Kephalaion. Studies in Greek philosophy and its continuation, offered
to professor C. J. de Vogel. Edited by de Rijk Lambertus Marie and
Mansfeld Jaap. Assen: Van Gorcum 1975.
"This volume is offered to Professor C. J. de Vogel, who for more than
twenty-five years held the chair of Ancient and Medieval (since 1968 of
Ancient and Patristic) Philosophy in the University of Utrecht."
Contents: W. J. Verdenius: Heraclitus' conception of fire 1; René Schaere:
Héraclite jugé par Platon 9; Jaap Mansfeld: Alcmaeon: 'Physikos' or
Physician? With some remarks on Calcidius' 'On vision' compared to Galen,
Plac. Hipp. Plat. VII 26; E. de Strycker S. J.: The oracle given to
Chaerephon about Socrates 39; G. J. de Vries: A general theory of literary
composition in the Phaedrus 50; Pierre-Maxim Schuhl: Platon et la pureté de
l'altitude 53; Enrico Berti: Logical and ontological priority among the
genera of substance in Aristotle 55; Suzanne Mansion: Une passage obscur du
deuxième livre de la Physique 70; G. Verbeke: Moral behaviour and tiem in
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics 78; Olof Gigon: Phronesis und Sophia in der
Nicomach. Ethik des Aristotle; B. L. Hijmans: Athenodorus on the Categories
an a pun on Athenodorus 105; Heinrich Dörrie: Logos-Religion? Oder
Noûs-Theologie? Die Hauptsächlichen Aspekte des kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus
115; Walter Burkert: Plotin, Plutarch un die platonisierende Interpretation
von Heraklit und Empedokles 137; Theo Gerard Sinnige: Metaphysical and
personal religion in Plotinus 147; A. H. Armstrong: Beauty and the discovery
of divinity in the thought of Plotinus 155; Modestus van Straaten O. S. A.:
On Plotinus IV, 7 [2], 8, 3 164; F. P. Hager: Proklos and Alexander von
Aphrodisias über ein Problem der Lehre von der Vorsehung 171; Maria
Timpanaro-Cardini: Two questions of Greek Geometrical terminology 183;
Robert Joly: Remarques sur Dion Chrysostome et le Nouveau Testament 189;
Cornelia W. Wolfskeel: Christliches und Neoplatonisches im denken Augustins
195; L. M. de Rijk: Quaestio de Ideis. Some notes on an important
chapter of Platonism 204; Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer: The Intellect in Plotinus
and the archetypes of C. G. Jung 214; Bibliography of C. J. de Vogel,
compiled by J. van Heel 223; Tabula gratulatoria 231.
"Some Thirteenth century tracts on the Game of Obligation. Part II. The
Obligationes Parisienses found in Oxford, Canon. misc. 281,"
Vivarium 13: 22-54 (1975).
"In his description of the Oxford manuscript Canon. misc. 281 Coxe
only mentions (*) anonymous glosses on Priscian's De constructione (Priscianus
minor). However this manuscript contains also a tract of logic.
(...)
The treatise as a whole has the following parts (the subdivisions printed in
minuscules are mine)
Prologus
De obligatione einsque speciebus I DE POSITIONE De positione determinata
De quibusdam regulis circa ponibile positum
Sophisma
Consimile sophisma
Idem sophisma
Aliud sophisma
Aliud sophisma
Aliud sophisma
De positione indeterminata
De indeterminate positionis duplici modo II DE DUBITATUR Utrum 'dubitatur' sit obligatio annon
De quibusdam regulis
Sophisma III DE DEPOSITIONE De eius diffinitione et regulis
De speciali depositione
Utrum non debeat esse obligatio
Sophisma." pp. 22 and 25.
(*) H. O. Coxe - Catalogi codicum manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Bodleiane
pars tertia codices graecos et latinos canonicos complectens, Oxford 1854,
col. 646.
"Logica Cantabrigiensis. A fifteenth century Cambridge manual of
logic," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 29: 297-315 (1975).
Special number in memory of Martin Grabmann.
"The manuscript 182/215 of the important manuscript collection of the
Library of Gonville and Caius College at Cambridge contains a number of
tracts on logic which were probably written at Cambridge as notes of
lectures. Part of them are also found in other manuscripts all over Europe.
It seems rather difficult to discern the exact extent of this work, since in
nearly all manuscripts the number and arrangement of the tracts is different
and other logical works are mixed up with those treatises which doubtless
belong to the Cambridge Logic." p. 297
Quaestio de Ideis. Some notes on an important chapter of
Platonism. In Kephalaion. Studies in Greek philosophy and its
continuation, offered to professor C. J. de Vogel. Edited by de Rijk
Lambertus Marie and Mansfeld Jaap. Assen: Van Gorcum 1975. pp. 204-213
"The opponents of Platonism as well as its adherents have to agree that
there is a lot of truth in Whitehead's famous statement that the safest
general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it
consists of a series of footnotes to Plato (*).
I think one of the everlasting items of that tradition is what has been
termed since St. Augustine the quaestio de Ideis. Indeed, the status
(either ontic or merely mental) of the Ideas has fascinated many
philosophers, especially the Christian, who could not dispense with a
statement concerning the relationship of the eternal and immutable Ideas to
God. In this short contribution to the dedicatory volume for our academic
teacher C. J. de Vogel, I shall confine myself to roughly sketch the
development of the problem of that relationship from Plato's days down to
some fourteenth century Franciscan thinkers." p. 204
(*) Alfred Nort Whitehead - Process and reality. An essay in cosmology -
Gifford lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh during the
session 1927-28. Camvrdige, 1929, p. 53.
"The place of Billingham's Speculum puerorum in Fourteenth and
Fifteenth century logical tradition, with the edition of some alternative
Tracts," Studia Mediewistyczne 16: 97-151 (1975).
"From the second half of the fourteenth century onwards the Speculum
puerorum (or iuvenum) compiled by the English logician Richard Billingham
was very popular, especially in Southern and Central Europe. However, this
popularity does not extend to his other works. The Speculum, which together
with works such as those of Thomas Manlevelt, William of Heytesbury and
Marsilius of Inghen, was a formidable competitor of Peter of Spain's
Tractatus, is an introduction to what from about the 1330's onwards has been
one of the cardinal items, if not the most characteristic one, of fourteenth
century logic, rather than a Summule of the type of Peter of Spain's
Tractatus, which contains all the topics of the Logica antiqua and moderna
favoured in Peter's days. Generally speaking, fourteenth century philosophy
focussed its attention on the search for certainty (certitudo and
evidentia). That fourteenth century logic paid special attention to the
procedures of proving a sentence, is evidenced by the numerous tracts
entitled De probationibus propositionum or De veritate ac falsitate
propositionum which have been handed down to us in fourteenth and fifteenth
century manuscripts.
Billingham's Speculum is one of them." pp. 99-100 (Notes omitted).
La signification de la proposition (dictum propositionis) chez
Abélard. In Pierre Abélard - Pierre le Vénérable. Les courants
philosophiques, littéraires et artistiques en Occident au milieu du XII
siècle. Edited by Jolivet Jean and Louis René. Paris: Éditions du Centre
national de la recherche scientifique 1975. pp. 547-555
Published also in: Studia Mediewistyczne 16, 1975 pp. 155-161.
Reprinted as chapter IV in: Through language to reality: studies in medieval
semantics and metaphysics.
"Cette communication se borne a un bref examen de la signification de la
phrase complète (propositio) dans la logique de Pierre
Abélard.
Il paraît utile de commencer par la définition du verbe signifier (significare)
chez ce logicien. 'signifier' dit des mots (dictiones) c'est produire une
intellection dans l'âme de l'auditeur (Logica ingredientibus 307, 30
ss.), tandis que le même verbe est également appliqué à la dénotàtion des
choses extérieures (ibid.); dans ce dernier sens, le verbe est
synonyme de appellare, nominare, demonstrare, designare.
'signifier' dit des phrases complètes (propositiones) c'est
produire une intellection laquelle est formée par la liaison des
intellections de ses parties (dictiones)." p. 547
"On peut conclure que selon Abélard le dictum n'est pas un objet qui
serait indépendent de la pensée, mais plutôt le contenu de la pensée,
c'est-à-dire une intellection objectivée, qui correspond soit à un
état de choses réel, soit à un état de choses seulement possible (Dial.
II, 205, 28-30: id dicimus quod id quod dicit hec propositio
'Socrates est homo', est unum de his que natura patitur esse), soit un
état de choses tout à fait impossible (Dial. II, 158, 7 -9: la
proposition 'Socrates est lapis' ne reflète pas une inherentia
de Socrate et de pierre, ni 'Socrates non est lapis' leur rémotion).
(...)
Ainsi, l'existence qu'établit la proposition en parlant, n'est pas une
existence réelle, mais, pourrait-on dire, une existence parlée, ou
plutôt, une existence pensée ou logique.
Employant la distinction bien connue du XIV siècles (presentée notamment par
jacques d'Ascoli, Thomas d'York, Pierre Thomae):
res: 1) extra animam (chose extérieure); 2) in anima: a)
subiective ( = acte de l'intellection comme tel) b) obiective
(contenu de l'intellection).
on peut dire qu'Abélard a essayé, à sa façon, de montrer que le dictum,
de la proposition, loin d'être une chose extérieure (res extra animam)
est une chose qui doit son existence à l'âme ou a l'intellection (res
in anima), mais qu'il faut en même temps bien le distinguer de
l'acte de l'intellection pris comme tel (res in anima subiective),
et reconnaître, sa propre identité dans le contenu objectif de
l'intellection. Par là, le dictum du grand logicien du XII siècle
semble être d'une nature logique par excellence." pp. 554-555. (some notes
omitted)
"Review of: Thomas Erfurt. Grammatica speculativa. An edition
with a translation and commentary by Geoffrey L. Bursill-Hall (London,
1972)," Linguistics 157: 160-164 (1975).
"Another Speculum puerorum attributed to Richard Billingham,"
Medioevo 1: 203-235 (1975).
"Every student of Mediaeval logic knows the tract on the truth and falsity
of the propositions by the hand of Richard Billingham.
It goes under the titles Speculum puerorum, Speculum iuvenum, and
also Terminus est in quern, after the well known incipit
borrowed from Aristotle's Prior Analytics (I I, 24b16-18) Terminus
est in quem resolvitur propositio ut predicatum et de quo predicator,
apposito vel diviso esse vel non esse. In 1970 Dr. Alfonso Maierù
published a very useful school edition of the work, (*) to the effect that
the scholary world has now that text at its disposition which exerted a
tremendous influence in fourteenth and fifteenth century logic, especially
in the universities of Eastern and Southern Europe.
The text has come down to us in two different redactions, an English and a
Central European one.(**) Elsewhere (***) I tried to show that Billingham's
work is the most famous specimen of quite a number of similar tracts De
veritate et falsitate propositiomun, but certainly not the oldest of
them. It is the aim of this article to introduce and edit another treatise
of this type, which like the well known treatise edited by Maierù goes under
the title Speculum puerorum and is likewise attributed to Billingham.
It is found in a late fourteenth century manuscript of the Archivo General
de la Corona de Aragon at Barcelona, Spain, viz. Ripoll 141." p. 203
(*). A. Maierù, Lo "Speculum puerorum sive Terminus est is quem" di
Riccardo Billingham. «Stud. Med.», 3 (1969), 297-397.
(**) See Maierù, Introd. 318 sqq. Maierù seems to be wrong in
distinguishing a third class of manuscripts; in fact at least two of this
class contain quite a different tract which also goes under the name
Terminus est is quem. See L. M. de Rijk, The Place of Billingham's
Speculum puerorum in 14th and 15th Century Logical Tradition, with
the edition of some alternative tracts, (1975).
(***) Study quoted in the previous note.
"Some Thirteenth century tracts on the Game of Obligation. Part III. The
Tract De petitionibus contrariorum, usually attributed to William of
Sherwood," Vivarium 14: 26-49 (1976).
"William of Sherwood (born between 1200-10 died between 1266-71) (*) is
commonly (*) considered the author of not only a tract De obligationibus but
also a short tract called in the only manuscript (Paris, B. N. Lat. 16.617,
f. 64v) Petitiones contrariorum. This small work deals with the solution of
logical puzzles (sophismata) that arise from hidden contrariety in the
premisses of an argumentation.
The aim of this paper is to publish the shorter tract from the Paris
manuscript and to investigate its attribution to Sherwood.
(*) The most extensive biography of Sherwood is found in Norman Kretzmann,
William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic translated with an introduction
and notes. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1966, Introd. pp.
3-12.
(**) See Kretzmann, op. cit., p. 15.
On Buridan's doctrine of connotation. In The logic of John Buridan.
Acts of the Third European Symposium on medieval logic and semantics,
Copenhagen 16-21 November 1975. Edited by Pinborg Jan. Copenhagen:
Museum Tusculanum 1976. pp. 91-100
Reprinted as chapter XI in: Through language to reality: studies in medieval
semantics and metaphysics.
"Mediaeval Terminist logic was concerned with the so-called properties of
terms (proprietates terminorum), to the extent that it not only studied the
formal structures of Latin language, its logical syntax, and all kinds of
specifications within this scope, but also interpreted the linguistic
elements and structures. This interpretation mainly focussed on what the
moderns would call semantics rather than on formal logic as such. The
properties of terms (significatio, appellatio, suppositio and its various
forms: ampliatio, restrictio, distributio) were investigated in their
relation to the so-called res extra animam (extra-mental reality).
Two statements can be made. First: Who wants to detect a Mediaeval thinker's
implicit ontological points of view, finds a wealth of firm evidence in his
doctrine of the properties of terms. Secondly: Within the domain of these
properties it is Buridan's appellatio that has a very interesting role
because of its affinity with the modern concept of connotation. So Buridan's
appellatio is entitled to have the attention of both the historians of
Mediaeval thought and learning as of those modern logicians who do not want
to seclude themselves from the historical background of modern doctrines.
My approach to the matter concerned now is to compare Buridan's appellatio
with modern connotation, more specifically to put the translation
'connotation' for Buridan's appellatio to the test." p. 91
"Richard Billingham works on logic," Vivarium 14: 121-138 (1976).
"Since Professor Alfonso Maierù published (*) his most useful work-edition
(strumento di lavoro) of Richard Billingham's Speculum puerorum every
student of Mediaeval logic has been acquainted with that famous work which
exerted such a great influence in the fourteenth and fifteenth century logic
curriculum, especially in the schools of Eastern and Southern Europe.
Elsewhere (**) I have tried to show that Billingham's work is part of a
certain tradition of similar works on the truth and falsity of propositions
and certainly not unique in the, genre nor at its origin.(...)
The aim of this paper is to recollect all manuscript evidence for
Billingham's logical works." pp. 121 and 123.
(*)Alfonso Maierù, Lo 'Speculum puerorum sive Terminus est in quem' di
Riccardo Billingharn. Estratto da A Giuseppe Ermini, Centro italiano di
studi sull' alto Medioevo, Spoleto 1970, 297-397. (= Studia medievalia 3,
(1969), 297-397).
(**) L. M. de Rijk, The Place of Billingham's Speculum puerorum in 14th and
15th Century Logical Tradition, with the Edition of Some Alternative Tracts
in: Studi Mediewistyczne 16 (1975), 99-153.
"Logica Oxoniensis. An attempt to reconstruct a Fifteenth century
Oxford Manual of logic," Medioevo 3: 121-164 (1977).
"In a recent paper (*) I have attempted to show that the study of logic at
Cambridge University during the fifteenth century led to the compilation of
an own textbook. It seems rather obvious that the rival school of Oxford had
also its specific textbook in usum delphini. However, our manuscript
tradition is less clear at this point; whereas the Cambridge logic seems to
be handed down as a whole, its Oxford counterpart presents itself in a
rather scattered form, to the extent, indeed, that, to my knowledge at
least, no manuscript contains all (presumable) parts of this work. This
paper attempts to reconstruct the (supposed) Oxford textbook." p. 121
(...)
"Conclusions. It is quite clear from the previous investigations that
about 1400 the study of logic in the Oxford schools led to a remarkable
production of tracts. There seems to have existed a more or less established
set of tracts on the different logical topics of those days. Far from having
one specific author this «Oxford Logic» seems to consist of
adaptations of famous fourteenth century tracts. This holds also good for
other famous Oxford treatises. So is Bradwardine's well-known tract on
proportion frequently found in various anonymous adaptations in our
fifteenth century manuscripts (see also some of the manuscripts analysed
above). (...)
Much work is still to be done about the exact affiliations and
interdependency of the tracts of the «Oxford Logic» and eponymous
works of the 14th and 15th centuries. Again, as with the Cambridge Logic,
the Southern Europe (especially Italian tradition, will turn out to be of
the utmost importance. The only aim of this paper is to give a survey of the
manuscript evidence. Most of the conclusions drawn can only be accepted with
all proper reserves." p. 163-164.
(*) 'Logica Cantabrigiensis' A fifteenth century manual of logic
"On ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics. Part I,"
Vivarium 15: 81-120 (1977).
"1. Introduction. The aim of this study is, rather than to give a
contribution to the history of semantics as such, to show (i) the
interdependence of Ancient (and Mediaeval) semantic views and metaphysical
doctrines, and (2) how some Mediaeval semantic points of view may be
clarified when traced back to the corresponding Ancient views. As far as
Antiquity is concerned, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics as well as
Neoplatonism and Peripatetics are discussed. However, it should be noticed
at the outset that in many cases it is practically impossible to discern
exactly what precisely in the different views found in Late Antiquity came
from what School, let alone to attribute the various views to specific
authors. To my mind, in his inspiring paper on the logical doctrines in the
Neoplatonic and the Peripatetic schools (*) A. C. Lloyd made the correct
approach to the subject matter. When discussing the question how much of the
Neoplatonic views is borrowed from Stoic logicians his answer is that
substantially it is nothing but the fact that the forms of Neoplatonism are
sometimes conditioned by Stoic logical doctrine and terminology; what still
remained under those adventitious shapes is the intrinsic impetus and
natural direction of Neoplatonism itself (Lloyd, 158)." p. 81.
(*) Neoplatonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic in: Phronesis, A Journal for
Ancient Philosophy (1) 1956, 58-72 and 146-160, henceforth quoted as Lloyd.
This study should be corrected in many points, however.
2. Participation and the multiplication of the Form in Plato; 2.1. A
particular's partaking of several Forms; 2.2. The Forms' capacity for mutual
communion; 2.3 The Forms and their being known;
"2.4. The Forms' epistemologic function and their ontological status.
The basic question of what is the extent of the World of Forms appears with
Plato in two distinct shapes: (a) which are the several classes of things
belonging to the Ideal World? and (b) where Forms are found? As a matter of
fact the two questions are clearly related.
The former is concerned whenever is asked about the transcendent nature of
organic and even anorganic (both honorable and undignified) things as well
as mathematical and moral entities (**). In last analysis this form of the
question has much to do with the hierarchic order of the transcendent world.
However, it is first the second question that should come under review now;
it is concerned with the status of the Forms. Next, the former question as
confined to the Hierarchy of Being will be discussed in the second part of
this section." pp. 96-97.
(**) The classical passages are found in the Phaedo, Republic, Parmenides,
Timeus, and the Seventh letter, 342 A.D.
2.4.1. The different status of the Platonic Form; 2.4.2. The hierarchic
arrangement of the Forms; 2.5. The threefold status of the Forms as found
with Plato; 2.5.1 The Form taken in its transcendent status; 2.5.2. The Form
taken in its immanent status; 2.5.3. The Form taken in its mental status.
"On ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics. Part II. The
multiplication of Being in Aristotle's Categories," Vivarium
16: 81-117 (1978).
"3. The multiplication of being in Aristotle's Categories.
3.1. Introduction. One of the results of the preceding section may be
that Lloyd (1956, p. 59) seems to be wrong in asserting that in Plato's view
the rôle of the universal is played by the Idea exclusively, and that only
by the time of the Middle Academy, that is, for the Platonists of the first
two centuries A.D., the performers of this rôle have been multiplied. As a
matter of fact the distinction between Plato and his followers of the Middle
Academy on this score would seem to be a different one. The ontological
problems of participation were felt as early as in the Platonic dialogues
(see our section 2), as well as the logical ones concerning predication
(which will be discussed in a later section). Well, the Platonists of the
first two centuries A.D., introduced explicitly a threefold distinction I of
the Platonic Form or rather of its status which was (only) implied with
Plato. I think, Lloyd is hardly more fortunate in ascribing (ibid.) this
introduction chiefly to the influence of Aristotelian logic on Platonic
interpretation. It is true, in stating the basic distinction between en
hypokeimenôi and kath' hypokeimenou Aristotle tried to face the same cluster
of fundamental problems which induced later Platonists to the distinction of
the Forms as taken before or after the methexis (cf. Simplicius, In Arist.
Categ., 79, 12ff.). However, Plato's disciple, Aristotle (the most
unfaithful one, in a sense, as must be acknowledged) was as deeply engaged
on the same problems as were his condisciples and the Master himself in his
most mature period. It is certainly not Aristotle who played the rôle of a
catalyst and was the first to provoke the multiplication of the Platonic
Form in order to solve problems which were not recognized before in the
Platonic circle. On the contrary, Plato himself had saddled his pupils with
a basic and most intricate problem, that of the nature of participation and
logical predication. It was certainly not left quite unsolved in the later
dialogues, but did still not have a perspicuous solution which could be
accepted in the School as a scholastic one. So any of his serious followers,
(who were teachers in the School, at the same time) was bound to contrive,
at least, a scholastic device to answer the intricate question. To my view,
Aristotle's solution should be discussed in this framework. For that matter,
Aristotle stands wholly on ground prepared by his master to the extent that
his works on physic and cosmology, too, are essentially discussions held
within the Academy (Cp. Werner Jaeger, Aristotle. Fundamentals of the
history of his development, Oxford 1949, 308)." pp. 81-82
3.2. Aristotle's classification of being as given in the Categories;
3.2.1. The common view: categories = predicates; 3.2.2. The things said
'aneu symplokés'; 3.2.3. The doctrine of substance given in the Categories;
3.2.4. The ontological character of the classification; 3.2.5. Some
obscurities of the classification; 3.2.6. The different status of the
'things' meant; 3.2.6.1 The first item of the classification; 3.2.6.2. The
second item of the classification; 3.2.6.3. The third item of the
classification; 3.2.6.4. The ontological status of the 'things' meant in the
items (2) and (3); 3.2.6.5. The fourth item of classification; 3.2.7. The
relation between the different 'things'; 3.3. Categories and predicables;
3.3.1. The opposition of category and predicable; 3.3.2. The impact of the
opposition; 3.3.3. The obscure position of the differentia; 3.3.4.
Conclusion.
"Facts and events. The historian task," Vivarium 17: 1-42 (1979).
"English translation (by Jop Spiekermann) subsidiezed by the University of
Leyden of part of my introductory book on Medieval Philosophy (Middeleeuwse
wijsbegeerte. Traditie en vernieuwing. Assen 1977) being part of Chapter
II (On the philosophical presuppositions of historical periodization)." p. 1
"Summary. Basically, a historian's conception of history is to be judged by
the status he assigns to historical fact. We on our part have defined
fact as the mental entity to which direct reference is made by a
descriptive statement accepted as true (1.2-1.4). Next, we have tried to
throw further light on this conception, not least by enlisting the aid of
linguistics (1.5-1.7).
History -- as distinct from what others have termed 'history in an objective
sense' -- has been defined as 'histoire connaissance', whose central
concerns it is to render insightful what we have called the vis-à-vis (XYZ),
sometimes indicated by the, to me repellent, term 'histoire réalité' (2.2).
Further reflection on what ultimately constitutes fact has led us to
adopt, in line with others, an extension of Kuhn's paradigm concept:
paradigms is whatever is constitutive of any external world
experience, regardless of what this experience may be; it is of a compelling
nature.
When the historian, intent on getting a grip on his vis-à-vis (XYZ),
delineates and structures it, any such structuring operation is, from the
perspective of the vis-à-vis, arbitrary and intrusive. On the historian's
part, however, it is of a compelling, paradigmatic nature (3.1). This lends
piquancy to such phrases as 'Historical truth dictates the observation
that...', since it is not any 'past reality' which dictates to us. Rather,
it is our own, indeed historical (!) paradigmatically determined experience
of our vis-à-vis which, without dictating anything, compels us.
But a paradigm can be reversed, thereby giving rise to a different,
eventually perhaps completely different, mode of experiencing the vis-à-vis
(3.2-3.3)
The historian-the medievalist no less than his fellow-historians-is
confronted with this matter on two counts. In his probing quest he himself
is tied clown to the contemporary paradigm. Though he is unable to discern
the outlines of the paradigm he is caught up inwhich must indeed, by
definition, be postulated-yet his realization that his mode of experiencing
the vis-à-vis determines his scientific activities and that both are shaped
by the prevailing paradigm, should restrain him from entertaining
unwarranted ideas about 'objectivity'. Equally, he must take into account
that his documentary sources, in turn, are paradigmatically determined. For
anyone writing at any moment in the past it was possible to be 'objective'
only in the sense that he honestly recorded what lie saw." pp. 41-42.
Die Mittelalterlichen Traktate De modo opponendi et respondendi:
Einleitung und Ausgabe der einschlägigen Texte. Münster: Aschendorff
1980.
Inhalt.
EINLEITUNG
1. Eine jüdisch-arabische (?) Vorlage des bekannten pseudo-albertischen
Traktats De modo opponendi et respondendi 1; 2. Der Thesaurus
philosophorum des 'Aganafat' 11; 3. Die Albert dem Grossen
fälschlicherweise zugeschriebene Überarbeitung des Thesaurus
philosophorum 26; 4. Eine weitere Bearbeitung des Thesaurus aus der
Feder eines Magisters Gentilis aus dem 14. Jahrundert 35; 5. Eine
selbständigere Überarbeitung des Thesaurus in einem Erlanger Kodex.
Weitere Spuren des Genres 43; 6. Die Technik und Methode der drei edierten
Traktate. Der vermutliche Umfang der Originalfassung des Thesaurus
54; 7. Die Stellung des Thesaurus c.s. im mittelalterlichen
Lehrbetrieb 68; 8. Zur Ausgabe. Beschreibung der Handschriften. Die Ratio
edendi 84.
DIE TEXTE
1. Die Thesaurus Philosophorum des Aganafat 106; 2. Die Prager
version des Thesaurus philosophorum 159; 3. Pseudo-Alberti Magni
De modo opponendi et respondendi 193; 4. Gentilis de Monte Ste Marie in
Georgio De arte et modo disputandi 287-379.
"On ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics. Part III. The
categories as classes of names," Vivarium 18: 1-62 (1980).
"4. The Categories as class of names; 4.1. Status quaestionis.
The previous sections contain several hints to the close interrelation
between three major issues in Plato's doctrine, viz. the question about the
true nature of the Forms and those about participation and predication.
Indeed, for the founder of the theory of the Forms, predication was bound to
become a problem. Forms are immutable and indivisible; yet other Ideas have
to participate in them; they are unique, by themselves and subsistent; yet,
when saying 'John is man' (or white), 'Peter is man'
(or white), should there be one perfect, eternal, immutable
etc. Form of MAN (or WHITE) in the one and another in the other? Or, as
I have put it above [1977: 85]: if John, Peter, and William are wise, does
this mere fact mean that there must be something which they are all related
to in exactly the same manner, namely WISDOM itself? And if 'John
is wise', 'Peter is wise', and 'William is wise' are all true
statements, what exactly is the meaning of the predicate name 'wise'?
The former question is concerned with participation, the latter with
predication. Well, that the crux of the latter problem is not the separate
existence of the Forms (chôrismos) clearly appears from the fact that
also the author of the Categories, who had entirely
abandoned all kind of chôrismos, could apparently not get rid of a
similar problem: if the categories really are classes of 'things there are'
(1 a 20) (i.e. 'real' substances, 'real' natures, and 'real' properties),
rather than concepts (i.e. logical attributes), what kind of 'thing' is
meant by a term qua 'category'? So for Aristotle the semantic
problem still remained. His distinction between en hypokeimenôi and
kath' hypokeimenou could only hide the original problem. It is often
said that these phrases refer to different domains, the metaphysical and the
logical one, respectively. We have already found some good reasons to
qualify this opposition (see [1978], 84; 88). It seems to be useful now to
collect all kind of information from Aristotle's writings, not only the
Categories, about the proper meaning of the categories. This will be the
aim of our sections 4.2-4.7." pp. 1-2
4.2. On some modern interpretations of 'kata symplokên'; 4.3. Aristotle's
use of the categories; "For this section see also my Utrecht
dissertation, The place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's
philosophy, Assen 1952 pp. 76-88. I have to correct or to adjust my
former views on several points."; 4.31. The categories as a
classification of reality; 4. 32. The categories as a classification of
sentence predicates; 4.33. The categories as a classification of 'copulative
being'; 4.4. How did Aristotle arrive at his list of categories?; 4.5. Are
the categories the 'highest predicates'?; 4.6. The categories taken as names
in Metaph. Z 1-6 and Anal. Post. I 4; 4.7. An attempt at a reinterpretation
of Categories, chs. 1-5; 4.8. Aristotle's view on relatives; 4.9.
Conclusion.
The semantical impact of Abailard's solution of the problem of
Universals. In Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142). Person, Werk und Wirkung.
Edited by Thomas Rudolf et al. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag 1980. pp. 139-151
Reprinted as chapter III in: Through language to reality: studies in
medieval semantics and metaphysics.
"It is most unfortunate that as late as in the second edition of his Theory
of Universals Richard Aaron has based his rather unfavourable view on Peter
Abailard's contribution to the solution of the problem of universals on the
older work of our famous logician only, viz. the Logica Ingredientibus. As
is known, the French Master's most mature solution is found in the Logica
Nostrorum petitioni (LNP) (*).
In this work (LNP 522, 10 ff.) Abailard attributes the commonness of common
nouns neither to extramental things nor to words (voces), rather he states
that it is significant word (sermo), that is either singular or universal.
He finds much support in Aristotle's definition of the universal: 'a
universal is that which is by its nature predicated of a number of things.'
(**) Abailard lays much stress on the nature of the formation of sermones,
which to his mind is a human establishment (hominum institutio), unlike the
formation of extramental things and that of words taken as articulated
sounds, which are creations of nature. His solution is entirely focused on
his explicit distinction between the material identity of vox and sermo as
opposed to their formal diversity ('non-identity').
There is, he says, a clear formal distinction between 'being predicable of
many,' or: 'predicability' and 'that which is predicable of many'. It is
predicability that must belong to a vox for it to be a universal; just being
something that is predicable of many is not enough.
Well, Abailard makes every effort to explain the formal difference between
vox (word, i. e. articulated sound) and sermo (significant word), which
should be put beside their material identity. The distinction is so
important to him that we need not wonder that throughout the whole
discussion Abailard makes use of his best weapon, his incomparable skill in
the field of linguistic (or rather: semantic) analysis."
(*) Richard I. Aron, The theory of Universals, Oxford, 1967 (2nd ed.), p.
13.(...)
(**) De interpretatione 7, 17a 39-40.
Peter Abälard (1079-1142), Meister und Opfer des Scharfsinns. In
Petrus Abaelardus, 1079-1142. Person, Werk und Wirkung. Edited by Thomas
Rudolf. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag 1980. pp. 125-138
Conference at the Trierer Theologischen Fakultät in Trier (18 April 1979).
Reprinted as chapter II in: Through language to reality: studies in medieval
semantics and metaphysics.
"Kehren wir zum Abschluss nochmals zu Abälards eigenen Worten zurück: „Von
der ganzen Philosophie sagte mir die Logik am meisten zu: für ihre Waffen
gab ich die Ritterwaffen dahin." Ihrer Stimme ist er tatsächlich gefolgt,
nicht nur als Theoretiker der Logik, sondern auch durch Anwendung seiner
subtilen Logik auf sonstige Wissensgebiete. Aber der Einfluss seiner
logischen Natur lässt sich auch des weiteren spüren: Sein ganzes Leben wurde
von seinem Scharfsinn geprägt: wusste er doch auch die Schwächen seiner
Gegner erbarmungslos zu analysieren.
Sein Schüler Berengar von Poitiers schrieb nach der Verurteilung seines
Lehrers (durch die Synode von Sens im Jahre 1140) eine Verteidigungsschrift,
die u. a. Abälards Glaubensbekenntnis (Confessio fidei) enthält (=
Epist. 17). Nun denn, die Confessio fidei gleicht keineswegs
Augustins Retractatio, scheint doch Abälard vielmehr versucht zu
sein, abermals recht zu behalten. Was er beiseite zu schaffen wünscht, sind
nicht etwa eigene Irrtümer, sondern Missverständnisse seitens anderer,
worunter ihm wohl das Wichtigste war, dass die Leute seinen aufrichtigen
Glauben angezweifelt hatten. Seine Stärke, die Logik, hat ihn bei vielen
verhasst gemacht, indem man sie dem christlichen Glauben gegenüberstellte."
p. 138.
"Each man's ass is not everybody's ass. On an important item in
13th century semantics," Historiographica Linguistica 7: 221-230
(1980).
Reprinted as chapter VIII in: Through language to reality: studies in
medieval semantics and metaphysics.
"After the discussion of the well-known sophism "Cuiuslibet hominis
asinus currit" William of Sherwood rejects an alternate analysis in the
following words: "quod sic vel sic iudicetur non est ex parte sermonis
sed ex parte nostra tantum" (...)
The aim of this paper, written in honour of a meritorious scholar in the
history of medieval linguistic thought, Geoffrey Bursill-Hall, is, first, to
discuss Sherwood's treatment of the sophism (and especially clarify his
concluding sentence); then, to put the question into its proper historical
context, viz. the medieval discussion of the logico-semantic impact of the
structure of discourse (i. e., the effect of word order on the meaning of a
given sentence)." p. 23
(...)
"3. The semantic impact of the discussion. Kilwardby's formulation of the condemned position is well-suited to
clarify the semantic impact of the whole discussion. It seems to be focused
on the question of whether, or not, nouns (names), by their own nature (secundum
propriam inventionem) refer to existent things alone. As is known
the affirmative answer is energetically defended by Roger Bacon (Braakhuis
1977). However, Roger's position is certainly not an isolate one. Not only a
William of Sherwood came very close to it (Braakhuis 1977), but, generally
speaking, many medieval logicians adhere to the view that a noun's primary
inclination is to refer to particular, demonstrable individuals and that
class-designation and connotation is just a secondary function of names. To
take our sophism. In 'asinus cuiuslibet hominis currit' the subject term
'asinus' preceding the distributive sign 'cuiuslibet' is not affected
by it and, accordingly, refers to one particular individual.
On the other hand, in 'cuiuslibet hominis asinus currit', in following
the sign the term 'asinus' is prevented from pursuing its primary
inclination and cannot help being confused over (confundi) a
multitude of individuals.
Elsewhere (De Rijk 1980a, 1980b) I have tried to show that as early as from
Abelaird's days medieval logicians developed semantic views to the effect
that, in fact, they endowed names with, at least, two levels: (a) a name in
its own nature refers to an existent thing alone, and (b) when occurring in
a syntactic formation (constructio), especially when joined to a verb
of a tense other than the present, a name is reduced to a confused level on
which it designates realization of a certain nature (form), including that
in the past or future, or even a possible one.
Later discussions of our sophism (e.g., the controversy between Paul of
Venice and Peter of Mantua on the issue (as found in the former's Logica
magna, Treatise Two make clear that our sophism should be put into the
general semantic framework of the period. Medieval word-order problems,
indeed, were often considered very important since word-order was viewed as
the rendez-vous of grammar and ontology." p. 230.
Braakuhuis 1977 = The views of William of Sherwood on some semantical
topics and their relation to those of Roger Bacon in Vivarium 15:
(1977) pp. 111-142
De Rijk 1980a = The semantical impact of Abailard's solution of the Problem
of Universals
De Rijk 1980b = Abailard's semantic views in the light of later developments
"On ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics. Part IV. Plato's
semantics in his critical period (First part)," Vivarium 19: 1-46
(1981).
"5. Plato's semantics in his critical period; 5.1. Introduction. In
concluding the previous section I argued (1980: nr. 4.9, p. 62) that
Aristotle's Categories may be viewed as dealing with the several ways
in which an individual man can be named without destroying his concrete
unity. A well-known passage of Plato's Sophist (251 A 8ff.) was
referred to in which Plato deals with the puzzle of one man with many names.
It is true, Plato labels the puzzle as just 'a magnificent entertainment for
the young and the late-learners' (251 B), and is more
interested in the related question of how 'things' like Rest and Change
(presently called Kinds) can also have several attributes
(attributive names) and the general problem of attribution as implying the
'Communion' of Kinds'. But it is obvious at the same time that in this shape
too the puzzle is mainly concerned with the notions of naming, asserting and
predication. So Plato's Sophist unavoidably has to be part of our
discussion.
A further argument for taking the Sophist into consideration may be
found in Ammonios' commentary to Aristotle's De interpretatione. He
remarks (ad 17 a 26ff.: Comm. in Aristot. graeca IV 5, p. 83,
8-13, ed. Busse) that the analysis of the apophantikos logos as given
by Aristotle is to be found scattered all over Plato's Sophist (261
Cff.) right after that master's excellent expositions about Non-being mixed
with Being (peri tou synkekramenou tôi onti me ontos). For
that matter, on more than one item of Aristotle's Categories and
De interpretatione the Ancient commentators refer to related questions
and discussions in Plato's later dialogues, especially the Sophist. I
hope to show in sections (5) and (6) that the views found in the
Categories and De interpretatione are most profitably compared
with what Plato argues in the related discussions of the Sophist." p.
1.
5.2. On the main theme of Plato's Sophist; 5.3. Plato's preliminary
attempt to search 'the Sophist' (216A-231E); 5.4. The semantic character of
the procedure; 5.5. On current views about 'what is' and 'what is not';
5.5.1. Introductory: on the genus of image-making; 5.5.2. What should be
understood by the phrase 'what is not'? (237B-242B); 5.5.2.1. On the notion
of 'what absolutely is not'; 5.5.2.2. On the association of 'what is not'
with likeness and falsehood; 5.5.3. Pluralists and Monists about 'what is';
5.5.3.2. On 'what is' as taken by the Monists; 5.5.4. Materialists and
Idealists about 'what is'; 5.5.4.1. The Materialists (245E-247E); 5.5.4.2
The Idealists (248A-249D); 5.5.4.3. Does 'what is in change' include Forms?;
5.6. The general problem of name-giving (249D-256D); 5.6.1. 'Being' as a
(formally) separate and (materially) all-embracing Form.
"On ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics. Part V. Plato's
semantics in his critical period (Second part)," Vivarium 19: 81-125
(1981). 5. Plato's semantics in his critical period (Continuation); 5.6.2. The
problem of giving several names and the Communion of Kinds; 5.6.2.1. On the
'trivial' question of 'one individual -- many names'; 5.6.2.2. Giving
several names and the Communion of Kinds; "5.6.3. Dialectic and the Communion of Forms In order to clarify the Communion of Kinds an analogy is drawn between
the vowels which 'form a sort of bond running through the whole system (253
A 4-5) and certain Forms that are 'running through all' (253 C 1). Just as
without the help of vowels it is impossible for one of the other letters to
fit in with any other (A 5-6), similarly it is the special Forms that make
possible Communion and are responsible for Division (C 2-3). It seems to be
useful to have a look at the impact of this analogy." p. 95 5.6.3.1. The precise impact of the wovel-analogy; 5.6.3.2. The proper
task of Dialectic; 5.6.3.3. The description of the dialectician's practice;
5.6.4. On the Communion of Forms as occurring in particulars; 5.6.5. The
question of 'what is not' reduced into a problem of name-giving; 5.6.6. Four
antinomies concerning the Five Kinds raised and solved (254D-255E); 5.6.6.1.
The first round: on the relations of Being, Rest and Change; 5..6.6.2. The
second round: on the relations of Change, Rest, Same and Other; 5.6.6.3. The
third round: 'What is' and 'the Same' disentangled; 5.6.6.4. The fourth
round: 'What is' and 'the Other' disentangled; 5.6.6.5. On the different
uses of kath' hauto; 5.6.6.6. 'What is' and 'the Other' disentangled.
Continuation; 5.6.6.6. 'What is' and 'Other' disentangled. Continuation.
Die Wirkung der neuplatonischen Semantik auf das mittelalterliche Denken
über das Sein. In Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter. Akten des 6.
internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société
internationale pour l'étude de la philosophie médiévale, 29. August-3.
September 1977 im Bonn. Edited by Beckmann Jan. Berlin: De Gruyter 1981.
pp. 19-35
Reprinted as chapter V in: Through language to reality: studies in medieval
semantics and metaphysics.
"Das Thema dieser Plenarsitzung, SPRACHE UND LOGIK, könnte man als ein rein
logisches, bzw. rein linguistisches Problem auffassen. Der Titel dieses
Vortrags jedoch genügt, um deutlich zu machen, dass dies nicht meine Absicht
ist; uns interessiert zur Stunde das Bedeutungsproblem als philosophische
Frage. Ich halte es für nicht ganz unwichtig zu bemerken, dass es sich für
mich dabei nicht um eine durch diesen Philosophiekongreß bedingte Wahl
handelt, sondern um eine prinzipielle Auffassung, und zwar, dass überhaupt
das Bedeutungsproblem nur als ein semantisches aufgefasst werden sollte. Wer
aber Semantik sagt, kann die Fragen der Ontologie und Metaphysik nicht
ausser acht lassen.
Diejenigen unter uns, die auf dem Gebiet der Logik eher Amateure als
Liebhaber sind, dürfen sich aber nicht darüber freuen, dass jetzt das
Verhältnis Sprache und Metaphysik unmittelbar, ich möchte
sagen, geradlinig, zu Wort gebracht werden wird. Es bleibt ja immer, zur
Vermeidung eines Kurzschlusses, der Umweg über die Logik wesentlich, da
sonst eine rein evokative, mehr andeutende als deutende Bewältigung der
metaphysischen Fragen in den Vordergrund treten würde.
Ich möchte von einem logischen Spezialfall der Seinsdeutung ausgehen. Zuerst
wird er in seinen logisch-semantischen Kontext gestellt; danach wird der
Doppelcharakter des Verbums „est" näher analysiert, wobei die
generelle Frage der Namensbezeichnung sich als das eigentliche Problem
entpuppt, und zum Abschluss wird sich dies besonders auf die Relation
Aktualität und Faktizität verlegen." p. 19
Anonymi auctoris franciscani Logica Ad rudium. Edited by de Rijk
Lambertus Marie. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1981.
Edited from the MS. Vat. lat. 946 with a short introduction, notes and
indices
Boèce logicien et philosophe: ses positions sémantiques et sa
métaphysique de l'être. In Atti del Congresso internazionale di studi
boeziani (Pavia, 5-8 Ottobre 1980). Edited by Obertello Luca. Genova:
Accademia Ligure di scienze e lettere 1981. pp. 141-156
"Le grand historien Etienne Gilson a bien remarqué que c'est à propos du
problème du Bien que la pensée de Boèce fut la plus personnelle et la plus
féconde. Avec Platon et Saint Augustin, il identifie dans son opuscule
Quomodo substantiae l'être au Bien (comme le Mal au non-être). Il est
évident que dans l'opinion de Boèce la doctrine de l'être obtient une
importance décisive comme base de la théorie du Bien. Aussi la solution du
problème du Bien et du Mal fut esquissé dans sa métaphysique de l'être.
L'identification de l'être et du Bien implique que pour tout ce qui est,
c'est une seule et même chose d'être et d'être bon. Mais si
les choses sont substantiellement bonnes, en quoi diffèrent-elles du
Bien en soi, qui est Dieu? Dans cette question la problématique du
Sophiste de Platon a dû revivre. On sait que dans cette dialogue Platon
a essayé de resoudre le problème fondamental de l'être des choses
périssables par une analyse vraiment pénétrante des notions de «Même» (tauton)
et «Autre» (heteron).
Il me semble que Boèce fait une chose comparable. Il n'est pas étonnant
qu'il commence (dans De hebdomadibus = Quomodo substantiae
etc.; voir l'edition de Stewart-Rand) ses exposés approfondis sur la notion
de l'être par l'axiome qui a dû provoquer tant de commentaires pendant le
moyen âge: diversum est esse et quit quod est (II 28-30: «il ya
diversité entr "être" et "ce qui est"»). Cette formule, qui est valable pour
tout être composé concerne la différence ontologique entre l'élément
constitutif, ou la forme, de tout être composé d'un côté, et la chose
elle-même, ou le tout établi par cette forme, de l'autre. Le tout doit son
être à l'élément constitutif qui est la forme substantielle, sans laquelle
il n'est pas du tout. Cependant la question sur son essence ne peut pas être
resolue en désignant cette forme. (...)
Il semble être utile de prendre au sérieux la suggestion des commentateurs
médiévaux et d'entreprendre la réponse à notre question du point de vue
sémantique. Je propose de discuter d'abord (1) la notion de qualitas
chez Boèce (2), ensuite son modèle sémantique (3), et ses idées sur le rôle
(logico-sémantique) du nom et du verbe (4-5); enfin la signification exacte
de sa notion de l'être (esse) sera discutée (6) et éclarcie en
mettant en lumière le but et la méthode du traité Quomodo substantiae
(7)." pp. 141-142 (Notes omitted).
La lexicographie du latin médiéval et l'histoire de la logique. In La
lexicographie du latin médiéval et ses rapports avec les recherches
actuelles sur la civilisation du moyen âge.1981. pp. 289-293
Colloque international, Paris 18-21 October 1978.
"J'arrive à la conclusion de cette courte intervention. Comme le fait
remarquer Olga Weijers dans sa contribution, il faut que les divers lemmes
montrent bien quelles sont les distinctions principales des divers sens d'un
mot, quelles sont les nuances, quelles sont les différentes expressions dans
lesquelles le mot est utilisé dans le cadre d'une même signification; bref,
il faut établir le tableau sémasiologique de façon détaillée et structurée.
Cette chose ne peut se faire qu'en se fondant sur une interprétation des
textes assez élaborée. Cette interprétation exige l'assistance de
spécialistes de divers domaines, surtout en ce qui concerne tous ceux qui,
dès la période médiévale, étaient de nature assez particulière et parfois
tellement ésotérique que les contemporains des auteurs médiévaux qui
n'appartenaient pas au petit cercle des initiés, ne comprenaient, pas plus
que la plupart d'entre nous, cette terminologie spécialisée. Un de ces
domaines était celui
de la logique terministe et de la sémantique à partir du XIII siècle. Dans
cette période bien des mots-clé ont été forgés, qui devaient être d'une
grande importance pour la terminologie philosophique jusqu' à nos jours.
Dans cet ordre d' idées il est essentiel que le lexique du latin médiéval
ne manque pas à sa tâche." p. 292
Répertoire des commentaires latins du moyen âge sur Aristote
conservés dans les bibliothèques publiques aux Pays-Bas. Amsterdam:
North Holland Publishing Company 1981.
Avant-propos.
"Il y a quelques années, la Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la
Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.) decida d'entreprendre un projet visant à
cataloguer et à décrire tous les manuscrits contenant des commentaires
latins du moyen âge sur les oeuvres (authentiques ou pseudépigraphes)
d'Aristote, y compris, en ce qui concerne la logique, les commentaires sur
l' Isagoge de Porphyre et sur les Opuscules de Boèce. Dans le
présent volume nous avons voulu, conformément au projet, décrire les
manuscrits qui se trouvent aux Pays-Bas.
Notons en passant que le manuscrit Utrecht, Universiteitsbibliotheek 695,
qui contient selon le catalogue des questions sur le De Anima
d'Aristote, est un recueil de textes médicaux et que le passage en question
(f. 79r-90"a) est en fait un ouvrage de médecine. Il ne sera donc pas décrit
dans ce volume.
Les descriptions codicologiques sont toutes de la main du second
cosignataire. Le premier soussigné, en faisant l'analyse du contenu des
manuscrits, a bénéficié du concours de dr. É.P. Bos (Leyde) qui a notamment
mis à sa disposition ses analyses circonstanciées des mss. Cuyck, La Haye
Meermanno-Westreenianum 10 A 8 et 9 et Utrecht 825.
L. M. de Rijk, Olga Weijers"
Abailard's semantic views in the light of later developments. In
English logic and semantics: from the end of the Twelfth century to the time
of Ockham and Burleigh. Edited by Braakhuis Henk A.G., Kneepkens Corneli
Henri, and de Rijk Lambertus Marie. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1981. pp.
1-58
Acts of the 4th European Symposium on Mediaeval Logic and Semantics,
Leiden-Nijmegen 23-27 April 1979.
Reprinted as chapter VI in: Through language to reality: studies in medieval
semantics and metaphysics.
"1. Semantics in Abailard's solution of the problem of universals.
Abailard's attempt at solving the problem of universals may be characterized
as a remarkable achievement in the filed of semantics. The procedure of this
solution found in his mature work, the Glosses on Porphyry (*) can be
divided into two stages: first, the extensive discussion of the formal
distinction between vox and sermo, the the semantic analysis
of the intensional act of intellection." p. 1
(*) Logica nostrorum petitioni, ed. Geyer (Münster 1933), pp. 505-533
(henceforth quoted as L.N.P.)
"Finally, I will briefly sum up some of the important items of Mediaeval
semantics which may be fitted into the frame-work of what I have labeled the
'semantic stratification of appellative names'.
First. There is the distinction of esse actuate and esse habituate
as adhered to by many 13th century authors but energetically rejected by
Roger Bacon, whereas William of Sherwood turns out to stand somewhere
half-way between Roger and the majority. The point at issue is the
significative force of an appellative noun. Whereas others commonly accepted
a name's referring to an esse habituale (that is, being common to
present, preterite and future being and even to what actually is and what
actually is not), Roger most strictly held that even in such metaphysical
propositions as 'omnis homo de necessitate est animal' the subject
term can only refer to actually existing things (therefore they are all
false on Roger's view). William, though admitting the distinction between
esse actuale and esse habituale, regarded such propositions as
equivocal. This reminds us of William's view that a name's meaning is
determined by the language - users rather than by speech itself (Syncat.,
52, 25 - 26). The pivotal point of this controversy seems to be the
different application of our F.R. On Roger's view, for instance, the
determination 'de necessitate' in propositions such as 'omnis homo
de necessitate est animal ' is unable to strip an appellative
noun of its primary function, of signifying only existing things, whereas
his opponents are apparently of the opinion that that phrase compels the
noun to withdraw to its second semantic level of designating just an esse
habituale, with the result that the proposition is true.
Secondly, the problems concerning verbs expressing a mental attitude may be
looked at from the same point of view. To quote Abailard (L.N.P. 531, 9 -
13; cfr. also above, pp. 4 - 5 ): When it is said: "I want a hood (desidero
cappam); well, every hood is this or that hood",
yet it does not follow that I want this or that hood. If,
however, one would say as follows: "I want a hood; well, every one who wants
a hood is wanting this or that hood; (therefore I am wanting this or
that hood ) ", then, indeed, the argument would go on correctly.
However, the assumption would be false, then. This much is certain, Abailard
rejects that in 'I want a hood' and 'every hood is this hood or
that hood' the term 'hood' has the same signification. As a
matter of fact the term 'hood' in the former proposition, unlike that
in the latter proposition, does not designate a hood actually existing,
(except in case, I have some particular hood in mind, of course). So we have
to conclude that the verb 'desidero' governing the object 'cappam'
precludes us from taking it for an actually existing hood and compels us
to understand it in the second-level-meaning of 'a concrete, particular,
hood', whether or not actually existing." pp. 50-51.
No doubt, it is Abailard who initiated many developments in Mediaeval
semantics. So I have considered it useful to draw the attention to the
achievements of this great master in the field of logic, since 'the logic
before Ockham' cannot be properly understood unless Abailard is recognized
as the man who stood, in many respects, at the craddle of fourteenth century
logic." p. 52.
Semantics in Richard Billingham and Johannes Venator. In English
logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th centuries. Edited by Maierù
Alfonso.1982. pp. 167-183
Acts of the 5th European Symposium, Rome, 10-14 November 1980.
Reprinted as chapter XII in: Through language to reality: studies in
medieval semantics and metaphysics.
"I shall try to elucidate in this paper some remarkable developments of the
theory of meaning found in Venator's comments upon Billingham" p. 168.
"I shall try to give a general framework of fourteenth century semantic
views. A specimen of a model of Mediaeval semantics. It should be noticed first that any model designed in order to elucidate
the peculiarities of Mediaeval semantic views should start from the
well-established fact that Mediaeval logic was substantially dialogic: any
statement is considered (or supposed to be) actually occurring in a
disputation." p. 178
"On ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics. Part VI. Plato's
semantics in his critical period (Third part)," Vivarium 20: 97-127
(1982). 5.6.7. How the diverse Kinds have communion with one another; 5.7. The
reinstatement of 'What is not' (256d-259D); 5.7.1. Forms being and Forms not
being: 5.7.2. The not-being of 'What is'; 5.7.3. The being of what is not';
5.7.4. Are there Forms corresponding to negative expressions?; 5.7.5. The
Parmenidean dogma refuted. Summary;
"5. 8 Conclusion. From our analysis of Soph., 216 A-259 D it may
be concluded that Plato did certainly not abandon his theory of Forms. We
may try to answer, now, the main questions scholarship is so sharply divided
about (see Guthrie [A History of Greek Philosophy] V, 143ff.). They
are, in Guthrie's formulation: (1) does Plato mean to attribute Change to
the Forms themselves, or simply to enlarge the realm of Being to include
life and intelligence which are not Forms?, and (2) is he going even further
in dissent from the friends of Forms and admitting what they called Becoming
--changing and perishable objects of the physical world -- as part of the
realm of True Being?
The first question should be answered in the negative. Indeed, Plato is
defending a certain Communion of Forms, but this regards their immanent
status and, accordingly, the physical world primarily, rather than the
'Forms themselves' (or: 'in their exalted status' as Guthrie has it, p.
159). As to the second question, to Guthrie's mind Plato's language makes it
almost if not quite insoluble. I think that if one pays Plato's expositions
the patient attention he asks for 'at 259 C-D and follows his
analysis stage by stage, the exact sense and the precise respect in which he
makes his statements (cf. 259 D 1-2: ekeinêi kai kat' ekeino ho physi)
about Being and Not-being, Sameness and Otherness, and so on will appear. It
will be easily seen, then, that there is no recantation at all in Plato's
development. He still maintains, as he will maintain in his later works
(e.g. Philebus, 14 D ff.) the Transcendent Forms as what in the last
analysis are the only True Being. But Plato succeeds in giving a fuller
sense to the old notions of 'sharing' and 'presence in' without
detracting the 'paradigm' function of the Forms in any respect. Matter,
Change and Becoming is given a better position in the Theory of Forms in
that their immanent status has been brought into the focus of Plato's
interest. From his Parmenides onwards Plato has been searching for
the solution of his metaphysical problems and has actually found it in the
Sophist in a new view of participation. Forms in their exalted status
are just a too eminent cause for the existence of the world of Becoming. But
their being shared in, i.e. their immanent status, make them so to
speak 'operable' and yet preserve their dignity of being paradeigmatic
standards. What makes something to be a horse is, no doubt, the Transcendent
Form, HORSENESS, but it only can partake of that Form and possess it
as an immanent form. So the Highness of the Form and the unworthy matter can
come together as matter 'informed', that is, affected by an immanent form.
Plato never was unfaithful to his original view about Forms as the only True
Being. In our dialogue, too, he brings the eminence of True Being (taken, of
course, as a Transcendent Form) into relief by saying (254 A) that
the true philosopher, through his devotion to the Form, 'What is' ('Being'),
dwells in the brightness of the divine, and the task of Dialectic,
accordingly, is described from that very perspective (see Part (5), 96ff.).
Focussing on the immanence of the Forms does not detract anything from their
'exalted status', since immanent forms are nothing else but the Transcendent
Forms as partaken of by particulars.(...)
In his critical period Plato never ceased to believe in the Transcendent
World. The important development occurring there consists in his taking more
seriously than before their presence in matter and their activities
as immanent forms. In the Sophist he uses all his ingenuity to
show that a correct understanding of the Forms may safeguard us from all
extremist views on being and not-being and zealous exaggerations of the
Friends of Forms as well." pp. 125-127.
Some 14th Century Tracts on the Probationes terminorum (Martin of
Alnwick O.F.M., Richard Billingham, Edward Upton and others). Nijmegen:
Ingenium Publishers 1982.
An edition of four current textbooks, with an introduction and indexes
The origins of the Properties of Terms. In The Cambridge history of
later medieval philosophy. From the rediscovery of Aristotle to the
disintegration of Scholasticism. Edited by Kretzmann Norman et al.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982. pp. 161-173
"Beginning as early as the eleventh century, the relationship between
thought and language was a focal point of medieval thought. This does not
amount to saying that the basic nature of that relationship was being
studied; rather it was accepted without discussion, as it had been in
antiquity. Thought was considered to be linguistically constrained by its
very nature; thought and language were taken to be related both to each
other and to reality in their elements and their structure. In the final
analysis, language, thought, and reality were considered to be of the same
logical coherence. Language was taken to be not only an instrument of
thought, expression, and communication by also in itself an important source
of information regarding the nature of reality. In medieval thought,
logico-semantics and metaphysical points of view are, as a result of their
perceived interdependence, entirely interwoven." p. 161.
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