purely extensional treatment of intensional contexts, such as tense and modalities. For the latter, some other extensional/nominalistic systems could have played the role of `experimental sample', but there seemed to be something intriguing about Ockham, as one wonders whether a philosopher from the XIVth century would have something relevant to add to our present logical issues. Moreover, he is considered to be the founder of nominalism, so the historical interest of such enterprise was self-evident - therefore, the legitimacy of the first purpose. I shall try to comply with two very distinct kinds of expectations: those which are the desiderata for a History of Philosophy work, and those of logicians, who are interested in the formal correcteness of the system hereby presented. The criteria of excellence of these two lines are almost incompatible, and one wonders if it is not a suicidal enterprise to try to combine them. On the one hand, an Ockham scholar may be discontent with the absence of a few important aspects of Ockham's logic, since I deliberately priorize those related to contemporary logic. On the other hand, a logician may be bothered by the presence of too many `antiquities', perhaps hindering logical clarity. So, at the risk of displeasing everybody, I nevertheless maintain that such a combination may turn out to be fruitful and informative to both sides. Chapter 1 will display some fundamental aspects of Ockham's logic and semantics, in a rather historical approach. However, even this part is developed taking into account what I later shall want to establish as my version of an `ockhamist system'. I consider it to be the flaw of many such reconstructions that they do not undertake a serious analysis of the underlying concepts; alternatively, some which did rely on such an analysis have reached very interesting results. Chapter 2 relates some apparently less central (when compared to supposition theory, for example) issues of Ockham's theory to relevant topics of Contemporary Philosophy, such as possible worlds, designation, demonstratives etc... In this chapter I also introduce conceptual tools which I will make use of for the reconstruction undertaken in chapter 3. Finally, Chapter 3 is an attempt to provide truth conditions for quantified, modal and tense propositions, based on the truth of singular propositions. I hereby hope to reach a rather broad account of Ockham's thinking, even though my main target is to build a coherent and correctly structured reconstruction of his theory of propositions."
Dutilh Novaes Catarina, "The Buridanian account of inferential relations between doubly quantified propositions: a proof of soundness," History and Philosophy of Logic 25: 225-243 (2004).
"On the basis of passages from John Buridan's Summula Suppositionibus and Sophismata, E. Karger has reconstructed what could be called the 'Buridanian theory of inferential relations between doubly quantified propositions', presented in her 1993 article 'A theory of immediate inference contained in Buridan's logic'. In the reconstruction, she focused on the syntactical elements of Buridan's theory of modes of personal supposition to extract patterns of formally valid inferences between members of a certain class of basic categorical propositions. The present study aims at offering semantic corroboration -- a proof of soundness -- to the inferential relations syntactically identified by E. Karger, by means of the analysis of Buridan's semantic definitions of the modes of personal supposition. The semantic analysis is done with the help of some modern logical concepts, in particular that of the model. In effect, the relations of inference syntactically established are shown to hold also from a semantic point of view, which means thus that this fragment of Buridan's logic can be said to be sound."
Dutilh Novaes Catarina. Formalizing medieval logical theories. Suppositio, Consequentiae and Obligationes. New York: Springer 2007.
Contetns: Introduction I-XII; 1. Supposition theory: algorithmic hermeneutics 7; 2. Buridan's notion of Consequentia 79; 3. Obligationes as logical games 145; 4. The philosophy of formalization 215; Conclusion 293; References 301; Index of names and topics 310.
"This book presents novel formalizations of three of the most important medieval logical theories: supposition, consequence and obligations. In an additional fourth part, an in-depth analysis of the concept of formalization is presented - a crucial concept in the current logical panorama, which as such receives surprisingly little attention. Although formalizations of medieval logical theories have been proposed earlier in the literature, the formalizations presented here are all based on innovative vantage points: supposition theories as algorithmic hermeneutics, theories of consequence analyzed with tools borrowed from model-theory and two-dimensional semantics, and obligations as logical games. For this reason, this is perhaps the first time that these medieval logical theories are made fully accessible to the modern philosopher and logician who wishes to obtain a better grasp of them, but who has always been held back by the lack of appropriate 'translations' into modern terms. Moreover, the book offers a reflection on the very nature of logic, a reflection that is prompted by the comparisons between medieval and modern logic, their similarities and dissimilarities. It is thus a contribution not only to the history of logic, but also to the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of language and semantics. The analysis of medieval logic is also relevant for the modern philosopher and logician in that, being the unifying methodology used across all disciplines at that time, logic really provided unity to science. It thus presents a unified model of scientific investigation, where logic plays the aggregating role."
Dutilh Novaes Catarina, "Theory of supposition vs. theory of fallacies in Ockham," Vivarium 45: 343-359 (2007).
"I propose to examine the issue of whether the ancient tradition in logic continued to be developed in the later medieval period from the vantage point of the relations between two specific groups of theories, namely the medieval theories of supposition and the (originally) ancient theories of fallacies. More specifically, I examine whether supposition theories absorbed and replaced theories of fallacies, or whether the latter continued to exist, with respect to one particular author, William of Ockham. I compare different parts of Ockham's Summa Logicae, namely III-4 (on fallacies), and the final chapters of part I and first chapters of part II (on supposition). I conclude that there is overlap of conceptual apparatus and of goals (concerning propositions that must be distinguished) in Ockham's theories of supposition and of fallacies, but that the respective conceptual apparatuses also present substantial dissimilarities. Hence, theories of supposition are better seen as an addition to the general logical framework that medieval authors had inherited from ancient times, rather than the replacement of an ancient tradition by a medieval one. Indeed, supposition theories and fallacy theories had different tasks to fulfil, and in this sense both had their place in fourteenth century logic."
Dutilh Novaes Catarina, "An intensional interpretation of Ockham's theory of supposition," Journal of the History of Philosophy 46: 365-394 (2008).
"According to a widespread view in medieval scholarship, theories of supposition are the medieval counterparts of theories of reference, and are thus essentially extensional theories. The author proposes an alternative interpretation: theories of supposition are theories of properties of terms, but whose aim is to allow for the interpretation of sentences. This holds especially of Ockham's supposition theory, which is the main object of analysis in this paper. In particular, she argues for my intensional interpretation of his theory on the basis of two key-phrases in his Summa Logicae: 'denotatur' and 'propositio est distinguenda'. Finally, she offers a reconstruction of his theory as a set of instructions to be carried out in order to generate the possible readings of (certain) sentences."
Ebbesen Sten, "The dead man is alive," Synthese 40: 43-70 (1979).
"English late 13th century logicians paid greater attention to the reference (suppositio) of terms than contemporary Parisian logicians ('modistae'), who concentrated on the unchangeable meaning (significatio) allotted to terms by 'impositio'. Discussions of the sophism 'this is a dead man, therefore this is a man' revealed weaknesses in modism and contributed to the 14th century acceptance of ockham-style suppositio semantics at Paris (Buridan & al.). Appendix contains texts by Radulphus Brito and two anonymi."
Ebbesen Sten, "Early supposition theory (12th-13th Century)," Histoire, Épistémologie, Langage 3/1: 35-48 (1981).
"The theory of supposition with the associated theories of copulatio (sign-capacity of adjectival terms), ampliatio (widening of referential domain), and distributio constitute one of the most original achievements of Western medieval logic. There is nothing really similar in any ancient text the medievals knew -though surely some Stoic writings once contained investigations of the problems these theories deal with -- nor had contemporary Byzantium anything similar.
The twelfth century produced a considerable harvest of rules about the referential range of terms in various contexts. When the 13th century arrived, a standard terminology had prevailed with such names as suppositio confusa and suppositio determinata for some particularly important types of referential range and a chapter on supposition had become a standard feature of Introductions to Logic (summulae). But then the development of the theory stopped. It appears that at least on the Continent, the chapter on supposition in the summulae became one that young students would be taught very early in their career, perhaps before entering university; and then forget all about through the rest of their student career.
In this paper I shall refrain from listing treatises 'de suppositionibus'; I shall on the whole refrain from following the developments of terminology and systematics. The spade-work in those fields has been done by De Rijk in his Logica Modernorum.
I will try to point to and explain some characteristic features of 12th and early 13th speculation about supposition without going into details and without paying much attention to the opinions of individual authors, not even when they protest they disagree with something I say they thought. I am not looking for the particular, but for general attitudes and patterns of thought underlying their investigation of suppositio."
Enders Heinz Werner. Sprachlogische Traktate des Mittelalters und die Semantikbegriff: ein historisch-systematischer Beitrag zur frage der semantischen Grundlegung formaler Systeme. Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöning 1975.
Ferrer Vincent. De supposicionibus dialectices. In Oeuvres de Saint Vincent Ferrer. (First volume). Paris: 1909. pp.
See now the critical edition edited by John Allen Trentam 1977 (listed below)
Ferrer Vincent. Tractatus de suppositionibus. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzborg 1977.
Critical edition with an introduction (pp. 11-86) by John Allen Trentman
Fitzgerald Michael Joseph, "Supposition and signification. An examination of Ockham's theory of reference", Ph. D. Dissertation Rutgers University, The State University of New Jersey (New Brunswick), 1982.
UMI Dissertation Express reference number 8221663
Forcada V., "Momento historico del tratado De suppositionibus de San Vincente Ferrer," Escritos del Vedat: 37-89 (1973).
Freddoso Alfred J., "O-propositions and Ockham's theory of supposition," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 20: 741-750 (1979).
Freitas Antonio de, "La teoria de la suposición en Pedro Hispano," Revista Venezolana de Filosofia (39-40) (1999).
Galonnier Alain. Le De grammatico et l'origine de la théorie des propriétés des termes. In Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains. Edited by Jolivet Jean and Libera Alain de. Napoli: Bibliopolis 1987. pp. 353-375
Garcia Cuadrado José Angel. La teoría de la suposición en los tratados filosóficos de San Vicente Ferrer. In Excerpta e Dissertationibus in Philosophia.Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra 1991. pp. 325-349
Abstract of the Ph.D: thesis presented at the University of Navarra
Garcia Cuadrado José Angel. La paradojia del análisis linguistico en la lógica de San Vicente Ferrer. In Actas del I Congreso Nacional de Filosofía Medieval, Saragosse, 12-14 December 1990. Edited by Lomba Fuentes J.M. Saragosse, Ibercaja: 1992. pp. 315-323
Garcia Cuadrado José Angel, "Aspectos gnoseológicos de la suppositio naturalis de San Vicente Ferrer," Analogía Filosófica.Revista de Filosófia 7: 153-167 (1993).
"The comparison between "suppositio naturalis" by Pedro Hispano and Vincent Ferrer, clearly shows us the gnoseological differences underlining the theory of one supposition from the other. Vincent Ferrer speaks of a "moderate realism" as seen by Thomas Aquinas; Ferrer proposes a new notion and classification of the "suppositio naturalis" which helps to solve some of the logical-semantic problems raised by the theory of supposition by Pedro Hispano."
Garcia Cuadrado José Angel. Hacia una semantica realista. La filosofía del lenguaje de San Vicente Ferrer. Pamplona: Eunsa 1994.
Garcia Cuadrado José Angel, "Una fuente inédita de la teoría de la suposición en Vicente Ferrer: la polémica Burleigh-Ockham," Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval 5 (1998).
.
"The 14th century controversy between William of Ockham and Walter Burleigh led to the publication of autonomous treatises on the theory of supposition, such as William Sutton's Textus de Suppositionibus. Significant parallels may be found between this treatise and the Tractatus de Suppositionibus of Vincent Ferrer; such coincidences lead to the formulation of the hypothesis of a direct influence of Sutton on Ferrer."
Geach Peter Thomas. Mental acts: their content and their objects. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1957.
Section 23 (pp. 101-106) is on Ockham's the theory of mental language.
Geach Peter Thomas. Reference and generality. An examination of some medieval and modern theories. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1962.
Second emended editon 1968; third revised and expanded edition 1980.
Geach Peter Thomas, "Distribution and Suppositio," Mind 84: 432-435 (1976).
Gelber Hester Goodenough, "I cannot tell a lie. Hugh Lawton's critique of Ockham on mental language," Franciscan Studies 44: 141-179 (1984).
"The article describes the evolution of Ockham's theory of mental language and its impact on three of his dominican contemporaries at oxford: Hugh Lawton, William Crathorn and Robert Holcot, and its impact at Paris on the works of Gregory of Rimini and Pierre d'Ailly. Hugh Lawton's critical response to Ockham relied on a liar-like paradox to show that mental language would preclude the ability to lie. Crathorn devised an alternative to Ockham's theory in reaction, whereas Holcot defended Ockham's views. At Paris, the debate suggested a solution to the liar paradox to Gregory of Rimini."
Giacon Carlo. La suppositio in Guglielmo di Occam e il valore reale delle scienze. In Arts libéraux et philosophie au moyen âge. Montréal, Paris: Vrin 1969. pp. 939-947
Actes du quatrième Congrés international de philosophie médiévale. Université de Montréal, Montréal, Canada. 27 Août - 2 Septembre 1967
Gibson Joan, "The role of mental language in the philosophy of William of Ockham", Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1976.
Henry Desmond Paul, "The early history of Suppositio," Franciscan Studies 23: 205-212 (1963).
Henry Desmond Paul, "Ockham, Suppositio, and modern logic," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 5: 290-292 (1964).
Henry Desmond Paul. Suppositio and Significatio in English logic. In English logic and semantics from the end of the Twelfth Century to the time of Ockham and Burleigh. Edited by Braakhuis Henk A.G. and Kneepkens Corneille Henry. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1981. pp. 361-387
Inciarte Fernando. Die Suppositionstheorie und die Anfänge der extensionalen Semantik. In Antiqui und Moderni. Traditionbewusstsein und Fortschrittsbewusstsein im späten Mittelalter. . Edited by Zimmermann Albert. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1974. pp. 126-141
Kann Christoph. Zur Suppositionstheorie Alberts von Sachsen. In Knowledge and the sciences in medieval philosophy. Vol. II. Edited by Knuuttila Simo, Tyorinoja R., and Ebbesen Sten. Helsinki: Yliopistopaino 1990. pp. 512-520
Proceedings of the Eight International Congress of Medieval Philosophy, Helsinki 24-29 August 1987. (Vol. II).
Kann Christoph. Materiale Supposition und die Erwähnung von Sprachzeichen. In Neue Realitäten. Herausforderung der Philosophie. XVI. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie 20.-24. September 1993, TU Berlin Sektionsbeiträge I.1993. pp. 231-238
Kann Christoph. Die Eigenschaften der Termini: Eine Untersuchung zur Perutilis Logica Alberts von Sachsen. Leiden, New York: E. J. Brill 1994.
With the Latin edition of Perutilis Logica. Tractatus Secundus. De suppositionibus terminorum (pp. 167-265)
Karger Elizabeth, "Conséquences et inconséquences de la supposition vide dans la logique d'Ockham," Vivarium 16: 46-55 (1978).
Karger Elizabeth. La supposition matérielle comme supposition significative: Paul de Venise, Paul de Pergola. In English logic and semantics from the end of the Twelfth Century to the time of Ockham and Burleigh. Edited by Braakhuis Henk A.G. and Kneepkens Corneille Henry. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1981. pp. 331-341
Karger Elizabeth, "Modes of personal supposition. The purpose and usefulness of the doctrine within Ockham's logic," Franciscan Studies 44: 87-106 (1984).
Karger Elizabeth. Une définition de la supposition par Guillaume d'Ockham et sa reprise par Albert de Saxe. In Itinéraires d'Albert de Saxe. Edited by Biard Joel. Paris: Vrin 1991. pp. 51-69
Karger Elizabeth. A theory of immediate inferences contained in Buridan's logic. In Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns. Edited by Jacobi K. Leiden, New York, Koln: E. J. Brill 1993. pp. 407-429
Karger Elizabeth, "Théories de la pensée, de ses objects et de son discours chez Guillaume d'Occam," Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical Review 33: 437-456 (1994).
Karger Elizabeth, "Mental sentences according to Burley and to the early Ockham," Vivarium 34: 192-230 (1996).
Kaye Sharon, "Later medieval nominalism and the politics of supposition," Eidos.The Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy 14: 29-50 (1997).
"The salient dispute between realists and nominalists of the fourteenth century concerns the metaphysics of supposition. Do general terms stand for extra-mental universals or not? By answering in the affirmative, Walter Burley loses his ability to provide a plausible account of indefinite promises such as "I promise you a horse." By answering in the negative, Ockham not only explains indefinite promises, but also paves the way for a conception of the faith community more revolutionary than Protestantism. In the Bible, Jesus promises his disciples that he will be with them "always, to the end of the age." In Ockham's view, this is an indefinite promise parallel to the case of the horse; it means "I promise you a Christian." According to this analysis, the universal church can survive in a single, unlikely, and even unknown, individual. Ockham thereby undermines the doctrine of papal infallibility as well as institutional religion itself."
Kelley F.E., "Some observations on the Fictum theory in Ockham and its relation to Hervaeus Natalis," Franciscan Studies 38: 260-282 (1978).
Klima Gyula. Existence and reference in mediaeval logic. In New essays in free logic. Edited by Morscher Edgar and Hieke Alexander. Dodrecht: Kluwer 1995. pp. 197-226
Klima Gyula. Semantic complexity and syntactic simplicity in Ockham's mental language. 1999. pp.
Klima Gyula, "Tradition and innovation in medieval theories of mental representation," Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics 4: 4-11 (2004).
Knabenschuch de Porta Sabine, "La téoria de la supósicion y los idiomas modernos," Revista de Filosofia (Venezuela): 75-99 (1989).
Kneepkens Corneille Henry. Suppositio and supponere in 12th Century Grammar. In Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains. Aux origines de la "Logica Modernorun". Edited by Jolivet Jean and Libera Alain de. Napoli: Bibliopolis 1987. pp. 325-351
Actes du septième symposium européeen d'histoire de la logique et de la sémantique médiévales. Centre d'Etudes Supérieures de Civilisation Médiévale de Poitiers. Poitiers 17-22 jiun 1985
Kneepkens Corneille Henry, "Erfurt, Amol Q 70A: A Questiones-commentary on the second part of Alexander de Villa Dei's Doctrinale," Vivarium: 26-54 (1990).
"In this paper it is argued that the Quaestiones-Commentary on Alexander de Villa Dei's Doctrinale in the manuscript Arfurt, Ampl. Q.70a is part of the conceptualist grammatical tradition of the late 14th century. A characteristic feature of this theory is the absolute primacy of mental language to spoken or written language. An edition of the first question has been appended."
Knudsen Christian, "Ein Ockhamkritischer Text zu Signifikation und Supposition und zum Verhältnis von erster und zweiter Intention," Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin 14: 1-26 (1975).
Kraml Hans. Supposition und Wahrheit. In Entwicklungslinien mittelalterlicher Philosophie. Edited by Leibold Gerhard and Löffler Winfried. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1999. pp. 222-231
Entwicklungslinien mittelalterlicher Philosophie. Vorträge des V. Kongresses der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Teil II.
Kunze Peter, "Satzwahrheit und sprachliche Verweisung. Walter Burleighs Lehre von der suppositio termini in Auseinandersetzung mit der mittelalterlichen Tradition und der Logik William of Ockham", 1980.
Ph. D. University of Freiburg
Lagerlund Henrik. What is singular thought? Ockham and Buridan on singular terms in the language of thought. In Mind and modality. Studies in the history of philosophy in honour of Simo Knuuttila. Edited by Hirvonen Vesa, Holopainen Toivo, and Tuominen Miira. Leiden: Brill 2006. pp. 217-238
Lenz Martin. Mentale Sätze. Wilhelm von Ockhams Thesen zur Sprachlichkeit des Denkens. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 2003.
Lenz Martin. Oratio mentalis und Mentalesisch. Ein spätmittelalterlicher Blick auf die gegenwärtige Philosophie des Geistes. In 'Herbst des Mittelalters'? Fragen zur Bewertung des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts. Edited by Aertsen Jan A. and Pickavé Martin. New York: De Gruyter 2004. pp. 105-130
Libera Alain de, "Supposition naturelle et appellation: aspects de la sémantique parisienne au XIII siècle," Histoire, Épistémologie, Langage 3 (1): 63-77 (1981).
Libera Alain de. La logique médiévale et la théorie de la supposition. Paris Université de Paris 7: Département de Recherches Linguistiques, Equipe d'Histoire des Théories Linguistiques 1982.
Libera Alain de. Suppositio et inclusio dans les théories médiévales de la référence. In La référence. Actes du Colloque de Saint-Cloud, Ecole Nomale Supérieure de Saint-Cloud, 12-13 octobre 1984. Edited by Danon-Boileau Laurent and Libera Alain de. Paris: Ophrys 1987. pp. 9-62
Loux Michael J., "Significatio and suppositio. Reflections on Ockham's semantics," New Scholasticism 53: 407-427 (1979).
"In this paper, I examine Ockham's views on "significatio" and "suppositio" in the light of pre-ockhamistic terminist treatments of these notions. What I try to show is that Ockham's views here are not simply nominalistic variants on traditional terminist themes. While conceding that Ockham's nominalism is central in his theory of terms, i try to locate the "semantical" underpinnings of his views on "significatio" and "suppositio". What I suggest is that Ockham's account deviates from those of his predecessors in taking the notion of standard reference or personal "suppositio" as conceptually prior to the notion of meaning or "significatio", and I conclude that perhaps a rejection of the atomistic semantics of his predecessors motivates this revision of the traditional theory of terms."
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