An excellent introduction to the argument is the article "Universals" by Mary C. MacLeod and Eric M. Rubenstein in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by James Fieser and Bradley Dowden.
FORMAL ONTOLOGY AND THEORY OF UNIVERSALS
"The central feature of a formal ontology is how it represents the nexus of predication, which depends on what theory of universals it assumes.
The three main theories of universals are nominalism, conceptualism, and (logical or natural) realism.
The analysis of the fundamental forms of predication of a formal ontology may be directed upon the structure of reality or upon the structure of thought.
Natural realism, and in particular Aristotle's ontology, is directed upon the structure of the natural world, and the preeminent mode of being is that of concrete individual things, or primary substances. There are two major forms of natural realism, moderate realism and modal moderate realism.
Aristotle's moderate natural realism has two types of predication: predication of species and genera (natural kinds), and predication of properties and relations.
Kant's and Husserl's categorial analyses, unlike Aristotle's, are directed upon the structure of thought and experience rather than upon the structure of reality. The categories function on this account to articulate the logical forms of judgments and not as the general causes or grounds of concrete being.
Husserl's formal ontology is based on a transcendental logic in which the laws and rules of logic are justified in terms of subjective analyses of presumed a priori structures that provide the evidence for the objective versions of those of those laws and rules.
There are two problems regarding the completeness of a formal ontology: first, the problem of the completeness of the categories of an ontology, and second, the problem of the completeness of the deductive laws that are based on those categories.
Set theory provides only an external semantics for a formal ontology; unless that ontology is set theory itself, which has no nexus of predication, and hence strictly speaking is not a formal ontology. An incompleteness theorem for a formal ontology based a set-theoretic semantics need not show that the ontology is incomplete with respect to an internal semantics. In particular, sometimes general models are a better representation of a formal ontology's internal
semantics than are. so-called "standard" models.
Conceptual realism is a, formal ontology framed within the context of a naturalistic epistemology and a naturalistic approach to the relations between language, thought, and reality as based on our scientific knowledge of the world.
Conceptual realism is based on a conceptualist account of the speech and mental acts that underlie reference and predication. It is directed in that regard primarily upon the structure of thought. But, because its methodology is based on a linguistic and logical analysis of our speech and mental acts, it is not committed to a phenomenological reduction of those acts. Nor does it preclude such a reduction.
Conceptual realism contains both a natural realism and an intensional realism, each of which can be developed as separate subsystems that are compatible within the larger framework, one containing a modern form of Aristotelian essentialism, and the other containing a modern counterpart of Platonism based on the intensional contents of our speech and mental acts."
From: Nino Cocchiarella - Formal ontology and conceptual realism - New York, Springer, 2007, pp. 23-24.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Universals and particulars: readings in ontology. Edited by Loux
Michael J. Garden City: Anchor Books 1970.
The problem of universals. Edited by Landesman Charles. New York:
Basic books 1971.
Contents: On the relations of universals and particulars, by B. Russell;
Universals and resemblances, by H. H. Price; On concept and object, by G.
Frege; Frege's hidden nominalism, by G. Bergmann; Universals, by F. P.
Ramsey; Universals and metaphysical realism, by A. Donagan; Universals and
family resemblances, by R. Bambrough; Particular and general, by P. F.
Strawson; The nature of universals and propositions, by G. F. Stout; Are
characteristics of particular things universal or particular? by G. E. Moore
and G. F. Stout; The relation of resemblance, by P. Butchvarov; Qualities,
by N. Wolterstroff; On what there is, by W. V. Quine; Empiricism, semantics,
and ontology, by R. Carnap; The languages of realism and nominalism, by R.
B. Brandt; Grammar and existence: a preface to ontology, by W. Sellars; A
world of individuals, by N. Goodman; Bibliographical notes pp. 307-308.
Das Universalien-Problem. Edited by Stegmüller Wolfgang.
Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1978.
Gli universali e la formazione dei concetti. Edited by Urbani
Ulivi Lucia. Milano: Edizioni di Comunità 1981.
Properties. Edited by Mellor D.H. and Oliver Alex. Oxford: Oxford
University Press 1997.
Universals, concepts and qualities. New essays on the meaning of
predicates. Edited by Strawson Peter Frederick and Chakrabarti Arindam.
Aldershot: Ashgate 2006.
Contents: Introduction byArindam Chakrabarti; Strawson on universals
byPranab Kumar Sen; Reply to Pranab Sen by P.F. Strawson; Universals and
other generalities by Jonardon Ganeri; Predicates and properties: an
examination of P.K. Sens' theory of universals by Fraser McBride; Buddhist
nominalism and desert ornithology by Mark Siderits; Universals transformed:
the first thousand years after Plato by Richard Sorabji; Conceptualism by
Chris Swoyer; The concept horse by Harold W. Noonan; Universals and
particulars: Ramsey's scepticism by Bob Hale; How not to trivialize the
identity of indiscernibles by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra; Universals and the
defence of ante rem realism by George Bealer; Particulars have their
properties of necessity by David Armstrong; Properties in abundance by
Wolfgang Künne; A category of particulars by P.F. Strawson; On perceiving
properties byArindam Chakrabarti; Index.
Aaron Richard I. The theory of universals. Oxford: Clarendon
Press 1952.
Armstrong David Malet. Universals and scientific realism.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1978.
Two volumes
Armstrong David Malet, "In defence of structural universals,"
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1): 85-88 (1986).
"1. The central issue. At the heart of David Lewis' case against
structural universals lies his contention that two different things cannot
be composed of exactly the same parts.
Here is what I take to be a counter-example to his principle. Let a and b
be two particulars, and R be a non-symmetrical relation. Let it be the
case that a has R to b, and that b has R to a.
We have two distinct states of affairs ('two different things'), yet, in a
clear sense of the word 'composed', they are composed of exactly the same
parts: a, b and R.
The two states of affairs may be called structures. In his important
recent book The Categorical Structure of the World (1983, Section
101), Reinhardt Groomsman offers the following identity-conditions for
structures. S1 and S2 are the very same structure if and only if (a) they
contain- the very same nonrelational parts; (b) they contain the very same
relations; (c) the same parts stand in the same relations to each other.
In my counter-example, the two structures contain the very same
non-relational parts, the very same relations, but it is not the case that
the same parts stand in the same' relation to each other.
My counter-example to Lewis' principle was chosen because, although it
involves structures, it does not involve structural universals. This shows,
I think, that the difficulty raised by Lewis is best thought of as an
argument against postulating any universals, structural or otherwise; or, at
least, as an argument against postulating relations which are universals.
Lewis, of course, would not allow the counter-example. By far the simplest
way for him to deal with it is by adopting a philosophy of what, following
D. C. Williams (1953), and, more recently, K. K. Campbell (1981),
he calls 'tropes'. Tropes are properties and relations, but they are
properties.' and relations conceived not as universals but as
particulars.;-On this; view 'of relations, my alleged counter-example
becomes two states of affairs, a R1 b, and b R2 a,
where R1 and R2 are not identical, although they may, resemble exactly.
(The universal R perhaps reduces to an equivalence-class of exactly
resembling tropes.) Given this account, I have certainly not produced a
counter-example to Lewis' view that two different things cannot: be composed
of exactly the same things.
But is not the dispute now a stand-off? Lewis can use his principle against
a philosophy of universals. I can use universals to produce a
counter-example to his principle. Indeed, is not Lewis close to begging the
question against me?
It may be replied that Lewis' view is the more economical. He puts forward
an attractive-sounding principle. I have to deny that the principle holds in
all cases, and my reason is that it is defeated by those suspicious
characters: universals.
To this I reply that economy in a metaphysics can only be judged, as Mark
Johnston has put it to me, 'in the end-game'. For myself, I believe that
universals are great explainers. The loss on the roundabouts as a result of
having to deny Lewis' principle may well be made up with interest on the
swings. In any case, as the great Dr. Tarrasch said, 'before the end-game,
the Gods have placed the middle-game'.
What it would be nice to have, but what I cannot supply, is formal
description of an operation which will take one from any unordered set of
universals to possible structural universals which involve nothing but
members of the set.' (I say 'possible' in order to respect the Principle of
Instantiation which I believe should apply to all universals.) Such an
operation will permit the one universal in the original set to appear in
more than one 'place' in the structural universal. (E.g. an F having R to an
F which has R to a third F.) A parallel is the way that, in a set of sets,
the very same individual may be found as a member of different sub-sets."
pp. 85-86.
Armstrong David Malet. Universals. An opinionated introduction.
Boulder: Westview Press 1989.
Contents: Preface XI-XII; 1. The problem 1; 2. Primitive natural classes 21;
3. Resemblance nominalism 39; 4. Particulars as bundles of universals 59; 5.
Universals as attributes 75; 6. Tropes 113; 7. Summing up 135; references
131; Index 145.
"This book is intended to be intelligible to the advanced undergraduate
student and should also be suitable for graduate seminars. However, I hope
that it will also be of interest to professional philosophers, particularly
those who are sympathetic to the project of an empirical metaphysics. Since
the publication of my book Universals and Scientific Realism in 1978,
although my views have remained the same in broad outline, I have become
aware of various mistakes and omissions in what I said then. The present
work, therefore, besides introducing the topic, tries to push the subject
further ahead.
I now think that a particular type of moderate Nominalism, moderate because
it admits properties and relations, but a Nominalism because it takes the
properties and relations to be particulars rather than universals, can be
developed as an important and quite plausible rival to a moderate Realism
about universals. In the earlier book I gave such a Nominalism only brief
consideration. By contrast, in this work a battle between Nominalists and
Realists over the status of properties and relations becomes one main theme.
In general, I have largely confined myself to moderate Nominalisms and
moderate Realisms. That host of contemporary philosophers who unreflectively
substitute classes of particulars for properties and relations I take to be
immoderate Nominalists. However, many of the arguments that I bring against
the more moderate Natural Class theory are also arguments against this
orthodoxy." (From the Preface)
"It is time to bring the matter to a conclusion. Metaphysicians should not
expect any certainties in their inquiries. One day, perhaps, the subject
will be transformed, but for the present the philosopher can do no more than
survey the field as conscientiously as he or she can, taking note of the
opinions and arguments of predecessors and contemporaries, and then make a
fallible judgment arrived at and backed up as rationally as he or she knows
how.
Of all the results that have been argued for here, the most secure, I
believe, is the real existence of properties and relations. Whether they be
universals or particulars is a more delicate matter, and just what
properties and relations are required may be obscure, and in any case not
for the philosopher to determine. But I hope that the arguments of Chapters
2 and 3, criticizing the versions of the Natural Class and Resemblance
theories that try to do without properties and relations, will be thought
weighty. Blobs are out; we require layer cakes. Reality must have more
fundamental structure than the stricter Nominalisms allow. The introduction
of properties and relations then involves, I argued, the admission of states
of affairs (facts) into our ontology." p. 135
(...)
"Therefore, the fate of the Universals theory may turn on the questions of
the inexact resemblance of universals and of the nature of laws. But if both
questions go as I surmise that they will go, the Universals theory seems
ahead of even the best Trope theory.
Drawing a figure from the game of chess, Mark Johnston has suggested to me
that the dispute between a suitably sophisticated theory of universals and a
suitably sophisticated theory of tropes can only be decided in the end game.
Maybe. We are probably only at the beginning of the middle game as yet.
We have seen in Chapter 6 the remarkable way that the Universals and Trope
theories, when thought through, turn out to run parallel in many respects.
We may in the end have to reconsider an idea of H. H. Price's (Thinking
and experience, Hutchinson, 1953, Ch. 1, pp. 30-32) that Universals and
Resemblance theories are no more than "alternative languages," although,
unlike Price, we will surely need to move to a trope version of a
Resemblance theory.
At any rate, the Problem of Universals is alive and well and may commend
itself to those happy few who feel the intellectual fascination in what D.
C. Williams called "grubbing around in the roots of being." p. 139
Armstrong David Malet, "Classes are state of affairs," Mind 100:
189-200 (1991).
Azzouni Jody. Deflating existential consequence. A case for
Nominalism. New York: Oxford University Press 2004.
Bacon John, "Armstrong's theory of properties," Australasian Journal
of Philosophy 64 (1): 47-53 (1986).
"At the heart of D. M. Armstrong's theory of universals in [N], [U] and [L]
is a set of basic theses about monadic universals, or properties, as he
calls them. The theses lay down the a priori conditions under which a
one, place predicate simple or compound) may stand for a property. Thus
there are predicates standing for no property. We may nevertheless say for
convenience that they stand for 'features', without here attempting a closer
semantic analysis of this way of speaking. The rough idea is that a
'feature' is a class-concept. As (placeholders for) one-place predicates, I
use F, G.
That F is a property or a universal will be expressed by the (closed)
sentence UF. The theory of U, of universalhood, is the metaphysical core of
Armstrong's theory of universals. My purpose here is to clarify the core so
far as formal means -permit."
[N] Nominalism and realism vo. 1 of Universals and scientific
realism, Cambridge 1978.
[U] A theory of universals, vol. 2 of same.
[L] What is a law of nature?, Cambridge 1983.
Bacon John. Universals and property instances. The alphabet of Being.
London: Blackwell 1995.
Bealer George, "Universals," The Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):
5-32 (1993).
Bochenski Joseph M., Church Alonzo, and Goodman Nelson. The problem
of universals. A Symposium. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press
1956.
Contents; Alonzo Church: Propositions and sentences 3; Nelson Goodman: A
world of individuals 15; Joseph Bochenski: The Problem of Universals 35-54.
"The papers contained in this publication were read at the Aquinas Symposium
sponsored by the Department of Philosophy of the University of Notre Dame on
March 9-10, 1956. Leo R. Ward, C.S.C., of the University of Notre Dame,
coordinator of the Aquinas Symposium, had invited scholars representing
several divergent views on the nature of Universals to present, within the
limits of a relatively short paper and a subsequent discussion period, some
aspects of the problem of Universals. Response to his invitation was very
gratifying.
Out of the meeting came three papers that literally make up a symposium:
Professor Alonzo Church of Princeton University, Professor Nelson Goodman of
the University of Pennsylvania, and Professor I. M. Bochcnski, 0.P., of the
University of Fribourg and Visiting-Professor at the University of Notre
Dame read papers that converge on the Problem of the Universals from three
different philosophic positions. Professor Richard McKeon of the University
of Chicago was the discussion leader at all of the sessions. These papers,
with a minimum of editing by the respective participants, are now made
available in this edition."
Boolos George, "Nominalist platonism," The Philosophical Review
94: 327-344 (1985).
Butchvarov Panayot. Resemblance and identity. An examination of the
problem of universals. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1966.
Cocchiarella Nino. Logical investigations of predication theory and
the problem of universals. Napoli: Bibliopolis 1986.
"Predication theory has been a subject of philosophical concern since at
least the writings of Plato and Aristotle. It is in its way the locus of a
number of philosophical issues both in metaphysics and epistemology, not the
least of which is the problem of universals.
The latter problem, sometimes all too simply put as the question of whether
there are universals or not, is especially germane to the notion of
predication since a theory of universals is at least in part a semantic
theory of predication; and it is just to such a theory that we must turn in
any philosophical investigation of the notion of predication.
In doing so, however, we need not assume the truth or superiority of any one
theory of universals over another. Indeed, an appropriate preliminary to any
such assumption might well consist of a comparative analysis of some of the
different formal theories of predication that can be semantically associated
with these different theories of universals: for just as the latter provide
a semantics for the former, it is only through the logical syntax of a
formal theory of predication that the logical structure of a theory of
universals can be rendered perspicuous. That, in any case, is the principal
methodological assumption for the approach to the problem of universals we
shall undertake in the present monograph where we will be more concerned
with the construction and comparison of the abstract logical systems that
may be associated with different theories of universals than with the
metaphysical or epistemological issues for which they were originally
designed. It is our hope and expectation, however, that these comparative
formal analyses will be instrumental toward any philosophical decision as to
whether to adopt a given theory of universals or not.
The original use of the term "universal" goes back to Aristotle according to
whom a universal is that which can be predicated of things (De
Interpretatione, 17 a 39). We shall retain the core of this notion
throughout this essay and assume that whatever else it may be a universal
has a predicable nature and that it is this predicable nature which is what
constitutes its universality.
Nothing follows from that assumption, however, regarding whether a universal
is (1) merely a predicate expression (nominalism) of some language or other;
(2) a concept (conceptualism) in the. sense of a sociobiologically based
cognitive ability or capacity to identify, collect or classify, and
characterize or relate things in various ways; or (3) a real property or
relation existing independently of both language and the natural capacity
humans have for thought and representation (realism). We propose to take
each of these interpretations or theories of universals seriously in what
follows at least to the extent that we are able to associate each with a
formal theory of predication. Our particular concern in this regard,
moreover, will be with the explanation each provides of the predicable
nature of universals, i.e., of that in which the universality of universals
consists.
Our discussion and comparison of nominalism, conceptualism and realism,
accordingly, will not deal with the variety of arguments that have been
given for or against each of them, but with how each as a theory of
universals may be semantically associated with a formal theory of
predication. Our assumption here, as indicated above, is that insofar as
such an associated formal theory of predication provides a logically
perspicuous medium for the articulation of the predicable nature of
universals as understood by the theory of universals in question, then to
that extent the formal theory may itself be identified with the explanation
which that theory of universals provides of the predicable nature of
universals. It is in the sense of this assumption, moreover, that we
understand a philosophical theory of predication to be a formal theory of
predication together with its semantically associated theory of universals."
pp. 11-12.
Forrest Peter, "Neither magic nor mereology: a reply to Lewis,"
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1): 89-91 (1986).
"In 'Against Structural Universals', David Lewis provides an important
critique of the theory of structural universals developed by D.. M.
Armstrong, and which I use in 'Ways Worlds Could Be'. Lewis' chief criticism
is based on the thesis that the only unanalysable, sui generis, :mode of
composition is that of mereology. (1) I call that the Either Mereology or
Magic Thesis. Lewis claims that the 'generation of sets out of their
elements is not some unmereological form of composition'. He, rightly in my
opinion, treats a set as the mereological sum of unit sets. And -- here' I
disagree -- -he insists that the generation of unit sets is 'not composition
at all.'
In reply to Lewis I shall attack the Either Mereology 'or Magic Thesis by
arguing:
(1) That it does not follow from a conceptual analysis. (2)
(2) Although it has considerable prima facie ;appeal it is not robust enough
to be used to argue against structural universals
and (3) Lewis himself is committed to counter-examples lo, it.
I conclude that Either Mereology or Magic Thesis is merely' an interesting
conjecture, which would hold for some ontologies, but which Lewis should not
advance and which has no power to refute my own theory of possibility."
(1) Against Structural Universals', this issue of the Australasian
Journal of Philosophy pp. 25-46.
(2) Nor is it obvious that Lewis intended it to be.
Forrest Peter, "Ways Worlds could be," Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 64 (1): 15-24 (1986).
Gosselin Mia. Nominalism and contemporary nominalism. Ontological and
epistemological implications of the work of W. V. O. Quine and of N.
Goodman. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1990.
Hale Bob. Abstract objects. Oxford : Basil Blackwell 1987. pp.
Hochberg Herbert, "A refutation of moderate nominalism," Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 66 (2): 188-207 (1988).
"Russell offered what has become a classic argument for the existence of
universal properties in his 1911 paper 'On the Relations of Universals and
Particulars. (1) My concern in this paper is not with the cogency of the
argument he offered there, but with a moderation of the nominalist's
position that concedes a point to Russell. (1) Some nominalist's have
recently acknowledged Russell's claim that a universal 'connection' or
'relation' of similarity is involved in taking qualities to be
particular-instances, or 'quality-moments' in Husserl's terminology, and
have argued as follows. The realist recognises particulars and universals.
In addition, the realist acknowledges a universal connection or tie or nexus
or predication relation - exemplification, say. Thus, the realist recognises
three distinct kinds of things: particulars, universal qualities (including
relations) and a connection between particulars and universals. The
'moderate' nominalist recognises particular quality-instances and a
universal connection - exact similarity. Consequently, Russell's argument,
at best, does not force a universal relational quality upon the
nominalist, but merely forces the nominalist to recognise a universal
connection that is a correlate of the realist's exemplification
connection, and not of the realist's universal qualities and relations.(2)
In a way, the modification of the nominalist's position is a tribute to
Bradley's 'paradox', which can be taken to force one to recognise, as
Russell sometimes did, that there is a basic predication relation that
cannot be included as a relation among relations without initiating a
vicious regress. (3)
The moderate nominalist can then reject Russell's claim that a universal
relational quality must be recognised. Since the similarity relation is the
analogue of the realist's exemplification connection, it is not a 'standard'
universal. And, as any view must recognise such a connection, giving Bradley
his due, the nominalistic advocate of quality-instances merely recognises,
in his way, what the realist must also recognise: a 'connection'
exemplification 'tie' (or several 'ties'): the nominalist recognises
particular quality-instances and a universal 'similarity tie'. Thus, while
Russell's argument is neither blocked nor denied, it is seemingly deprived
of its sting.
I shall argue that the moderate nominalist's argument fails for a number of
reasons. (It is worth noting that Wilfrid Sellars has long advocated a
variant of this kind of nominalism, though he sought to avoid explicitly
accepting either a universal tie or quality-instances.) (4) One reason
the argument fails is that it tries to avoid one kind of entity by giving
another type of entity a two-fold function. The realist's exemplification
connection performs only one function. It serves to connect particulars to
universals so that we have states of affairs (5) to provide truth conditions
for atomic sentences. In short, it combines elements into complexes. The
nominalist's connection is not merely a connection in that sense. It
not only connects exactly similar qualityinstances into what we may call
'similarity-facts', but, by so doing, it provides the qualitative content
for an object. This is readily seen when we note that the realist's
connection may or may not obtain, in the sense that a state of
affairs may or may not obtain, given the elements - the particular and
the quality - that enter into it. The nominalist's similarity fact must
obtain, given the elements that enter into it, and is thus necessary, just
as the similarity relation may be said to be 'internal', as opposed to an
'external' tie of exemplification. Thus, the relation of exact similarity is
quite different from a connecting tie like exemplification." pp. 188-189
(1) Russell's classic argument will not do as it was presented. It will do
in an amended form. On this point see my 'Russell's Proof of Realism
Reproved', Philosophical Studies 37, 1980.
(2) I am indebted to D. M. Armstrong for calling my attention to this
variant of nominalism and to discussion of it with him.
(3) Russell's concern with the Bradley paradox was partially responsible for
his holding, in the manuscript of 1913 entitled Theory of Knowledge, that
facts involved logical forms which were not constituents. See Chapter VII of
the manuscript, published as vol. 7, The Collected Papers of Bertrand
Russell, ed. E. Eames et. al. (London: 1984).
(4) On Sellars' nominalism see my 'Logical Form, Existence, and Relational
Predication', in Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, ed. H. Wettstein, et.
al. (Minneapolis: 1981), reprinted in my book Logic, Ontology and Language
(Munich: 1984).
(5) Questions arise regarding 'possible' facts or states of affairs that do
not 'obtain'. Such issues, though relevant to the dispute between realists
and nominalists, will be avoided in this paper.
Jacquette Dale, "Bochenski on property identity and the refutation of
universals," Journal of Philosophical Logic 35: 293-316 (2006).
"An argument against multiply instantiable universals is considered in
neglected essays by Stanislaw Lesniewski and I. M. Bochenski. Bochenski
further applies Lesniewski's refutation of universals by maintaining that
identity principles for individuals must be different than property identity
principles. Lesniewski's argument is formalized for purposes of exact
criticism, and shown to involve both a hidden vicious circularity in the
form of impredicative definitions and explicit self-defeating consequences.
Syntactical restrictions on Leibnizian indiscernibility of identicals are
recommended to forestall Lesniewski's paradox."
Johansson Ingvar, "Determinables as Universals," The Monist 83
(1): 101-121 (2000).
Katz Jerrold and Postal Paul, "Realism vs. Conceptualism in
linguistics," Linguistics and Philosophy 14: 515-554 (1991).
Küng Guido. Ontology and the logistic analysis of language. An
enquiry into the contemporary views on universals. Doridrecht: Reidel
1967.
Original edition: Ontologie und logistische Analyse der Sprache Eine
Untersuchung zur zeitgenössischen Universaliendiskussion - Wien,
Springer-Verlag, 1963.
Landini Gregory and Foster Thomas, "The persistence of counterexample:
re-examining the debate over Leibniz Law," Noûs 25: 43-61 (1991).
Largeault Jean. Enquête sur le nominalisme. Louvain: Éditions
Nauwelaerts 1971.
Lewis David, "Against structural universals," Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 64 (1): 25-46 (1986).
Lewis David, "Comment on Armstrong and Forrest," Australasian Journal
of Philosophy 64 (1): 92-93 (1986).
Linsky Bernard and Zalta Edward, "Naturalized Platonism versus
Platonized naturalism," The Journal of Philosophy 92 (10): 525-555
(1995).
Marsonet Michele. The problem of realism. Aldershot: Ashgate
2002.
Maurin Anna-Sofia. If tropes. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2002.
Mellor D.H., "There are no conjunctive universals," Analysis 52:
97-103 (1992).
"In short, just calling particulars and universals 'parts' of facts will not
distinguish them even from functions like conjunctions, negation and
disjunction, let alone from each other. Nor will it tell us whether there
are conjunctive universals. For the answer to that question will now depend
on whether the specifically universal type of parts of facts includes
non-ultimate parts. If it does, there will be conjunctive universals; if
not, not. So to say that there are such universals, just because parts are
generally taken to include non-ultimate parts, would simply beg the
question. Moreover this answer to it will now give advocates of conjunctive
universals far more than they want. (...)
I conclude that none of Oliver's models of how particulars and universals
constitute facts will tell us whether, and if so why, there are conjunctive
universals." p. 99
Moreland James Porter. Universals, qualities, and quality-instances:
a defense of realism. Lanham: University Press of America 1985.
Moreland James Porter, "How to be a nominalist in realist clothing,"
Grazer Philosophische Studien 39: 75-101 (1991).
Moreland James Porter. Universals. Montréal: McGill-Queen's
University Press 2001.
Newman Andrew. The physical basis of predication. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1992.
Oliver Alex, "Could there be conjunctive universals?," Analysis
52: 88-103 (1992).
"Recently D. H. Mellor (1) has revived an argument of Ramsey's against the
existence of complex universals. Although he believes in simple universals,
Mellor argues that negative, disjunctive and conjunctive universals do not
exist. I will show that his argument rests on a contentious identity
criterion for facts. Despite the recent renewal of interest in a metaphysics
of facts, conspicuously little has been said about the relationship between
a fact and its constituents. I sketch three models of this relationship,
only one of which sanctions the identity criterion. It turns out that this
model does not fit Mellor's interpretation of Ramsey's theory of facts. I
conclude by showing that Ramsey's argument does nothing to rule out one kind
of conjunctive universal." p. 88
(1) D. H. Mellor, Properties and predicates, in his Matters of
metaphysics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991 pp. 170-182.
Quinton Anthony. The nature of things. London: Routldge & Kegan
Paul 1973.
Rodriguez-Pereyra Gonzalo, "What is the Problem of Universals?," Mind
109: 255-273 (2000).
"In this article I address the Problem of Universals by answering questions
about what facts a solution to the Problem of Universals should explain and
how the explanation should go. I argue that a solution to the Problem of
Universals explains the facts the Problem of Universals is about by giving
the truthmakers (as opposed to the conceptual content and the ontological
commitments) of the sentences stating those facts. I argue that the
sentences stating the relevant facts are those like "a has the property F",
that is, sentences stating that a particular has a certain properly. Finally
I show how answering these questions in this way transforms the Problem of
Universals, traditionally conceived as the One over Many, that is, the
problem of explaining how different particulars can have the same
properties, into the Many over One, that is, the problem of explaining how
the same particular can have different properties. The Problem of Universals
is the problem of the Many over One."
Rodriguez-Pereyra Gonzalo. Resemblance nominalism. A solution to the
Problem of Universals. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2002.
Rodriguez-Pereyra Gonzalo, "The problem of Universals and the limits of
conceptual analysis," Philosophical Papers 31: 39-47 (2002).
Stegmüller Wolfgang. The problem of Universals then and now. In
Collected papers on epistemology, philosophy of science and history of
philosophy. Vol. I. Dordrecht: Reidel 1977. pp. 1-65
Original German: Das Universalienproblem eisnt und jetzt in:
Archiv für Philosophie, 6 (1956) pp. 192-225 and 7 (1957) pp.45-81.
Teichmann Roger. Abstract entities. New York: St. Martin's Press
1992.
Van Cleve James, "Predication without universals? A fling with Ostrich
Nominalism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 577-590
(1994).
"In this paper I wish to consider the merits of Realist theories of
predication vis-à-vis three varieties of Nominalism, which Armstrong has
dubbed Predicate Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism, and Ostrich Nominalism)
In Part I, I shall argue that Ostrich Nominalism is the most satisfactory
position of these four, and that the Realist view favored by Armstrong and
many others is prone to the same fundamental difficulty as the other two
varieties of Nominalism. In Part II, I shall consider difficulties for the
argument of Part I."
Williams Donald, "Universals and existents," Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 64 (1): 14 (1986).
"The somewhat dusty problem on which I engage us here is about as inclusive
and 'ontological' as any, and I would introduce it by,,' developing some
implication of the remark that our philosophical object, the world, and each
part of it, is (naturally enough) a totality of what is. The italicized
phrase at once brings to the pedagogic mind certain further catchwords which
point up the contrast between what a thing is and that it is. The 'what'
here however has itself stood for two meanings. By 'what it is' we may mean
it, the thing, the particular case it is, the individual subject, denoted by
an' ordinary proper name, so that what exists when Socrates exists is
Socrates; but we may mean again its nature, the kind it is, the character
generally said to be connoted by a common noun or conveyed by descriptive
adjectives -and denoted by an abstract noun, so that to answer what exists
when Socrates exists is to say that it is a man, is wise, is snubnosed, and
so forth, or even that the 'what' of it is Humanity, Wisdom, Snubnosedness,
etc. The dichotomy here is sometimes signalized by distinguishing within the
import of the present 'what', considered in contrast with the 'that', a
narrower sense of 'what' which we pedagogues sometimes express by '(the)
such', viz., the kind or character, in contrast with '(the) this', viz., the
case or instance. The, problem of universals, which is the clearer and
easier of the problems associated with the opposition of 'essence and
existence', is that of the real distinction and connection of the two
referents of our more inclusive 'what', the such and this, and especially
the assessment of the view that these involve an entity of one category, an
abstract universal, which inheres in or qualifies an entity of another
category, a concrete particular."
Editors Note: This article by the late Professor Donald C. Williams
(1899-1983) dates from about 1959.
Wolterstorff Nicholas. On universals. An essay in ontology.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1970.
Zalabardo José, "Predicates, properties and the goal of a theory of
reference," Grazer Philosophische Studien 51: 121-161 (1996).
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