Did Parmenides reject the sensible world? In Graceful reason: essays
in ancient and medieval philosophy presented to Joseph Owens, CSSR on the
occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday and the fiftieth anniversary of his
ordination. Edited by Gerson Lloyd. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies 1983. pp. 29-53
"Two camps of scholars interpreting Parmenides' poem have recently been
distinguished and labeled as the Majority and the Minority. The former holds
that, unlike the Alêtheia part, the Doxa part presents an altogether untrue
account of things that properly speaking have no real existence. According
to the Minority, however, the Doxa was put forward as possessing some kind
or degree of cognitive validity. I shall try to show that both these two
positions are ambiguous and accordingly fail in giving a clear insight into
what Parmenides intends to tell us. They both seem to need correction to the
extent that Parmenides does distinguish the Alêtheia route from the Doxa
route(s), but there is nothing in the text to tell us that he makes a
distinction between two separate domains. one true and the other
untrue. As any genuine philosopher he was concerned about the sensible
world, our world and it was that which he wanted to truly
understand." pp. 29-30
(...)
One cannot deny that Heraclitus faced the primitive approach of the
physicists in a radical way. So Parmenides in defending another steady inner
nature ('Be-ing') sees in him his most dangerous rival. No wonder that his
offences against Heraclitus are the most bitter. And indeed he tries to
bring Heraclitus into the company of those who, two-headed as they are, are
not able to make the great decision.
Subsequent thinkers had to take into account Parmenides' doctrine and in
fact could not help digesting its rigidity. Plato was the first to take the
big decision so seriously that he left the idea of one world as approached
by mortals along two different Routes and settled on the assumption of two
separate worlds, one of Unshakable Being, the other of Unreliable Becoming.
Aristotle, for his part, thought it possible to dispose of Plato's
chorismos and find the inner nature of things right in themselves. No
doubt it is Parmenides, cited by Fr. Owens as 'one of the truly great
philosophic geniuses in the history of Western thought,' (*) who was the
catalyst of all subsequent metaphysics" p. 53
J. Owens, A history of ancient western philosophy (New York 1959) p.
76
"Walther Burley's Tract De exclusivis. An edition," Vivarium
23: 23-54 (1985).
"Some years ago the late Jan Pinborg drew our attention to Burley's early
work on propositions which contains some syncategorematic terms effecting an
exclusion ('tantum', 'solus'; 'only'). (...)
The treatise is found in only three manuscripts, and one of these contains
only its beginning. It belongs to the oldest group of logical writings which
may be assigned to this famous English logician whose great renown is mainly
due to his sagacious tract De puritate artis logicae. The earlier
corpus comprises six tracts which in fact form a course of logic in general
use in those days:
(1) De suppositionibus, recently edited by Brown (Stephen F. Brown,
Walter Burleigh's Treatise De suppositionibus and Its Influence on
William of Ockham, in: Franciscan Studies, 32 (1972), 15-64)
(2) De exclusivis, which will be edited here
(3) De exceptivis, which will be edited in the next issue of this
journal (4) De consequentiis, edited by Green-Pedersen (Niels Jorgen Green
Pedersen, Walther Burley's "De consequentiis". An Edition, in:
Franciscan Studies, 40 (1980), 102-66)
(5) De insolubilibus, edited by Roure (M. L. Roure, La
problématique des propositions insolubles au XIIIe siècle et au début du
XIVe, suivie de l'edition des traités de W. Shyreswood, W. Burleigh et Th.
Bradwardine, in: Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen
age, 45 (1970), 205-84)
(6) De obligationibus, not edited so far. For the MSS tradition, see
J. Weisheipl, Repertorium Mertonense, in: Mediaeval Studies, 31
(1969), [174-224], 196." pp. 23-24.
"Martin M. Tweedale on Abailard. Some criticisms of a fascinating
venture," Vivarium 23: 81-97 (1985).
See also: "Reply to Professor de Rijk's 'Martin M. Tweedale on Abailard:
some criticisms of a fascinating venture' by Martin M. Tweedale in:
Vivarium (25), 1987 pp. 3-22 and the postscript by L.M. de Rijk. id. p.
23.
"Some years ago Martin M. Tweedale wrote a book on a quite fascinating
subject: Abailard on Universals (North Holland Publishing Company,
Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, 1976). (...)
Mr. Tweedale's study is bound to give any of his readers the firm impression
that, as logician, Peter Abailard has accomplished a tremendous achievement.
Unfortunately, however, Tweedale, (...) is on the wrong track in
claiming-throughout his study-that the modern interpreter has to 'ferret'
Abailard's answers out of 'rather obscure passages' (p. 7), and that he is
inconsistent (p. X and passim). Tweedale has failed to appreciate
Abailard's lucidity and clear language. He has missed the point several
times and more than once this is due to his defective knowledge of Latin.
However, let me not move too hurriedly to my conclusion.
In writing this book, the author had two main objectives in mind, as we
learn from the Preface. First, 'to present in a form easily
accessible to professional philosophers, theologians and historians those
scattered portions of Abailard's logical writings which seem to record a
very original scrutiny of the foundations of logic and in particular the
problem of unversals'. Secondly, 'to interpret the texts in a way that would
connect them with the ancient tradition and also make them intelligible to
contemporary philosophers.' So chapters I and II try to give an insight into
the classical and post-classical background. The core of the essay is to be
found in Chapters III-V; Chapter VI contains a comparison between Abailard
and Frege.
Without doubt, the author has succeeded in enlarging the modern scholar's
acquaintance with, and admiration of, Abailard as a logician and early
Medieval philosopher and theologian. Even someone who has had only a glimpse
of the contents of this rich essay, cannot help experiencing a kind of
thrill on realising that he is meeting in Peter Abailard a remarkable and
original thinker.
However, to write a successful book something more is needed. To my mind the
author was heavily hampered in realising the two objectives he had set
himself, as a result of his poor knowledge of (both classical and Medieval)
Latin grammar and syntax. Sometimes his judgment of Abailard's achievements
is incorrect, for no other reason than his inability to correctly read
Abailard's concise language." 81-82
La philosophie au moyen âge. Leiden: E. J. Brill 1985.
Translation from Dutch by Pierre Swiggers of: Middeleeuwse wijsbegeerte.
Traditie en vernieuwing, Assen, 1981
"Le présent ouvrage rassemble un nombre de cours préparatoires, tous
consacrés à la philosophie médiévale. L'auteur y insiste sur le problème du
caractère spécifique de cette philosophie. Il cherche à préciser son propre
point de vue, e.a. par la mise-en-cause des problèmes posés par la
philosophie de l'histoire. Son classement de la philosophie au Moyen Age
part de la même trame. Le chapitre IV traite de la méthode scolastique et
fournit des renseignements sur les points de départ des penseurs médiévaux
dans le domaine des différentes disciplines.
Dans le chapitre sur la croyance et la connaissance au Moyen Age l'auteur
commence par donner un exposé général du problème et ensuite il trace son
évolution au moyen des preuves de l'existence de Dieu, d'Anselme (11e s.)
jusqu'à Guillaume d'Ockham (14e s.). Une analyse de l'ontologie de Thomas
d'Aquin donne lieu à l'auteur d'étudier la confrontation des pensées
néoplatonicienne et aristotélicienne de ]'époque. Le chapitre sur la logique
et la sémantique médiévales perrmet au lecteur de s'initier à la relation
entre la sémantique et le point de vue philosophique d'un auteur du Moyen
Age.
Le dernier chapitre traite de la différence profonde entre le criticisme
médiéval et la scepticisme de penseurs comme Montaigne. L'auteur rnontre que
Descartes a été profondément influencé par la pensée médiévale en ce qui
concerne sa victoire du scepticisme."
TABLE DES MATIÈRES. Avant-propos de l'édition française XI; 1. Le
Moyen Age: périoede 'typiquement médiévale'? 1; 2. Périodisation, critique
des sciences et philosophie de l'histoire 25; 3. La division de la
philosophie médiévale 65; 4. La méthode scolastique 82; 5. Croire et savoir:
les arguments pour l'existence de dieu d'Anselme à Occam 106; 6. La
métaphysique de l'ëtre chez saint Thomas d'Aquin (1) 142; 7. La métaphysique
de l'ëtre chez saint Thomas d'Aquin (2) 164; 8. Lasupposition naturelle: une
pierre de touche pour les points de vue philosophiques 183; 9. Scepticisme
antique et criticisme médiéval 204; Notes 219; Index 235.
Mediaeval semantics and metaphysics. Studies dedicated to L. M. de
Rijk, Ph. D. on the occasion of his 60th birthday. Edited by Bos Egbert.
Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1985.
Table of contents: Curriculum vitae IX; List of publications
1947-1984 IX; These accomplished under the supervision of L. M. de Rijk
XXIV; Introduction XXV-XXIX; Klaus Jacobi: Diskussionen über unpersönliche
Aussagen in Peter Abaelardes Kommentar zu Per hermeneias 1 - Notes
41; Desmond Paul Henry: Abelard's mereological terminology 65; C. H.
Kneepkens: Kilwardby versus Bacon? The contribution to the discussion on
univocal signification of Beings and Non-Beings found in a Sophism
attributed to Robert Kilwardby 111 - Notes 122 - Text 126; Jean Jolivet:
Logique cathare: la scission de l'universel 143 - Notes 156; Jan A. Aersten:
Der wissenschaftstheoretische Ort der Gottesbweise in der Summa Theologie
des Thomas von Aquin 161 - Notes 186; Antonie Vos: On the philosophy of the
young Duns Scotus. Some semantical and logical aspects 195 - Notes 217;
Alfonso Maierù: Á propos de la doctrine de la supposition en théologie
trinitaire au XIV siècle 221 - Notes 235; Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore
Stump: The anonymous De arte obligatoria in Merton College U. S. 306
- Introduction 239 - Notes to the Introduction 242 - Edition 243 -
Translation 251 - Notes on the edition 261 - Notes on the Treatise 261: Ria
van der Lecq: John Buridan on the intentionality 281 - Notes 290; E. P. Bos:
Peter of Mantua's Treatise 'De veritate et falsitate, sive De taliter et
qualiter' 291 - Notes 308; Gabriel Nuchelmans: Stanislaus of Znaim (d.
1414) on the truth and falsity 313; Indexes 339; Index of manuscripts 341;
Index of ancient and mediaeval names 343; Index of modern names 347.
From the Introduction "On the occasion of Prof. L. M. de Rijk's 60th
birthday his pupils and friends hereby present him with a volume containing
essays on semantics and metaphysics in the Middle Ages. The present volume
is specifically devoted to this subject and the contributors have been
selected accordingly.
For everyone who has studied De Rijk's books and papers it is clear that De
Rijk is especially interested in the interdependence of language, thought
and reality, and in the metaphysical implications of logical tracts. In
medieval philosophy logico-semantical and metaphysical theories are
interwoven, especially because the mediaeval philosophers themselves thus
interpreted this relation.
The contributions to this volume cover the period from the XIIth century up
to and including the XVth century. They are chronologically ordered.
It should be noted here that Dr. Jan Pinborg (Copenhagen) had expressed his
willingness to contribute to this volume. By his premature death he was
prevented to fulfill this promise, however."
Pedro Hispano. Tractatus llamado después Summule logicales.
Ciudad de México: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM 1986.
Spanish translation by Mauricio Beuchot of: Tractatus, called afterwards
Summule logicales
"Walther Burley's De exceptivis. An edition," Vivarium 24:
22-49 (1986).
"Here is the edition of Walther Burley's early tract on the so-called
'exceptive propositions.' For some information on it, see the
Introduction preceding my edition of Burley's De exclusivis, in
this journal, vol. 23 (1985), pp. 23-54. Contents
Chapters
1-3 Introductio 4 Regula 1a: omnis propositio in parte vera et in parte falsa
potest verificari per exceptionem
5-15 Dubitatio 16 Regula 2a: exceptiva est preiacenti instantia
17-23 Instantiae
24 Regula 3a: si tot excipiuntur quot supponuntur, exceptiva est
impropria
25-34 Instantiae
35-69 DE SUPPOSITIONE IN EXCEPTIVA
36-40 De supposìtione subiecti 41-61 De suppositione partis extracapte 42-45 De prima opinione 46-54 De secunda opinione 55-62 De tertia opinione
63-69 De suppositione predicati 70-84 DE HABITUDINE INTER EXCEPTIVAM ET EXCLUSIVAM
70-77 An omnis exclusiva inferat exceptivam et econverso
78-82 An exceptiva inferatur ex negativa exponente exclusive
83-84 An exceptiva inferatur ex affirmativa exponente exclusive 85-91 UTRUM EXCEPTIVA POSSIT ESSE FALSA, UTRAQUE EXPONENTE EXISTENTE
VERA
92-99 AN POST EXCEPTIONEM FIAT DISTRIBUTIO
100-109 QUID DETERMINET PREPOSITIO CUM SUO CASUALI" p. 22
Plato's Sophist. A philosophical commentary. Amsterdam:
North-Holland 1986.
Contents. Preface 9; Preliminary: Plato's Sophist to be reconsidered?
11; Introduction 13; Chapter 1. The dispute about interpreting Plato 22;
Chapter 2. The evolution of the doctrine of Eidos 30; Reconsidering
Plato's Sophist 69; Chapter 3. The dialogue's main theme and
procedure 71; Chapter 4. On current views about 'what is not' 82; Chapter 5.
On current views about 'what is' 93; Chapter 6. Plato's novel metaphysical
position 103; Chapter 7. The variety of names and the communion of kinds
110; Chapter 8. An important digression on dialectic 126; Chapter 9. The
communion of kinds; Chapter 10. How the five kinds combine 159; Chapter 11.
The reinstatement of 'what is not' (256d-259d) 164; Chapter 12. On
philosophic and sophistic discourse 186; The framework: semantics and
philosophy in Plato; Chapter 13. Plato's semantics in the Cratylus
217; Chapter 14. Naming and representing 254; Chapter 15. Language and
knowing 277; Chapter 16. Semantics and metaphysics 327; Bibliography 355;
Index of passages quoted or referred to 365; Index of proper names 377;
Index of terms and topics 383-394.
From the Preface: "The way in which Plato announces (Sophist, 249c-d)
his novel metaphysics has been puzzling modern scholars for a long time:
'What is and the All consist of what is changeless and what is in
change, both together'. Did Plato really introduce Change into the
Transcendent World and thus abandon his theory of Unchangeable Forms?
Many of Plato's commentators have claimed that the use of modern techniques
of logico-semantical analysis can be a valuable aid in unravelling this
problem and other difficulties Plato raised and attempted to solve. However,
not all modern distinctions and tools can be applied without reservation;
for many of these are entirely alien to Plato's thought. Interpreters of
Plato must also resist the temptation of applying methods as disjointing the
dialogue and selecting specific passages only, in their eagerness to prove
that Plato was explicitly interested in (their own favourite) problems of
'identity and predication' (not to mention such oddities as the
'self-predication of Forms'), or the distinctions between different senses
(or applications) of 'is'.
The present author has tried to understand Plato by a close reading of the
complete dialogue and to relate the doctrinal outcome of the Sophist
to Plato's general development. Close reading Plato involves following him
in his own logico-semantical approach to the metaphysical problems, an
approach which shows his deep interest in the manifold ways to 'name' (or to
'introduce into the universe of discourse') 'what is' (or the 'things there
are').
The reader may be sure that my indebtedness to other authors on this subject
is far greater than it may appear from my text. Also many of those who have
gone in quite different directions than mine have been of great importance
to me in sharpening my own views and formulations. Two authors should be
mentioned nominatim: Gerold Prauss and the late Richard Bluck; two
scholars, whose invaluable works deserve far more attention than they have
received so far.
I owe my translations of the Greek to predecessors. Where I have not
followed them, my rendering is no doubt often painfully (and perhaps
barbariously) literal: I do not wish to incur the suspicion of trying to
improve Plato by modernising him."
"Peter Abelard's semantics and his doctrine of Being," Vivarium
24: 85-127 (1986).
"6. Conclusion. Upon surveying Abelard's investigations about
sentencehood it may be stated that it certainly developed gradually and, as
a result, so to speak, of our author's continuously scrutinizing the
recalcitrant problems concerning the ways in which, in our linguistic
behaviour, we deal with the vital problem of being.
First, Abelard makes us recognize the peculiar nature of the substantive
verb 'to be' ('esse'), peculiar indeed, since it is the only verb that is
capable of conjoining but, at the same time, when serving, thus, as a device
for predication, conveys, due to its proper invention, the notion of
'substantialness' ('essentia'). As was said before (above, p. 109),
Abelard's entire discussion of the problem is ostensibly concerned with
mastering the antagonism between coupling and predication. First, he
considers the vicissitudes the predicate noun cannot escape undergoing as
the very result of this antagonism and finds a remedy in splitting up the
different strata present in nouns such as 'album' ('the or a white
<thing>'). In this endeavour, the chimaera and the like (the
'non-existents') turn out to be a real spoil-sports.
In the Dialectica, then, Abelard maintains, a a whole, his previous
position (which is found in two parts of the Logica Ingredientibus, viz.
the Perihermeneias commentary and the one on Boethius De
topicis differentiis), but sets on to refine it in that he gives the
coupling of 'substantialness' a predominant position over and against
the predication of a (substantial or accidental) form. However, he
aptly combines this move (quite unavoidably, it may seem) with a subtle
emptying of the notion of 'essentia' ('substantialness'), with the result
that, from now on, 'est' ('is') has developed into a mere container (meaning
'undetermined substantialness') for a 're-al' ('thing-like') content (or
sememe) conveyed by a predicate noun (which also may be a participle of an
ordinary verb). An additional result is that, on this interpretation, the
existential import seems to come from the predicate noun, so that our
chimaera is no longer a spoil-sport. Finally, the empty-container view of
the copula is completed by Abelard's suggestion to take the 'is' plus
the predicate noun as merely one linguistic construct.
(...)
However this may be, Abelard's achievements in semantics are astonishingly
great and even remain unparalleled for centuries." pp. 123-124 and 125.
1. Preliminary: Significatio in Abelard; 2. Nomen, verbum, oratio;
3. On the predicative-copulative function of the verb; 4. The noun and verb
in Abelard. A survey; 5. Sentencehood: connection and predication; 5.1. Some
preliminary remarks on naming and predication; 5.2. Predication as a
semantic problem: linguistics vs semantics 5.3. On dating the logical works
of Abelard; 5.4. Abelard's tackling of the problem of Predication in
Glossae super Periermeneias; 5.5. The present interpretation confirmed
by Super Topica Glossae; 5.5. The discussion of predication in the
Dialectica; 6. Conclusion.
Note: This paper is meant as a continuation to the series 'On
ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics' published in this
Journal [Vivarium] from 1977-82. For bibliographical reasons the original
title has been dropped and the studies will be continued under separate
titles.
"Abelard and moral philosophy," Medioevo 12: 1-27 (1986).
"When speaking of ethics in this connection, we are not referring to a
'doctrine on human behaviour'; rather it is to be understood as the
philosophical (or theological) pursuit concerning the justification of such
a theory. Beforehand it must be said that Abelard's Ethica seu Scito te
ipsum can be regarded as a theological work in being part of the
curriculum presented in theological training. The central question this work
deals with can be expressed as follows: what are the exact standards by
which human behaviour is judged good or evil?
One should not ask whether Abelard's Ethics is a theological or
philosophical work, for that is not the point. As we have already mentioned,
ethics was part of theological enquiry and teaching. This answer is not a
final one, however. For Abelard's conception of theology was such that
philosophy, as an ultimate rational justification, was certainly
admitted to theology, but, moreover, it even implied that philosophy was an
essential constituent of fundamental theological enquiry. We must examine
his Ethics in detail in order to see how Abelard in fact discusses
the issue." p. 1
Logos and Pragma. Essays on the philosophy of language in honour of
Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans. Edited by de Rijk Lambertus Marie and
Braakhuis Henk A.G. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1987.
Table of contents: Introduction XI; List of Professor Nuchelmans'
publications 1950-1987 XI-XVII; W. E. Abraham: The strategy of Plato's
philosophy of language 1; L. M. de Rijk: The anatomy of proposition: Logos
and Pragma in Plato and Aristotle 27; N. Kretzmann: Boethius and the truth
about tomorrow's sea battle 63; H. A. G. Braakhuis: The view of Peter of
Spain on propositional composition 99; E. P. Bos: The theory of the
proposition according to John Duns Scotus' two commentaries on Aristotle's
Perihermeneias 121; E. Stump: Consequences in Ockham's Summa
Logicae and their relation to syllogism, topics and insolubles 141; K.
H. Tachau: Wodeham, Crathorn and Holcot: the development of the Complexe
significabile 161; E. J. Ashworth: Jacobus Naveros (fl. ca. 1533) on the
question: 'Do spoken words signify concepts or things?' 189; E. M. Barth:
Contradictions and symmetry rage in the logical Interregnum. An essay in
empirical logic 215; E. Morscher: Propositions and all that: ontological and
epistemological reflections 241; M. F. Fresco: Über das Verhältnis von
Sprache, Denken und Welt. Ontologische Fragen unter besondere
Berücksichtigung der Philosophie von J. A. der Mouw 259; Bibliography 281;
Index of passages quoted or referred to 299; Index of names 311; Index of
concepts and terms 317.
The anatomy of the proposition. Logos and Pragma in Plato
and Aristotle. In Logos and Pragma. Essays on the philosophy of language
in honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans. Edited by de Rijk Lambertus
Marie and Braakhuis Henk A.G. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1987. pp. 27-61 "Introductory
This study is written in honour of a scholar who, among many other things,
has laid the solid basis for the study of what may be considered the kernel
of the semantics of the statement-making utterance, viz. the definition of
the bearers of truth and falsity.
In the first section I present a survey of Plato's semantics of the
statement-making expression and a number of key notions involved. Next, I
explore Aristotle's views of the matter, starting with a discussion of
Aristotle's notion of pragma including that of being qua truth
and not-being qua falsehood. In search for the nature of Aristotle's
logos, I discuss this notion as it occurs on the onomazein
level as well as the way in which it acts on the legein level. Next,
I investigate the important notions of synthesis and dihaeresis
and the role of einai as a monadic functor and qua
syncategorematic container of categorial being. Finally, I attempt to
present a characterization of Aristotle's statement-making utterance.
(...) p. 27 "Epilogue We may summarize what we have found as follows:
1 For Plato,
1.1 a logos is a composite expression consisting of a name (onoma)
and an attribute (rhêma) which as such is not yet a
statement-making utterance
1.2 a logos represents a state of affairs (pragma), i.e. an actual
combination of some participata (dynameis) in the outside world
1.3 a logos eirêmenos is a statement-making utterance; it asserts
that the pragma represented by the logos is actually the case.
2 For Aristotle,
2.1 a logos is a composite expression consisting of an onoma
and a rhêma which represents both a notional and an ontological state
of affairs. It may be characterized as a 'statable complex'
2.2 a pragma is a state of affairs either ontologically: state
of affairs being part of the outside world or semantically: state of
affairs conceived of and expressed by a logos
2.3 a logos apophantikos ('statement-making utterance') is a logos
actually stated (either asserted or denied)
2.4 a logos may as such be used either on the onomazein level or on
the legein level (qua logos apophantikos). Similarly,
phasis (kataphasis, apophasis) may be used on either of
these levels
2.5 synthesis is either synthesis1, = the act of uniting an
onoma and a rhêma into a logos (on the onomazein level) or synthesis2
= the assertion of such a union accomplished in a logos apophantikos,
(on the legein level), while dihairesis is always the
denial of such a union (on the legein level)
2.6 the esti forming part of a logos apophantikos is not a
copula, properly speaking. Rather, it is a sign of (it consignifies, to
speak with De interp. 3,16b24-5) synthesis2. The onoma and rhêma are
already united to make up a logos ('statable complex') by synthesis, and,
then, the esti rather than acting as a dyadic copulative functor, is
merely a monadic sign of the 'statable complex' being actually stated
2.7 The propositional structure found in the logos apophantikos may
be described as follows: linguistically: a logos expressing categorial being (i.e.
syncategorematic being implemented by one or more of the ten categories of
being) is stated (either affirmatively or negatively) by means of the
monadic functor 'be' or 'not be' semantically: the pragma represented by the logos is said to be (or
not to be, respectively) part of the outside world (or: 'be (not) the
case')." pp. 53-54 (notes omitted).
Logic and ontology in Ockham. Some notes on his view of the Categories
of Being and the nature of its basic principles. In Ockham and
Ockhamists. Acts of the Symposium organized by the Dutch society for
medieval philosophy Medium Aevum on the occasion of its 10th anniversary
(Leiden, 10-12 September 1986). Edited by Bos Egbert and Krop Henri.
Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1987. pp. 25-40
Reprinted as chapter XIII in: Through language to reality: studies in
medieval semantics and metaphysics.
"Conclusion. There is no single reason, I think, to ascribe to Ockham
any feelings of hostility towards metaphysics on this account. God created
'true and real being', but He created it in shaping 'what is truly and
really being', individual beings, that is. As created, it is radically
changeable and contingent as well. Uncreated, unchangeable being is not to
be created, not even as some mysterious constituent present in creatural
being. Human beings are not entitled to sublimate their (indispensable)
conceptual tools (e.g. universal terms) so that they represent unchangeable
ontic standards. Whenever we are inclined to do so, Ockham's razor comes in,
not however, to make us say that the metaphysical domain is void. Rather
logic (and human thought in general) should make us recognize our own
limitations, and refrain from speaking about the unspeakable when, and
inasmuch as, our linguistic tools are bound to lead us astray. The same
applies to Ockham's view of proofs of God's existence. He only admits the
proof of God as first preserver of these actual things in this actual world
and rejects all atemporal proofs. However, his faith is unshakeable and not
involved in any philosophical thinking either. Likewise it is Ockham's
ontology (doctrine of being) which is modest, the onta 'beings') are
as abundant as they are. For that matter, Ockham let them really be (ontôs
einai Plato would say). Well, in order to let them be, human
thinking should be prudent in cautiously managing its homemade conceptual
apparatus." pp. 38-39
Gilbert de Poitiers. Ses vues sémantiques et métaphysiques. In
Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: aux origines de la Logica
modernorum. Actes du septième Symposium européen d'histoire de la logique et
de la sémantique médiévales. Centre d'études supérieures de civilisation
médiévale de Poitiers, Poitiers, 17-22 Juin 1985. Edited by de
Libera Alain and Jolivet Jean. Napoli: Bibliopolis 1987. pp. 147-171
"La contribution à notre Symposium que je vous propose maintenant a pour but
de n'envisager l'oeuvre théologique du fameux maître chartrain qu'au profit
de notre connaissance de sa pensée philosophique. A l'intérieur de cette
entreprise, on portera un intérêt spécial à l'interférence des vues
sémantiques et métaphysiques chez Gilbert.
Prenons notre point de départ dans son commentaire sur le De hebdomadibus
de Boèce. On va voir que l'étude de cette oeuvre nous fera entrer dans
le coeur même de la problématique." p. 147
(...)
" Je suis d'avis que la finesse des expositions théologiques et
philosophiques que nous offre le Porrétain nous échappe, à moins qu'elles ne
soient replacées dans leur contexte sémantique. C'est bien dans le domaine
de la sémantique que Gilbert est digne du vif intérêt de l'historien de la
logique médiévale. Non pas seulement parce que ses expositions sont bien
imprégnées de la pensée logico-grammaticale de son temps; cela n'a rien
d'étonnant étant donné qu'il s'agit d'un savant de son envergure. Mais ce
qui est d'un plus grand intérêt pour nous, ce sont les contributions que
Gilbert a lui-même faites à l'évolution de la pensée sémantique au douzième
siècle.
L'étude des oeuvres théologiques de Gilbert nous permet d'avancer les deux
thèses suivantes:
(1) C'est par l'étude sémantique qu'est favorisée au plus haut point notre
compréhension des pensées théologiques et philosophiques du Porrétain; je
considère comme essentielles la manière et la mesure dont Gilbert a habillé,
pour ainsi dire, sa pensée théologique et philosophique du vêtement de ses
pensées grammatico-logicales.
(2) En expliquant les difficultés assez pénibles dans les opuscula sacra
de Boèce, Gilbert a formulé ses propres vues sémantiques. Celles-ci,
aussi empreintes de la tradition platonicienne qu'elles soient, ne
témoignent pourtant pas moins d'une profondeur vraiment originale." p. 171
War Ockham ein Antimetaphysiker? Eine semantische Betrachtung. In
Philosophie im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen. Wolfgang
Kluxen zum 65. Geburstag. Edited by Beckmann Jan, Honnefelder Ludger,
and Wieland G. Hamburg: F. Meiner 1987. pp. 313-328
Reprinted as chapter XIV in: Through language to reality: studies in
medieval semantics and metaphysics.
"IV. Schlußbetrachtung. Ockham anerkennt ohne Einschränkung den
transzendenten Bezirk, d. h. das Metaphysische oder Übersinnliche als
Bezirk; in diesem Sinne ist er also gewiß kein Antimetaphysiker. Aber
verwirft er denn die Metaphysik als Wissenschaft, oder höhlt er sie
zumindest aus? Zuerst muß anerkannt werden, daß Ockham im Prinzip der
Metaphysik das Weisungsrecht über die Seienden (d. h., für Ockham, die
individuellen Seienden) keineswegs abspricht. Zugleich kann nicht geleugnet
werden, daß bei ihm der Metaphysik eine auffallend bescheidene Stelle
zukommt. Wie läßt sich das unter Berücksichtigung von Ockhams unzweifelbarer
Ehrfurcht vor dem Übersinnlieben erklären?
Der Schlüssel zur Lösung dieser Frage liegt nicht bloß in Ockhams Ontologie
des individuellen Seins, sondern auch in seinen anthropologischen
Auffassungen. Der Mensch ist nach ihm in seinen Denken und Sprechen nicht
imstande, das Erhabene wesentlich zu durchforschen. Dessen soll sich der
Mensch fort während eingedenk sein. Dies ist für Ockham in zwei deutliche
Strategien übersetzbar:
a) nicht jedem modus significandi oder loquendi entspricht ein modus essendi
in der Wirklichkeit
b) viele maßgebende Aussagen, sowohl sakrale wie profane, soll man nicht de
virtute sermonis (dazu reicht unser Sprechen zuwenig aus), ondern der Ab
sicht des Redners oder Schriftstellers entsprechend deuten." pp. 326-327
(Notes omitted).
De quelques difficultés de nature linguistique dans le vocabulaire de
Gilbert de la Porrée. In Actes du colloque Terminologie de la vie
intellectuelle au moyen âge. Edited by Weijers Olga. Turnhout: Brepols
1988. pp. 19-25
Colloque at Leyde/La Haye, 20-21 September 1985.
"On sait que, comme ceux de l'Antiquité, les philosophes du moyen âge ont
fait aussi leur propre vocabulaire technique.
Le but de cette courte communication est de mettre en lumière quelques
difficultés spéciales du vocabulaire philosophique et théologique de Gilbert
de Poitiers, auteur bien connu de la première moitié du XIIe siècle.
D'abord, il faut remarquer que ces difficultés ressortent de l'usage très
personnel et très original que fait Gilbert des termes courants de la langue
philosophique du XIIe siècle.
Il va de soi que ces difficultés sont délicates une fois de plus pour les
philologues, en général pour les non-initiés en ce qui concerne l'histoire
de la philosophie, parce que la confusion terminologique se présente déjà
dans le domaine philosophique lui-même.
Aussi va-t-on commencer par quelques termes connus, c'est-à-dire les termes
substantia, subsistentia et subsistens et, dans ce contexte,
la différence entre esse et esse aliquid. On va essayer de
placer la terminologie dans le contexte des vues philosophiques de Gilbert,
en particulier de la doctrine porrétaine sur le statut ontique de la chose
concrète." p. 19.
"'Categorization' as a key notion in ancient and medieval semantics,"
Vivarium 26: 1-18 (1988).
"The aim of this paper is to argue for a twofold thesis: (a) for Aristotle
the verb 'katêgorein' does not as such stand for statemental
predication, let alone of the well-known 'S is P' type, and (b)
'non-statemental predication' or 'categorization' plays an important role in
Ancient and Medieval philosophical procedure.
1. Katêgorein and katêgoria in Aristotle Aristotle was the first to use the word 'category' (katêgoria) as
a technical term in logic and philosophy. It is commonly taken to mean
'highest predicate' and explained in terms of statement-making. From the
logical point of view categories are thus considered 'potential
predicates'.(*)
(...)
1.3 Name giving ('categorization') as the key tool in the search for
'true substance' What Aristotle actually intends in his metaphysical discussions in the
central books of his Metaphysics (Z-Th) is to discover the proper
candidate for the name 'ousia'. According to Aristotle, the primary kind of
'being' or 'being as such' (to on hêi on) can only be found in
'being-ness' (ousia; see esp. Metaph. 1028b2). Unlike Plato,
however, Aristotle is sure to find 'being as such' in the domain of things
belonging to the everyday world. Aristotle's most pressing problem is to
grasp the things' proper nature qua beings. In the search for an
answer name-giving plays a decisive role: the solution to the problem
consists in finding the most appropriate ('essential') name so as to bring
everyday being into the discourse in such a way that precisely its
'beingness' is focussed upon.
(...)
2. The use of 'praedicare' in Boethius
The Greek phrase katêgorein ti kata tinos is usually rendered in
Latin as praedicare aliquid de aliquo. The Latin formula primarily
means 'to say something of something else' (more precisely 'of somebody').
Of course, the most common meaning of the Latin phrase is 'to predicate
something of something else in making a statement of the form S = P'.
However, the verb praedicare, just as its Greek counterpart
katêgorein, is used more than once merely in the sense of 'naming' or
'designating by means of a certain name', regardless of the syntactic role
that name performs in a statement. In such cases praedicare stands
for the act of calling up something under a certain name (designation), a
procedure that we have labelled 'categorization'. (...)
Boethius' use of praedicare is quite in line with what is found in
other authors. Along with the familiar use of the verb for statemental
predication, Boethius also frequently uses praedicare in the sense of
'naming' or 'designating something under a certain name' whereby the use of
the designating word in predicate position is, sometimes even explicitly,
ruled out." pp. 1, 4, 9-10.
(*) See L. M. de Rijk, The Categories as Classes of Names (= On Ancient
and Medieval Semantics 3), in: Vivarium, 18 (1980), 1-62, esp. 4-7
Some earlier Parisian Tracts on Distinctiones sophismatum. Edited
by de Rijk Lambertus Marie. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1988.
Edited with introduction and indexes.
Content: I. Tractatus Vaticanus De multiplicatibus circa orationes
accidentibus -- II. Tractatus Florianus De solutionibus sophismatum -- III.
Tractatus Vaticanus De communibus distinctionibus
"Semantics and metaphysics in Gilbert of Poitiers. A chapter of Twelfth
century Platonism. Part I," Vivarium 26: 73-112 (1988).
"1 The Ontic Constituents of Natural Bodies
There is one distinction that is of paramount importance in order for us to
understand Gilbert's ontology, viz. the Boethian contradistinction of id
quod and id quo. We have to start with this pair of key notions.
1.1 Preliminary: 'id quod' and 'id quo'
According to Gilbert, our world consists of a number of individual 'things'.
This world and its inhabitants appear to have the following characteristics:
(a) each and every 'thing' is in fact to be considered as one self-contained
entity, (a 'subsistens') whose identity and ontological unity are due to the
singularity of what is proper to it (sue proprietatis singularitas; Eut.
30, 88; Trin. 144, 58-62),
(b) however, every 'subsistent' (henceforth my rendering of Latin
'subsistens') itself consists of a plurality of forms; in addition, there
are 'circumstantial features' (rather than 'forms' properly speaking) that
determine its actual state or condition ('status'); Trin. 137, 55;
cf. Nielsen(*), 56-8 and below, our nrs 1.2 and 1.72. In fact, Gilbert's ontology is one continuous attempt to establish two
basic relationships, one between a natural thing and its Creator and the
other between the thing's diverse actual constituents, which while being
totally different from each other grant it its intrinsic unity at the same
time.
(...)
1.9 Summary Each inhabitant of our world Gilbert calls (following Boethius) an id
quod est or subsistens. Its main constituents are the
subsistentiae (or the subsistent's id quo which is sometimes
taken collectively to stand for ea quibus) and these are accompanied
by the 'accidents', quantity and quality. The subsistent owes its status (or
transitory condition) to a collection of inferior members of the
Aristotelian class of accidents, which to Gilbert's mind are rather
'accessories' or 'attachments from without' (extrinsecus affixa). The term 'substantia' is used both to stand for substance and
substantial form (subsistentia), i.e., that by which something is
subsistent (or 'is a substance').
The collection of subsistentiae (substantial forms) or the forma
totius is called natura. However, 'natura' is also used to stand
for either just one subsistentia or all the forms found in a
subsistens even including its 'accidental' forms (quantity and quality).
The inclusion of all kinds of accidents (including those inferior ones that
make up a thing's status) is seldom found in the intension of the
word 'natura'.
One of the key notions featuring in Gilbert's ontology is esse aliquid.
'To be a-something' has a threefold import. First, it means 'to be only
some thing', and to miss perfection. Second, it has the positive
sense of 'being a something', i.e. 'being determinate and
well-delineated', not indefinite, not formless that is. Third, 'to be a
something' implies concreteness, corporealness and singularity." pp. 74,
111-112
(*) Lauge Olaf Nielsen, Theology and philosophy in the twelfth century.
A study of Gilbert Porreta's thinking and the theological expositions of
the doctrine of the Incarnation during the period 1130-1180, Leiden 1982.
On Boethius' notion of Being. A chapter of Boethian semantics. In
Meaning and inference in medieval philosophy. Studies in memory of Jan
Pinborg. Edited by Kretzmann Norman. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers 1988. pp. 1-29
Reprinted as chapter I in: Through language to reality: studies in medieval
semantics and metaphysics.
"From Parmenides onwards, ancient and medieval thought had a special liking
for metaphysical speculation. No doubt, speculative thought was most
influentially outlined by Plato and Aristotle. However, what the Christian
thinkers achieved in metaphysics was definitely more than just applying and
adapting what was handed down to them. No student of medieval speculative
thought can help being struck by the peculiar fact that whenever fundamental
progress was made, it was theological problems which initiated the
development. This applies to St Augustine and Boethius, and to the great
medieval masters as well (such as Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus).
Their speculation was, time and again, focused on how the notion of being
and the whole range of our linguistic tools can be applied to God's Nature
(Being).
It is no wonder, then, that an inquiry into Boethius's notion of being
should be concerned, first and foremost, with his theological treatises,
especially De hebdomadibus. (...)
My final section aims at showing how Boethius's notion of being is clearly
articulated in accordance with his semantic distinctions. This is most
clearly seen in the main argument of De hebdomadibus where they may
be actually seen at work.
As is well known, the proper aim of De hebdomadibus is to
point out the formal difference between esse and esse bonum,
or in Boethius's words: 'the manner in which substances are good in
virtue of their being, while not yet being substantially good'
(38.2-4). Its method consists in a careful application of certain formal
distinctions, viz.:
(a) The distinction between an object 'when taken as a subsistent whole and
id quod est = the constitutive element which causes the object's
actually' being; it is made in Axiom II and used in Axiom IV.
(b) The distinction (closely related to the preceding one) obtaining between
the constitutive element effecting the object's actual being (forma
essendi, or ipsum esse) and the object's actuality as such (id
quod est or ipsum est); it is made in Axioms VII and VIII.
(c) The distinction between esse as 'pure being' (= nihil aliud
praeter se habens admixtum), which belongs to any form, whether
substantial or incidental, and id quod est admitting of some
admixture (lit. 'something besides what it is itself'); it is made in Axiom
IV and in fact implies the distinction between esse simpliciter and
esse aliquid. (d) The distinction between 'just being some thing', tantum esse
aliquid, and 'being something qua mode of being'.
It is made in Axiom V and used in Axiom VI and is in fact concerned with a
further distinction made within the notion of id quod est. It points
out the differences between the effect caused by some form as constitutive
of being some thing and that caused by the main constituent (forma
essendi) which causes an object's being simpliciter. (e) The distinction between two different modes of participation, one
effecting an object's being subsistent, the other its being some
thing, where the 'some thing' (aliquid) refers to some
(non-subsistent) quality such as 'being white', 'being wise', 'being good',
etc.
The application of these distinctions enables Boethius to present a solution
to the main problem: although the objects (ea quae sunt, plural of
id quod est) are (are good) through their own constitutive
element, being (being good), nevertheless they are not
identical with their constitutive element nor (a fortiori)
with the IPSUM ESSE (BONUM ESSE) of which their constituent is only a
participation." pp. 1 and 22-23.
"Semantics and metaphysics in Gilbert of Poitiers. A chapter of Twelfth
century Platonism. Part II," Vivarium 27: 1-35 (1989).
"Gilbert's View of Transcendent Reality.
Gilbert's world consists of quite a lot of singular subsistent objects which
owe their being and 'being-a-something' to a collection of forms, both
subsistential and accidental. Well, God has created this world after what in
the Platonic tradition was called the 'exemplary Forms'. For Gilbert,
creation and concretion are two complementary notions which play an
important role in his ontology. Creation is the reception of a total form or
collection of subsistentiae; it is also called generation. As a natural
process it amounts to 'beginning to be-of-acertain-kind'.'
(...)
POSTSCRIPT. In his short study on Gilbert of Poitiers (in A History of
Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy, ed. Peter Dronke, Cambridge 1988,
328-52) John Marenbon rightly argues that when presenting an account of
Gilbert's thought one should not separate his philosophy from his theology.
However, I fully disagree with his suggestion (p. 351) that as a
metaphysician Gilbert proves to have been a thinker whose 'treatment is
inadequate and confused'. On the contrary, when dealing with really
intricate theological problems Gilbert of Poitiers, like many other Medieval
thinkers (e.g. Thomas Aquinas), develops his (NeoPlatonic) metaphysics as a
'clear-minded and subtle writer', and so there seems to be no reason at all
to oppose Gilbert against people like Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham and others.
They were all real philosophers, albeit in a theological context, which
as such confronted them with a series of genuinely philosophical issues.
In fact, why should any historian of philosophy approach only Gilbert of
Poitiers 'as a thinker who tackled a set of changeless (sic!)
metaphysical problems-identical (sic!) to those which faced, for instance,
Plato and Aristotle, or Kant and Hegel'?" pp. 1, 34-35.
Through language to reality. Studies in medieval semantics and
metaphysics. Edited by Bos Egbert. Northampton: Variorum Reprints 1989.
The volume is dedicated to L. M. De Rijk on the occasion of his 65th
birthday.
Contents
Preface IX-XI; SIXTH CENTURY: I. On Boethius's notion of Being. A chapter of
Boethian semantics; TWELFTH CENTURY: Peter Abälard (1079-1142): Meister und
Opfer des Scharfsinns; III. The semantical impact of Abailard's solution of
the problem of universals; IV. La signification de la proposition (dictum
propositionis) chez Abélard; V. Die Wirkung der neuplatonischen Semantik
auf das mittelalterliche Denken über das Sein; VI: Abailard's semantics
views in the light of later developments; THIRTEENTH CENTURY: VII. Die
Bedeutungslehre der Logik im 13. Jahruhndert und ihr Gegenstück in der
metaphysischen Spekulation; VIII. Each man's ass is not everybody's ass. On
an important item in 13th-century semantics; IX. The development of
Suppositio naturalis in mediaeval logic, I. Natural suppositiojn as
non-contextual supposition; FOURTEENTH CENTURY: X. The development of
Suppositio naturalis in mediaeval logic, II. 14th-century natural
supposition as atemporal (omnitemporal) supposition; XI: On Buridan's
doctrine of connotation; XII. Semantics in Richard Billingham and Johannes
Venator; XIII. Logic and ontology in Ockham. Some notes on his view of the
categories of Being and the nature of its basic principles; XIV. War Ockham
ein Antimetaphysicker? Eine semantische Betrachtung; Indexes. 1.
Manuscripts; 2. Anonymous tract; 3. Ancient and medieval names; 4. Modern
names; 5. Subjects and terms. (This volume contains XII + 322 pages).
Ist Logos Satz? Zu Heideggers Auffassung von Platons Stellung 'am
Anfänge der Metaphysik'. In Heideggers These vom Ende der Philosophie.
Verhandlungen des Leidener Heidegger-Symposiums (April 1984). Edited by
Fresco Marcel, Van Dijk Rob, and Vijgeboom Peter. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag 1989.
pp. 22-32
Einiges zu den Hintergünden der Scotistischen Beweistheorie: die
Schlüsselrolle des Sein-Könnens (Esse possibile). In Die Kölner
Universität im Mittelalter. Geistige Wurzeln und soziale Wirklichkeit.
Edited by Zimmermann Albert. Berlin: Walter de Gruiyter 1989. pp. 176-191
Ockham's theory of demonstration: his use of Aristotle' s kath' holou
and kath' hauto requirements. In Die Gegenwart Ockhams.
Edited by Vossenkuhl Wilhelm and Schõnberger Rolf. Weinheim:
VCH-Verlagsgesellschaft 1990. pp. 232-240
"Far from being a sceptic William of Ockham made every effort to corroborate
the basis of philosophical and theological thought by purifying it of all
sorts of untenable presuppositions. His main contribution to fourteenth
century philosophical and theological development lies in systematically
rethinking scholastic doctrines, and especially their assumptions, on the
firm basis of his own favourite leading principles: the strictly individual
nature of all that really is and the radical contingency of all creatural
being.
These two principles also play a major part in Ockham's way of dealing with
the Aristotelian theory of demonstration. The present paper aims at
investigating Ockham's doctrine of demonstrative proof, focusing on the way
in which he felt forced to adapt or rephrase the special requirements
Aristotle had laid down for propositions to enter into syllogistic proof,
especially strict proof (the so-called 'demonstratio potissima'). Our
main argument will concern Aristotle's rather peculiar 'kath holou'
requirement and Ockham's appliance of the 'kath hauto' (Latin: 'per
se') notion which is also involved in framing correct premisses for
demonstrative proofs. A few preliminary remarks will be made about the
essentials of Aristotle's theory of demonstration." p. 232
(...)
"Conclusions.
To sum up our findings: Ockham's adaptations and manipulations of
Aristotle's requirements for genuine demonstrative propositions are as many
demands imposed by his own metaphysical views. He comments on Aristotle,
always starting from his own favourite views. Though Aristotle is the
Master, Ockham is the one to say what the Master meant, or what he should
have meant. On the other hand, his introducing the 'per se strictissimo
modo' rather seems to be a matter of technicality. Whereas in
Posterior Analytics Aristotle deals with the scientific procedure of
apodeixis in general, in which the apodeictic syllogism is merely a
vehicle for correctly framing an apodeixis, the Medievals, and Ockham
in particular, were apt to reduce Aristotle's theory of demonstrative proof
to a theory of demonstrative syllogism. That is why the 'demonstratio
potissima' (including its specific demands) so heavily influenced
Ockham's theory of demonstration." p. 239
Specific tools concerning logical education. In Méthodes et
instruments du travail intellectuel au moyen âge. Edited by Weijers
Olga. Turnhout: Brepols 1990. pp. 62-81
"Unlike in our days logical doctrine was very influential in the Middle
Ages. Logic was indeed considered then the vehicle par excellence both in
matters of teaching and scientific inquiry in any field of knowledge. When
embarking upon a discussion of the specific terminology concerning logical
education, some preliminary remarks seem to be indispensable.
The reader should be warned, first. Logical theory taken as such, which
comprises a great mass of specifically logical terms (such as
'praedicamentum', 'predicable', 'syllogism', 'fallacy', 'supposition',
'appellation', 'ampliation', 'distribution', 'syncategorema', and so on) is
out of scope now; those terms and their like will be mentioned only in
passing, inasfar namely as they occur in educational practice.
Another remark better starts from the well-known Medieval distinction
between logica docens and logica utens, the former of which being logical
doctrine as developped, expounded and taught for its own sake, whereas the
latter is rather logic practically applied in any sort of logical analysis
or argumentation. To be sure, logica utens does not merely coincide with the
more or less explicit occurrence of logical argumentation in whatever
context. Even qua logica utens the art of logic displayed a high degree of
technicality. In other words: medieval logica utens rather than being
practical argumentation as loosely accomplished by somebody who exhibited a
remarkable natural ability for logical reasoning consisted in the
performance of somebody being really well-versed in all those logical
techniques he had been taught in his youth in class room. So, whoever is
interested in specific terms of logical teaching and learning should surely
not leave exhibitions of logica utens out of consideration (*).
Our third remark which is in the line of the previous one, concerns the
remarkably wide scope of logica utens. Of course, logica docens played a
very important part in Medieval education, as may be also gathered from its
predominant position in Medieval curricula. However, according to a good
Peripatetic tradition, logic was taken to serve as the organon or instrument
of all other branches of learning and science, which means that logic, and
logic alone, provided other disciplines with the correct art of thinking and
reasoning. Thus logic proves to have been effectually present, for example,
in theological disputation, a fact that every student of Medieval theology
is fully aware of. But it had an equally prevailing position in other fields
of learning, too, such as Natural science ("Physics"), Ethics and even
Political philosophy.
A final preliminary remark aims at elucidating the large scope of Medieval
logic from still another point of view, viz. the close relationship between
scientific inquiry and exposition as well as scientific education in the
Middle Ages. That is to say that scientific inquiry and exposition as well
as education and learning were controlled by the same didactics of
exposition and argumentation. Indeed, nearly all Medieval writings that
contain scholarly investigations in any field of learning whatsoever display
didactic approaches which are quite similar to those used by works mainly
intended for instruction, no matter for the benefit of beginners or advanced
people." pp. 62-63
(*) For the contradistinction of dialectica docens and dialectica
utens both of them especially concerned with the use of logical topics (loci),
see Eleonore Stump, Topics: their development and absorption into
consequences in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy,
1982, p. 281, n. 41.
The Posterior Analytics in the Latin West. In Knowledge and the
sciences in medieval philosophy. Proceedings of the Eight International
Congress of medieval Philosophy (SIEPM), Helsinki, 24-29 August 1987.
Edited by Asztalos Monika, Murdoch John Emery, and Niiniluoto Ilkka.
Helsinki: Acta Philosophica Fennica 1990. pp. 104-127
Volume I
"It is common knowledge that Aristotle had the conviction that all reality
was to be found within our world of sensible experience and that Plato's
assumption of another, Transcendent World of Perfect Being was merely 'empty
talk and poetic metaphor' (Metaph. A9, 991a20). Indeed, Aristotle
took Plato's Forms to be quite useless for explaining the possibility of
true knowledge about our world. However, like his master, Plato, Aristotle
stuck to the Parmenidean conviction about the real existence of unchanging
formal principles of being. As is well-known, his formal principles are
in things as their immanent dynamic natures (eidê).
For Aristotle, true knowledge concerns the essential natures immanent in
things (see e.g. Metaph., 991a12-3; 999a24-9; 1018b36; 1032b1 ff. et
alibi). To be sure, all being is individual being and so Aristotle is
compelled to answer the quite intriguing question: if the proper object of
true knowledge is universal nature and everything real is a particular, how,
then, are we able to gain genuine knowledge about the things in their own
right? In his Posterior Analytics Aristotle explains what he
understands by truly knowing things. Well, quite in line with his
philosophical stand, Aristotle claims that all scientific knowledge is
concerned with discerning a universal nature as immanent in a
particular. In I 2, 72a75-7 e.g., it is explicitly said that the
elements of the deduction are such and such in concreto (cf.
73a29-31). For Aristotle, demonstration in fact concerns some phenomenal
state of affairs of which the investigation aims to clarify the
essential structures." p. 102
(...)
"Aristotle's description of induction and its role in the scientific process
fits in remarkably well with what he has earlier remarked about the process
of proper categorization. Referring to the well-known battle simile - how a
general retreat comes to an end after one man makes a stand, and then
another etc., the author argues that 'as soon as one of the
undifferentiated <percepts> makes a stand, there is a primitive universal in
the mind ... until the highest genera <have been reached>' (II 19,
100a14-b4).
The faculty, or rather cognitive attitude, by which we become familiar with
the first principles is the Nous or intellective apprehension. Well,
just as the Nous precedes all principles (such as axioms etc.), in the same
way scientific knowledge covers the whole domain of states of affairs (pragmata),
Aristotle concludes (100b16-17).
Let us try, now, in the next sections, to discover the Medievals' doctrinal
reception of the Posterior Analytics by discussing their views of
some themes characteristic of Aristotle's scientific method. It would be
useful, to that end, to single out the following items: the Medievals'
discussion of the well-known four questions, their views of the three
requirements for 'hunting essential attributes', their (different) views of
necessity, and, finally, the Medieval conceptions of induction and our
knowledge of the First Principles." p. 110
Un tournant important dans l'usage du mot 'idea' chez Henri de Gand. In
Idea. VI Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico internazionale Europeo.
Roma, 5-7 Gennaio 1989. Edited by Fattori Marta and Bianchi Massimo
Luigi. Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo 1990. pp. 89-98
"1. Introduction. On sait que le terme 'idée' était un mot-clé dans
la métaphysique de Platon. Les exposés importants de ce matin ont rendu
entièrement superflu de rappeler le rôle du mot idea chez Platon ainsi que
dans la tradition platonicienne et dans la patristique.
Les communications que nous venons d'écouter cet après-midi nous ont fait
comprendre l'importance du mot latin idea, ou plutôt la valeur de la
notion d'idée, dont le mot idea n'était que l'un des véhicules à côté
de forma, species, notio, conceptus, intentio, etc.
Il n'est pas nécessaire d'être spécialiste de l'histoire de la philosophie
médiévale pour bien savoir que, quelle que soit la dette des auteurs
médiévaux envers des sources antiques, et quel que fût le respect qu'ils ont
ressenti envers toute autorité -- les sources ne les ont cependant jamais
empêchés de suivre leur propre voie au fur et à mesure que cela s'imposait
dans l'intérêt de leur réflexions philosophiques.
C'est pourquoi l'étude de l'usage des termes philosophiques et leur
développement au cours du moyen-âge n'est pas seulement d'intérêt
linguistique. Au contraire, l'analyse de ce développement est tout à fait
indispensable pour bien comprendre les doctrines philosophiques elles-mêmes
de la période médiévale.
Je me propose dans cette communication de mettre en relief le tournant
important qu'a subi l'usage du mot latin idea chez certains auteurs
de la seconde moitié du 13e siècle, usage, bien entendu, qui s'est prolongé
au 14' siècle. La figure centrale sera celle du philosophe flamand Henri de
Gand (mort en 1293).
Comme je viens de vous suggérer, ce tournant est significatif d'un
développement doctrinal chez ces auteurs. Aussi ce développement doctrinal
s'impose comme le cadre adapté aux exigences d'un exposé sémantique à propos
de l'usage du mot idea, disons après saint Thomas d'Aquin (mort en
1277)." p. 89
Language in dispute: an English translation by Francis P. Dinneen of
Peter of Spain's Tractatus called afterwards Summulae logicales.
Amsterdam, Philadelphia: J. Benjamins 1990.
On the basis of the critical edition established by L. M. De Rijk
(click on the image to see the PDF file)