An excellent introduction to the medieval period is Gyula Klima, "The Medieval Problem of Universals" The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
INTRODUCTION
"One of the most debated problems during the Middle Ages was the problem of the nature of general concepts. Greek logic, after long discussions, established the theory of the concept, which became classic, and was transmitted by commentators in their manuals and compendia. In the Middle Ages, the problem of the nature of general concepts, called by the logicians of the time universalia, was placed in the centre of logical and philosophical concerns, and gave
rise to the famous "dispute of the universals".
(...)
This dispute lasted throughout the Middle Ages, though in certain periods a particular conception might prevail. This problem originates from a famous passage in Porphyry's Introduction to Aristotle's Categories — Isagogé — translated by Boethius, a treatise which represented the corner-stone of all dialectical studies. This passage appears at the beginning of the above mentioned work and it raised the following problem: are genera and species real,
or are they empty inventions of the intellect? Here is that famous passage, opening the Prooemium in Porphyry's Isagogé: De generibus speciebus illud quidem sive subsistent, sine in nudis intellectibus posita sunt, sive subsistentia corporalia sent an incorporalia, et utrum separata a sensibilibus an in sensibilibus posita et circa ea constantia, dicere recusabo; altissimum mysterium est hujus modi et majoris indigens inquisitionis ("I shall avoid investigating whether genera and species do exist
in themselves, or as mere notions of the intellect, or whether they have a corporeal, or incorporeal existence, or whether they have an existence separated from sensible things, or only in sensible things; it is quite a mystery which requires a more thorough investigation than the present one"). This problem, raised by Boethius, had been left aside for a while in the Middle Ages, but it arose again as soon as Aristotle's texts became better known.
(...)
Let us now see how this extraordinary problem of the universals arose. Aristotle said, (...) that there was no other science but of the universal. This thesis was adopted by the Scholastic logicians, who kept repeating: Scientia est de universalibus, existentia est singularium — "Science concerns the universals, existence refers to singular (objects)" or, with another formula: Nulla est fluxorum scientia -- "There is no science of transient
(ephemeral) things". It is therefore clear that the universal will be the central problem of any science, its whole foundation, its starting point. They granted such a great importance to this problem because they wanted first and foremost to lay the basis of science, without which science itself could not exist. Also, at the beginning of this dispute, a nominalist thinker, Roscelin, appeared, who denied the universal; this shocked the Aristotelian and Latin minded Middle Ages and gave rise to the discussion.
The treatises on the history of philosophy simplify, generally, the solutions the Scholastic proposed to the problem of the universals, and deal with only three or four main solutions. This simplification is made in order to detect the general directions of the Scholastics' thinking. As we shall see, the problem was far more complicated and subtle. Of course, it appeared simple to the first Scholastics. F. J. Thonnard remarks (Précis d'histoire de la philosophie,
Paris, Tournai, Rome, 1963 p. 285) : "In the Middle Ages, the first philosophers did not realise initially all the nuances, and they answer by yes, or by no". According to Thonnard, only two groups of philosophers should be considered: (1) the realists, embracing a metaphysical point of view, and who assert that the universals are definitely objects; (2) the antirealists, adopting a psychological standpoint, and raising objections which force the realists to be more precise in their solutions.
The problem of the universals, as defined by Porphyry, and taken over by Boethius, was called prima quaestio — "the first problem". Great importance was attached to this problem because of the numerous trends and nuances implied by the solutions. We possess a complete classification of these solutions, made by a mediaeval logician, John of Salisbury (twelfth century), in his. work Metalogicus (Metalogicon). In this work, the author enumerates 13
directions in the problem of the universals.
Metalogicus was a treatise on logic which the author himself confessed to have written (1159) from memory, after a rather long interruption of his studies of logic. His intention was to prove the usefulness of logic, opposing the attacks against this discipline by certain philosophers. The value of the work is that it is a vast source of information about the conceptions of the time.
Here are the 13 conceptions in the problem of the universals, such as given by John of Salisbury.
(1) Roscelin's conception, in keeping with which the universals are mere words — votes (nominalism).
(2) Abelard's, and his disciples' conception, with whom the general concepts are reduced to sermons, predication being possible only in sermo (judgement), as the predicate of an object cannot be an object.
(3) Another position upheld that the universal is intellectus (idea), or notio, such as Cicero (that is the Stoics) had seen it. Thinking cannot discriminate the particular and corporeal concrete from the sensation, but only the abstract, namely the general abstract, which is devoid of reality.
(4) Walter of Mortaigne's position, who maintained the universals to be closely united with the individuals (res sensibiles), but to have a mode of existence — status — according to which way they are considered. It is the so-called theory of the status.
Walter of Mortaigne was a professor in Paris, and died as a bishop of Laon in 1174. His position is interesting because he professed, basically, a multiplicity of ontological status. The species and genera, up to the supreme genus, have different existential states. So, the status of the general, united to the individual, depends on the consideration of the individual as belonging to one or to another species. (This idea, of "the multiple states
of the Being"
originated with Aristotle. See the relevant chapter). The idea of multiple ontological states has appeared in contemporary logic since the establishment of the many-valued logics where the proposition can have more than two values, truth and falsehood. A close examination of Walter of Mortaigne's theories in this respect would certainly prove very interesting.
(5) The platonic realism of Bernard of Chartres.
(6) Gilbert of Poitiers' conception concerning the native forms - forma nativae.
Gilbert de la Porrée, bishop of Poitiers (1076-1154), is known also as Gilbertus Porretanus, or Pictaviensis (of Poitiers). His most important work on logic is De sex principiis, which played an important part later on. He started from the Platonic conception of ideas — principles; these have copies — the native forms — which become multiple ant distinct in the individuals. Comparing these forms, the intellect shapes by abstraction a unique form, the genus,
or the species, which conforms with the divine idea. Therefore in Plato's existence he saw a special "subsistence" subsistentia — the essence of the individual Plato, this "Platonicity" — Platonitas —, his distinct form, a copy of the idea of man.
(7) Gauslenus of Soissons' opinion, according to which the universal exist only in collections.
Gauslenus of Soissons (1125-1151), bishop of Soissons, held that the universal concept exists only in the collection of individuals belonging to the same class, and not in the individual. The author of the treatise Metalogicus wrote that "Gauslenus Suessonensis episcopus situated the universal in objects gathered in a collection" (rebus in unum collectis) and denied it with isolated individuals.
(8) The so-called theory of "manners" — maneries.
This conception, just like that of Gauslenus of Soissons, of the collections or of native forms, is to be found in a work, written in the Middle Ages, De generibus et speciebus. This conception is a nominalist variant, in keeping with which the thing — res — is mere word — vox.
The term maneries means "way of treating" or "way of handling", and is the origin of the French "manière". The canonist Huguccio (d. 1212), author of Summa Decretorum defined, in this sense, the species (species) as being rerum maneries (the "manner" of things). In short, a thing is a word — vox —, and genus is its manner — maneries.
(9) The opinion according to which the universals are abstract form similar to the mathematical forms.
(10) The so-called ratio indifferentiae doctrine, in keeping with which one thing can be at the same time individual and universal, although there is nothing universal in things, but the universal is what is similar between them.
Charles de Rémusat in Abélard (2nd ed., Paris, 1855) supplied a few excerpts from Abelard Glossulae super Porphyrium which explain this ratio indifferentiae conception. What in Plato, or in Socrates, is non-differentiated, or similar, indifferens vel consimile. Certain things are mutually convening, or agreeing, that is similar in nature, such as animals, bodies, so they are both universal and particular — universal in that they
are several in a community
of essential attribution, and particular in that each of them is different from the other.
(11) William of Champeaux's (1070-1120) opinion, who held a rather strange realism, finally coming to a theoria indifferentiae.
(12) The conception according to which the distinction between genus and individual lies merely in a particularity of existence, as the universal exists at the same time in several and in the particular object.
(13) The conception of the unknown author of the above mentioned — De generibus et speciebus, a sort of Platonism, the "theory of identity". According to it, the genus, mankind for instance, is unique and identical with all the individuals, which are only accidentally distinct."
From: Anton Dumitriu - History of logic - Vol. II - Tunbridge Wells, Abacus Press, 1977, pp. 62-66.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
The problem of universals. Edited by Van Iten Richard J. New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 1970.
The problem of universals. Edited by Schoedinger Andrew B.
Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press 1992.
Five Texts on the mediaeval problem of Universals: Porphyry,
Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham. Edited by Spade Paul Vincent.
Indianapolis: Hackett 1994.
Contents: Introduction VII; Note on the text XVI; Porphyry the Phoenician:
Isagoge 1; Boethius: From his Second Commentary on Porphyry's
Isagoge 20; Peter Abelard: From the "Glosses on Porphyry" in His
Logica 'ingredientibus' 26; John Duns Scotus: Six questions on
individuation from his Ordinatio II. d. 3, part 1, qq. 1-6 57;
William of Ockham: Five questions on universals from his Ordinatio d.
2, qq. 4-8 114; Glossary 232; Bibliography 235-238.
"It is well known that the problem of universals was widely discussed in
mediaeval philosophy --indeed, some would say it was discussed then with a
level of insight and rigor it has never enjoyed since. The five texts
translated in this volume include the most influential and some of the most
sophisticated treatments of the problem in the whole Middle Ages.
The first text is Porphyry's Isagoge, translated here in its
entirety. Porphyry was a third-century Greek neo-Platonist, a pupil and the
biographer of Plotinus, and the one who arranged Plotinus's writings into
six groups of nine essays (the "Enneads").
(...)
Despite its importance in this respect, perhaps the main influence of the
Isagoge lies not in what it says, about the predicables or anything
else, but in what it does not say. For in his introductory remarks, Porphyry
raises but then modestly refuses to answer three questions about the
metaphysical status of universals, saying only that they belong to "another,
greater investigation". [Isagoge, 2] It is this brief passage that
raised the problem of universals in the form in which it was first discussed
in the Middle Ages. It contains some of the most consequential lines in the
entire history of philosophy.
Porphyry's silence means that there really is no detailed theory of
universals in the Isagoge -- or for that matter in his other
writings. Taken by himself, therefore, Porphyry would not have been a very
important figure in the history of our problem. But he cannot be taken by
himself. His importance lies in the fact that his Isagoge was translated
into Latin in the early Middle Ages and used as the occasion for discussing
the problem of universals directly and in detail. It was as though
commentators found his silence intolerable and were irresistibly drawn into
the very questions Porphyry himself had declined to discuss.
The most important of these early mediaeval discussions is undoubtedly
Boethius's.
(...)
In addition to works of Aristotle, Boethius also translated Porphyry's
Isagoge and wrote two commentaries on it. (His first commentary was
based on an earlier translation by Marius Victorinus, who is known to
readers of Augustine's Confessions VIII. 2 & 4.) Although Boethius
addressed the problem of universals in several places, the discussion in his
Second Commentary on Porphyry was the longest and probably the most
inIluential. The relevant portion of that commentary is translated below.
(...).
Abelard wrote on the problem of universals in several places. The most well
known of them is in the "Glosses on Porphyry" in his Logica
'ingredientibus'. Once again the relevant passage is a discussion of
Porphyry's three unanswered questions.
(...)
By the time of the last two authors represented below, John Duns Scotus (c.
1265-1308) and William of Ockham (c. 1285-1347), philosophy had become a
specialized and highly technical academic discipline, carried on almost
exclusively in a university context. These last two texts are here
translated into English for the first time, and are by far the longest and
most intricate in this volume. " pp. VII-XI.
Adams Marilyn McCord, "Ockham's nominalism and unreal entities,"
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Amerini Fabrizio, "What Is real: a reply to Ockham's ontological
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"When Ockham's logic arrives in Italy, some Dominican philosophers bring
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Ockham some arguments extracted from Hervaeus Natalis's works. Franciscus's
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"In an often-neglected passage of the Principles (Sections 48-70 of
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features he makes explicit nowhere else in his writings. I first lay out
Descartes's theory in some detail, clarifying, interpreting and commenting
as I go. I then focus on his conceptualistic account of universals and
compare it with the treatment of mathematical objects in the Fifth
Meditation. I argue that Descartes was not a Platonic realist in the
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what he says there and the explicit conceptualism of the Principles.
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"Aristotle's theory of universals is expounded by contrast with Plato's.
Where Plato had said that X is F iff X participates in the form of F,
Aristotle has two analyses. If F is a substance predicate then X is F iff X
is specifically identical with an F. If F is an accidental predicate then X
is F iff there is a Y in X which is specifically identical with an
individual in the appropriate category for F."
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Society.Supplementary Volume 79: 53-72 (2007).
" Scotus's belief that any created substance can depend on the divine
essence and/or divine persons as a subject requires him to abandon the
plausible Aristotelian principle that there is no merely relational change.
I argue that Scotus's various counterexamples to the principle can be
rebutted. For reasons related to those that arise in Scotus's ailed attempt
to refute the principle, the principle also entails that properties cannot
be universals."
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presenting the doctrine of intuitive and abstractive knowledge, the author
discusses Ockham's critics to realism and his specific way of conceiving
universals."
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Forms were ever intended as an alternative to Aristotelian universals. In
fact, the role that Forms are supposed by Plato to fulfill is independent of
the function of a universal. I briefly consider the gradual mutation of the
problem in the Academy, in Alexander of Aphrodisias, and among some of the
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subsequently carried forward by early moderns such as Descartes. Hobbes's
radicality emerges in comparison with Ockham and Descartes, as, unlike them,
Hobbes also reduces the intellectual faculty entirely to imagination.
According to Hobbes, we have nothing in which a stabilizing, prediscursive
mental language could inhere.
Hobbes thus concludes that all thinking is affective and semiotic, and
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then to demonstrate the features the thing must have because of that nature.
A philosophically inevitable question thus arises for Aristotelians: what
is a nature? Is it a reality over and above (or perhaps "in" the things
whose nature it is? Is it a mental construction, existing only in our
understanding of things, if so, on what basis is it constructed? This is the
medieval problem of universals, or at least one way of thinking about the
problem. In a classic formulation, Boethius states the problem in terms of
the reality of genera and species, two main types of
universals involved in an Aristotelian definition of essential nature (as in
"a human being is a reasoning / speaking animal," which places us in the
genus of animals and marks off our species by reference to our "difference"
from other animals in reasoning or using language): "Plato thinks that
genera and species and the rest are not only understood as universals, but
also exist and subsist apart from bodies. Aristotle, however, thinks that
they are understood as incorporeal and universal, but subsist in
sensibles."' A rigorous tradition of, mainly Aristotelian, discussion
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master Peter of Limoges († 1306) to the old library of the Sorbonne. After a
general presentation (section I) and before some clarifications on the
Ratio edendi (section III), the doctrinal study (section II) which
precedes this edition (section IV) shows how the author-compiler of the
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Ockham's fundamentally theological presuppositions, and (b) his Aristotelian
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Chapters about: Boethius, John Scot Erigene, Roscelin of Compiègne, William
of Champeaux, Adelard of Bath, Abelard, John of Salisbury.
Marciszewski Witold, "Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and the Polish debate on
Universals," Quaderni del Centro per la Filosofia Mitteleuropea 3:
7-16 (1991).
Martin Christopher, "The Compendium logicae Porretanum: a survey of
philosophical logic from the School of Gilbert of Poitiers," Cahiers del
l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin 46: 1XVIII-XLVI (1983).
Matteo Anthony M., "Scotus and Ockham: a dialogue on universals,"
Franciscan Studies 45: 83-96 (1985).
McInerny Ralph. Albert on universals. In Albert the Great.
Commemorative essays. Edited by Kovach Francis J. and Shahan Robert W.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press 1980. pp. 3-18
Moody Ernest A. Buridan and a dilemma of nominalism. In Harry Austryn
Wolfson Jubilee Volume on the Occasion of His Seventy-Fifth Birthday.
English Section - Vol. II. Jerusalem: American Academy for Jewish
Research 1965. pp. 577-596
Reprinted in E. A. Moody - Studies in medieval philosophy, science, and
logic. Collected papers 1933-1969 - Berkeley, University of California
Press, 1975, pp. 353-370
Nolan Lawrence, "The ontological status of Cartesian natures,"
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78: 169-194 (1997).
"In the Fifth Meditation, Descartes makes a remarkable claim about
the ontological status of geometrical figures. He asserts that an object
such as a triangle has a 'true and immutable nature' that does not depend on
the mind, yet has being even if there are no triangles existing in the
world. This statement has led many commentators to assume that Descartes is
a Platonist regarding essences and in the philosophy of mathematics. One
problem with this seemingly natural reading is that it contradicts the
conceptualist account of universals that one finds in the Principles of
Philosophy and elsewhere. In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation
of the notion of a true and immutable nature which reconciles the Fifth
Meditation with the conceptualism of Descartes's other work. Specifically, I
argue that Descartes takes natures to be innate ideas considered in terms of
their so-called 'objective being'."
Nolan Lawrence, "Descartes' theory of Universals," Philosophical
Studies.An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
89: 161-180 (1998).
"I argue that Descartes holds a conceptualist account of both the ontology
and the origin of universals. Universal mathematical objects, such as the
number two, are merely innate ideas that are made occurrent by a process of
abstraction. Although Descartes's conceptualism is fairly explicit
textually, the details of his theory are not. I recover this theory by
linking it to his account of attributes--an attribute being something which
we distinguish from a substance within our thought where there is no
distinction in real.
This approach uncovers Descartes's diagnosis of how the realist goes wrong
in positing universals outside thought."
Norena Carlos P., "Ockham and Suarez on the ontological status of
universal concepts," New Scholasticism 55: 348-362 (1981).
Normore Calvin G. The tradition of mediaeval nominalism. In Studies
in medieval philosophy. Edited by Wippel John F. Washington: Catholic
University of America Press 1987. pp. 201-217
Nuchelmans Gabriel. Theories of the proposition. Ancient and
mediaeval conceptions of the bearers of truth and falsity. Amsterdam:
North-Holland 1973.
Panaccio Claude, "Intuition, abstraction et langage mental dans la
théorie occamiste de la connaissance," Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale
97: 61-82 (1992).
Pannier Russell and Sullivan Thomas D., "Aquinas's solution to the
Problem of Universals in "De Ente et Essentia"," American Catholic
Philosophical Quarterly 68: 159-172 (1994).
Piché David. Le problème des universaux à la Faculté des Arts de
Paris entre 1230 et 1260. Édition critique sélective, traduction française,
analyses structurelle et formelle et étude historico-philosophique.
Paris: Vrin 2005.
Pinborg Jan. Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter. Ein Ueberblick.
Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog 1972.
Resnick Irven, "Odo of Tournai, the Phoenix, and the Problem of
Universals," Journal of the History of Philosophy 35: 355-374 (1997).
Resnick Irven M., "Odo of Tournai, the Phoenix, and the problem of
universals," Journal of the History of Philosophy 25: 355-374 (1997).
"This paper examines Odo of Tournai's (d. 1113) treatment of an ambiguity in
the definition he had inherited from Boethius of the species or universal
nature, viz. that the species is that which can be predicated of many
individuals. The application of this definition, however, encountered an
anomaly in the case of species or classes having only a single member. It
also created a difficulty for protonominalists or 'vocalists,' who,
increasingly, viewed the species as merely a term constituted by a
collection of discrete individuals.
In the case of a species having only one member there was the danger that
species and individual would fully coalesce, further complicating an already
difficult debate on universals. Here the author explores Odo's discussion of
the phoenix as a test case of a species having but a single member."
Rubenstein Eric M., "Nominalism and the disappearance of the Problem of
Individuation," Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 5: 193-204
(2002).
"While the medievals spilled much ink over the 'problem of individuation',
the moderns scarcely mention it. My aim here is to explore what philosophical
reasons, as opposed to historical or sociological ones, might lie behind the disappearance of a philosophical
problem that vexed minds for centuries. I argue that Ockham clearly saw that
a commitment to nominalism removes the need to take seriously the problem of
individuation. Suarez, who did take seriously the problem, but who also
advocated nominalism, will be shown to be subject to important
Ockham-inspired arguments. To the extent, then, that Ockham's nominalism
carried the day into the moderns, it is understandable, philosophically,
that the moderns should turn a deaf ear to the problem of individuation."
Sacksteder William, "Some words Aristotle never uses: attributes,
essences, and universals," New Scholasticism 60: 427-453 (1986).
Scaltsas Theodore. Substances and universals in Aristotle's
metaphysics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1994.
Sedley David, "The Stoic theory of Universals," Southern Journal of
Philosophy 23: 87-92 (1985).
Supplementary volume.
Sharma Ravi K., "A new defense of Tropes? On "Categories" 3b10-18,"
Ancient Philosophy 17: 309-315 (1997).
"Daniel Devereux has argued that "Categories" 3b10-18 provides evidence for
the view that Aristotle's first-order accidents are tropes. However, the
passage should be interpreted differently than as Devereux proposes and the
proper interpretation is neutral as between a tropes-view and a
universals-view."
Sharples Robert, "Alexander of Aphrodisias on universals: two
problematic texts," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 50:
43-55 (2005).
"Two texts that raise problems for Alexander of Aphrodisias' theory of
universals are examined. De anima 90.2-8 appears to suggest that
universals are dependent on thought for their existence; this raises
questions about the status both of universals and of forms. It is suggested
that the passage is best interpreted as indicating that universals are
dependent on thought only for their being recognised as universals. The last
sentence of Quaestio 1.11 seems to assert that if the universal did
not exist no individual would exist, thereby contradicting Alexander's
position elsewhere. This seems to be a slip resulting from the fact that
species with only one member are the exception rather than the rule."
South James B., "Singular and Universal in Suárez's account of
cognition," Review of Metaphysics 55: 785-823 (2002).
"In this essay, I argue that the typical way of thinking about the problem
of universals and the cognition of them (realism vs. nominalism,
abstraction) is inapplicable to the account Suárez gives in his
Commentary on the De anima. I show how he justifies objective universal
concepts while rejecting the notion of a common nature, as well as the
typical nominalist appeal to intuitive cognition. His proposal, I conclude,
provides an interesting contrast to the traditional nominalist account of
cognition, while retaining the emphasis on the primacy of the singular in
intellectual cognition."
Spade Paul Vincent, "The problem of Universals and Wyclif's alleged
"Ultrarealism"," Vivarium 43: 111-123 (2005).
"John Wyclif has been described as "ultrarealist" in his theory of
universals. This paper attempts a preliminary assessment of that judgment
and argues that, pending further study, we have no reason to accept it. It
is certainly true that Wyclif is extremely vocal and insistent about his
realism, but it is not obvious that the actual content of his view is
especially extreme. The paper distinguishes two common medieval notions of a
universal, the Aristotelian/Porphyrian one in terms of predication and the
Boethian one in terms of being metaphysically common to many. On neither
approach does Wyclif 's theory of universals postulate new and non-standard
entities besides those recognized by more usual versions of realism. Again
pending further study, neither do Wyclif 's views appear to assign
philosophically extreme or novel roles to the entities he does recognize as
universal. On the contrary, by at least one measure, his theory of
universals is less extreme than Walter Burley's, as Wyclif himself observes.
For Wyclif, the universal is numerically identical with its singulars, but
numerical identity is governed by something weaker than the Indiscernibility
of identicals."
Spruyt Joke, "Gerardus Odonis on the Universal," Archives d'Histoire
Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 63: 171-208 (1996).
Thompson Augustine, "The debate on Universals before Peter Abelard,"
Journal of the History of Philosophy 33: 409-429 (1995).
Trentman John, "Predication and universals in Vincent Ferrer's logic,"
Franciscan Studies 28: 47-62 (1968).
Tweedale Martin. Abailard on universals. Amsterdam: North-Holland
1976.
"This work shows how Abailard elaborated and defended the view that
universals are words, avoided the pitfalls of an image theory of thinking,
and propounded a theory of "status" and "dicta" as objects of thought
without treating them as subjects of predication. His defense of these views
is shown to depend on certain fundamental departures from the Aristotelian
term logic of his day, including a proposal for subjectless propositions,
the treatment of copula plus predicate noun as equivalent to a simple verb,
and a transformation of the 'is' of existence into the 'is' of predication."
Tweedale Martin, "Alexander of Aphrodisias views on universals,"
Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 29: 279-303 (1984).
Tweedale Martin, "Aristotle's Universals," Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 65 (4): 412-426 (1987).
"This paper is devoted in the main to arguing for certain negative theses of
the general form: Aristotle did not himself hold such and such a view of
universals; but in the course of the discussion some points about
Aristotle's own positive conception of universals, to the limited extent
that he had one, will emerge. In fact, Aristotle's negative remarks about
universals, e.g. that they are not substances, not separate, not in addition
to the particulars, etc., are much clearer and less tentative than any of
his positive ones, and it is little wonder that interpreters through the
ages have attributed to him radically different and opposed positive
theories. The words they found in their authority could not easily be used
to decide the issue between their competing interpretations.
In order to clarify the aim of this essay I want first of all to distinguish
with regard to any topic Aristotle treats the question of what view he
himself held, if any, from the question of what view he should have
held given the basic tenets and thrust of his whole philosophy. The views
which are definitely not, as I shall claim, ones Aristotle himself held,
i.e. not defensible answers to the first question, may well be tenable
answers to the second. Indeed, I am rather inclined to think there are
several mutually incompatible theories that will answer as well as any the
question of what view Aristotle should have taken of universals. On
that whole matter I shall have nothing more to say in this place.
The two interpretations I shall discuss see Aristotle as a nominalist and a
conceptualist respectively. By 'nominalism' I mean any theory which says
that what is universal is universal only in so far as it is a certain sort
of sign. In other words, being a sign is necessary to being a universal,
although the converse is not true. Just what the things are which serve as
universal signs is left entirely open on this definition of nominalism.
Signs may be spoken sounds, written marks, mental images, mental states or
any thing you please. Also the definition is non-committal on just what sort
of a sign it is that is universal; theories about this will vary with the
semantic theory the nominalist adopts. There is perhaps a place for a
narrower sense of 'nominalism' in which the nominalist must maintain that
universals are all certain expressions of a written or spoken language. In
this narrower sense Ockham, for example was not a nominalist since the signs
he thought of as universal were primarily those of a mental language,
although he was certainly a nominalist in the broader sense I first
proposed.
By 'conceptualism' I mean the view that nothing could be a universal unless
there were in existence thought and cognition of an intellectual sort. In
this broad sense all nominalists are conceptualists, since presumably there
could not be signs unless there were thought. But there is a narrower sense
of 'conceptualism' too, in which the conceptualist must maintain that
universality applies only to mind-dependent entities, e.g. concepts, mental
images, etc. (Even words when they are conceived as not identifiable with
their physical manifestations are things that cannot exist unless there are
minds and so are mind-dependent in my sense.)
The difference between the broad and narrow senses has this noteworthy
consequence: someone can be a conceptualist in the broad sense and believe
that what is universal is some entity independently existing outside the
mind as long as they also accept that it is a universal only when it is
thought of or conceived in some way. But such a person is not a
conceptualist in the narrow sense. Also nominalists need not be
conceptualists in the narrow sense since they can hold that the things which
are signs are mind-independent objects with a wholly physical existence, for
example sounds or marks.
My task will be to convince the reader that Aristotle was neither a
nominalist nor a conceptualist in any of these senses. I shall begin with
the nominalist proposal, but to some extent my refutation of it will be
incomplete until I have finished with conceptualism. From the fact that
Aristotle was not a conceptualist in the broad sense it will follow that he
was not a nominalist, so the evidence against broad conceptualism argues
against nominalism as well." pp. 412-413.
Tweedale Martin, "Duns Scotus' doctrine on Universals and the
Aphrodisian tradition," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 67:
77-93 (1993).
Tweedale Martin. Scotus vs. Ockham - A medieval dispute over
Universals. Vol. I: Texts. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press 1999.
Text translated into English with commentary
Tweedale Martin. Scotus vs. Ockham - A medieval dispute over
Universals. Vol. II: Commentary. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press 1999.
Vignaux Paul. Nominalisme. In Dictionnaire de théologie catholique:
contenant l'exposé des doctrines de théologie catholique, leurs preuves et
leur histoire . Edited by Vacant Alfred and Mangenot Alfred-Eugène.
Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané 1930. pp.
Vignaux Paul, "La problématique du nominalisme médiéval peut-elle
éclairer des problèmes philosophiques actuels?," Revue Philosophique de
Louvain 75: 293-331 (1977).
Wagner Michael F., "Supposition theory and the problem of universals,"
Franciscan Studies 41: 385-414 (1981).
I examine Burleigh's and Ockham's positions on universals through explaining
their theories of signification and supposition. I argue for a
representational analysis of these theories, which i distinguish from
prevailing interpretations of these theories; and i argue, in particular,
that when Burleigh's theory of the signification and supposition of general
terms is properly understood, he is not an extreme realist (at least as this
view is normally understood) and his disagreement with Ockham over
universals is much more subtle than it is normally conceived by historians
of philosophy.
Woods Michael, "Universals and particulars forms in Aristotle's
Metaphysics," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Supplementary
volume: 41-56 (1991).
Zonta Mauro, "Una disputa sugli universali nella logica ebraica del
Trecento. Shemuel di Marsiglia contro Gersonide nel "Supercommentario" all'
"Isagoge" di Yehudah ben Yishaq Cohen," Documenti e Studi sulla
Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 11: 409-458 (2000).
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