Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Edited by Copi Irving M. and
Beard Robert W. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1966.
Essays on Wittgenstein. Edited by Klemke Elmer D. Urbana:
University Of Illinois Press 1971.
Logic and ontology. Edited by Canfield John V. New York: Garland
Publishing 1986.
The philosophy of Wittgenstein. A fifteen volume collection. Vol. 2
Ludwig Wittgenstein. Critical assesments. Edited by Shanker
Stuart. London: Croom Helm 1986.
Vol. 1: From the Notebooks to Philosophical Grammar. The
construction and dismantling of the Tractatus; Vol. 2: From
Philosophical investigations to On certainty: Wittgenstein's
later philosophy; Vol. 3: From the Tractatus to Remarks on the
foundations of mathematics: Wittgenstein on the philosophy of
mathematics; Vol. 4: From theology to sociology: Wittgenstein's impact on
contemporary thought.
The early philosophy - Language as picture. Edited by Canfield
John V. New York: Garland Publishing 1986.
The philosophy of Wittgenstein. A fifteen volume collection. Vol. 1
From Frege to Wittgenstein. Perspective in early analytic philosophy.
Edited by Reck Erich H. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002.
Post-analytic Tractatus. Edited by Stocker Barry. Aldershot:
Ashgate 2004.
Allaire Edwin. The Tractatus: nominalistic or realistic? In
Essays in ontology. Edited by Allaire Edwin. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
1963. pp. 148-165
Reprinted in: Copin & Beard (eds.) - Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus -
pp. 167-186
Anscombe Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret. An Introduction to
Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Themes in the philosophy of Wittgenstein.
London: Hutchinson University Library 1959.
Fourth edition St. Augustine Press 2001.
Arabi Oussama. Wittgenstein: langage et ontologie. Paris: Vrin
1982.
Armstrong David Malet, "The nature of possibility," Canadian Journal
of Philosophy 16: 575-594 (1986).
Bergmann Gustav, "Ineffability, method and ontology," The
Philosophical Review 69: 18-40 (1960).
Reprinted in: Gustav Bergmann - Logic and reality (1964) and in: E.
D. Klemke (ed.) - Essays on Wittgenstein (1971).
Bergmann Gustav, "Stenius on Wittgenstein's Tractatus,"
Theoria.A Swedish Journal of Philosophy: 176-204 (1963).
Reprinted in: E. D. Klemke (ed.) - Essays on Wittgenstein (1971) and
in: J. V. Canfield (ed.) - The philosophy of Wittgenstein: a fifteen
volume collection. Vol 1: The early philosophy, language as picture
(1986).
Black Max. A companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Pres 1964.
Bloom Stephen L., "A completeness theorem of 'theories of kind
Wittgenstein'," Studia Logica 27: 43-56 (1971).
Bogen James. Wittgenstein's philosophy of language: some aspects of
its development. London: Routldge and Kegan Paul 1972.
Chapter 1: The picture theory and the Tractatus' ontology pp. 14-101.
Bonino Guido, "Russell, Frege e la forma logica nel Tractatus,"
Rivista di Estetica 44: 47-59 (2004).
"The main aim of this paper is that of suggesting that Wittgenstein's notion
of logical form -- as it appears in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
-- is better understood if it is conceived of as deriving from Russell's
notion of logical form -- as put forth, for instance, in Theory of
Knowledge --, rather than from Frege's notion of function. Such a
prevailingly historical aim is associated with a second one,
theoretical-exegetical in character: trying to understand what exactly the
logical form is in the Tractatus, and what its role is in the context of the
picture theory of language."
Bradley Raymond. The nature of all Being: A Study of Wittgenstein's
modal atomism. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992.
Bremer Manuel, "Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der
Dinge," Grazer Philosophische Studien 57: 111-131 (1999).
Brosch Annette. Die Logik des Tractatus: eine logisch-semantische
Untersuchung dessen, "was der Fall" sein kann. New York: Peter Lang
1995.
Candiotto Maurizio, "I concetti tra proprietà e funzioni. Modelli per
l'incompletezza ontologica: Frege, Husserl, Wittgenstein," Rivista di
Filosofia 22: 69-94 (2002).
"The Fregean notion of concept -- i.e., of the reference (vs. the sense) of
a predicate -- is here compared with cognate notions in Husserl's Logical
Investigations and in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Their common trait is unsaturatedness or existential dependency: the
different treatment of this chief notion of formal ontology is in turn
examined comparatively, with regard to the conflicts and the alliances
taking tacitly place between the three. In Frege's notion of concept, at any
rate, an inner tension arises from its twofold nature of property and of
truth-function: saturation and function/argument are too heterogeneous
models. Hints for a way out."
Canfield John V., "A model Tractatus language," The
Philosophical Forum 4: 199-217 (1972).
Reprinted in: John V. Canfield (ed.) - The philosophy of Wittgenstein. A
fifteen volume collection - New York, Garland, 1986 - Vol. I - The
early philosophy -- language as picture
Canfield John V., "Tractatus objects," Philosophia.Philosophical
Quarterly of Israel 6: 81-99 (1976).
Reprinted in: John V. Canfield (ed.) - The philosophy of Wittgenstein. A
fifteen volume collection - New York, Garland, 1986 - Vol. II - Logic
and ontology. "Universals such as red are plausible examples of Tractatus
objects, despite 6.3751. This view is linked to the Tractatus'
conception of analysis and to its phenomenalism. Facts are composed of
universals bound together. The totality of facts forms the solipsistic
universe; the universe as it appears. There is no subject to whom it
appears; there are only the constituent atomic facts. Appearances change;
what was the case is no longer the case. What does not change are the
eternally subsisting universals whose changing combinations constitute
reality."
Carruthers Peter. Tractarian semantics: finding sense in
Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1989.
Carruthers Peter. The metaphysics of the Tractatus. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1990.
Cerezo María. Does a proposition affirm every proposition that follows
from it? In Studies on the history of logic. Proceedings of the Third
Symposium on the history of logic. Edited by Angelelli Ignacio and
Cerezo María. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1996. pp. 357-368
"The problem of the relations between the orders of signification, truth and
logical consequence is central to logic. The way in which these
relationships are established goes some way towards determining the logical
theory to which the writer subscribes. This problem has been a major issue
in the history of logic. In this essay, I propose to show that the problem
of these relations is present in the course of the historical development of
logic, and that there is no one solution to it. My aim is thus not to offer
an answer to the question posed, but to highlight the contrast between
different solutions, approaching this issue from the standpoint defended by
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.2 Nor
do I intend to provide a detailed explanation of Wittgenstein's view, but
only to outline it and bring out the contrasts with other possible
solutions, solutions which predate it by some considerable time." (Notes
omitted)
Cerezo María, "Nombrar kripkeano versus nombrar tractariano: un intento
de demarcación," Theoria.Revista de Teoria, Historia y Fundamentos de la
Ciencia 13: 427-444 (1998).
"Raymond Bradley, in his book The Nature of All Being, has put
forward an essentialist interpretation of the ontology of Wittgenstein's
Tractatus Logico-philosophicus and aims to develop the modal dimensions
that, in his opinion, are implicit in that work. The aim of this paper is to
reassess Bradley's interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators,
by examining the tractarian notion of name and the Kripkean concept
of rigid designator in Naming and Necessity, with a view to
answering the question as to whether an interpretation of tractarian names
as rigid designators is possible, and to bringing to light some similarities
and differences between the two theories of meaning."
Cerezo María, "La nociones de Sachverhalt, Tatsache y Sachlage
en el Tractatus de Wittgenstein," Anuario Filosófico 37: 455-479
(2004).
"In this paper, I develop some reflections on the interpretation of the
notion of Sachverhalt in the Tractatus, with a view to show
the complexity of the tractarian view and to point out some tensions. I
intend to elucidate this notion in the context of its relation to the
notions of Tatsache and Sachlage, and in its relation to the
two main theories of the Tractatus, the truth-functions theory and
the picture theory. I hope that this elucidation sheds some light on a
possible comparison between Wittgenstein's and Husserl's views and I point
out some suggestions in this sense in the last part of the paper."
Cerezo María. The possibility of language. Internal tensions in
Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Stanford: CSLI Publications 2005.
Cheung Leo K.C., "Showing, analysis and the truth-functionality of
logical necessity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus," Synthese 139:
81-105 (2004).
"This paper aims to explain how the Tractatus attempts to unify logic
by deriving the truth-functionality of logical necessity from the thesis
that a proposition shows its sense. I first interpret the Tractarian notion
of showing as the displaying of what is intrinsic to an expression. Then I
argue that, according to the Tractatus, the thesis that a proposition
shows its sense implies the determinacy of sense, the possibility of the
complete elimination of nonprimitive symbols, the analyticity thesis and the
strong analyticity thesis. The picture theory emerges as what provides the
only acceptable account of an elementary proposition, subject to the
constraint that a proposition must show its sense. The picture theory and
the analyticity thesis then entail the contingency thesis and the
independence thesis which, together with the strong analyticity thesis,
imply that all logical propositions are tautologies."
Chrudzimski Arkadiusz, "Contentless syntax, ineffable semantics, and
transcendental ontology: reflections on Wittgenstein's Tractatus,"
Kriterion.Zeitschrift für Philosophie 17: 1-6 (2003).
"Wittgenstein's Tractatus contains some very striking theses. We read,
e.g., that "in a sense" we could not be wrong in logic, and that the
whole subject matter of the theory of modalities could be reconstructed on
the ground of the insights in the mechanism of the linguistic reference. Yet
in the light of the last sentences of Tractatus the whole semantics
turns out to be principally ineffable. In our paper we will try to clarify
these matters. We show how these theses could be made plausible in the
context of the transcendental method of Wittgenstein's Tractatus."
Cocchiarella Nino B., "Logical Atomism and modal logic,"
Philosophia.Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 4: 41-66 (1974).
Copi Irving M., "Objects, properties and relations in the Tractatus,"
Mind 67: 145-165 (1958).
Reprinted in: Irving M. Copi and Robert W. Beard (eds.) - Essays on
Wittgenstein's Tractatus - pp. 167-186.
Copi Irving M., "Frege and Wittgenstein's Tractatus,"
Philosophy and History 6: 447-461 (1976).
Reprinted in: Stuart Shanker (ed.) - Ludwig Wittgenstein. Critical
assessments - London, Croom Helm, 1986 - Vol. I.
Czermak Johannes. The reducibility of a logical space with many-values
dimensions. In Wittgenstein and his impact on contemporary thought.
Proceedings of the Second International Wittgenstein Symposium, 29th August
to 4th September 1977, Kirchberg/Wechsel (Austria). Edited by
Leinfellner Elisabeth. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1978. pp. 171-173
Czermak Johannes. Ein Mengentheoretisches Modell der Tractatus
Ontologie. In Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, and critical rationalism.
Proceedings of the Third International Wittgenstein Symposium, 13th to 19th
August 1978, Kirchberg am Wechsel (Austria). Edited by Berghel Hal,
Hübner Adolf, and Eckehart Köhler. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1979. pp.
162-164
Daniels Charles B. and Davison John, "Ontology and method in
Wittgenstein's Tractatus," Noûs 7: 233-247 (1973).
"Wittgenstein's method is that of showing the categories of being through a
perspicuous language that mirrors the world. For Wittgenstein there are two
categories of being, the category of objects and the category of facts.
These categories are radically disjoint: no object is a fact, no fact an
object. n a perspicuous language facts cannot be named and objects cannot be
asserted. A perspicuous language has one and only one name for each object
and one and only one proposition for each possible (and in addition one
not-so-possible) fact. Material properties and generality are shown to be
analyzable; formal properties are seen as not expressible. The unity of
reality shows in the general form of a proposition that is given in a manner
far clearer and much less ambiguous than Wittgenstein's own version. The
Tractarian view of logic and mathematics is developed, and questions are
raised concerning it that can be seen to occupy Wittgenstein in his later
writings."
Dayton Eric, "Tractatus 5.54 - 5.5422," Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 6: 275-285 (1976).
Dejnozka Jan. The ontology of the analytic tradition and its origins.
Realism and identity in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine. Lanham:
Littlefield Adams Books 1996.
Paperback edition reprinted with corrections, 2002; reprinted with further
corrections, 2003.
"While many books discuss the individual achievements of Frege, Russell,
Wittgenstein, and Quine, few books consider how the thought of all four
thinkers bears on the fundamental questions of twentieth century philosophy.
This book is about existence-identity connections in Frege, Russell,
Wittgenstein, and Quine. The thesis of the book is that there is a general
form of ontology, modified realism, which these great analysts share not
only with each other, but with most great philosophers in the Western
tradition. Modified realism is the view that in some sense there are both
real identities and conceptual (or linguistic) identities. In more familiar
language, it is the view that there are both real distinctions and
distinctions in reason (or in language). Thus in modified realism, there are
some real beings which can serve as a basis for accommodating
possibly huge amounts of conceptual or linguistic relativity, or objectual
identities' 'shifting' as sortal concepts or sortal terms 'shift.'
Therefore, on the fundamental level of ontology, the linguistic turn was not
a radical break from traditional substance theory. Dejnozka also holds that
the conflict in all four analysts between private language arguments (which
imply various kinds of realism) and conceptual "shifting" (which suggests
conceptual relativism) is best resolved by, and is in fact implicitly
resolved by, their respective kinds of modified realism. Frege and Russell,
not Wittgenstein and Quine, emerge as the true analytic progenitors of 'no
entity without identity,' offering between them at least twenty-nine private
language arguments and fifty-eight 'no entity without identity' theories."
Elgin Catherine, "The impossibility of saying what is shown,"
Southern Journal of Philosophy 16: 617-627 (1978).
Favrholdt David. An interpretation and critique of Wittgenstein's
Tractatus . Copenhagen: Munksgaard 1964.
Finch Henry Le Roy. Wittgenstein. The early philosophy. An exposition
of the Tractatus. New York: Humanities Press 1971.
Fogelin Robert J. Wittgenstein. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
1976.
Second revised edition 1987.
Frascolla Pasquale, "On the nature of Tractatus objects,"
Dialectica 58: 369-382 (2004).
"A conjecture on the metaphysical nature of Tractatus objects is put forward
and its interpretative adequacy is tested. The clarification of the true
import of the metaphor of logical space and the recognition of the
theoretical role played by Wittgenstein's explicit claim that the emptiness
of logical space is conceivable enable us to account for the thesis that
objects are the substance of the world. Once objects are identified with
those universal abstract entities which are qualia, and complexes or states
of affairs with their concrete instances, some statements of the Tractatus
become liable to a consistent reading: that objects are colourless (TLP
2.0232); that space, time and colour are forms of objects (TLP 2.0251); that
Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, though still holding
for complexes, does not apply to objects (TLP 2.0233). Lastly, it is shown
how the interpretation of objects as qualia sheds a vivid light on the theme
of the relation between objects and time."
Italian version: Sulla natura degli oggetti nel Tractatus - Rivista
di estetics. 44, 2004, pp. 61-73.
Friedlander Eli. Signs of sense: reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus .
Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2001.
Gale Richard M. Could logical space be empty? In Essays on
Wittgenstein in honour of G. H. von Wright. Edited by Hintikka Jaakko.
Amsterdam: North-Holland 1976. pp. 85-104
García Suárez Alfonso. Are the objects of the Tractatus
phenomenological objects? In Studies on the history of logic. Proceedings
of the Third Symposium on the history of logic. Edited by Angelelli
Ignacio and Cerezo María. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1996. pp. 343-355
Geach Peter Thomas. Saying and showing in Frege and Wittgenstein. In
Essays on Wittgenstein in honour of G. H. von Wright. Edited by Hintikka
Jaakko. Amsterdam: North-Holland 1976. pp. 54-70
Geach Thomas Peter, "Wittgenstein's operator N," Analysis
41: 168-171 (1981).
Glock Hans-Johann. A Wittgenstein dictionary. London: Blackwell
1996.
Glock Hans-Johann, "Truth in the Tractatus," Synthese 148:
345-368 (2006).
Goddard Leonard and Judge Brenda. The metaphysics of Wittgenstein's
Tractatus. Bundoora (Victoria): Australasian Association of Philosophy
1982.
"The ontology of the Tractatus, in terms of which objects are
characterized as property-less simples, is coherent provided Wittgenstein is
not mistakenly taken to be a constructive atomist building complexes from
simples. A geometrical model is given to illustrate this. It is also shown
that an ontology like that of the Tractatus removes much of the
conceptual puzzlement of modern particle physics and has implications for
current debates about realism, possible worlds and rigid designators."
Granger Gilles-Gaston, "Le problème de l'espace logique dans le
Tractatus de Wittgenstein," L'Age de la Science: 181-195 (1968).
Griffin James Patrick. Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism. Oxford:
Clarendon Press 1964.
Grossmann Reinhardt, "Wittgenstein and the problem of non-existent
states of affairs," Acta Analytica: 139-146 (1998).
"The history of philosophy is full of amazing quirks. One of them is the
fact that just two basic ontologies have ruled the roost for the last two
thousand years, namely, the Platonic system and the Aristotelian system. But
it is even more peculiar that neither system contains the category of state
of affairs. The main reason for this neglect seems to be a consideration
which has plagued philosophy to this day. There can be no such things as
states of affairs, because there simply are no states of affairs for false
sentences. Russell, influenced by Wittgenstein's criticism, tried to escape
from this conclusion with his so-called multiple relation theory of
judgment. But he does not succeed. Wittgenstein claimed to have avoided
Russell's mistake and to have presented a correct view about the nature of
judgment in the Tractatus. But a study of the few references in the
Tractatus to the ontological status of states of affairs represented by
false sentences does not show this."
Hadot Pierre, "Réflexions sur les limites du langage. A propos du
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus," Europe 905: 12-30 (2004).
Hadot Pierre. Wittgenstein et les limites du langage. Paris: Vrin
2004.
Hamilton Kelly Ann, "Darstellungen in the Principles of Mechanics
and the Tractatus: the representation of objects in relation in Hertz
and Wittgenstein," Perspectives on Science: Historical, Philosophical,
Social 10: 28-68 (2002).
"Ludwig Wittgenstein's conception of the role of objects in our
philosophical understanding of the logic of our language is critical for his
early philosophy in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. While the important
connections between Heinrich Hertz's Principles of Mechanics and
Wittgenstein's Tractatus have long been recognized, recent work by Jed
Buchwald has deepened our knowledge of the importance of the
object-orientation of Hertz's scientific work in a manner that should also
deepen our understanding of the nature of objects in the Tractatus. I will
argue that there are important ontological links, involving "a certain
physical scheme, one that had powerful implications for thinking as well as
doing," between Hertz's work and Wittgenstein's early philosophy."
Hieke Alexander and Maier Maria. A formal approach to the ontology and
the picture-theory of the Tractatus. In Wittgenstein. Towards a
re-evaluation. Proceedings of the 14th International Wittgenstein-Symposium,
centenary celebration, 13th to 20th August 1989, Kirchberg am Wechsel
(Austria). Edited by Haller Rudolf and Brandl Johannes. Wien:
Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1990. pp.
Hintikka Jaakko, "Quantification and the picture theory of language,"
The Monist 53: 204-230 (1969).
Reprinted in: Jaakko Hintikka - Logic, language-games and information.
Kantian themes in the philosophy of logic - Oxford, Clarendon Press
Hintikka Merrill B. and Hintkka Jaakko. Investigating Wittgenstein.
Oxford: Blackwell 1986.
Hochberg Herbert, "Negation and generality," Noûs 3: 325-343
(1969).
Reprinted in: Elmer D. Klemke (ed.) - Essays on Wittgenstein -
Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1971
Hochberg Herbert. Facts, possibilities and essences in the Tractatus.
In Essays on Wittgenstein. Edited by Klemke Elmer D. Urbana:
University of Illinois Press 1971. pp. 485-533
Hochberg Herbert. Thought, fact and reference: The origins and
ontology of Logical Atomism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
1978.
Hochberg Herbert. Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein: the revival of
realism. Egelsbach: Hänsel-Hohenhausen 2001.
Horn Patrick Rogers. Gadamer and Wittgenstein on the unity of
language. Reality and discourse without metaphysics. Aldershot: Ashgate
2005.
Hyder David Jalal. The mechanics of meaning. Propositional content
and the logical space of Wittgenstein's Tractatus . Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter 2002.
Ishiguro Hide. The so-called Picture Theory: language and the world in
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In Wittgenstein: a critical reader.
Edited by Glock Hans-Johann. Malden: Blackwell Publishers 2001. pp. 26-46
Jacquette Dale, "Analysis of quantifiers in Wittgenstein's Tractatus: a
critical survey," Logic Analysis and History of Philosophy 4: 191-202
(2001).
"In the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Wittgenstein distinguishes
between what can and cannot be said in any language by the general form of
propositions. I explain Wittgenstein's method and discuss Robert J.
Fogelin's criticism of what he takes to be the incompleteness of
Wittgenstein's general form of propositions in his exposition of the 'Naive
Constructivism of the Tractatus.' [Chapter 6 of: Robert J. Fogelin -
Wittgenstein pp. 78-85]. I argue that Fogelin's objection is
mistaken, and that, contrary to Fogelin's claim, Wittgenstein's method when
properly applied produces all of the well-formed formulas with mixed
multiple quantification that Fogelin maintains it cannot provide. I conclude
by offering a critical comparison of similar solutions proposed, among
others, by P.T. Geach, Scott Soames, and Matthias Varga von Kibéd."
Jacquette Dale. Wittgenstein's Tractatus and the logic of fiction. In
Wittgenstein and philsophy of literature. Edited by Gibson John and
Huemer Wolfgang. London: Routledge 2004. pp. 305-317
"Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus articulates a logic
and semantics for all possible languages in which states of affairs (Sachverhalten,
Tatsachen) as truth-makers are pictured in sentences under analysis.
Wittgenstein considers both existent and nonexistent states of affairs as
pictured, respectively, by true and false sentences. This raises the
question as to whether the Tractatus constitutes or provides the
formal basis for a logic of fiction. I identify four criteria for a logic of
fiction, and argue that the Tractatus satisfies only the first three.
The remaining criterion has to do with logical analysis of a fictional
character's psychology internal narration. These are excluded by
Wittgenstein's application of Occam's razor in defense of the general form
of proposition in the case of fiction just as they are in nonfictional
discourse."
Kannisto Heikki. Thoughts and their subject. A study of
Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica 1986.
Kaplan David, "Foundations of intensional logic", 1964.
Unpublished Ph. D. thesis; available at ProQuest Dissertation Express, reference
number: 6408563.
Kenny Anthony John Patrick. Wittgenstein. London: Allen Lane
1973.
Second revised edition: Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 2006.
Klement Kevin C., "Putting form before function: logical grammar in
Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein," Philosopher's Imprint 4: 1-47
(2004).
"The positions of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the priority of
complexes over (propositional) functions are sketched, challenging those who
take the "judgment centered" aspects of the Tractatus to be inherited
from Frege not Russell. Frege's views on the priority of judgments are
problematic, and unlike Wittgenstein's. Russell's views on these matters,
and their development, are discussed in detail, and shown to be more
sophisticated than usually supposed.
Certain misreadings of Russell, including those regarding the relationship
between propositional functions and universals, are exposed. Wittgenstein's
and Russell's views on logical grammar are shown to be very similar.
Russell's type theory does not countenance types of genuine entities nor
metaphysical truths that cannot be put into words, contrary to conventional
wisdom. I relate this to the debate over "inexpressible truths" in the
Tractatus. I lastly comment on the changes to Russell's views brought
about by Wittgenstein's influence."
Klemke Elmer D. The ontology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. In
Essays on Wittgenstein. Edited by Klemke Elmer D. Urbana: University of
Illinois Press 1971. pp. 104-119
Kluge Eike Henner, "Objects as universals: a re-appraisal of the
Tractatus," Dialogue 12: 64-77 (1973).
Küng Guido. Ontology and the logistic analysis of language. an
enquiry Into the contemporary views on universals. Dordrecht: Reidel
Publishing Company 1967.
Translated from German by E. C. M. Mays, and revised by the author]
Küng Guido, "The difficulty with the well-formedness of ontological
statements," Topoi 2: 111-119 (1983).
Latraverse François, "Signe, proposition, situation: éléments pour une
lecture du Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus," Revue Internationale
de Philosophie 56: 125-140 (2002).
Levvis Gary, "The so-called (and actual!) Realism of the Tractatus,"
Grazer Philosophische Studien 54: 45-70 (1998).
"David Pears's contention that the Tractatus [in: The false prison
- vol. 1 - Chapter 6: The basic Realism of the Tractatus] is to
be understood as advancing a form of metaphysical realism is defended
against McGuinness's view that Tractatus 1-2.063 is to be treated
just as introducing a metaphysical myth that may be employed to bring into
prominence salient features of propositions. Starting with a discussion of
the involved difficulties, e.g., determining (1) whether Wittgenstein does,
in fact, provide an argument for the existence of simple objects, (2) what
this object is, and (3) what role the existence of simple objects plays
within the Picture Theory of the Proposition, Wittgenstein's argument for
the existence of simple objects is reconstructed, augmenting Pears's
existing account by providing further details of why Wittgenstein held that
determinacy of sense requires the existence of simple objects."
Lokhorst Gert-Jan C., "Ontology, semantics, and philosophy of mind in
Wittgenstein's Tractatus. A formal reconstruction," Erkenntnis
29: 35-75 (1988).
"The paper presents a formal explication of the early Wittgenstein's views
on ontology, the syntax and semantics of an ideal logical language, and the
propositional attitudes. It will be shown that Wittgenstein gave a 'language
of thought' analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions, and that his
ontological views imply that such ascriptions are truth-functions of (and
supervenient upon) elementary sentences. Finally, an axiomatization of a
quantified doxastic modal logic corresponding to Tractarian semantics will
be given."
Lombardi Olimpia Iris, "¿Qué son los objetos del Tractatus?," Revista
de Filosofia (Spain) 12: 55-76 (1999).
"In this paper we provide an interpretation of the concept "object", in the
context of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. We argue that (1) "objects" are
logical entities, the nodes of the logical net which is common to all
possible worlds; (2) general words are not "names" and, therefore, "objects"
are particulars."
Ludwig Jan, "'Substance' and 'simple objects' in Tractatus 2.02ff,"
Philosophical Studies 29: 307-318 (1976).
Reprinted in: John V. Canfield (ed.) - The philosophy of Wittgenstein. A
fifteen volume collection - New York, Garland, 1986 - Vol. II - Logic and
ontology.
Marion Mathieu. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Introduction au Tractatus
logico-philosophicus. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France 2004.
Maslow Alexander. A study in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Berkeley:
University of California Press 1961.
From the Preface: "This study in Wittgenstein Tractatus is
substantially as it was written in 1933".
Reprinted by Thoemmes Press in 1997.
Maury André. The concepts of "Sinn" and "Gegenstand" in
Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Amsterdam: North-Holland 1977.
" It is argued that the Tractatus notion of propositional sense
contains an irreducible modal element. An interpretation of Wittgenstein's
early notion of "bipolarity" is given. It is further argued that explicit
recognition of the modal element helps us to understand the particular form
of the Tractatus ontology. Wittgenstein's early views on sense and
modality are contrasted with Frege's and Russell's views. Part II is a
defense of the view that the Tractatus objects include predicates.
The argument is backed up by reference to later unpublished writings by
Wittgenstein. The
development of his views on names and predicates are examined."
McDonough Richard. The argument of the Tractatus. Its relevance to
contemporary theories of logic, language, mind, and philosophical truth.
Albany: State University of New York Press 1986.
McGinn Marie. Elucidating the Tractatus: Wittgenstein's early
philosophy of logic and language. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006.
McGuinness Brian, "Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein' "Notes on logic","
Revue Internationale de Philosophie 26: 440-460 (1972).
McGuinness Brian. The so-called realism of Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
In Perspectives on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Edited by Block I.
Oxford: Balckwell 1981. pp. 60-73
Reprinted in: B. F. McGuinness - Approaches to Wittgenstein. Collected
papers - pp. 82-94.
McGuinness Brian. Approaches to Wittgenstein. Collected papers.
London: Routledge 2002.
McManus Denis. The enchantment of words. Wittgenstein's Tractatus
logico-philosophicus. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006.
Milkov Nikolay, "Tractarian scaffoldings," Prima Philosophia 14:
399-414 (2001).
"Wittgenstein's Tractarian ontology has its historical roots in Russell's
programme for constructionalism. There is an essential difference between
the constructionalism of Russell and that of Wittgenstein though. Whereas
Tractarian ontology is approximately Aristotelian, Russell's logical atomism
accepts a Platonic penetration of the autonomous world of logical forms into
the autonomous world of facts. Russell's logical constructionalism, more
precisely, uses the metaphor of a 'logical skeleton' on which the data of
experience are fleshed out. In opposition, in the Tractatus Wittgenstein
doesn't speak of a skeleton but introduces the concept of 'logical
scaffolding' and also of the 'scaffolding of the world' instead. This
terminology reflects a new type of ontology, as well as a new type of logic,
radically different from that of Russell. Its most important concepts are
that of 'object' and 'state of affairs', both of them used in new,
idiosyncratic sense."
Miller III High, "Tractarian semantics for predicate logic," History
and Philosophy of Logic 16: 197-215 (1995).
"It is a little understood fact that the system of formal logic presented in
Wittgenstein's' Tractano provides the basis for an alternative general
semantics for a predicate calculus that is consistent and coherent.
essentially independent of the metaphysics of logical atomism. and
philosophieall illuminating in its own right. The purpose of this paper is
threefold: to describe the general characteristics of a Tractarian-style
semantics, to defend the 'Fulcrums system against the charge of expressive
incompleteness as levelled by Robert Fogelin, and to give a semantics for a
formal language that is the Tractarian equivalent of a first-order predicate
calculus. Of note in regard to the latter is the fact that a Trachuus-style
truth-definition makes no appeal to the technical trick of defining truth in
terms of the satisfaction of predicates by infinite sequences of objects,
yet is materially equivalent to the usual Tarski-style truth-definitions."
Morrison James C. Meaning and truth in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
The Hague: Mouton 1968.
Mounce Howard O. Wittgenstein's Tractatus. An introduction.
London: Basil Blackwell 1981.
Mounce Howard O. The logical system of the Tractatus. In
Wittgenstein: a critical reader. Edited by Glock Hans-Johann. Malden:
Blackwell Publishers 2001. pp. 59-93
Mudersbach Klaus. A tentative axiomatization of the ontology of the
Tractatus. In Wittgenstein and his impact on contemporary thought.
Proceedings of the Second International Wittgenstein Symposium, 29th August
to 4th September 1977, Kirchberg/Wechsel (Austria). Edited by
Leinfellner Elisabeth. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1978. pp. 159-161
Müller Anselm Winfried. Ontologie in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
Bonn: Bouvier 1967.
Newen Albert, "Interpretation und Rekonstruktion der Ontologie in
Wittgensteins Tractatus," Grazer Philososphiche Studien 41:
33-65 (1991).
Noonan H.W., "Tractatus 2.0211 - 2.0212," Analysis 36:
147-149 (1975).
"The existence of objects as substances. Tractatus's relationship to
the theory of the proposition in Frege."
Nordmann Alfred. Wittgenstein's Tractatus. An introduction.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Oaklander Nathan L. and Miracchi Silvano, "Russell, negative facts, and
ontology," Philosophy of Science 47: 434-455 (1980).
"Russell's introduction of negative facts to account for the truth of
"negative" sentences or beliefs rests on his collaboration with Wittgenstein
in such efforts as the characterization of formal necessity, the theory of
logical atomism, and the use of the ideal language. In examining their views
we arrive at two conclusions. First, that the issue of negative facts is
distinct from questions of meaning or intentionality; what a sentence or
belief means or is about rather than what makes it true or false. Second,
that the ontological use of the ideal language is incompatible with the
requirements of its employment in the logical study of inferences. On this
basis we conclude that despite elaborations by recent proponents, the
doctrine of negative facts lacks adequate support, and perhaps more
importantly, it is proper ontological method to free the ideal language from
the exigencies of a symbolism constructed for logical investigation."
Omyla Mieczyslaw. Zarys logiki niefregowskiej (An outline of
non-Fregean logic). Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnicztwo Naukowe 1986.
Book written in Polish
Ostrow Matthew B. Wittgenstein's Tractatus. A dialectical
interpretation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002.
Page James, "Unconfigured Tractarian objects," Philosophical
Investigations 20: 39-50 (1997).
"According to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, the world consists of atomic
objects arranged in various configurations and the ways the world might be
are determined by the ways these objects can be configured. I question
whether these very objects can be unconfigured as well. Black and Fogelin
are nearly alone in their attention to this issue but reach opposite
conclusions. Black asserts, essentially without argument, that atomic
objects can be configured, while Fogelin is committed to the view that they
cannot. I think Black is right and my aim is to show why."
Pears David Francis. Wittgenstein. New York: Viking Press 1970.
Pears David Francis, "The ontology of the Tractatus," Teorema:
49-58 (1972).
"The article is concerned with the status of the ontology of the
Tractatus. In it I argue 1) that, although the ontology of the
Tractatus is a metaphysic of language like Kant's metaphysic of
experience, it is supposed to set the standard of objectivity, and to yield
the firmest conclusions about reality; 2) that Wittgenstein abandoned this
ontology when he abandoned the theory of language from which it had been
deduced, because it expressed too narrow a view of the possible forms that
language may take. The article is an attempt to establish in what way
Wittgenstein's later philosophy is more anthropocentric than his early
philosophy."
Pears David Francis, "The relation between Wittgenstein's picture theory
of propositions and Russell's theories of judgement," The Philosophical
Review 86: 177-196 (1977).
Reprinted in: S. G. Shanker (ed.) - Ludwig Wittgenstein. Critical
assessments - Vol. 1 - From the Notebooks to Philosophical grammar: the
construction and dismantling of the Tractatus (1986) - pp. 92-107.
Pears David Francis. The false prison. A study of the development of
Wittgenstein's philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1987.
Two volumes.
Contents of the first volume: Abreviations XI; Part I: Introduction 1; 1.
Wide-angle view 3; 2. Close-up: the early system 20; 3. Close-up: the late
system 34; Part II: Inside the early system 61; 4. Logical Atomism 63; 5.
The basic realism of the Tractatus 88; 6. Sentences as pictures 115;
7. Solipsism 153; 8. Review and prospect 192; Bibliography 197; Index 201.
Perszyk Kenneth, "The ontology of the Tractatus,"
Philosophia.Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 18: 39-59 (1988).
" Reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus as an extended answer to the
question "what must the world be like for the symbolic logic developed by
Frege, Russell, and Whitehead to apply to it?" helps elucidate the
connection between its theory of language and its ontology. My main argument
is to show that the ontology is derived from the logic of Principia
mathematica taken to its completion. throughout the Tractatus.
Wittgenstein takes a stance on a number of traditional problems in the
history of philosophy, and my aim in discussing some of these is to place
the Tractatus in broader historical perspective."
Perzanowski Jerzy. Some ontological and semantical puzzles of
Wittgenstein's Tractatus. In Aesthetics. Proceedings of the 8th
International Wittgenstein Symposium, 15th - 21st August 1983, Kirchberg am
Wessel (Österreich). Edited by Haller Rudolf. Wien:
Holder-Pichler-Tempsky 1984. pp. 224-230
Perzanowski Jerzy. Some observations on modal logics and the
Tractatus. In Philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology.
Proceedings of the 9th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 19th-26th
August 1984, Kirchberg am Wechsel (Österreich). Edited by Chisholm
Roderick. Wien: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky 1985. pp. 544-550
Perzanowski Jerzy. Logiki modalne a filozofia. Krakow:
Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego 1989.
Perzanowski Jerzy. Towards post-Tractatus ontology. In Wittgenstein.
Towards a re-evaluation: Proceedings of the 14th International
Wittgenstein-Symposium, centenary celebration, 13th to 20th August 1989
Kirchberg am Wechsel (Austria). Edited by Haller Rudolf and Brandl
Johannes. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1990. pp. 185-199
Perzanowski Jerzy. Ce qu'il y a de non Fregéen dans la sémantique du
Tractatus de Wittgenstein et pourquoi? In Wittgenstein et la philosophie
aujourd'hui: Journées internationales Créteil-Paris, 16-21 juin 1989 à
l'occasion du centenaire de la naissance de Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951).
Edited by Sebestik Jan and Soulez Antonia. Paris: Klincksieck 1992. pp.
163-177
Translated in English as: What is non-Fregean in the semantics of
Wittgenstein's Tractatus and why? - Axiomathes, 1993, 4, pp. 357-372.
Piana Giovanni. Interpretazione del Tractatus di Wittgenstein.
Milano: Il Saggiatore 1973.
Pippin Robert B., "Negation and not-being in Wittgenstein's Tractatus
and Plato's Sophist," Kant Studien 70: 179-196 (1979).
Plochmann George Kimball and Lawson Jack B. Terms in their
propositional contexts in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. An index.
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press 1962.
Plourde Jimmy, "Ontologie der Modalitäten im Tractatus," Metaphysica
1: 19-39 (2000).
Plourde Jimmy, "Wittgenstein et les théories du jugement de Russell et
de Meinong," Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical Association 44: 249-283
(2005).
"Un des principaux enjeux de la théorie du jugement de Russell consistait à
élaborer une théorie qui n'engage pas à admettre des entités complexes
vraies, fausses ou inexistantes tels que les objectifs meinongiens. Dans
l'étude du débat entre Russell et Wittgenstein sur cette théorie, on n'a
jamais sérieusement envisagé que Wittgenstein n'ait pas suivi Russell sur
cette question et qu'il ait plutôt adopté une position plus proche de celle
de Meinong. Dans cet article, j'aborde cette question et soutiens que
Wittgenstein a trouvé la solution aux problèmes posés par la théorie du
jugement de Russell dans la théorie de l'image et qu'il a longuement hésité
dans les Carnets entre des versions de la théorie de l'image en accord avec
la position de Russell et des versions en accord avec celle de Meinong.
Enfin, je soutiens qu'il a finalement tranché la question dans le Tractatus
en optant pour une théorie du type de celle privilégiée par Meinong."
Poulain Jacques, "La possibilité des propositions ontologiques dans le
Tractatus logico-philosophicus," Les Études Philosophiques:
529-552 (1973).
Proops Ian. Logic and language in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. New
York: Garland Publishers 2000.
"This work is a minimally revised version of my Harvard doctoral thesis,
which was written during the years 1994-1998. My understanding of
Wittgenstein's early philosophy has, of course, continued to evolve since
completing the thesis, but because the attempt to incorporate these new
ideas seemed likely to result in a wholly new work, I have decided to
present the dissertation in its original form, with the exception of a few
minor and mostly stylistic changes."
Proops Ian, "Wittgenstein on the substance of the world," European
Journal of Philosophy 12: 106-126 (2004).
"A reading is offered of Wittgenstein's argument for substance in his
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Wittgenstein's talk of "substance" is an
allusion to Kant's conception of substance in the
"First Analogy" of the Critique of Pure Reason, namely, the concept
of some stuff that exists at all times and such that all existence changes
are alterations of it. Tractarian substance is the
modal analogue of Kantian substance. It is that which "endures," not
literally through time, but figuratively through a "space" of possible
worlds. To argue for substance is therefore to argue for necessary
existents. From this starting point, a detailed reconstruction of the
argument for substance is developed and its coherence (if not soundness)
defended."
Ramsey Frank Plumpton, "Critical notice of the Tractatus,"
Mind 32: 465-478 (1923).
Reprinted in: F. P. Ramsey - The foundations of mathematics and other
logical essays - Edited by R. B. Braithwaite, with a preface by G. E.
Moore - New York, The Humanities Press, 1931 (Reprinted Patterson,
Littlefield, Adams, 1965)
Rhees Rush. "Ontology" and "Identity" in the Tractatus. A propos
of Black's Companion. In Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein.
Edited by Winch Peter. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1969. pp. 51-65
Rhees Rush. Ontology and identity in the Tractatus. In Studies
in the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Edited by Winch Peter. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul 1969. pp. 51-65
Reprinted in: John V. Canfield (ed.) - The philosophy of Wittgenstein. A
fifteen volume collection - New York, Garland, 1986 - Vol. II - Logic
and ontology.
Russell Bertrand, "The philosophy of Logical Atomism," The Monist
(1919).
Reprinted in: B. Russell - Logic and knowledge. Essays 1901-1950 -
Edited by Robert Charles Marsh - London, Allen & Unwin, 1956, pp. 175-282
Simons Peter. Logical and ontological independence in the Tractatus.
In Ethics: foundations, problems, and applications. Proceedings of the
Fifth International Wittgenstein Symposium, 25th to 31st August 1980,
Kirchberg am Wechsel (Austria). Edited by Morscher Edgar and Stranzinger
Rudolf. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1981. pp. 464-467
Simons Peter, "The old problem of complex and fact," Teoria (Italy)
5: 205-225 (1985).
Reprinted in: P. Simons - Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from
Bolzano to Tarski. Selected essays - Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1992 pp.
319-338.
Simons Peter, "Tractatus mereologico-philosophicus? A Brentanian look at
Wittgenstein, and a moral," Grazer Philosophische Studien 28: 165-186
(1986).
Soames Scott, "Generality, truth functions, and expressive capacity in
the Tractatus," The Philosophical Review 92: 573-589 (1983).
Reprinted in: John V. Canfield (ed.) - The philosophy of Wittgenstein. A
fifteen volume collection - New York, Garland, 1986 - Vol. II - Logic
and ontology.
Specht Ernst Konrad. The foundations of Wittgenstein's later
philosophy. Manchester: Manchster University Press 1967.
Original edition: Die sprachphilosophischen und ontologischen Grundlagen
im Spätwerk Ludwig Wittgensteins - Cologne, Kölner Universitäts-Vverlag,
1963.
The first two chapters are about the Tractatus.
Stegmüller Wolfgang, "Eine modelltheoretische Präzisierung der
Wittgensteinschen Bildtheorie.," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
7: 181-195 (1966).
Stenius Erik. Wittgenstein's Tractatus. A critical exposition of its
main lines of thought. Oxford: Blackwell 1960.
Stenius Erik. The sentence as a function of its constituents in Frege
and in the Tractatus. In Essays on Wittgenstein in honour of G. H.
von Wright. Edited by Hintikka Jaakko. Amsterdam: North-Holland 1976.
pp. 71-84
Stevens Graham, "From Russell's Paradox to the theory of judgement:
Wittgenstein and Russell on the unity of the proposition," Theoria.A
Swedish Journal of Philosophy 70: 28-61 (2007).
"It is fairly well known that Wittgenstein's criticisms of Russell's
multiple-relation theory of judgment has a devastating effect on the
latter's philosophical enterprise. The exact nature of those criticisms,
however, and the explanation for the severity of their consequences, has
been a source of confusion and disagreement amongst both Russell and
Wittgenstein scholars. In this paper, I offer an interpretation of those
criticisms which shows them to be consonant with Wittgenstein's general
critique of Russell's conception of logic and which serves to elucidate some
of the notoriously enigmatic passages of the Tractatus. In
particular, I seek to show the continuity of Wittgenstein's criticisms of
the theory of judgment with his remarks on Russell's paradox and the theory
of types."
Stokhof Martin J.B. World and life as one. Ethics and ontology in
Wittgenstein's early thought. Stanford: Stanford University Press 2002.
"The book's main thesis is twofold. It argues that the ontological theory of
the Tractatus is fundamentally dependent on its logical and linguistic
doctrines: the tractarian world is the world as it appears in language and
thought. It also maintains that this interpretation of the ontology of the
Tractatus can be argued for not only on systematic grounds, but also via the
contents of the ethical theory that it offers. Wittgenstein's views on
ethics presuppose that language and thought are but one way in which we
interact with reality."
Sullivan Peter M., "The totality of facts," Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 100: 175-192 (2000).
"Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, conceives the world as "the totality
of facts." Type-stratification threatens that conception: the totality of
facts is an obvious example of an illegitimate totality. Wittgenstein's
notion of truth-operation evidently has some role to play in avoiding that
threat, allowing propositions, and so facts, to constitute a single type.
The paper seeks to explain that role in a way that integrates the
"philosophical" and "technical" pressures on the notion of an operation."
Suszko Roman, "Ontologia w "Traktacie' L. Wittgenstein" (Ontology in the
Tractatus by L. Wittgenstein)," Studia Filozoficzne: 97-120
(1968).
Paper witten in Polish
Suszko Roman, "Ontology in the Tractatus of L. Wittgenstein,"
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 9: 7-33 (1968).
Suszko Roman, "Definitions in theories of kind W," Bulletin of the
Section of Logic 1: 14-19 (1972).
Co-author: Mieczyslaw Omyla
Suszko Roman, "Description in theories of kind W," Bulletin of the
Section of Logic 1: 8-13 (1972).
Co-author: Mieczyslaw Omyla
Suszko Roman. Abolition of the Fregean axiom. In Logic Colloquium.
Symposium on logic held at Boston, 1972-73. Edited by Parikh Rohit.
Berlin: Springer-Verlag 1975. pp. 169-239
Preprint 1973.
Tejedor Chon, "Sense and simplicity: Wittgenstein's argument for simple
objects," Ratio.An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16:
272-289 (2003).
"This paper puts forward an alternative interpretation of the argument for
simple objects advanced in the 2.0s of the Tractatus. In my view,
Wittgenstein derives the simplicity of objects directly from his account of
possible states, complex objects and senseful propositions. The key to
Wittgenstein's argument is the idea that, if there were no simple objects,
possible states would not be necessarily possible. If this were the case,
however, there would be no senseful language, in Wittgenstein's view. One of
the subsidiary aims of this paper is to question the idea that Wittgenstein
posits simples because, without them, language would be infinitely
analyzable."
Voltolini Alberto, "Possibilia, qualia e sensibilia," Rivista di
Estetica 43: 127-137 (2003).
"In this paper I will try to show the following two things. First,
Wittgenstein's Tractatus logico-philosophicus semantically exiges
that Tractarian objects be conceived of as possibilia in the sense of
Russell (1903), namely as objects that may exist as well not exist. Second,
the Tractatus's general ontological framework suggests to integrate
this onto-semantical conception with a view of such objects not as qualia
but rather as sensibilia in the sense of Russell (1914), namely as
possible sense-data."
Weissman David, "Ontology in the Tractatus," Philosophy and
Phenomnological Research 27: 475-501 (1967).
White Roger M. Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
Readers' guide. New York: Continuum 2006.
Wolniewicz Boguslaw. A difference between Russell's and Wittgenstein's
logical atomism. In Akten des XIV. Internationalen Kongresses für
Philosophie. Wien, 2. - 9. September 1968 - Vol. II. Wien: Herder 1968.
pp. 263-267
Reprinted in: Logic and metaphysics (1999) - pp.193-197
Wolniewicz Boguslaw. Rzczy i fakty. Wstep do pierwszei filozofii
Wittgensteina (Things and Facts. An introduction to the first philosophy of
Wittgenstein). Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnicztwo Naukowe 1968.
Book witten in Polish.
Wolniewicz Boguslaw, "A note on Black's 'Companion'," Mind 78:
141 (1969).
Reprinted in: Logic and metaphysics (1999) - p. 229
Wolniewicz Boguslaw. A parallelism between Wittgensteinian and
Aristotelian ontologies. In Boston studies in the philosophy of science.
Vol. IV. Edited by Cohen Robert S. and Wartofsky Marx W. Dordrecht:
Reidel Publishing Company 1969. pp. 208-217
Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the philosophy of science
1966/1968.
Reprinted in: Logic and metaphysics (1999) - pp.198-207
Wolniewicz Boguslaw, "O formalnych wlasnosciach pojecia faktu (On formal
properties of the notion of fact)," Rozprawy Filozoficzne: 413-423
(1969).
Paper written in Polish.
Wolniewicz Boguslaw. Wittgensteinian foundation of non-Fregean logic. In
Contemporary East European philosophy. Vol. 3. Edited by D'Angelo
Edward, DeGrood David, and Riepe Dale. Bridgeport: Spartacus Books 1971. pp.
231-243
Wolniewicz Boguslaw, "The notion of fact as a modal operator,"
Teorema: 59-66 (1972).
"The notion of fact: FP = 'It is a fact that P' is characterized
axiomatically, and the ensuing modal systems shown to be equivalent to T, S4
and S5 respectively."
Wolniewicz Boguslaw. Zur Semantik des Satzkalküls: Frege und
Wittgenstein. In Der Mensch - Subjekt und Objekt (Festchrift für Adam
Schaff). Edited by Borbé Tasso. Wien: Europaverl. 1973. pp.
Wolniewicz Boguslaw. Wittgenstein und der Positivismus. In
Wittgenstein, the Vienna circle and critical rationalism. Proceedings of the
third International Wittgenstein Symposium, 13th to 19th August 1978,
Kirchberg am Wechsel (Austria). Edited by Berghel Hal, Hübner Adolf, and
Eckehart Köhler. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1978. pp.
Wolniewicz Boguslaw. A Wittgensteinian semantics for propositions. In
Intention and intentionality. Essay in honour of G. E. M. Anscombe.
Edited by Diamond Cora and Teichman Jenny. Ithaca: Cornell University Press
1979. pp. 165-178
Wolniewicz Boguslaw, "A formal ontology of situations," Studia Logica
41: 381-413 (1982).
"A generalized Wittgensteinian semantics for propositional languages is
presented, based on a lattice of elementary situations. Of these, maximal
ones are possible worlds, constituting a logical space; minimal ones are
logical atoms, partitioned into its dimensions. A verifier of a proposition
is an elementary situation such that if real it makes true. The reference
(or objective) of a proposition is a situation, which is the set of all its
minimal verifiers. (Maximal ones constitute its locus.) Situations are shown
to form a Boolean algebra, and the Boolean set algebra of loci is its
representation. Wittgenstein's is a special case, admitting binary
dimensions only."
Contents:
0. Preliminaries;
1. Elementary Situations
1.1.The Axioms; 1.2.Some Consequences; 1.3. W-Independence; 1.4.States of
Affairs;
2. Sets of Elementary Situations
2.1.The Semigroup of SE"-Sets; 2.2.The Lattice of Minimal SE"-Sets;
2.3.Q-Spaces and V-Sets; 2.4.V-Equivalence and Q-Equivalence; 2.4.V-Classes
and V-Sets;
3. Objectives of Propositions
3.1. Verifiers of Propositions; 3.2. Verifying and Forcing; 3.3. Situations
and Logical Loci; 3.4. Loci and Objectives of Compound Propositions 3.5. The
Boolean Algebra of Situations;
4. References
Wolniewicz Boguslaw, "Logical space and metaphysical systems," Studia
Logica 42: 269-284 (1983).
"The paper applies the theory presented in "A formal ontology of situations"
(Studia Logica, vol. 41 (1982), no. 4) to obtain a typology of metaphysical
systems by interpreting them as different ontologies of situations.
Four are treated in some detail: Hume's diachronic atomism, Laplacean
determinism, Hume's synchronic atomism, and Wittgenstein's logical atomism.
Moreover, the relation of that theory to the "situation semantics" of Perry
and Barwise is discussed."
Wolniewicz Boguslaw. Ontologia Sytuacji (Ontology of Situations).
Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnicztwo Naukowe 1985.
Book written in Polish.
Wolniewicz Boguslaw. The essence of Logical Atomism: Hume and
Wittgenstein. In Wittgenstein. Eine Neubewertung. Akten 14.
Internationale Wittgenstein-Symposium. Vol. 1. Wien:
Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1990. pp. 106-111
Wolniewicz Boguslaw. Logic and metaphysics. Studies in Wittgenstein's
ontology of facts. Warsaw: Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne 1999.
Contents: Preface 11; Discontinuity of Wittgenstein's philosophy 13; 1.
Elementary situations as a lattice of finite length 19; Elementary
situations as a semilattice 73; 3. Independence 127; 4. Elementary
situations generalized 137; 5. Auxiliary studies 193; 5.1 The Logical
Atomisms of Russell and Wittgenstein 193; 5.2 A parallelism between
Wittgenstein and Aristotle 198; 5.3 Frege's semantics 207; 5.4. The notion
of fact as a modal operator 218; 5.5 "Tractatus" 5.541 - 5.542 224; 5.6
History of the concept of a Situation 229; 6. Offshoots 243 6.1 Languages
and codes 243; 6.2 Logic and hermeneutics 254; 6.3 Kotarbinski's Reism 265;
6.4 On Bayle's critique of theodicy 271; 6.5 Elzenberg's axiology 286; 6.6
Needs and values 293; 6.7 Suszko: a reminiscence 302; Supplements 307;
Indices: Index of subjects 317; Index of names 326; Index of Tractatus
references 329.
Wright Georg Henrik von. Historical introduction. The origin of
Wittgenstein's Tractatus. In Prototractatus. An early version of
Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Edited by McGuinness Brian. London:
Routledge 1971. pp.
Revised and expanded in G. H. von Wright - Wittgenstein - Oxford,
Blackwell, 1982.
Wright Georg Henrik von. Some observations on modal logic and
philosophical systems. In Contemporary philosophy in Scandinavia.
Edited by Olson Raymond E. and Paul Anthony M. Baltimore: The John Hopkins
Press 1972. pp. 17-26
Wright Georg Henrik von. Modal logic and the Tractatus. In
Wittgenstein. Oxford: Blackwell 1982. pp. 185-200
Zemach Eddy M., "Sachverhalte, Tatsachen and properties,"
Ratio.An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17: 49-51
(1976).
Zheng Yiwei, "Les configurations et les propriétés des objets dans le
Tractacus de Wittgenstein," Philosophical Investigations 22:
136-165 (1999).
"In this paper I approach some central problems concerning the Tractarian
objects, e.g., the picture theory, the internal and external properties of
objects, and the debate whether properties and relations should be included
as the Tractarian objects, from a study of configurations of objects. I
argue that a detailed study of configurations of objects offers us new
insights and helps us reach solutions to some of the important disputes
concerning the characteristics of objects, e.g., the dispute whether the
Tractarian objects include properties and relations."
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