"Like most philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition, Ockham distinguishes between propositions and the terms out of which they are composed. Central to Ockham's analysis of the concept of a term is his distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic terms. We can get at this dichotomy if we distinguish between expressions that do and expressions that do not yield a meaningful proposition when substituted for x in 'This x -es' or 'This is (a/an)
x'. The former (including predicate-expressions, proper names, demonstratives, and pronouns) Ockham calls categorematic terms; the latter (including articles, particles, interjections, quantifiers, and truth-functional connectives) he calls syncategorematic terms.
It is among categorematic terms that Ockham locates the distinction between singular and general, or employing Ockham's own terminology, the distinction between discrete and common terms. Very roughly, this is the distinction between categorematic terms that can and categorematic terms that cannot function as predicate in subject-predicate propositions, or that at least is the way a contemporary Ockhamist would express the dichotomy. Ockham himself construes the subject-predicate
nexus more broadly to include identity-statements, existential propositions, and propositions incorporating either the universal or particular quantifier. Against this broad interpretation of subject-predicate discourse, Ockham tells us that while the discrete term is predicable of just one thing, the common term is predicable of many.
I have indicated that this distinction has traditionally been associated with the distinction between universals and particulars. For the medieval, the view that these two distinctions are related was legitimized by Aristotle's claim that the universal is that which is predicable of many. In a number of medieval philosophers this relation was explicated in terms of the notion of signification. The claim was that while discrete or singular terms signify particulars, common
or general terms signify universals.
In medieval semantics, 'signify' was used as a transitive verb linking categorematic terms with their non-linguistic counterparts. Underlying this usage was the notion that categorematic terms are signs of objects, and the concept of a sign at work here was interpreted in psychological terms. A categorematic term is the sign of an object in the sense that the utterance of the expression has the effect of "bringing that object before the mind" of anyone familiar
with the conventions governing the language in which the expression is embedded. The fact that signification involves a word-thing relationship suggests that the medieval notion of signification corresponds to the contemporary notion of reference; but in fact, the two concepts are quite different. The contemporary view tends to be that terms refer (or are used to refer) to objects only within the context of a proposition. The medievals, however, held that the signification of a term is a property which it exhibits
quite independently of its role in any particular proposition; and they claimed that, at least in the case of univocal terms, the significatum of a categorematic expression is invariant over the various referential uses to which the term is put. Although it is explicitly relational, the medieval notion of signification is probably closer to the contemporary notion of meaning. In contemporary terms, the medievals were claiming that to know the meaning of a categorematic term is to know which object is its significatum."
From: Michael J. Loux - The ontology of William of Ockham. - In: William of Ockham's theory of terms. Part I of the Summa logicae. Notre Dame: University of Indiana Press 1974. pp. 1-2 )Reprint: South Bend, St. Augustine's Press, 1998).
Ockham and Ockhamists. Edited by Bos Egbert and Krop H.A. Nijmegen:
Ingenium Publishers 1987.
Acts of the Symposium organized bt the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy
Medium Aevum on the occasion of its 10th anniversary (Leiden, 10-12
September 1986).
Die Gegenwart Ockhams. Edited by Vossenkuhl Wilhelm and Schönberger
Rolf. Veinheim: VCH Acta humaniora 1990.
Ockham - Bibliographie 1900-1990. Edited by Beckmann Jan P. Hamburg:
Felix Meiner 1992.
Inhalt: Danksagungen 6; Einleitung des Herausgegebers 7; Tei I.
Primärbibliographie; 1. Editionen 13; 2. Übersetzungen 21; Teil II.
Sekundärbibliographie; Alphabetisches Verzichnis der Schriften über Ockham 1900
- 1990 31; Teil II: Indices; Personenregister (Index auctorum) 135; Werkregister
(Index operum) 141; Systematisches Register (Index systematicus) 143;
Sachregister (index rerum) 155; Anhang: Schema "Ockham-Literatur 1900-1990" 168.
Scotus vs. Ockham - A medieval dispute over Universals. Vol. I: Texts.
Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press 1999.
Texts translated into English with commentary by Martin M. Tweedale.
"This work is meant to make accessible to students of philosophy and later
medieval thought the key texts in one of the most crucial philosophical debates
of that period. The concentration is on Scotus's positive doctrine since it is
difficult and has not received the detailed attention it deserves. Ockham's
polemic against Scotus raises a host of objections to the internal coherence of
Scotus's reworking of the traditional line. Some of these are ones it seems to
me Scotus could have countered quite easily; others would have required some
revisions, but ones that are basically within the spirit of the doctrine. Some,
however, are very difficult indeed, and I shall leave to the commentary and its
introductory essay the exposition of my own view on whether Scotus's position
can survive intact. There is also a positive side to Ockham's views about
universals, and that is only partially covered in what follows. The texts that
show how Ockham envisioned preserving all the essentials of Aristotelian science
even after real universals have been excised, are presented and discussed, and
the very real issue of whether Ockham's effort here could possibly succeed is
broached but not definitely resolved one way or the other."
Scotus vs. Ockham - A medieval dispute over Universals. Vol. II:
Commentary. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press 1999.
"The commentary which composes the greater part of this volume attempts not only
to explain the texts translated in the Iirst volume and to understand the
positions adopted by the protagonists in this debate, but also to assess the
cogency of the various arguments put forward. After all that work is done,
however, there remains the task of drawing attention to the crucial issues that
have emerged and arriving at some understanding of the debate as a whole and the
relative merits of the positions put forward. It is this task that this
introductory essay undertakes. Perhaps it would be better read after a thorough
study of the commentary, but I am inclined to think that some awareness of the
general issues and positions taken by Scotus and Ockham helps in making one's
way through the individual texts and their often elaborate argumentation. In
explaining these issues and positions I have made free use of philosophical
ideas of our own day, at least to the extent that this is not grossly
anachronistic."
The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Edited by Spade Paul Vincent.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999.
Adams Marilyn McCord, "Did Ockham know of material and strict implication? A
reconsideration," Franciscan Studies 32: 5-37 (1973).
Adams Marilyn McCord, "Ockham on identity and distinction," Franciscan
Studies 36: 5-74 (1976).
Adams Marilyn McCord, "Ockham's nominalism and unreal entities,"
Philosophical Review 76: 144-176 (1977).
Adams Marilyn McCord, "Ockham's theory of natural signification," Monist
61: 444-459 (1978).
Adams Marilyn McCord. William Ockham. Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press 1987.
Two volumes.
Adams Marilyn McCord, "Ockham on truth," Medioevo 15: 143-172 (1989).
Adams Marilyn McCord. Ockham's individualisms. In Die Gegenwart Ockhams.
Edited by Vossenkühl Wilhelm and Schönberger Rolf. Weinheim:
VCH-Verlagsgesellschaft 1990. pp. 3-24
Adams Marilyn McCord, "Ockham on final causality: muddying the waters,"
Franciscan Studies 56: 1-46 (1998).
Alanen Lilli, "Descartes, Duns Scotus and Ockham on omnipotence and
possibility," Franciscan Studies 45: 157-188 (1985).
Alféri Pierre. Guillaume d'Ockham, le singulier. Paris: Les Editions
de Minuit 1989.
Andrews Robert, "The 'Defensorium Ockham'," Franciscan Studies 54:
99-122 (1997).
Andrés Teodoro de. El nominalismo de Guillermo de Ockham como filosofia
del lenguaje. Madrid: Editorial Gredos S. A. 1969.
Ariew Roger, "Did Ockham use his razor?," Franciscan Studies 37: 5-17
(1977).
Bastit Michel. Les principes des choses en ontologie médiévale: Thomas
d'Aquin, Scot, Occam. Bordeaux: Bière 1997.
Baudry Léon. Guillaume d'Occam; sa vie, ses oeuvres, ses idées sociales
et politiques. Paris: Vrin 1949.
Vol. I: L'homme et les oeuvres (only published).
Baudry Léon. Lexique philosophique de Guillaume d'Ockham. Étude des
notions fondamentales. Paris: P. Lethellieux 1957.
Beckmann Jan. Wilhelm Ockham. München: C. H. Beck 1996.
Beckmann Jan, "Ockham, Ockhamismus, und Nominalismus: Spuren der
Wirkungsgeschichte des Venerabilis Inceptors," Franciscan Studies 56:
77-95 (1998).
Beierle John, "A truth-functional non-modal interpretation of Ockham's
theory of consequences," Franciscan Studies 44: 71-80 (1984).
Beretta Beatrice. Ad aliquid: la relation chez Guillaume d'Occam.
Fribourg: Éditions universitaires 1999.
Berger Harald, "Extensionale versus intentionale Semantik am Beispiel der
Sprachphilosophie Ockhams Disziplin," Acta Analytica: 171-186 (1989).
Biard Joel. La redéfinition ockhamiste de la signification. In Sprache
und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter. Akten des VI. Internationalen Kongresses für
Mittelaterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l'Etude de la
Philosophie Médiévale. Edited by Kluxen Wolfgang. Berlin, New York: Walter
de Gruyter 1981. pp. 451-458
Biard Joel, "L'unité de monde selon Guillaume d'Ockham (ou la logique de la
cosmologie ockhamiste)," Vivarium 22: 63-84 (1984).
Biard Joel. Les logiciens médiévaux face aux textes d'Aristote. L'exemple de
Guillaume d'Ockham. In Penser avec Aristote. Edited by Sinaceur Mohammed
Allal. Toilouse: Erès 1991. pp. 307-324
Biard Joel. Guillaume d'Ockham. Logique et philosophie. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France 1997.
Biard Joel. Intention et signification chez Guillaume d'Ockham. La critique
de l'être intentionnel. In Langages et philosophie. Hommage à Jean Jolivet.
Edited by Libera Alain de, Elamrani-Jamal Abdelali, and Galonnier Alain. Paris:
Vrin 1997. pp. 201-220
Boehner Philotheus, "The realistic conceptualism of William Ockham,"
Traditio 4: 307-335 (1946).
Reprinted in: Boehner, Collected articles on Ockham pp. 156-174
Boehner Philotheus. Collected articles on Ockham. Edited by Buytaert
Eligius. Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts 1958.
Boh Ivan. Burleigh and Ockham. An ontological confrontation. In
Proceedings of the 7th Inter-American Congress of Philosophy. vol. II.
Québec: 1968. pp. 255-262
Boh Ivan, "Propositional attitudes in the logic of Walter Burley and William
Ockham," Franciscan Studies 44: 31-60 (1984).
Boh Ivan. Epistemic logic and Ockham's theory of demonstration. In Die
Gegenwart Ockhams. Edited by Vossenkühl Wilhelm and Schönberger Rolf.
Weinheim: VCH-Verlagsgesellschaft 1990. pp. 241-255
Boler John, "Ockham on difference in category," Franciscan Studies
56: 97-111 (1998).
Bos Egbert Peter. William of Ockham and the "Predication of a thing". In
Ockham and Ockhamists. Acts of the Symposium organized by the Dutch Society for
Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum on the occasion of its 10th anniversary
(Leiden, 10-12 September 1986). Edited by Bos Egbert Peter and Krop H.A.
Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1987. pp. 71-79
Bosley Richard, "What revision of Realism could meet Ockham's critique,"
Franciscan Studies 45: 111-118 (1985).
Brown Stephen, "Sources for Ockham's Prologue to the Sentences,"
Franciscan Studies 26: 36-65 (1966).
Brown Stephen, "Walter Burleigh's Treatise De Suppositionibus and its
influence of William of Ockham," Franciscan Studies 32: 15-64 (1972).
Corcoran John and Swiniarski John, "Logical structures of Ockham's theory of
supposition," Franciscan Studies 38: 161-183 (1978).
This exposition of Ockham's theory of (common, personal) supposition involves
the logical form of the four descent/ascent conditions and the logical relations
of these with the three main modes of supposition. Central theses: each
condition is a one-way entailment, each mode is a truth-functional combination
of conditions, two of the three modes are not even coextensive with the two-way
entailments commonly taken as their definitions. Ockham's idea of "the
singulars" of a general proposition is vague and problematic and the entailment
used in the descent/ascent conditions probably cannot be taken to be logical
consequence in any strict sense.
Courtenay William J. Ockham and Ockhamism. Studies in the dissemination
and impact of his thought. Leiden: Brill 2008.
Davies Julian. A Compendium of Ockham's teachings. A translation of the
Tractatus de Principiis Theologiae. St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan
Institute 1998.
Day Sebastian. Intuitive cognition. A key to the significance of the
Later Scholastics. St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute 1947.
De Muralt André, "La connaissance intuitive du néant et l'évidence du 'je
pense'. Le rôle de l'argument de potentia absoluta dei dans la théorie
occamienne de la connaissance," Studia Philosophica 36: 107-158 (1976).
Introduction, traduction et commentaire du Prologue des Sentences de
Guillaume d'Occam quaestio 1, 1.
De Muralt André, "La critique de la notion scotiste d'esse objectivum,
le "psychologisme" et le "nominalisme" occamiens," Cahiers de la Revue de
Théolgie et de Philosophie 20: 113-148 (1999).
Métaphysiques Médiévales. Études en l'Honneur d'André de Muralt - Éditées par
Curzio Chiesa et Léo Freuler.
de Rijk Lambertus Marie. War Ockham ein Antimetaphysiker? Eine semantische
Betrachtung. In Philosophie im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien und
Paradigmen. Wolfgang Kluxen zum 65. Geburstag. Edited by Beckmann Jan,
Honnefelder Ludger, and Wieland G. Hamburg: F. Meiner 1987. pp. 313-328
Reprinted as chapter XIV in: Through language to reality: studies in medieval
semantics and metaphysics.
"IV. Schlußbetrachtung. Ockham anerkennt ohne Einschränkung den transzendenten
Bezirk, d. h. das Metaphysische oder Übersinnliche als Bezirk; in diesem Sinne
ist er also gewiß kein Antimetaphysiker. Aber verwirft er denn die Metaphysik
als Wissenschaft, oder höhlt er sie zumindest aus? Zuerst muß anerkannt werden,
daß Ockham im Prinzip der Metaphysik das Weisungsrecht über die Seienden (d. h.,
für Ockham, die individuellen Seienden) keineswegs abspricht. Zugleich kann
nicht geleugnet werden, daß bei ihm der Metaphysik eine auffallend bescheidene
Stelle zukommt. Wie läßt sich das unter Berücksichtigung von Ockhams
unzweifelbarer Ehrfurcht vor dem Übersinnlieben erklären?
Der Schlüssel zur Lösung dieser Frage liegt nicht bloß in Ockhams Ontologie des
individuellen Seins, sondern auch in seinen anthropologischen Auffassungen. Der
Mensch ist nach ihm in seinen Denken und Sprechen nicht imstande, das Erhabene
wesentlich zu durchforschen. Dessen soll sich der Mensch fort während eingedenk
sein. Dies ist für Ockham in zwei deutliche Strategien übersetzbar:
a) nicht jedem modus significandi oder loquendi entspricht ein modus essendi in
der Wirklichkeit
b) viele maßgebende Aussagen, sowohl sakrale wie profane, soll man nicht de
virtute sermonis (dazu reicht unser Sprechen zuwenig aus), ondern der Ab sicht
des Redners oder Schriftstellers entsprechend deuten." pp. 326-327 (Notes
omitted).
de Rijk Lambertus Marie. Logic and ontology in Ockham. Some notes on his
view of the Categories of Being and the nature of its basic principles. In
Ockham and Ockhamists. Acts of the Symposium organized by the Dutch society for
medieval philosophy Medium Aevum on the occasion of its 10th anniversary
(Leiden, 10-12 September 1986). Edited by Bos Egbert and Krop Henri.
Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1987. pp. 25-40
Reprinted as chapter XIII in: Through language to reality: studies in medieval
semantics and metaphysics.
"Conclusion. There is no single reason, I think, to ascribe to Ockham any
feelings of hostility towards metaphysics on this account. God created 'true and
real being', but He created it in shaping 'what is truly and really being',
individual beings, that is. As created, it is radically changeable and
contingent as well. Uncreated, unchangeable being is not to be created, not even
as some mysterious constituent present in creatural being. Human beings are not
entitled to sublimate their (indispensable) conceptual tools (e.g. universal
terms) so that they represent unchangeable ontic standards. Whenever we are
inclined to do so, Ockham's razor comes in, not however, to make us say that the
metaphysical domain is void. Rather logic (and human thought in general) should
make us recognize our own limitations, and refrain from speaking about the
unspeakable when, and inasmuch as, our linguistic tools are bound to lead us
astray. The same applies to Ockham's view of proofs of God's existence. He only
admits the proof of God as first preserver of these actual things in this actual
world and rejects all atemporal proofs. However, his faith is unshakeable and
not involved in any philosophical thinking either. Likewise it is Ockham's
ontology (doctrine of being) which is modest, the onta 'beings') are as
abundant as they are. For that matter, Ockham let them really be (ontôs einai
Plato would say). Well, in order to let them be, human thinking should be
prudent in cautiously managing its homemade conceptual apparatus." pp. 38-39
de Rijk Lambertus Marie. Ockham's theory of demonstration: his use of
Aristotle' s kath' holou and kath' hauto requirements. In Die
Gegenwart Ockhams. Edited by Vossenkuhl Wilhelm and Schõnberger Rolf.
Weinheim: VCH-Verlagsgesellschaft 1990. pp. 232-240
"Far from being a sceptic William of Ockham made every effort to corroborate the
basis of philosophical and theological thought by purifying it of all sorts of
untenable presuppositions. His main contribution to fourteenth century
philosophical and theological development lies in systematically rethinking
scholastic doctrines, and especially their assumptions, on the firm basis of his
own favourite leading principles: the strictly individual nature of all that
really is and the radical contingency of all creatural being.
These two principles also play a major part in Ockham's way of dealing with the
Aristotelian theory of demonstration. The present paper aims at investigating
Ockham's doctrine of demonstrative proof, focusing on the way in which he felt
forced to adapt or rephrase the special requirements Aristotle had laid down for
propositions to enter into syllogistic proof, especially strict proof (the
so-called 'demonstratio potissima'). Our main argument will concern
Aristotle's rather peculiar 'kath holou' requirement and Ockham's
appliance of the 'kath hauto' (Latin: `per se') notion which is also
involved in framing correct premisses for demonstrative proofs. A few
preliminary remarks will be made about the essentials of Aristotle's theory of
demonstration." p. 232
(...)
"Conclusions.
To sum up our findings: Ockham's adaptations and manipulations of Aristotle's
requirements for genuine demonstrative propositions are as many demands imposed
by his own metaphysical views. He comments on Aristotle, always starting from
his own favourite views. Though Aristotle is the Master, Ockham is the one to
say what the Master meant, or what he should have meant. On the other hand, his
introducing the `per se strictissimo modo' rather seems to be a matter of
technicality. Whereas in Posterior Analytics Aristotle deals with the
scientific procedure of apodeixis in general, in which the apodeictic
syllogism is merely a vehicle for correctly framing an apodeixis, the
Medievals, and Ockham in particular, were apt to reduce Aristotle's theory of
demonstrative proof to a theory of demonstrative syllogism. That is why the 'demonstratio
potissima' (including its specific demands) so heavily influenced Ockham's
theory of demonstration." p. 239
de Rijk Lambertus Marie. Ockham as the Commentator of His Aristotle.
His treatment of Posterior Analytics. In Aristotelica et Lulliana:
magistro doctissimo Charles H. Lohr septuagesimum annum feliciter agenti
dedicata. Edited by Domínguez Reboiras Fernando et al. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff 1995. pp. 77-127
1. Introduction; 2. Preliminary: Aristotle on demonstrative or epistemonic
proof; 2.1 On the three requrements 'kata pantos', kath' 'hauto', 'kath'
holou', 2.2 On the notion of necessity; 2.3 On the four types of questions.
On 'Middle' and 'Definiens'; 2.3.1 Subject and attribute. The Middle; 2.3.2. On
definition and the four question-types; 2.3.3 The role of definitions in
epistemonic proof; 2.3.4 Recipes for the discovery of definitions; 2.4 The 'kath'
holou' requirement revisited; 2.5 Particulars and the proper objects of
Aristotle's epistemonic proof; 3. Ockham as a Commentator of Posterior
Analytics; 3.1 Ockham's treatment of the four basic question-types; 3.2
Ockham's view of the 'kath' holou' requirement; 3.3 The impact of
Ockham's ontology upon his theory of demonstration; 3.3.1 Ockham's problem
concerning the First Subject; 3.3.2 Ockham's introduction of 'Non-First
Subject'; 3.3.3 'Demonstratio particularis' in Ockham; 3.3.4 Ockham's
view of necessity; 3.5 'Dici per se' and 'propositio per se vera'
in Ockham; 3.5.1 Two kinds of 'per se' assignment; 3.5.2 The 'propositio
per se (vera)' in Ockham; 3.5.3 The strict and strictest senses of 'per
se'; 4. Comclusion.
"The present paper aims to clarify the attitude towards Aristotle adopted by one
of the leading lights of fourteenth century philosophical and theological
thought, William of Ockham, by investigating (a) how in some of the vital
subjects of Aristotelian doctrine, the Venerable Inceptor understood and
interpreted the Master, (b) how and why on specific occasions, he deliberately
took the liberty to stray from Aristotle's teachings. It goes without saying
that in such an undertaking, one has to confine oneself to certain doctrinal
themes the choice of which might seem quite arbitrary. The present author has
picked out the Aristotelian doctrine of demonstrative proof as interpreted by
Ockham." p. 78
de Rijk Lambertus Marie, "Ockham's horror of the Universal. An assessment of
his view of individuality," Mediaevalia.Textos e Estudos 7-8: 473-497
(1995).
Quodlibetaria: miscellanea studiorum in honorem prof. J. M. da Cruz Pontes anno
iubilationis suae, Conimbrigae MCMXCV
Dutilh Novaes Catarina, "A study of William of Ockham's logic - from
suppositio to truth conditions", University of Amsterdam, 2000.
Eco Umberto, "Signification and denotation from Boethius to Ockham,"
Franciscan Studies 44: 1-30 (1984).
Fitzgerald Michael Joseph, "Ockham's implicit priority of analysis rule?,"
Franciscan Studies 38: 213-219 (1978).
Flórez Alfonso. La filosofía del lenguaje de Ockham. Exposición crítica e
interpretación cognitiva. Granada: Editorial Comares 2002.
Freddoso Alfred J. Ockham's theory of truth conditions. In William of
Ockham's theory of propositions. Part II of the Summa logicae. Notre Dame:
University of Indiana Press 1980. pp.
Introduction to the translation.
Reprint: South Bend, St. Augustine's Press, 1998.
Freddoso Alfred J., "Ontological reductionism and faith versus reason: a
critique of Adams on Ockham," Faith and Philosophy 8: 317-339 (1991).
Gál Gedeon and Wood Rega, "The Ockham edition: William of Ockham's 'Opera
Philosophica et Theologica'," Franciscan Studies 51: 83-101 (1991).
Ghisalberti Alessandro. Guglielmo di Ockham. Milano: Vita e Pensiero
1972.
Gibson Arthur. Ockham's world and future. In Routledge history of
philosophy. Volume III: Medieval philosophy. Edited by Marenbon John. New
York: Routledge 1998. pp. 329-367
Goddu André. The physics of William of Ockham.Leiden 1984.
Goddu André. William of Ockham's "empiricism" and constructive empiricism.
In Die Gegenwart Ockhams. Edited by Vossenkühl Wilhelm and Schönberger
Rolf. Weinheim: VCH Acta Humaniora 1990. pp. 208-231
Goddu André, "Connotative concepts and mathematics in Ockham's natural
philosophy," Vivarium: 106-139 (1993).
"Connotation plays a central role in Ockham's analysis of the language of
natural philosophy and mathematics. Some simple connotative terms belong to the
deep structure of mental language. Ockham's program cannot guarantee the
objectivity of things being quantified or located in space and time without his
connotation-theory. Ockham's theory provides a partial explanation of why
fourteenth- century philosophers shifted attention from discussion about the
objects of mathematics to discussion of mathematics as a language. The shift
explains in part the adoption of mathematical and metalinguistic approaches to
philosophical and theological problems."
Grellard Christophe and Ong-Van-Cung Kim Sang. Le vocabulaire d'Ockham.
Paris: Ellipses 2005.
Guelluy Robert. Philosophie et théologie chez Guillaume d'Ockham.
Paris: Vrin 1947.
Hamesse Jacqueline, "Les problèmes posés par l'édition critique des
reportations," Franciscan Studies 46: 107-118 (1986).
Henninger Mark, "Peter Aureoli and William of Ockham on relations,"
Franciscan Studies 45: 231-244 (1985).
Henry Desmond Paul, "Ockham and the formal distinction," Franciscan
Studies 25: 285-292 (1965).
Hoffmann Fritz. Ockham-Rezeption und Ockham-Kritik im Jahrzehnt nach
Wilhelm von Ockham in Oxford 1322-1332. Münster: Aschendorff 1998.
Hülsen Reinhard, "Burleigh and Ockham on anaphoric pronouns," Archiv fur
Geschichte der Philosophie 80: 30-51 (1998).
"Many medieval grammar and logic texts contain treatments of relativa
grammaticalia, expressions some of which we now call anaphoric pronouns. The
first philosopher who paid attention to these treatments seems to have been
Peter Geach. Apparently, Geach found their treatments both stimulating and
frustrating.' In his main work on semantics, Reference and Generality
(1), he presents some theses of Walter Burleigh's on this topic, a fourteenth
century logician and opponent of William Ockham, at considerable length.
Elsewhere, however, he remarks that while 'the logic of pronouns with
antecedents was extensively studied by medieval logicians in their chapters de
suppositione relativorum; [...t]his medieval treatment of pronouns was
inconclusive" (2) and that '[...] the medievals who discussed relativa -
pronouns with antecedents - were groping in the dark despite all their
ingenuity'. (3) What Geach deplored was the apparent tendency of 'the medievals'
to treat anaphoric pronouns, relativa grammaticalia substantiae identitatis
in terms of co-reference, of 'supponere pro eodem'. As is well known,
Geach himself favors a rather different approach, according to which it is
nonsense to talk about the reference of such pronouns at all, for they act like
bound variables. His view on pronouns has now a considerable number of adherents
and a few critics - most notably Gareth Evans. (4)
I am not concerned here with the question whether Geach's own theory of pronouns
is correct, but whether his verdict about medieval theories of
relativa is justified. His verdict is of unrestricted generality: it is not
some medieval treatment of pronouns that is inconclusive, but "the" medieval
treatment. This makes his claims an easy target for counterattack: Just find
some medieval logician, whose theory does not fit Geach's claims. I have done
this elsewhere. (4) Here I want to consider two logicians Geach has actually
dealt with himself: Burleigh and Ockham.
(1) Geach (1962), Reference and Generality: An Examination of Some Medieval
and Modern Theories, Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press (3rd edition)
1980.
(2) Geach (1960-61), "Ryle on Namely-Riders"; Analysis 21/3, repr. in
Geach, Logic Matters, Oxford 1972, pp. 88-92, p. 92. All page-references
will be to this edition.
(3) Geach (1968-69), "Quine's Syntactical Insights", Synthese 19, repr.
in Geach, Logic Matters, pp. 115-127, p. 118. All page-references will be
to this edition.
(4) Evans (1977), "Pronouns, Quantifiers, and Relative Clauses (I), Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 7, pp. 467-536.
(5) On a few such logicians see my Die Semantik anaphorischer Pronomina,
Leiden 1994.
Jordan Michael, "What's new in Ockham's formal distinction?," Franciscan
Studies 45: 97-110 (1985).
Karger Elizabeth, "A study of William of Ockham's modal logic", 1976.
Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley.
Karger Elizabeth, "Would Ockham have shaved Wyman's beard?," Franciscan
Studies 40: 244-264 (1980).
Reprinted in: H. A. G. Braakhuis, C. H. Kneepkens, L. M. de Rijk (eds.) -
English logic and semantics. From the end of the Twelfth century to the time of
Ockham and Burleigh - Nijmegen, Ingenium Publishers, 1981, pp. 389-407.
Karger Elizabeth. Référence et non-existence dans la sémantique de Guillaume
d'Occam. In Lectionum Varietates. Hommage à Paul Vignaux. Edited by
Jolivet Jean, Kaluza Zénon, and Libera Alain de. Paris: Vrin 1991. pp. 163-176
Karger Elizabeth, "Propositions et syllogismes "à l'oblique" dans la logique
d'Ockham," Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 60:
147-164 (1993).
Karger Elizabeth, "Théories de la pensée, de ses objets et de son discours
chez Guillaume d'Occam," Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical Review 33:
437-456 (1994).
Karger Elizabeth, "William of Ockham, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham on the
objects of knowledge and belief," Vivarium 33: 171-196 (1995).
Karger Elizabeth. Ockham's misunderstood theory of intuitive and abstractive
cognition. In The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Edited by Spade Paul
Vincent. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999. pp. 204-226
Kaufmann Matthias. Begriffe, Sätze, Dinge. Referenz und Wahrheit bei
Wilhelm von Ockham. Leiden: E. J. Brill 1994.
"This volume gives an introduction to William Ockham's theory of signs, his
ontology, his epistemology, and the interrelations between these fields. Some
recent results of analytic philosophy turn out to be useful instruments for the
interpretation of Ockham's thought.
Part one contains a presentation of the basic concepts of Ockham's semantics. It
is followed by an investigation of his ontology, including a comparison with
modern ontology. Part three deals with the common and different elements in the
conceptions of supposition and of quantification. Part four shows some
similarities of Ockham's views on the truth of sentences with those of Davidson.
The final part presents Ockham's epistemology within the discussion of his
contemporaries and confronts it with actual issues raised by Quine and Putnam."
Kaufmann Matthias. The discussion on the nature of the concept in Ockham's
Perihermeneias Commentary. In Aristotle's Peri hermeneias in the Latin
Middle Ages Essays on the Commentary tradition. Edited by Braakhuis Henk
A.G. and Kneepkens Corneille Henri. Groningen: Ingenium Publishers 2003. pp.
119-133
Kaye Sharon. Russell, Strawson, and William of Ockham. In The Proceedings
of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Volume 2 Metaphysics. Edited
by Rockmore Tom. Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center 1999. pp.
207-216
Kaye Sharon M. and Martin Robert M. On Ockham. Belmont:
Wadsworth/Thomson Learning 2001.
Kelley Francis, "Some observations on the 'Fictum' theory in Ockham and its
relation to Hervaeus Natalis," Franciscan Studies 38: 260-282 (1978).
King Peter, "Le rôle des concepts selon Ockham," Philosophiques 35:
435-447 (2005).
Klima Gyula. Ockham's semantics and ontology of the Categories. In The
Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Edited by Spade Paul Vincent. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1999. pp. 118-142
Klima Gyula. The nominalist semantic of Ockham and Buridan: a 'rational
reconstruction'. In Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic. Edited by Gabbay Dov
and Woods John. Amsterdam: Elsevier 2008. pp. 389-432
Handbook of the history of logic: Vol. 2.
König-Pralong Catherine. Avènement de l'aristotélisme en terre
chrétienne. L'essence et la matière: entre Thomas d'Aquin et Guillaume d'Ockham.
Paris: Vrin 2005.
Krop H.A. The self-knowledge of God. Duns Scotus and Ockham on the formal
object of scientific knowledge. In Ockham and Ockhamists. Edited by Bos
Egbert Peter and Krop H.A. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1987. pp. 83-92
Lagerlund Henrik. What is singular thought? Ockham and Buridan on singular
terms in the language of thought. In Mind and modality. Studies in the
history of philosophy in honour of Simo Knuuttila. Edited by Hirvonen Vesa,
Holopainen Toivo J., and Tuominen Miira. Leiden: Brill 2006. pp. 217-237
Lambertini Roberto, Marmo Costantino, and Tabarroni Andrea. Virtus
verborum: linguaggio ed interpretazione nel Dialogus di Guglielmo di Ockham.
In Langages et philosophie. Hommage à Jean Jolivet. Edited by Libera
Alain de, Elamrani-Jamal Abdelali, and Galonnier Alain. Paris: Vrin 1997. pp.
221-236
Langston Douglas, "Scotus and Ockham on the univocal concept of Being,"
Franciscan Studies 39: 105-129 (1979).
Leff Gordon. William of Ockham. The metamorphosis of scholastic
discourse. Manchester: Manchester University Press 1975.
Leffler Oliver. Wilhelm von Ockham: Die Sprachphilosophischen Grundlagen
seines Denkens. Werl/Westfalen: Dietrich Coelde Verlag 1995.
Leite Pedro Gilberto Junior. Univocity of being in William of Ockham's
thought: a first approach. In New essays on metaphysics as scientia
transcendens. Edited by Pich Roberto Hofmeister. Louvain-la-Neuve:
Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales 2007. pp. 303-320
Lenzen Wolfgang, "Ockhams modale Aussagenlogik," Archiv fur Geschichte
der Philosophie 75: 125-159 (1993).
Longeway John. Demonstration and scientific knowledge in William of
Ockham. A translation of Summa logicae III-II : De syllogismo demonstrativo, and
selections from the Prologue to the Ordinatio. Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press 2007.
Loux Michael J. The ontology of William of Ockham. In William of Ockham's
theory of terms. Part I of the Summa logicae. Notre Dame: University of
Indiana Press 1974. pp. 1-21
First introductory essay to the translation.
Reprint: South Bend, St. Augustine's Press, 1998.
"The distinctions between singular and general terms, on the one hand, and
abstract and concrete terms, on the other, play crucial roles in discussions of
ontological issues. Although these dichotomies can be expressed in purely
grammatical terms, they have traditionally been thought to point to two
over-arching distinctions among things. Philosophers have frequently claimed
that the singular-general term distinction is rooted in a distinction between
objects that are particulars and objects that are universals; whereas, the
distinction between concrete and abstract terms forces us to confront the
distinction between substances (minimally interpreted to include material bodies
and persons) and the various characteristics they possess or exhibit.
But because they appear to carry these far-reaching metaphysical implications,
these grammatical dichotomies receive detailed treatment at the hands of the
nominalist. If his theory is to be at all plausible, the nominalist must have
the resources for providing a metaphysically neutral account of the
singular-general and concrete-abstract dichotomies. In this essay I want to
examine William of Ockham's ontology by focusing on his treatment of these
distinctions. My aim here is twofold. By examining Ockham's analysis I hope to
provide an introduction to the central themes of Part I of the Summa Logicae
and to clarify the concept of a nominalistic ontology in general." p. 1
Loux Michael J. Ockham on generality. In William of Ockham's theory of
terms. Part I of the Summa logicae. Notre Dame: University of Indiana Press
1974. pp. 23-46
Second introductory essay to the translation.
Reprint: South Bend, St. Augustine's Press, 1998.
Marmo Costantino, "Guglielmo di Ockham e il significato delle proposizioni,"
VS Versus.Quaderni di Studi Semiotici 38/39: 115-148 (1984).
Martin Gottfried. Wilhelm von Ockham. Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der
Ordnungen. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1949.
Massobrio Simona, "The individuation of matter in Ockham's philosophy,"
Franciscan Studies 44: 197-210 (1984).
Matteo Anthony M., "Scotus and Ockham: a dialgue on Universals,"
Franciscan Studies 45: 83-96 (1985).
Maurer Armand, "Method in Ockham's nominalism," Monist 61: 426-443
(1978).
Maurer Armand. The philosophy of William of Ockham in the light of its
principles. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1999.
McGrade Arthur Stephen, "Plenty of nothing: Ockham's commitment to real
possibles," Franciscan Studies 45: 145-156 (1985).
Michon Cyrille. Nominalisme. La théorie de la signification d'Occam.
Paris: Vrin 1994.
Michon Cyrille, "Asimétries: Thomas d'Aquin et Guillume d'Occam précurseurs
de Frege," Études Philosophiques: 307-321 (1996).
Miralbell Ignacio. Guillermo de Ockham y su crítica lógico-pragmática al
pensamiento realista. Pamplona: Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico 1998.
Moody Ernest. The logic of William of Ockham. New York: Sheed & Ward
1935.
Reprinted New York, Russell & Russell, 1965.
Müller Paola, "Terminus e Nomen nella logica di Ockham,"
Rivista di Filosofia neo-scolastica 77: 599-611 (1985).
"The author analyses philologically and philosophically the two different
expressions 'nomen' and 'terminus' used by Ockham in the chapters given up to
the supposition theory in his "Summa logicae". By that we can say that Ockham's
logic of terms is interested primarily in the words, and in the concepts just
with reference with these last ones, without qualifying Ockham's logic as
'nominalist': in fact 'nomen' receives his own capacity of meaning by the
concept as natural linguistic sign."
Müller Paola, "La discesa al particolare nella logica di Ockham," Rivista
di Filosofia neo-scolastica 78 (3): 353-377 (1986).
Müller Paola, "Nominare l'essenza divina. La distinzione XXII dell'Ordinatio
di Ockham," Rivista di Filosofia neo-scolastica 81: 224-254 (1989).
Müller Paola, "Esistenza e verità in Guglielmo di Ockham," Medioevo
17: 249-280 (1991).
Müller Paola. Le obligationes nella Summa logicae di Guglielmo
di Ockham. In Filosofia e teologia nel Trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio
Randi. Edited by Bianchi Luca. Louvain-la -Neuve: Fédération Internationale
des Instituts d'Études Médiévales 1994. pp. 85-104
Norena Carlos P., "Ockham and Suarez on the ontological status of universal
concepts," New Scholasticism 55: 348-362 (1981).
Normore Calvin Gerard, "The logic of time and modality in the later Middle
Ages: the contribution of William of Ockham", Ph. D. Dissertation, University of
Toronto, 1976.
Normore Calvin Gerard. Some aspects of Ockham's logic. In The Cambridge
Companion to Ockham. Edited by Spade Paul Vincent. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1999. pp. 31-52
Nuchelmans Gabriel. Ockham on performed and signified predication. In
Ockham and Ockhamists. Edited by Bos Egbert Peter and Krop H.A. Nijmegen:
Ingenium Publishers 1987. pp. 55-62
Reprinted in: G. Nuchelmans - Studies on the history of logic and semantics, 12th-17th century
- Edited by E. P. Bos - Aldershot, Ashgate, 1996
Nute Donald, "A contradiction in Ockham's theory of language,"
Philosophical Studies 25: 417-422 (1974).
"It is argued that Ockham's theory of language either fails to provide a
principle of individuation to account for the diversity of mental entities he
posits or is committed to certain spoken terms both having and not having some
one entity as a significant. It is suggested that this problem can be solved by
allowing that every categorematic term is subordinated to an infinite number of
concepts and by modifying Ockham's supposition theory."
Panaccio Claude, "Langage ordinaire et langage abstrait chez Guillaume
d'Occam," Philosophiques 1: 37-60 (1974).
Panaccio Claude, "Signification et nomination. La logique de Gullaume
d'Occam", Ph. D. Dissertation University of Montreal, 1978.
Panaccio Claude. Guillaume d'Occam et les pronoms demonstratifs. In
Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter. Akten des VI. Internationalen Kongresses
für Mittelaterliche Philosophie der Société internationale pour l'étude de la
philosophie médiévale (First volume). Edited by Beckmann Jan P. et al.
Berlin, New York: Wlater de Gruyter 1981. pp. 465-470
Panaccio Claude. Les mots, les concepts et les choses. La sémantique de
Guillaume d'Occam et le nominalisme d'aujourd'hui. Paris: Vrin 1992.
Panaccio Claude. Guillaume d'Ockham et la perplexité des platoniciens. In
Contre Platon. Tome I: Le platonisme devoilé. Edited by Dixsaut Monique.
Paris: Vrin 1993. pp. 117-135
Panaccio Claude. La philosophie du langage de Guillaume d'Occam. In
Sprachtheorien in Spatantike und Mittelalter. Edited by Ebbesen Sten.
Tubingen: Gunter Narr Verlag 1995. pp. 184-206
Panaccio Claude. Le discours intérieur. De Platon à Guillaume d'Ockham.
Paris: Editions du Seuil 1999.
About this volume see the special number of "Laval Théologique et Philosophique"
vol. 57 n. 2 (June 2001)
Panaccio Claude, "Propositionalism and atomism in Ockham's semantics,"
Franciscan Studies 44: 61-70 (2002).
Panaccio Claude. Ockham on concepts. Aldershot: Ashgate 2004.
Panaccio Claude, "Le nominalisme d'Ockham et la représentation mentale.
Précis de Ockham on Concepts," Philosophiques 35: 423-426 (2005).
Panaccio Claude, "Réponses à mes critiques," Philosophiques 35:
449-457 (2005).
Replies to the essay by E. J. Ashworth and P. King in the same journal.
Panaccio Claude. L'ontologie d'Ockham et la théorie des tropes. In
Compléments de Substance. Études sur les propriétés accidentelles offertes à
Alain de Libera. Edited by Erismann Christophe and Schniewind Alexandrine.
Paris: Vrin 2008. pp. 167-181
Perini-Santos Ernesto, "L'extension de la liste des modalités dans les
commentaires du Perihermeneias et des Sophistici Elenchi de
Guillaume d'Ockham," Vivarium 40: 174-188 (2002).
Perini-Santos Ernesto, "A explicação ockhamiana de proposições passadas, ou
instruções ára um aprendiz," Analytica.Revista de Filosofia 7: 49-64
(2003).
"Within the Ockhamist semantics, the predicate 'true' is explained by another
more basic semantical relation, the relation of supposition.
The author shows how this relationship between two semantical predicates figures
in the analysis of the truth-conditions of propositions about the past, and
demonstrates that it is a model that can be extended to propositions about both
the future and the possible. The author indicates how the semantics of alethic
modalities is in continuity with the semantics of propositions about the past
and about the future. If we consider another aspect of Ockham's modal theory,
viz., the fact that modalities are defined as any term that can be predicated of
a whole proposition, the importance of this point becomes clear. In conclusion,
the author points out the different levels of analysis of alethic modalities
within an Ockhamist framework."
Perini-Santos Ernesto. La théorie ockhamienne de la connaissance
évidente. Paris : Vrin 2006.
Perler Dominik. Kopulatheorie und Seinsbegriff. Zum Verhältnis von Logik und
Metaphysik bei Wilhelm von Ockham. In Historia philosophiae Medii Aevi.
Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Edited by Mojsisch
Burkhard and Pluta Olaf. Amsterdam: R. Grüner 1991. pp. 805-829
Putallaz François-Xavier, "Autour de la connaissance intuitive des
non-existants chez Ockham," Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und
Theologie 30: 447-467 (1983).
Rabade Romeo Sergio. Guillermo de Ockham y la filosofía del siglo XIV.
Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto "Luis Vives"
de Filosofía 1966.
Read Stephen, "The objective being of Ockham's ficta,"
Philosophical Quarterly 27: 14-31 (1977).
Schulthess Peter. Sein, Signifikation und Erkenntnis bei Wilhelm von
Ockham. Berlin: Akademia Verlag 1992.
Scott T.K., "Ockham on evidence, necessity, and intuition," Journal of
the History of Philosophy 7: 27-50 (1969).
Shapiro Herman. Motion, time and place according to William Ockham.
St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute 1957.
Shimizu Tetsuro, "Time and eternity: Ockham's logical point of view,"
Franciscan Studies 50: 283-307 (1990).
Spade Paul Vincent, "Ockham on terms of first and second Imposition and
Intention, with remarks on the Liar Paradox," Vivarium 19: 47-55 (1981).
Spade Paul Vincent, "Ockham, Adams and connotation. A critical notice of
Marilyn Adams, William Ockham," Philosophical Review 99: 593-612
(1990).
Spade Paul Vincent, "The logic of 'Sit Verum' in Richard Brinkley and
William of Ockham," Franciscan Studies 54: 227-250 (1997).
Spade Paul Vincent, "Three versions of Ockham's reductionist program,"
Franciscan Studies 56: 347-358 (1998).
Spade Paul Vincent. Ockham's nominalist metaphysics: some main themes. In
The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Edited by Spade Paul Vincent. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1999. pp. 100-117
Stump Eleonore. In Logos and Pragma. Essays on the philosophy of language
in honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans. Edited by de Rijk Lambertus Marie
and Braakhuis Hek A.G. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1987. pp. 141-159
Stump Eleonore. The mechanisms of cognition: Ockham on mediating species. In
The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Edited by Spade Paul Vincent. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1999. pp. 168-203
Tabarroni Andrea, "A note on a short treatise attributed to Ockham: The
Super terminos naturales," Franciscan Studies 44: 329-349 (1984).
Tachau Katherine. Vision and certitude in the age of Ockham. Optics,
epistemology and the foundations of semantics 1250-1345. Leiden : E. J.
Brill 1988.
Tweedale Martin, "Scotus and Ockham on the infinity of the most eminent
Being," Franciscan Studies 23: 257-267 (1963).
Tweedale Martin, "Ockham's supposed elimination of connotative terms and his
ontological parsimony," Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical Review 31: 38-54
(1992).
Vossenkühl Wilhelm, "Ockham and the cognition of non-existants,"
Franciscan Studies 45: 33-46 (1985).
Webering Damascene. Theory of demonstration according to William Ockham.
Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts 1953.
Weidemann Hermann, "William of Ockham on particular negative propositions,"
Mind 88: 270-275 (1979).
White Graham, "Ockham's real distinction betweeen form and matter,"
Franciscan Studies 44: 211-226 (1984).
Willing Anthony, "Buridan and Ockham: the logic of knowing," Franciscan
Studies 45: 47-56 (1985).
Wood Rega. Ockham on essentially-ordered causes, logic misapplied. In Die
Gegenwart Ockhams. Edited by Vossenkühl Wilhelm and Schönberger Rolf.
Weinheim: VCH-Verlagsgesellschaft 1990. pp. 25-50
Zheng Yiwei, "Metaphysical simplicity and semantical complexity of
connotative terms in Ockham's mental language," Modern Schoolman 75:
253-264 (1998).
In this paper I offer a formal presentation of Ockham's connotation theory,
based upon a distinction between metaphysical simplicity and semantical
complexity of connotative terms, that I argue render consistent Paul Spade's
claim (1975) that Ockham needs and adopted a recursive semantics for his
ontological elimination and Claude Panaccio's observation (1990) that there is
no simple connotative term in Ockham's mental language.
Zheng Yiwei. Ockham on connotative terms. The Paideia Project On-Line.
Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Boston, Massachusets
U.S.A. 10-15 August 1998 1998. pp.
Zheng Yiwei, "Ockham's connotation theory and ontological elimination,"
Journal of Philosophical Research 26: 623-634 (2001).
"The importance of the connotation theory in Ockham's semantics and metaphysics
can hardly be overstated--it is the main mechanism that brings forth Ockham's
famous ontological elimination. Yet none of the extant interpretations can
satisfactorily accommodate three widely accepted theses: (1) there is no synonym
in mental language; (2) a connotative term has a semantically equivalent nominal
definition; and (3) there are simple connotative terms in Ockham's mental
language. In this paper I offer an interpretation that I argue can accommodate
all."
(click on the image to see the PDF file)